Outpost of Freedom blog

Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus
Scene 4 – Government Fears Habeas Corpus

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 27, 2015

Setting the Stage: Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum (the sacred writ) has not been addressed at the Supreme Court since 1890. A recent effort resulted in the Supreme Court simply refusing to rule on a Petition for Habeas Corpus, even after all of the lower courts refused to even acknowledge that right. Now, in the current story, the Court has paid “token” acknowledgment of the right, while endeavoring to quash it — rather than pursuing Justice, as is its constitutional responsibility. Instead, as you will see, the Federal District Court in Montana is there to make sure that the government has no chance of losing a case.

The Government is Afraid of Habeas Corpus

William Krisstofer Wolf (that’s is how the government refers to a friend that we know simply as “Wolf”) and I have known each other for over a year. We have never met, but we have shared many hours of phone conversation, email correspondence, and I can’t count the number of times I was a guest on his radio show on “The Montana Republic”.

Among the subjects discussed in those appearances were “The Plan for Restoration of Constitutional Government“, “Declaration of Dissolution of Government”, “Targeting“, “Committees of Safety“, and “Habeas Corpus – The Guardian of Liberty“. The last, regarding the “Sacred Writ”, Habeas Corpus, was also the subject of some of our private conversations. Wolf fully understands what I had learned, over the past three years, though we had never anticipated having to call upon the sacred writ on his behalf — until he was arrested on March 25, 2015.

Based upon our previous conversations on the subject, I prepared a simple demand for Habeas Corpus (3 pages) and a Power of Attorney authorizing me to speak o his behalf regarding Habeas Corpus. These were Priority mailed to him on March 27, and he executed and attempted to have them delivered to the Court. After numerous attempts to have the guards take and deliver the documents to the Court, and the Court refusing to recognize the prepared Habeas Corpus, Wolf resorted to a one page, handwritten, Habeas Corpus (Court Doc. 1), dated April 1, to wit:

United States of America
v.                                             15-                  -BIL-CSO
William Krisstofer Wolf

In the Honorable Court of:
UNITED STATES Magistrate Judge Carol S. Ostby
On April 1, 2015, I, William Krisstofer Wolf, by the only means available. in Yellowstone Corrections Facility interoffice mail, SERVE on the court a DEMAND FOR HABEAS CORPUS.
In as such, I, William Krisstofer Wolf hereby request to be put on the Docket to Schedule a hearing date on the DEMAND FOR HABEAS CORPUS. This docket request for a scheduling here is needed to allow my Attorney in Fact, who has a Power of Attorney – Specific, time to travel to this Honorable Court to speak on my behalf, by authority of the case of Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 US 146.

Done on this Day, April 1, 2015
/s/William Krisstofer Wolf
Defendant

This was sufficient for the Court to finally take notice of Wolf’s right to challenge both unconstitutional laws and absence of jurisdiction. On April 15, the Court “Received” the document. The Court stated that they would not let the Habeas Corpus hold the Court hostage, so they opened a civil case, on April 16, and filed the handwritten Habeas Corpus and then filed an ORDER (Court Doc. 2), immediately thereafter.

The Court’s Efforts to Quash Habeas Corpus

Here are some of the “claims” made in the ORDER (Court Doc. 2):

1. [T]he document does not specify the number of the criminal case or indicate in any other way that it is meant to be filed in the criminal case.
2. [T]he document states that Wolf is acting “by the only means available”; yet counsel was appointed for Wolf in the criminal case on March 26, 2015.
3. Wolf did not pay the filing fee of $5.00 or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
4. “In all courts of the United States, the parties may plead and conduct their own causes personally or by counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (emphasis added); see also Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). [She concludes this claim with the statement] “Wolf may litigate this matter pro se, or he may appear through duly qualified and admitted counsel without an attorney-in-fact.
5. [T]he “‘demand for habeas corpus’ does not set forth any allegations of fact”. “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Wolf cannot mount such an attack until he alleges facts he believes demonstrate that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2242. If Wolf intends to proceed, he must submit an amended petition alleging such facts and explaining why his custody violates the law.
6. If Wolf intended to seek a detention hearing in the criminal case that is pending against him, he should discuss this with his attorney, who can file a motion for a detention hearing under the criminal case number, CR 15-20-MJ-BLG-CSO. If Wolf wishes to file the motion on his own, the Court will then need to consider the motion and decide whether to entertain the motion from Wolf personally, notwithstanding his representation by counsel. But the rule that an attorney-in-fact may not act for Wolf in court applies in all federal cases, civil or criminal. Kelley, 539 F.2d at 1201-03. Moreover, in the criminal case, Wolf’s attorney-in-fact can play no role at all. Wolf is the person charged.

