Outpost of Freedom blog

Camp Lone Star

The Hole Gets Deeper

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
November 7, 2017

About an hour after I posted yesterday’s (November 6, 2017) article, I went out to get the mail.  There was a letter from Kevin “KC” Massey, from his hellhole in Seagoville, Texas.  This is beginning to play out like a “B” movie, however, this time; I think that I should give it to you in Kevin’s own words.

Now, before we begin, there have been some comments that the last article just might get Kevin in more trouble than he already is.  In the letter in which he gave me the information for the story, he said that he wasn’t a writer, and wanted me to put it in my words.  He knows that this either will serve for good, or will make things worse.  Being the man that he is, he is willing to take that risk.

One more thing before we get on with Kevin’s own words.  I am on the FBI press release mailing list.  After I read Kevin’s mail, I check my email and, well, I found this waiting for me.  Perhaps a sign that things are getting more honest in government, and I surely hope so.  So, you can read it for yourself:

ECI Correctional Officer Sentenced to 46 Months in Federal Prison for Racketeering Conspiracy

Now, for Kevin’s story:

“Well today, I had to go to another DHO hearing on the “green leafy substance” that they said was found in my locker.  After sending it to a lab to determine its chemical composition they threw away the lab report and found it was a narcotic based on the “NIK” test.  A Lieutenant told me the NIK test is not reliable or accurate.  They (BOP) asserted that what was suspected for it to be “K2”, but K2 is not illegal, nor is it a narcotic.  Convenient how they can decide to use an inadmissible, unreliable test over a laboratory Test.

“Anyway now they hit me with another sanction on top of the one for the cigarettes.  41 days loss of good time, 60 days in solitary, 180 days more of no phone, visits, or commissary.  This could cause me to have to do all of my “time” up to May 20 2018.

“My only hope of getting out soon is the Supreme Court or my 2255 motion.  These motherfuckers are gonna fuck me until the last drop.

“The DHO bastard also read me my rights then boldly denied me my rights.  The Hearing was recorded so I am going to appeal it.  He said I had a right to have a staff representative and I had a right to have witnesses on my behalf.  Then he said I refused my rights, but he couldn’t produce any document I signed waiving any of my rights.  He only had a document signed by me of my enumerated rights with my signature and the statement without prejudice.  I told him that specifically means I wasn’t waiving any rights by my signature.  He still said I had waived my rights.  It is all “recorded” supposedly.  I’ll bet somehow the recording will get lost.  They have no conscience about lying or fucking anyone over.

. Continue reading ‘Camp Lone Star – The Hole Gets Deeper’ »

Barbeau Qued in Seattle

The Government is Seeking the Last Drop of His Blood

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
September 4, 2017

Schuyler Barbeau’s Sentencing Recommendation, based upon his record, history, etc., recommends months of incarceration. This would be followed by 3 years of supervised release. It also recommends no monetary penalty, except the $200 Special Assessment. His Sentencing Hearing is scheduled for September 8, 2017, just a few days away. Schuyler was okay with this, as at least, he would be free (except the supervised release) in December or January.

Now, we must talk about the role of the United States Attorney. His role is to get a conviction. During trial, when Schuyler changed his pleas to Guilty, so the  that task was done. However, prosecutors are those people that will lie, falsify evidence, object to defendants putting on a defense, and use every conniving trick in their book, are also vindictive. The Sentencing Guidelines establish a check list for the punishment of guilty defendants. There wouldn’t be much need for the Guidelines if Congress felt that the punishment should be determined in the courtroom. However, they enacted the Guidelines in their quest for “equality”, and that should be the end of it.

However, those well-paid government attorneys seem to have a scorecard, like ticket quotas for police.  Their vindictive nature (since they are otherwise immune from nearly any remedy) shows when they can’t be satisfied with a job, well, well done, with the conviction.

Not so with USA Annette L. Hayes and AUSA Thomas M. Woods, with the United States Attorney in Seattle, Washington. They have prepared a 12 page “Government’s Sentencing Memorandum” in an effort to nearly triple Schuyler’s sentence, to 72 months.

That Memorandum says that:

“Barbeau has spent years telling the world that he will use deadly force against law enforcement officers who attempt to take any steps that interfere with his beliefs, including instances in which officers are simply carrying out Court-authorized orders. His conduct has not been limited to words—he built a fully-automatic machinegun that he repeatedly threatened to use against law enforcement. He sought to purchase a .50 caliber gun on the theory that it would be more effective in a shootout with law enforcement.”

