Freedom of the Press #6
“Tilting at Windmills” – Redux
I have noticed over the years, that some believe in quality, as I do, and others believe in quantity. They think that throwing out a massive missive will drown the opposition in, well, paper. It appears this is the new approach by the United States Attorney, and minions, from Portland, Oregon. They have, with their most recent filing (Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Government’s Motion For an Order to Show Cause), on February 7, exceeded all my expectations, in terms of quantity. They have cited 30 court decisions. I have reviewed five of the cited cases, though I will comment on more of them. Since their research is of such poor quality, It would be my pleasure to review cases for them in the future. However, if I work for the government, my prices will not be discounted. Considering how poorly their current hired help performs, it just might be worthwhile for them to get it right, for a change.
Now, let’s get on with the boring stuff. However, there will be some really good stuff towards the end.
They begin the Memorandum with a statement of what it will address:
1. The District of Oregon is the proper venue for this Court to enforce its own Protective Order against a third party;
2. Third-party Gary Hunt should be held in Civil Contempt of this Court’s Orders after he has had an opportunity to appear and Show Cause why he should not be held in contempt;
3. There is a factual basis to conclude by clear and convincing evidence that third party Gary Hunt is aiding and abetting a defendant (or defendants) in this case in violating the Court’s original Protective Order (ECF No. 342), the new Order (ECF No. 1691), and the Supplement to the original Protective Order (ECF No. 1692); and
4. There are no prior restraint issues or “press” privilege issues.
So, we will begin with Part I. Under the heading in the Memorandum:
I. The District of Oregon Is the Only Proper Venue for This Court to Enforce Its Own Orders
A. Proper Venue Under the Law
The first case cited is:
Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 101 (1924). The Supreme Court in Myers held that venue is only proper where the court rendered the decree sought to be enforced.
Well, I did look that one up and here is what I found:
An information charged that plaintiffs in error willfully disobeyed the injunction lawfully issued in equity cause, St. Louis, San Francisco Railway Company, Complainant, v. International Association of Machinists, et al., Defendants, pending in the Western Division of the Western District of Missouri, by attempting, within the Southwestern Division of the same District, to prevent certain railroad employees from continuing at work. The order ran against men on strike, and the cause is treated as one within the purview of the Clayton Act.
Well, that supports my position. The case was in “Western Division of the Western District of Missouri”, however, the other jurisdiction mentioned was in the “Southwestern Division of the same District.”
Now, that “Clayton Act” does come under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, since it deals with the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Clayton Antitrust Act is an amendment passed by U.S. Congress in 1914 that provides further clarification and substance to the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 on topics such as price discrimination, price fixing, and unfair business practices.
Well, I sought relevance, but did not find. So, let’s move on.