Response to The Court’s Efforts to Quash Habeas Corpus

So, let’s look at what the correct response is to the above claims:

As far as Claim #1, Wolf had no access to documents, and by this time, he was “blocked” from calling some of his friends on the phone. At the time that he wrote the handwritten, which was long after the typed 3 page version (Court Doc. 3), he had only the “Criminal Complaint“, and from that, was only able to extract “15-     -BIL-CSO”, which he properly quoted in the handwritten document, and it was styled as all subsequent filings, “United States of America v. William Krisstofer Wolf”, just as the Court did. So, that doesn’t take rocket science, heck, even the Post Office could have figured that out.

To Claim #2, that he is acting “by the only means available”, raises an interesting question. Wolf stated to the Judge, at his next appearance, that he does not recognize the jurisdiction of the Court and he had no intention of entering a plea. So, if he were to go through the court appointed attorney, an officer of that court, would he not be submitting to the jurisdiction that that Court? There is little doubt, as you will see, that the Court will resort to obfuscation and chicanery in an effort to undermine his right to challenge that persecution that is currently being conducted against him.

Claim #3 says that he “did not pay the filing fee of $5.00”. I can find no reference to the filing fee in the “UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA – Local Rules of Procedure“. However, with regard to:

Rule 3.1 Filing a New Case.

(a) Required Items. The following items are required to file a new case:

(1) a complaint, petition, or other originating document;

(2) unless the originating document is a petition for writ of habeas corpus, payment of the full amount of the filing fee or a motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); and

(3) a civil cover sheet, unless the plaintiff or petitioner is proceeding pro se.

So, the originating document (1)was provided, though they refused the first and opened the case based upon the handwritten document. As to the fee, there is an exception for Habeas Corpus (2), and otherwise, only the full amount can be accepted. It does not address any partial, or alternate fee, such as $5.00, it simply exempts Habeas Corpus from fees. As it exempts the requirement for a cover sheet (3), if he is proceeding pro se (presumably, that would also apply to someone proceeding “pro per”. So, why the effort to extort (yes, that is the legal term) $5.00 from Wolf? Or, is it an effort to simply place obstructions in the way, to discourage his attempt to seek his right to challenge the Court?

Now, with Claim #4, we enter into a rather interesting aspect, which deals directly with our rights and efforts to force us into submission to the dictates of the government. This will be similar to those in #5 and #6, though we will consider them separately. The claim cites both 28 U.S.C. § 1654 and the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). Consequently, “[a]ny individual acting without an attorney must appear personally and may not delegate that duty to any other person who is not a member of the bar of this Court.” D. Mont. L.R. 83.8(a) [Local Rules of Procedure]; see also United States v. Kelley, 539 F.2d 1199, 1201-03 (9th Cir. 1976).

28 U.S. Code § 1654 – Appearance personally or by counsel
In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.

As stated earlier, a writ “is a form of written command in the name of a court or other legal authority to act, or abstain from acting, in some way.” It requires no plea, nor is it a case; it is a request for the court to command an action, which, in the matter of Habeas Corpus, is to issue the writ to raise the questions posed by the person requesting the writ. From that point, it’s not a matter of innocence or guilt, it is to assure that there is proper legal authority regarding the action upon which it is based.

The next citation is the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35:

And be it further enacted, That in all courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by assistance of such counsel or attorneys at law as by the rules of the said courts respectively shall be permitted to manage and conduct causes therein… for crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United States, and all civil actions in which the United States shall be concerned… in the respective courts before which the suits or prosecutions shall be.

In the broadest construction, that “assistance of counsel”, which clearly is not an “attorney at law”, hence the “or”, nor the party, himself, hence the other “or”, which leaves the possibility that a party, a person, may, since he is also capable of taking all responsibility upon himself, assign another to speak on his behalf, as an “attorney in fact”.

The Court references D. Mont. L.R. 83.8(a):

83.8 Self-Represented Litigants.

(a) Any individual acting without an attorney must appear personally and may not delegate that duty to any other person who is not a member of the bar of this Court. A selfrepresented person is bound by the Federal Rules and all applicable local rules. Sanctions, including but not limited to entry of default judgment or dismissal with prejudice, may be imposed for failure to comply with local rules.

This Rule applies to “litigants. This will be addressed along with the cited Kelley case.