The fact that this is a conclusion of the government, not a fact ruled on in court, seems to make no difference. Just because the government says it is so, it must be so.

The government goes on to say:

“Specifically, Barbeau has repeatedly stated that he will use deadly force to “protect himself” against an arrest where he believes that the arrest is unlawful. Thus, he repeatedly stated his intent to kill any law enforcement officers who sought to arrest him or his friends because of his view that none of them have done anything wrong. This conduct is not “self-defense”—it is murder.”

Now, this just shows how far away from our Constitution the government has drifted. In 1900, the Supreme Court ruled that John Bad Elk, who had shot and killed an officer who was armed, though the officer never raised his rifle, was guilty of a misdemeanor, or no crime at all, since the attempt to arrest him was not lawful. See The Right to Self Defense. I supposed, as we have all conjectured, the Constitution has been put aside by the government. With the crafty wording of enactments, and the “case law method”, they continue to circumvent the Constitution.

. Continue reading ‘Barbeau Qued in Seattle – The Government is Seeking the Last Drop of His Blood’ »

Freedom of the Press #18
The Big Guns

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
August 10, 2017

August 8, 2017, was the date set for the government to file their response.  They did so in the Government’s Reply to Respondent’s Opposition to Government’s Memorandum in Support of Civil Contempt.  That will be the subject of this article, however the recent background, since the May 9, 2017, Jurisdiction Hearing.

As a result of that Hearing, the government first filed the Government’s Memorandum in Support of Civil Contempt (June 12, 2017).  That was the subject “Freedom of the Press #16 – Jurisdiction Hearing“.  It appears that since January, when the government sought to have me held in Contempt of Court, they have yet to come up with a case citation that supports their position.

My response was filed as Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Government’s Memorandum in Support of Civil Contempt (July 21, 2017).  This Memorandum increases the burden on the government, separating articles published before the “Supplemental Protective Order” and the one article published after that Order.  The government has yet to meet any standard of proof with regard to their legal responsibility to do so.

So, the current government Reply endeavors to regurgitate some of the same arguments that the government has relied upon, through the course of this ordeal.  For example, they have, from the beginning, relied upon Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), when they state, “The substantial government interest in protecting confidential sources is long established.”  Where they fail in Roviaro, is that the protection is afforded by allowing the government to protect the identity of the informant.  In the words of the Roviaro decision, “What is usually referred to as the informer’s privilege is, in reality, the Government’s privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons…”  What it does not do is to extend any criminal liability to those that disclose an informant’s identity.  It simply gives the government the right to try to protect the identity.

In the current matter, that was done to the extent that the law allows, the Protective Order that sanctioned those who were given certain information from disclosing that information.  It is only that person, whether a defendant, defendant’s counsel, or even government employee, was subject to the Court’s order not to divulge the identity of the informants.

The government did so even prior to the Discovery being given to the defendants, when they redacted what they believed to be any information that would tend to expose the informants.  The informant’s names were redacted as where many hundreds of words that the government felt would identify the informants.  The government keeping that information away from the defendants (the identification of informants) was their exercise of the protection of the informants, as per Roviaro.

The government continues to persist in stating, rightfully, “this Court had the authority to issue the orders and that it continues to have the authority to enforce the orders.”  However, they have yet to address the relevant aspect of jurisdiction.  To put this in context, if a judge in Mexico issues an order, he has such authority.  He also has the right to enforce that order.  However, does he have the jurisdiction to first, apply that order to someone not within his jurisdiction?  And, second, the authority to enforce the order against someone not within his jurisdiction?

The government wants to spin the context of what I said into a confession that is very, very far from my belief and honest admission as to the authority of the judge.

As the government continues, they make this rather curious assertion:

“When Hunt complains that this Court’s orders “prohibit” him from publishing “certain investigative pieces,” his factual premise is simply inaccurate.  Second, the justification for the original Protective Order continues because there is an ongoing need to protect cooperating witnesses regardless of the status of the trial.”

So, let’s break this down.  I have never complained about anything, except the fact that I was arrested by the government, similar to this current contempt situation, wrongfully applying a statute that did not apply to me, resulting in my spending a week in the Sacramento County Jail.  It would have been substantially longer had not Judge Brown seen through the deceitful tactic of the government in attempting to punish me, by simply lying to have a warrant issued for my arrest.  See Freedom of the Press #17 – Is This Legal?