Regarding United States v. Kelley, as we look at that case, we might wonder just what the Court was thinking, or was it stabbing blindly, in the dark, to endeavor to equate Kelley with the current matter, the writ. Kelley was being prosecuted. He was not seeking to question the constitutionality of the law, nor the jurisdiction. First, “he argues that he had a right to be represented by a non-lawyer.” Then, “Kelley sought to have his trusted friend Hurd, who was well-versed on Kelley’s monetary theory, serve as trial counsel. Hurd is a roofer and not a licensed attorney. The district court denied the request and prohibited Hurd from sitting at the counsel table or consulting with Kelley during the course of the trial.”

It is well known that if you don’t assert a right, the Court will not grant you that right. Kelley wanted Hurd to sit with him and counsel him. Kelley did not provide a “power of attorney”, according to the decision, he just wanted Hurd to sit and advise him. It doesn’t begin to approach the question at hand. This case is not on point, since it is silent on the point that the Court is trying to make about power of attorney and attorney in fact, and whether this is applicable to a writ, instead of litigation.

Finally, she says that he “may litigate this matter pro se, or he may appear through duly qualified and admitted counsel without an attorney-in-fact.” “Litigate means, “To dispute or contend in form of law; to settle a dispute or seek relief in a court of law; to carry on a suit… a judicial contest.” This is not a dispute, it is simply seeking an answer to a challenge to jurisdiction and constitutionality. As stated before, it is “a form of written command in the name of a court… to act, or abstain from acting, in some way.” It is not an adversarial proceeding.

Wolf had provided a “Power of Attorney”, making Gary Hunt his “Attorney in Fact”, and that was submitted to the Court and filed in the case. Therefore, it is before the Court. The Court, however, challenges Wolf’s right to have someone other than the court appointed attorney, or another “attorney at law”, speak for him on this matter that is not a suit, and, is not a prosecution, it is a “writ of right”, asking the Court to rule on the question presented — that being whether the laws upon which the charges are based, are, in fact, constitutional as applied to Wolf, and whether he falls under the jurisdiction of the authority behind those laws, and the Court, itself (or should I say, “herself”?).

So, let’s see what both “power of attorney” and “attorney in fact” mean (Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition):

Power of attorney: An instrument authorizing another to act as one’s agent or attorney. The agent is attorney in fact and his power is revoked on the death of the principal by operation of law. Such power may be either general or special. [no citations given]

Attorney in fact: An attorney authorized to act in his place and stead, either for some particular purpose, as to do a particular act, or for the transaction of business in general, not of legal character. This authority is conferred by an instrument in writing, called a “letter of attorney,” or more commonly a “power of attorney”. [no citations given]

Now, so as not to be misunderstood, that phrase, “not of a legal character” applies only to the “general business”, which is separated from the “particular act” by the “or”.

So, what the Court has said is, well, not on point to the entire matter before it.

So, let’s move on to Claim #5:

Though she does cite, correctly, from the case, when she says, “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody”, she has the subject of custody out of context to what is applicable in Wolf’s case. Wolf has not been convicted. He is challenging his detention based upon absence of jurisdiction as well as absence of constitutional authority of the charges against him. In Preiser, Rodriguez had been convicted and had already served some time in prison. He had sought relief from the length of his sentence, well, in the words of the decision:

Respondents were state prisoners who had elected to participate in New York’s conditional-release program, by which a prisoner serving an indeterminate sentence may earn up to 10 days per month good-behavior-time credits toward reduction of his maximum sentence… Held: When a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his physical imprisonment and by way of relief seeks a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

This decision, Preiser, as stated in the decision, is an action under 28 U.S, Code §2254:

(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 US Code § 2251: Stay of State court proceedings, begins the subject of dealing with state prisoners challenging through the federal court system. Wolf’ case is purely federal, so we need not concern ourselves, though the court has, with this,. Even if we did, we are really discussing what it says in §2241 (b), below, so I have no idea what her majesty was thinking; she should no that this is a federal matter — I think.

Though the ORDER does not cite §2254, as the case does, it does, properly, cite §§2241-2242, below. However, this citation is really apples and oranges, as the Preiser decision has no bearing on the subject of this current matter. §2254 has no relevance, at all, to the Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum Wolf is seeking, and that the Court is required to respond (answer) to.

So, let’s look at the pertinent parts of 28 U. S. Code §§2241-2242:

28 U.S.C. § 2241 : US Code – Section 2241: Power to grant writ

(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had.

(b) The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit judge may decline to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer the application for hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it.

(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless –

(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or

(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United States; or

(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States; or

28 U.S.C. § 2242 : US Code – Section 2242: Application

Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf. It shall allege the facts concerning the applicant’s commitment or detention, the name of the person who has custody over him and by virtue of what claim or authority, if known. It may be amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions. If addressed to the Supreme Court, a justice thereof or a circuit judge it shall state the reasons for not making application to the district court of the district in which the applicant is held.

So, the District Court is the proper place in which to initiate a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum. Now, under subparagraph (c), we find two applicable qualifiers for who may Petition for such writ. The ORDER cites subparagraph (3), though seems to skip right over subparagraph (1). However, until the person detaining Wolf has answered the writ, that determination cannot be made. Though that last sentence may seem confusing, we will shed some light on it as we venture into the next relevant section, that the Court seemed to have completely, or conveniently, overlooked.

28 U.S.C. § 2243 : US Code – Section 2243: Issuance of writ; return; hearing; decision

A court, justice or judge entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.

The respondent is, of course, the person who has detained Wolf, or that Wolf is detained under the authority thereof. So, unless the Court can show that the applicant (“attorney in fact”, or, “next friend”) is not entitled thereto, which it has, perhaps, insufficiently, attempted to do, must either grant or require the respondent to “show cause”. By the way, “forthwith” is without delay, immediately, etc., It does not provide for excuses, only action.

The writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained. It shall be returned within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.

Now, the civil case was opened on April 15, fully two weeks after the Habeas Corpus was submitted, “by the only means available”, and the Court has still not, over a month later, even begun the process that §2243 requires. So, from the “forthwith”, being the starting of the clock required for what Madison, the father of the Constitution, described as “in the most expeditious and ample manner“, the respondent then has three days to return, which is “to show cause”. Remember, the Fourth Amendment states that you have the right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation”.

Further, the Court states, “Wolf cannot mount such an attack until he alleges facts he believes demonstrate that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”. But, wait just a minute. The Amendment says that the government has to show “nature” and “cause”, not the accused. This is supported by the wording in §2243, that the “order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained.” It sort of makes you wonder if law school has any courses on English comprehension.

Continuing with §2243:

The person to whom the writ or order is directed shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention. When the writ or order is returned a day shall be set for hearing, not more than five days after the return unless for good cause additional time is allowed.

There it is, again. The person making the return, that would be the person detaining, not the person detained, “shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention.” How could that have possible been overlooked by a District Judge, in whose hands lie the lives and futures of those who are required to stand before her for judgment? And, when is that damned hearing going to be held? Wolf sits in detention, denied his liberty, while the judge fritters away that very object that brought the colonies to rebel against England, and part ways with a corrupted judicial system.

The remainder of §2243:

Unless the application for the writ and the return present only issues of law the person to whom the writ is directed shall be required to produce at the hearing the body of the person detained. The applicant or the person detained may, under oath, deny any of the facts set forth in the return or allege any other material facts.

The return and all suggestions made against it may be amended, by leave of court, before or after being filed.

The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.

Now, that last line says it all, that “The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.”

As to Claim #6, Wolf does not seek a detention hearing, as to do so would admit to jurisdiction. The other points in this Claim have already been addressed.

Stay tuned for Act I, Scene 5.

Camp Lone Star — A Favorable Ruling?

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 26, 2015

On March 30, Massey attended a hearing with testimony that was discussed in Camp “Lone Star — The Setup – Get Massey“. At the end of that hearing, since the government had not responded directly to the existing “Motion to Dismiss”, Judge Hanen allowed the Prosecutor until April 10, and the Defense until April 17, to file supplemental motions.

Massey’s attorney, Louis Sorola, submitted a First Supplement to Opposed Motion to Dismiss Indictment. However, rather than just arguing “case law”, though some was included, he ventured into the realm of “substantive law”, arguing two points with regard to the Constitution, and not just previous decisions.

Massey wanted to challenge jurisdiction, though he was too late to do so, having pled “not guilty”. He also wanted to question the constitutionality of the charges against him, for a number of reasons — most significantly, those discussed in “Camp Lone Star – Massey & The Clash of Laws“. However, his former attorney, Ed Cyganiewicz, refused to take the battle to the courtroom, preferring to go along with the game of “let’s make a deal”. Fortunately, Massey’s insistence in fighting, rather than just giving in, caused Cyganiewicz to withdraw from the case.

Providence, then, provided his next attorney, Mr. Louis Sorola. Sorola listened to Massey, and Massey provided him a copy of an article, Liberty or Laws? “Felon in Possession of a Firearm” is Not Legal or Lawful“, which addressed, among other questions, what Massey refers to as the “has-had” argument and the “equal justice” argument.

Sorola, faithful to his client (unusual, nowadays), did research, found that the “has-had” argument had not been argued, and then prepared the “First Supplement…” (linked above), and served it on the Court and Judge Hagen within the time allowed.

Word came back that after receiving the “First Supplement…”, the courthouse was “abuzz”. Apparently, Hagen was taken aback, and had no idea just how to deal with this new stick in the federal spokes.