Then, the government shysters endeavored to make a point:

“We are not asking this Court to restrain Hunt’s ability generally to write about the case — or even the informants — we only want him to observe this Court’s Order, which means that he cannot publish the discovery material subject to the Court’s Order.”

How nice of them to say that they don’t have a problem with me writing “about the case — or even the informants.”  How gracious.  However, these shysters are supposed to present facts.  My reputation as a journalist (not a blogger) is based on presenting facts.  Let’s suppose that I wrote about the informants, but failed to justify my conclusions without facts to back up those conclusions.  Well, then, I might just be a blogger.  However, as facts are a requisite in our judicial system, they are also a matter of principle to a good journalist.  To make accusations without presenting the facts makes a mockery of journalism, as it would of the judicial system.

Besides, such accusations are prolific in the patriot community.  They tend to lack any substance and are often made over a simple disagreement between two people.  Should some rely upon simply my word that so and so is an informant, the informant would simply accuse the accuser of being an informant.  And, the louder voice would probably prevail.  Surely, the government shysters would love to see an expansion of the “he said; she said” sort of rhetoric in the community.

As we continue through the Reply, we find this rather subjective statement of ‘facts’:

“[T]he government’s interests far outweigh any First Amendment interest Hunt may assert.  First, we need to protect our confidential sources for all of the valid reasons identified in Roviaro.  Second, the Court has a significant interest in enforcing the terms of its own Protective Orders.  Without enforcement, Hunt’s defiance threatens to undermine our ability to exchange discovery in future criminal cases.”

Now, the first point has already been addressed, with regard to the government’s right to endeavor to protect their sources — which they did by denying the defendants the right to call the witnesses against them (6th Amendment).  Second, the Court wrote the Protective Order and subjected those identified as subject to that Protective Order.  Daniel Ellsberg was the criminal in the “Pentagon Papers”.  The New York Times was not.  Finally, and the most laughable, is that the government feels that the exchange of discovery might be undermined.  Well, there is little doubt that the shysters want to keep as many secrets as they can from the defense.  However, in an effort to attempt to maintain their unscrupulous cadre of spies amongst us, they would willingly subvert the Constitution.

. Continue reading ‘Freedom of the Press #18 – The Big Guns’ »

The Bundy Affair #21
Batson Challenge – in the Name of Injustice

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
July 31, 2017

Introduction

In “Liberty or Laws?  – Justice or Despotism?“, I discussed how the case law method provides the government, through judicial proceedings, to move, a decision at a time, away from the intent of the Constitution.  In recent events in the second Tier 3 trial, only two-thirds of the trial was declared a “mistrial”, while the other third was not declared a mistrial.  I say this because the first trial, by the government’s design, included six defendants, all of whom were accused of wielding firearms on April 12, 2014, when the Bureau of Land Management returned the surviving captured cattle to their rightful owner.  Two defendants were found guilty of some of the charges.  The remaining four were not found guilty of any of the charges, though they were also not found not guilty.  So, there was no mistrial on the two, but there was a mistrial in the same singular trial of the other four.

Now comes the second trial, and the subject of this article.  Jury selection occupied the first two days of the trial and much of the third day.  Now, in jury selection, each side, Prosecution and Defense, may challenge a juror for cause.  Each side also has what are called “peremptory challenges”.  This is the definition of peremptory challenges found in Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition:

Peremptory challenge.  A request from a party that a judge not allow a certain prospective juror to be a member of the jury.  No reason or “cause” need be stated for this type of challenge.  The number of peremptory challenges afforded each party is normally set by statute or court rule.

However, on the third day of trial, the government, apparently butt-hurt over the Defendant’s Peremptory Challenges, brought up what is known as a “Batson Challenge”, historically exercised by the defense, not by the prosecution.  They allege that the peremptory challenges were intentionally applied (state of mind) to exclude certain potential jurors.  Well, it appears that the Defendants cannot have a state of mind presented in Court as to why they went from their homes to Bunkerville, but they can be held accountable for their state of mind when it comes to jury selection.

Background of the Batson Challenge

The Batson Challenge is based upon a 1986 United States Supreme Court decision in Batson v Kentucky 476 US 79.  It deals with the Defendant’s right to challenge a jury makeup if the government’s peremptory challenges create a gender or racial bias in the jury.  First, a little background based upon earlier decisions.  In reviewing these cases, you will see that the original protection afforded to the people by the Constitution is slowly being chipped away.  In this current trial, the right protected for the people is now being used to afford the government the opportunity to claim a right that was intended to be a prohibition against the government.