The Argument

Let’s first look at the wording of the “felon in possession” statute, 18 USC § 922 (g), that is pertinent to the argument.

“to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”

That is it. The question is what does “has” mean, as written in the statute.

Now, we will look at the “has-had” argument (paragraph #4), from the “First Supplement…”:

The word “has”, as opposed to the word “had” was used in the statute. “Has” is the third person singular, present indicative, verb meaning active in the action just completed, where “had” is past tense and participle of the verb have, meaning in a previous situation. So, if one were the direct recipient, then the word “has” would be appropriate. However, if it were expansive, intended to include any firearm shipped in interstate commerce, then “had” would be the proper verb. The use of “had” would have meant to include any and all that “had” been so transported any time prior

Keep that in mind as we visit the “equal justice” argument “(paragraphs #14, 15), again from the “First Supplement…”:

[I]f you live in a state that manufactures a firearm, then you can possess it, as it has not been involved in interstate commerce. However, if you have ammunition that was manufactured in another state, then you are guilty because of the ammunition. If you live in a state that manufactures both weapons and ammunition, you can possess those “firearms” and ammunition. However, if you live in a state that manufactures one, the other, or neither, then you may have but one, or none. That seems to give preference to one state over another.

Further, this absolutely defies the concept of equal justice; it would defy the concept of Article IV, § 2, which states, “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all of the Privileges and Immunities of the Citizens of the several States.” It would mean that if one moved to another state, with what was legal, from the federal standpoint, in the state from which he began, he would be a criminal in the other state.

Before we look back to put some perspective on our argument, let’s visit another provision of the Constitution, not included in the argument, but relevant to our consideration, is Article IV, § 4:

“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government…”

Under the authority so guaranteed, Texas enacted their own “felon in possession” statute, many decades ago. It provides that:

Sec. 46.04. UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF FIREARM.

(a) A person who has been convicted of a felony commits an offense if he possesses a firearm:

(1) after conviction and before the fifth anniversary of the person’s release from confinement following conviction of the felony or the person’s release from supervision under community supervision, parole, or mandatory supervision, whichever date is later;

So, one “commits an offense”, unless his sentence for a felony, and any other supervision, etc., is five years, or more, behind him. Texas recognizes that the right to bear arms is restored when one has rehabilitated himself, and “stayed clean” for five years.

So, the Texas statute is in conflict with 922 (g) if we accept that “has” means “had”, and the impediment, the prohibition of possession, was not limited to the act of commerce, but was applicable to the rest of one’s life.

And, the “equal justice” provision, Article IV, § 2, is in conflict with 922 (g) if we accept that “has” means “had”, in that the application would be solely dependent upon the state that one lived in, rather than any sense of justice..

However, if we consider that “has”, as written, means “has”, as written and intended, and improperly applied in the “administration” of that law by the government, then there is no conflict between 922 (g) and either Article IV, § 2, or the right of Texas to enact laws under “a Republican Form of Government”.

* * *

Since April 20, when the court first received the “First Supplement…”, Massey and Sorola have been waiting, anxiously, for Judge Hanen’s ruling on the motions before it. Now Judge Hanen is busy dealing with the Department of Justice and their deceitful practice of defying his order in the Amnesty case, but after 4 weeks, there was still no ruling.

It seems that if Judge Hanen were going to rule against Sorola’s motions, it would be a no-brainer to simply rule, and get on with the trial. However, there was nothing except a very loud SILENCE from the Court, until May 20, when Judge Hanen delivered a rather interesting “Order“. The order indicates that Hanen still has to rule on two motions before the Court, and opens the door for another round of paperwork, (amendments to the previous positions), giving until May 29 to answer. He does cite the recent Henderson v. United States decision out of the Supreme Court, and though he finds that there is no “impact on the pending motions”, he leaves the door open, to allow the Prosecution every latitude.

Massey’s apprehension in quite understandable. He has been wearing an “ankle bracelet” since November 12, 2014, and has been under “Home Detention”, since that time (See “Camp Lone Star – Cruel and Unusual Punishments – Before Conviction“. His last motion was submitted on April 20, and so a month later, he finds that there will be nine more days of agonizing waiting for the ruling that will determine whether the Constitution and the laws of the State of Texas are supreme, or if Administrative Rules and Regulations override them.