As early as 1879, the United States Supreme Court ruled on the right of the defendant, with regard to the use by the prosecution of Peremptory Challenges, to stack the jury.  The case was Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 US 303.  Based upon the 14th Amendment, the decision stated, “that a State denies a black defendant equal protection when it puts him on trial before a jury from which members of his race have been purposefully excluded.”  [Quoted portion cited from Batson v. Kentucky.]

Strauder goes on to say that “A defendant has no right to a petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race.  However, the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race, or on the false assumption that members of his race as a group are not qualified to serve as jurors.  By denying a person participation in jury service on account of his race, the State also unconstitutionally discriminates against the excluded juror.”  [Quoted portion cited from Batson v. Kentucky.]

Interestingly, that underlined portion from Batson, “By denying a person participation in jury service on account of his race, the State also unconstitutionally discriminates against the excluded juror “, presumes that the juror has a right to sit on the jury, nearly equal to the right of the defendant.  This appears to be a very early example of Civil Rights (See Liberty or Laws? – Natural Rights versus Civil Rights), whereby the government grants a civil right at the expense of one who previously enjoyed a natural right.

However, note that since the Bill of Rights, particularly the Fifth Amendment, guarantees the people the right to a trial by jury, it does not grant that right to the jury.  If anything, the jury has no right to refuse jury service, unless they are otherwise exempted.  The Bill of Rights was to protect us from the government.  It was never intended to provide the government the means to remove our protection from the actions of that government.

What the Batson decision does not provide, however, is the background of Strauder.  Strauder was indicted for murder.  He was an ex-slave, and the indictment was tried in a West Virginia Circuit Court and found guilty.  His case then went to the West Virginia Supreme Court, where they upheld the lower court’s verdict.  It then went to the United States Supreme Court on a Writ of Error.  So, taking from the Strauder decision, we find what led to the composition of the jury in the Circuit Court trial, to wit:

In the Circuit Court of the State, before the trial of the indictment was commenced, the defendant presented his petition, verified by his oath, praying for a removal of the cause into the Circuit Court of the United States, assigning, as ground for the removal, that ‘by virtue of the laws of the State of West Virginia no colored man was eligible to be a member of the grand jury or to serve on a petit jury in the State; that white men are so eligible, and that by reason of his being a colored man and having been a slave, he had reason to believe, and did believe, he could not have the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings in the State of West Virginia for the security of his person as is enjoyed by white citizens, and that he had less chance of enforcing in the courts of the State his rights on the prosecution, as a citizen of the United States, and that the probabilities of a denial of them to him as such citizen on every trial which might take place on the indictment in the courts of the State were much more enhanced than if he was a white man.’

This led to West Virginia, not a seceding state that would have been required to rewrite its constitution, to revise its laws on jury makeup.  This, of course, was a consequence of the due process provision of the 14th Amendment.

As I have said in the past, the presumption of innocence was based upon the fact that the Indictment (the alleged story of events) was on trial, not the defendant.  However, we have lost sight of that concept and now perceive the guilt of the defendant (the focus) as the purpose of the trial, not the validity of the Indictment.  Subtle, but still effective.

The Batson decision also provides the following:

[T]he Kentucky Supreme Court observed that recently, in another case, it had relied on Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, and had held that a defendant alleging lack of a fair cross section must demonstrate systematic exclusion of a group of jurors from the venire.

So, in this citation, the defendant has the burden of proving that the prosecution has not used “systematic exclusion” in their use of their peremptory challenges.  However, as we will see, in the current case, that burden will be transferred to the prosecution, and the defendant is accused of “systematic exclusion”.

. Continue reading ‘The Bundy Affair #21 – Batson Challenge – in the Name of Injustice’ »

Freedom of the Press #15
The Long Arm of the Law, or Not?

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
April 25, 2017

Amendment I

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Amendment VI

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.

Now, this sets the stage for Jurisdiction.  Any criminal proceedings must be in “the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”  Could it be any less for, say, a violation of a Court issued Protective Order?  Especially, if that Protective Order only subjects a few, fully described people, in its mandate?  The Order:

Here is the pertinent part of the “Protective Order” (#342):

ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 16(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, defense counsel may provide copies of discovery only to the following individuals:

(1) The defendants in this case;

(2) Persons employed by the attorney of record who are necessary to assist counsel of record in preparation for trial or other proceedings in this case; and

(3) Persons who defense counsel deems necessary to further legitimate investigation and preparation of this case.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defense counsel shall provide a copy of this Protective Order to any person above who receives copies of discovery.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any person above who receives copies of discovery from defense counsel shall use the discovery only to assist the defense in the investigation and preparation of this case and shall not reproduce or disseminate the discovery material to any other person or entity.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Protective Order applies only to:

(1) Statements by witnesses and defendants to government officials;

(2) Sealed documents; and

(3) Evidence received from searches of electronic media.

So, you see by what is underlined, that the Protective Order does not apply to me.  If I had received it from “defense counsel”, he would have given me a copy of the Protective Order.  None of the defense attorneys gave me either the discovery or the Protective Order.

.The next question that arises is whether the Supplemental Protective Order is lawfully appropriate.  The Supplemental Protective Order is prefaced with an “Order Granting in Part Government’s Motion to Enforce Protective Order” (#1691).  The pertinent parts of this Order read:

To the knowledge of the government, Hunt is not a member of the staff of any defense counsel representing any Defendant in this case.

The Court issued the Protective Order in order to obviate “a risk of harm and intimidation to some witnesses and other individuals referenced in discovery.” Order (#285) issued Mar. 9, 2016, at 2.

In order to make clear in the public record that the Protective Order prohibits even third parties from disseminating protected materials and information, the Court is filing a Supplement to the Protective Order together with this Order.

On this record, therefore, the Court concludes the government has sufficiently demonstrated that Hunt has aided and abetted the dissemination of materials covered by the Protective Order, and, therefore, the Court GRANTS in part the government’s Motion (#1680) to Enforce Protective Order as follows:

1. The Court DIRECTS Hunt to remove all protected material and/or information derived from material covered by the Protective Order from his website(s) within 24 hours of the service of this Order;

2.The Court ENJOINS Hunt from further dissemination of material covered by the Protective Order or information derived therefrom to any person or entity.

3.The Court DIRECTS the government to serve Hunt personally with a copy of this Order together with a copy of the Protective Order (#342) and the Supplement (#1692) thereto as soon as possible and to file immediately in the record a certificate stating it has effectuated such personal service or otherwise ensured Hunt has personal knowledge of the contents thereof.

4.In the event that Hunt fails to comply with this Order after he is served, the government may initiate contempt or other enforcement proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Note that the government acknowledges that the original Protective Order did not apply to me when they state.  “Hunt is not a member of the staff of any defense counsel representing any Defendant in this case“.

Then, an explanation of why the initial Protective Order was issued is given with, “a risk of harm and intimidation to some witnesses and other individuals referenced in discovery“.  However, this is one of the government’s stock excuses, along with, “I feared for my life or the life of another”, “We were outgunned”, ” ‘X’ is a flight risk”, and a multitude of other phrases intended to simply justify an action against an individual, from extended incarceration to being shot to death, though unarmed.  Now, this gets interesting.  This Order tries to convert aiding and abetting into something that the statute does not.  “On this record, therefore, the Court concludes the government has sufficiently demonstrated that Hunt has aided and abetted the dissemination of materials“.  The statute and case law says that aiding and abetting in the performance of a criminal act.  This is about as absurd as arresting someone for resisting arrest, when there is no criminal charge for which they are making an arrest.

. Continue reading ‘Freedom of the Press #15 – The Long Arm of the Law; Or Not?’ »

Camp Lone Star
Massey Appeal Denied

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
March 27, 2017

My last article in this series was congratulations to Massey on being moved to the minimum-security camp.  After nearly two years of being treated as a threat, often being thrown in solitary confinement, just a few months after leaving the control of the US Marshal Service, he entered the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) authority.

Massey was more than willing to serve peaceably, if they didn’t mess with him.  He was just biding his time, awaiting the Appellate Court’s decision on his appeal, which was heard (oral arguments) on February 9, 2017.

Though the Decision was made on February 22, his attorney did not advise Massey of the decision until March 24.  Shortly after speaking with his attorney, he called to give me the bad news.  Massey and I agree it has become abundantly clear the judicial process has become one without consideration of written law, but rather, a tool in the persecution of those deemed unfavorable to the policies of government.