So, why is Judge Hanen waiting so long to rule? Denying the motions would be such a simple task, though ruling that “Felon in Possession” is, well, unconstitutional, is not so easily accomplished. There is a likelihood that the government, facing such a loss, would appeal. Most judges prefer to not have a decision overturned by a higher court, so if he is going to grant the Motion to Dismiss, he apparently afforded every opportunity for the Prosecutor to attempt a challenge to the position presented in the “First Supplement…”, thereby minimizing the possibility of a successful appeal. And, of course, knowing that the government does not like to have its authority challenged, it might well be a career ending decision for Hanen to make. However, if others are willing to give their lives for the Constitution, then to end one’s career for such purpose is an act worthy of a true patriot.

Further, Judge Hanen has not rescheduled the planned June 4 Jury Selection, nor the Pre-Trial Conference, set for June 2, leaving just one working day from the final motions to trial start. This would lend one to believe that his intention is to rule in favor of the Motion to Dismiss Indictment, unless the government can scrape together a non-existent argument in opposition to “has-had” and “equal justice”. In which case, the trial would have to be scheduled even further down the road to allow for preparation.

It does appear that when Judge Hanen does pick up his gavel, it will come down declaring freedom for KC Massey, and a quandary for the government, as all those who have been convicted, or even pled guilty to “Felon in Possession” may have pled, or been convicted, of a non-crime.

Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus
Scene 3 – Guardian of Personal Liberty

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 26, 2015

Setting the Stage: Joseph Story called Habeas Corpus “the great bulwark of personal liberty.” He did so as he, as well as did other legal scholars and various Supreme Court decision, because the founders knew that overarching government might attempt to suppress the rights of the people that had been so recently won, at great cost to the people. The inclusion of the “sacred writ” in the Constitution was to assure that their posterity would always have a means of challenging the federal government, when it went beyond those limits set by the Constitution.

The Truth About Habeas Corpus, the “Sacred Writ”

Now, let’s visit the remedy the Founders provided us, in the Constitution. It is fair to say that the Constitution was written with an understanding of both human nature and the incessant obsession in some to seek power solely for the sake of wielding that power.

In Article I, which is the Legislative Branch, § 9, clause 2, it provides that:

The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.

A privilege is a right that can be suspended.

So, exactly what does it mean? Let’s see what some early judicial scholars had to say.

In 1768, William Blackstone, in his Commentaries, provides insight into the necessity and requirements associated with this Writ of Right.

But the great and efficacious writ in all manner of illegal confinement, is that of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum; directed to the person detaining another, and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner with the day and cause of his caption and detention…

[I]f a probable ground be shewn, that the party is imprisoned without just cause, and therefore hath a right to be delivered, the writ of habeas corpus is then a writ of right, which “may not be denied, but ought to be granted to every man that is committed, or detained in prison, or otherwise restrained, though it be by the command of the king, the privy council, or any other.”

In a former part of these commentaries we expatiated at large on the personal liberty of the subject. It was shewn to be a natural inherent right, which could not be surrendered or forfeited unless by the commission of some great and atrocious crime, nor ought to be abridged in any case without the special permission of law.

A remedy the more necessary, because the oppression does not always arise from the ill-nature, but sometimes from the mere inattention of government.

From the Constitutional Convention, we have Madison’s Records of the Federal Convention.

“The privileges and benefits of the writ of habeas corpus shall be enjoyed in this government in the most expeditious and ample manner: and shall not be suspended by the Legislature, except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a limited time, not exceeding [blank] months.”

“Expeditious and ample” are easily understood, and, clearly, the intention of the inclusion of the “Sacred Writ” within the protection of the Constitution. Being the only “right” defined as a “privilege”, we need simply understand that it is the only enumerated right that is subject to legislative suspension, though only legislative.

William Rawle, in “A View of the Constitution of the United States” (1829), provides us insight into the perception of the Writ just forty years after the Ratification of the Constitution, and, clearly, as it was envisioned at the time.

Reasons will be given hereafter for considering many of the restrictions, contained in the amendments to the Constitution, as extending to the states as well as to the United States, but the nature of the writ of habeas corpus seems peculiarly to call for this construction. It is the great remedy of the citizen or subject against arbitrary or illegal imprisonment; it is the mode by which the judicial power speedily and effectually protects the personal liberty of every individual, and repels the injustice of unconstitutional laws or despotic governors. After erecting the distinct government which we are considering, and after declaring what should constitute the supreme law in every state in the Union, fearful minds might entertain jealousies of this great and all-controlling power, if some protection against its energies when misdirected, was not provided by itself.

If this provision had been omitted, the existing powers under the state governments, none of whom are without it, might be questioned, and a person imprisoned on a mandate of the president or other officer, under colour of lawful authority derived from the United States, might be denied relief.

The Honorable Justice Joseph Story, in “Commentaries on the Constitution“, will provide even more insight.

1333. In order to understand the meaning of the terms here used, it will be necessary to have recourse to the common law; for in no other way can we arrive at the true definition of the writ of habeas corpus. At the common law there are various writs, called writs of habeas corpus. But the particular one here spoken of is that great and celebrated writ, used in all cases of illegal confinement, known by the name of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, directed to the person detaining another, and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner, with the day and cause of his caption and detention… It is, therefore, justly esteemed the great bulwark of personal liberty; since it is the appropriate remedy to ascertain, whether any person is rightfully in confinement or not, and the cause of his confinement; and if no sufficient ground of detention appears, the party is entitled to his immediate discharge. This writ is most beneficially construed; and is applied to every case of illegal restraint, whatever it may be; for every restraint upon a man’s liberty is, in the eye of the law, an imprisonment, wherever may be the place, or whatever may be the manner, in which the restraint is effected.

Finally, we will visit Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856):

HABEAS CORPUS, remedies A writ of habeas corpus is an order in writing, signed by the judge who grants the same, and sealed with the seal of the court of which he is a judge, issued in the name of the sovereign power where it is granted, by such a court or a judge thereof, having lawful authority to issue the same, directed to any one having a person in his custody or under his restraint, commanding him to produce, such person at a certain time and place, and to state the reasons why he is held in custody, or under restraint.

7.  The Constitution of the United State Article 1, s. 9, n. 2, provides, that ” the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it and the same principle is contained in many of the state constitutions. In order still more to secure the citizen the benefit of this great writ, a heavy penalty is inflicted upon the judges who are bound to grant it, in case of refusal.

It is pro8.  per to consider, 1. When it is to be granted. 2. How it is to be served. 3. What return is to be made to it. 4. The bearing. 5. The effect of the judgment upon it.

9. – 1. The writ is to be granted whenever a person is in actual confinement, committed or detained as aforesaid, either for a criminal charge, or, …under any color or pretence whatsoever…

10. – 2. The writ may be served by any free person, by leaving it with the person to whom it is directed, or left at the gaol or prison with any of the under officers, under keepers, or deputy of the said officers or keepers...

16.  The habeas corpus can be suspended only by authority of the legislature. The constitution of the United States provides, that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of invasion and rebellion, the public safety may require it. Whether this writ ought to be suspended depends on political considerations, of which the legislature, is to decide…

It is apparent that the inclusion of Article I, Section 3, clause 3, was included in the Constitution as a bar against overarching government, unconstitutional laws, and jurisdiction beyond that authorized by the Constitution.

Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus
Scene 2 – Who is in Charge Now?

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 23, 2015

Setting the Stage: Ten years after the Ashwander Decision, an Act of Congress established a far more authoritative agency structure, creating a Fourth Branch of Government. Though intended to affect less than 1% of the population, or so they said, it now affects nearly every one of us.

bu·reauc·ra·cy. noun

A system of government in which most of the important decisions are made by state officials rather than by elected representatives.

Administrative Agencies Rule Our Lives

The “Administrative Procedures Act of 1946” was submitted by Representative Pat McCarran, Democrat, Nevada, who gave us some insight into its purpose, when, in the Congressional Record, he said:

“We have set up a fourth order in the tripartite plan of government which was initiated by the founding fathers of our democracy. They set up the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches; but since that time we have set up fourth dimension, if I may so term it, which is now popularly known as administrative in nature. So we have the legislative, the executive, the judicial, and the administrative.”

What? A fourth branch of government? My Constitution only has three. Wouldn’t an Amendment be required to create a fourth branch?

He then goes on to say:

“[This bill], the purpose of which is to improve the administration of justice by prescribing fair administrative procedure, is a bill of rights for the hundreds of thousands of Americans whose affairs are controlled or regulated in one way or another by agencies of the Federal government. It is designed to provide guarantees of due process in administrative procedure.

So, he says that there are hundreds of thousands of people “whose affairs are controlled or regulated in one way or another by agencies of the Federal government.” The population of the United States, in 1946, was 150 million people. So, the “hundreds of thousands”, he didn’t say anything about a million, would constitute well less than one percent of the population.

There is an old saying that if you give an inch, they will take a mile. This appears to be an understatement when you consider that the less than 1% has expanded, in these past 69 years, to incorporate probably 99.9% of the people in this country.

This is, most certainly, NOT the limited government that was given to us by the Founding Fathers. Though we find that their foresight provided a means by which we could challenge that expansion (let’s be honest, usurpation) of authority in the limitations imposed upon that government. However, before we do, we need to look at what those men of integrity also told us of the consequences of such usurpations.