The Decision is so ambiguously written it appears the arguments Massey had set forth were never heard by the Court.  Until we receive copies of the transcript, we have nothing upon which to evaluate what transpired in the Halls of “Just US”.  We can, however, review the Decision that suggests the court seem to speak a different language than the rest of us.  We, the People, are bound by the words, as written, in the Constitution and those laws in pursuance thereof.  The Court, however, appears more inclined to the aforementioned policies.

From that Decision, we find the following:

Massey was charged with four counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He moved to dismiss on the grounds that he was complying with Texas’s felon-in-possession statute and that Section 922(g) is unconstitutional as applied to him. He also maintained that, to satisfy the jurisdictional element of Section 922(g), the government was required to prove more than just that the firearms had traveled in interstate commerce.

Here, the Court has set forth two elements of Massey’s arguments.  The First had to do with the authority of the State.  Article IV, § 4 of the Constitution states:

The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government…

That means, even before the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, that the States could enact their own laws, so long as the were not in conflict with those law “which shall be made in Pursuance [to the Constitution]” (Article VI, cl. 2).

. Continue reading ‘Camp Lone Star – Massey Appeal Denied’ »

Freedom of the Press #9
“Prior Restraint”

Gary Hunt

Outpost of Freedom
February 22, 2017  – George Washington’s Birthday

In the previous article, though suggested in the government’s Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Government’s Motion For an Order to Show Cause, of February 7, 2017, it really didn’t get to the heart of “Prior Restraint”.  So, let’s get to the heart of that matter.

Let’s start with the law that explains the potential severity of publication of certain information, in a case similar to what the government and Judge Anna J. Brown are attempting to construct against me.  Section 793 (e) of the Espionage Act was cited as the authority by which the government attempted to impose “Prior Restraint” on the New York Times for publishing what was known as the “Pentagon Papers”.  The Papers had been leaked to the press by a government employee who had signed a non-disclosure agreement (not just based upon a Protective Order), which precluded that employee from divulging any information protected by Section, 793 (e):

Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it.
… Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

There, in a rather large nutshell, is the extent of the government’s authority to impose upon a party limitations in communicating certain information, and/or retaining and/or not delivering it to the government.  However, as we shall see, even that did not have the effect implied in the wording of the Act.

To understand the legal limitations of government’s authority, we need to look at New York Times Co. v. United States 403 U.S. 713 (1971).  The case taken up by the Supreme Court included a similar action brought against the Washington Post.  The cases were joined and the Supreme Court granted certiorari, in which the United States sought to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing the contents of a classified study entitled “History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy.”  Prior to the Supreme Court decision, the District Court for the Southern District of New York, in the New York Times case, and the District Court for the District of Columbia, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in the Washington Post case held that the Government had not met that burden of proof.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the District Court in the New York Times case, putting a stay on publication on June 25, 1971.  The Supreme Court then ordered that the stay be vacated.

Now, before we go on, this is not about the source that provided the information to the newspapers.  It is solely about the right of the press to publish what it had obtained, regardless of the source.  With that in mind, we must take the reader back to a statement in the Supplement Memorandum (linked above), which states:

The government is not seeking the testimony of third-party Gary Hunt to identify the source or sources of the protected discovery information. The government intends to investigate that on its own. The government is merely seeking the removal of protected discovery material that this Court has ordered protected. Nothing about Gary Hunt’s blogging[sic] activities is implicated by the Motion to Show Cause. Third-party Gary Hunt is continuing to disseminate protected discovery material in the face of three Court Orders. No privilege is implicated.

This demonstrates the similarity of the parties in New York Times Co. and the current situation.  In neither case is the source of the information sought, though there can be little doubt that in both cases, the government was investigating the source.

. Continue reading ‘Freedom of the Press #9 – “Prior Restraint”’ »

Freedom of the Press #6
“Tilting at Windmills” – Redux

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
February 08, 2017

I have noticed over the years, that some believe in quality, as I do, and others believe in quantity.  They think that throwing out a massive missive will drown the opposition in, well, paper.  It appears this is the new approach by the United States Attorney, and minions, from Portland, Oregon.  They have, with their most recent filing (Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Government’s Motion For an Order to Show Cause), on February 7, exceeded all my expectations, in terms of quantity.  They have cited 30 court decisions.  I have reviewed five of the cited cases, though I will comment on more of them.  Since their research is of such poor quality, It would be my pleasure to review cases for them in the future.  However, if I work for the government, my prices will not be discounted.  Considering how poorly their current hired help performs, it just might be worthwhile for them to get it right, for a change.

Now, let’s get on with the boring stuff.  However, there will be some really good stuff towards the end.

They begin the Memorandum with a statement of what it will address:

1. The District of Oregon is the proper venue for this Court to enforce its own Protective Order against a third party;

2. Third-party Gary Hunt should be held in Civil Contempt of this Court’s Orders after he has had an opportunity to appear and Show Cause why he should not be held in contempt;

3. There is a factual basis to conclude by clear and convincing evidence that third party Gary Hunt is aiding and abetting a defendant (or defendants) in this case in violating the Court’s original Protective Order (ECF No. 342), the new Order (ECF No. 1691), and the Supplement to the original Protective Order (ECF No. 1692); and

4. There are no prior restraint issues or “press” privilege issues.

So, we will begin with Part I.  Under the heading in the Memorandum:

I. The District of Oregon Is the Only Proper Venue for This Court to Enforce Its Own Orders

A. Proper Venue Under the Law

The first case cited is:

Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 101 (1924).  The Supreme Court in Myers held that venue is only proper where the court rendered the decree sought to be enforced.

Well, I did look that one up and here is what I found:

An information charged that plaintiffs in error willfully disobeyed the injunction lawfully issued in equity cause, St. Louis, San Francisco Railway Company, Complainant, v. International Association of Machinists, et al., Defendants, pending in the Western Division of the Western District of Missouri, by attempting, within the Southwestern Division of the same District, to prevent certain railroad employees from continuing at work.  The order ran against men on strike, and the cause is treated as one within the purview of the Clayton Act.

Well, that supports my position.  The case was in “Western Division of the Western District of Missouri”, however, the other jurisdiction mentioned was in the “Southwestern Division of the same District.”

Now, that “Clayton Act” does come under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, since it deals with the Sherman Antitrust Act.

Clayton Antitrust Act is an amendment passed by U.S. Congress in 1914 that provides further clarification and substance to the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 on topics such as price discrimination, price fixing, and unfair business practices.

Well, I sought relevance, but did not find.  So, let’s move on.

. Continue reading ‘Freedom of the Press #6 – “Tilting at Windmills” – Redux’ »

The Bundy Affair #20
The Invisible Witness

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
February 2, 2017

I have been so busy writing about the goings on in Oregon that I haven’t had much opportunity to consider the situation in Nevada.  As I have told those that I been working with regarding the Group 1 trial in Oregon, who have all started concentrating their efforts in Nevada.  I told those who I had been working with in Oregon, “You all get to work down where it is warm and sunny, while I’m still stuck up here where there is snow on the ground, and it is cold.”  Seriously, however, I am in Northern California, about halfway between the two.  But, I was spending my time primarily on the Oregon, Ammon Bundy, et al, case.

Then, the government filed a Motion.  Upon reading the Motion, I found that the US Attorney has decided to invite me down to Nevada, an offer I couldn’t refuse.

On January 27, 2017, the government filed “Government’s Motion for Protective Order Regarding Undercover Employee“.  It is their effort to hide from the defense the identification of an Undercover Employee (UCE).

The invitation is found, beginning on page 9 of that Motion, to wit:

Events subsequently in the courtroom and in the United States v. Ammon Bundy, et al. case in Oregon have shown that the danger to the lone UCE witness in the government’s case is particularly great. Although the discovery information in United States v. Bundy was restricted due to a protective order, an associate of the defendants (including some of the seven common defendants in the Nevada case), Gary Hunt, posted discovery material to “out” confidential human sources to his webpage. Litigation is ongoing in the District of Oregon to remove the information from the web. See, e.g., Order Granting in Part Government’s Motion to Enforce Protective Order, United States v. Bundy, Case No. 3:16-cr-00051-BR (D. Or. Jan. 11, 2017).

Now, some might think that this doesn’t look like an invitation, but, after all, beauty is in the eye of the beholder.  I see that the United States Government Railroad (USGRR) is in full operation, and flying down the tracks at breakneck speed.

So, getting started in catching up with the USGRR, you will note that they imply a threat when they state that the events in Oregon “have shown that the danger to the lone UCE witness in the government’s case is particularly great.”  On the contrary, they have shown that there is no risk, at all, to the informants in the Oregon occupation — unless you consider that most of the informants have abandoned their old phone numbers, and are not accessible by phone, anymore.

Let’s look at some facts about this alleged “danger”.  On September 21, 2016, AUSA Gabriel, in questioning OSP officer Jeremiah Beckert, asked, “And did you have information about whether the driver [Mark McConnell] was cooperating with the Government?”  Beckert answered in the affirmative, and of its own volition, the government hung one of its informants out to face, what, serious bodily harm?  Death?  Well, that did not happen.  And, the government put this informant at risk.  That very act disputes the government’s entire argument regarding the potential threat to any of the informants.

. Continue reading ‘The Bundy Affair #20 – The Invisible Witness’ »

Freedom of the Press #3
“Contemptuous Postings”

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
January 11, 2017.

Well, even though there were many interruptions, I was working on a response to SA Ronnie Walker’s first Affidavit.  Then, on January 9, 2017, Judge Brown, in a Minute Order (See “Freedom of the Press Update – A Grateful Thank You“), told the US Attorney that what they had filed with the Court was insufficient, and they had to go back and “do over”, to justify what they were asking the Court to do.

I will assume that they were up late, as they did make the deadline of providing a Memorandum, supported by an Affidavit, in Response to Judge Brown’s Order.  So, let’s look into the minds of these well-paid defenders of justice (just kidding).  We will deal with the Memorandum, though it will refer to, in one instance, the Affidavit.  There is no need to address the Affidavit.  It is simply a review of recent events with regard to this matter, but does provides a smidgen of hearsay supported by another smidgen of hearsay.  When one is desperate, one digs deep.

Now to the Memorandum; I will include all pertinent text, I will underline and address the more significant parts..

The United States of America, by Billy J. Williams, United States Attorney for the District of Oregon, and through Ethan D. Knight, Geoffrey A. Barrow, Craig J. Gabriel, and Pamala R. Holsinger, Assistant United States Attorneys, hereby submits this supplemental memorandum in support of the Government’s Motion to Enforce Protective Order.

On January 6, 2017, the government filed a Motion to Enforce Protective Order seeking an order from this Court enjoining third party Gary Hunt from further dissemination of discovery materials subject to this Court’s March 4, 2016, Protective Order. The Motion was supported by the Affidavit of FBI Special Agent Ronnie Walker.  On January 9, 2017, this Court directed the government to file a supplemental memorandum addressing the following issues:

Well, I suppose they could be, at once, be paying attention and not paying attention.  The Cease and Desist letter stated, “dissemination and publication of any excerpts of that material“.

To which I responded in “Freedom of the Press #2 – Cease and Desist“, when I wrote, “Holsinger has added a new twist by separating ‘dissemination’ from ‘publication of any excerpts’ with an ‘and’, making them separate and distinct elements.  However, the Order only addresses dissemination.”

So, we are back to dissemination.  Readers will recall that I have consistently stated that I was “excerpting, not disseminating“.  Of course, I first drew that distinction back on October 15, 2016, in “Burns Chronicles N^o 40 – Allen Varner (Wolf)“.  So, are there two elements, each different from the other, as in the Letter, or, only one element, as in the Protective Order?  Again, we must look at the letter of the law, and not what some government attorney wants it to be, at any given moment.

This is what Judge Brown has ordered the US Attorney to address.

1. The Court’s authority to enjoin the actions of a third party under the existing terms of the Protective Order and without advanced notice to the third party and an opportunity for that third party to be heard;

2. The Court’s jurisdiction to compel an individual who is not present within the district of Oregon to respond to the government’s arguments raised in the Motion via an order to show cause or other form of order; and

3. Whether the Court should amend the existing Protective Order in any respect to address the issues raised in the government’s Motion.

Now, these three items were deficient in this latest attempt to intimidate me into acquiescing to their unlawful demands.  Thankfully, Judge Brown saw through their charade and held their feet to the fire.

Now, let’s be clear that I don’t disagree with the title of this next section.  I think that it is easily understood that any Court has the authority to enforce its own lawful orders.  As an example, Mexico has the right to enforce its own lawful orders, within its own jurisdiction.  Come to think of it, so does California.  Even the Ninth Circuit Court can enforce its own awful orders, within its jurisdiction.  Now, the Ninth Circuit, coincidentally, includes both Oregon and California.  However, the Oregon District, while fully able to enforce its lawful orders within its own jurisdiction, it is not able to enforce in another jurisdiction, such as Mexico, or California.

Let’s see what the legal eagles in Portland have to say.

. Continue reading ‘Freedom of the Press #3 – “Contemptuous Postings”’ »