The Founders on Constitutional Limitations

Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No 78, made clear the judiciary, especially the Supreme Court (which is the only court proposed at the date of his writing) was “the citadel of the public justice and the public security“, and, that “No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid“.

Further, Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137), says that “an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void“.

Prior to the ratification of the federal Constitution, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in 1787, first nullified an enacted statutes that was contrary to the North Carolina Constitution, in Bayard v Singleton (1 N.C. 42). They said that “if they could [enact legislation contrary to the constitution], they would at the same instant of time destroy their own existence as a legislature and dissolve the government thereby established“.

The next Scene will explain what the Founders did to protect us from such encroachments by the government that we created.

Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus
Scene 1 – Limited Federal Jurisdiction

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 22, 2015

Setting the Scene: This Act is a series of scenes that will lead up to the events, the paper chase, that are going on in Montana, in an effort to persuade the Court to recognize that rights of William wolf and the limitations of federal authority, as conceived by the Founders. It will provide an understanding of what was, why it was, and what happened to deceive us into believing that it no longer existed. It will conclude with the ongoing effort to restore the proper relationship between the federal government and us.

* * *

From my early school years, I heard explanations pertaining to Habeas Corpus, the “Sacred Writ”. It could be used to remove you from unlawful detention; it could be written on a scrap of paper to be served; it could be served, on your behalf, by anyone who wanted to assist you in being removed from unlawful detention, and, perhaps even more. It was championed as fundamental to our liberty. However, little more was said of it, and it remained only as a mental symbol of something that, though not well explained, was one of the most important inclusions in the Constitution. So important that it was not included in the Bill of Rights, rather, it was part of that first venture into the creation of the new government that we have, today, the Constitution.

Understanding that circumstances might warrant the suspension of that “Sacred Writ”, the power to do so was left solely to the Legislative Branch of the government, and only “in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”

Interestingly, this fits nicely within that portion of the Fourth Amendment that states that you have a right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation” against you. But, what do “nature” and “cause” mean? So, we will visit the language of the Founders; from Webster’s 1828 Dictionary, we find that “nature” is a noun, and that the appropriate definition is, ” The essence, essential qualities or attributes of a thing, which constitute it; what it is”. So, nature is the element (essence) from which the charges are brought. The “cause” is, quite simply, that which brings it about — the act.

So, the “cause” is the act that brings about the charges, and the nature is the source from which the law acquires its authority. And, in any act, for which a “cause” is brought by the federal government, it must also have a source of authority, that being only, and limited to, the Constitution. The Constitution provides for both authority of enactment of laws and limitations upon the jurisdiction within which it can apply those laws and impose penalties, if convicted of the act.

After all, we know that the Constitution was written to set limits upon the government that was created by that document. They granted to that government so created, both powers and authorities, and they imposed limitations upon it.

Most cases that go to the United States Supreme Court are based upon certiorari; that is to see if there were irregularities, or errors, at trial in the inferior court. These writs deal solely with whether the applicable laws, or standards of justice (due process), were properly applied. The decisions in such cases often have the appearance of creating not only detailed instruction as to interpretation of a law, rule, or regulation, but also often they go beyond that written law, serving to extend the authority of such law beyond that was intended by the Congress, when it was enacted. This, however, is based upon the presumption that it if a law is enacted by, or under the authority (rules and regulations), of Congress, it must be constitutional in its enactment.

What is does not do, at least in recent years, is question whether the law, even if constitutionally enacted, is imposed where the constitutional limitations preclude its applicability, i.e. jurisdiction.

Before we proceed further, perhaps understanding what a “writ” is, and what it is not, is necessary for perspective. It is not a court case, nor a lawsuit, nor a criminal prosecution against a person. Quite simply, it is “a form of written command in the name of a court or other legal authority to act, or abstain from acting, in some way.”

Limited federal Jurisdiction

Under Article I, § 8, clause 17, Congress has “exclusive legislative jurisdiction”. Under Article IV, § 3, clause 2, Congress may “make all needed Rules and Regulations”, with the caveat, “respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” So, under these authorities, many ‘laws” are enacted that apply only to the extent that jurisdiction also applies. A good example of this is a law enacted in 1825 that gave the government the authority to punish “certain crimes against the United States”. We’ll let the act speak for itself:

“That if any person or persons, within any fort, dock-yard, navy-yard, arsenal, armory, or magazine, the site whereof is ceded to, and under the jurisdiction of the United States, or on a site of any lighthouse, or other needful building belonging to the United States, the sight whereof is ceded to them [United States], and under their jurisdiction, as aforesaid, shall, willfully…”

Take note that this does not apply to government property outside of that limited jurisdiction. The property must be to be on lands that are ceded and jurisdiction also ceded, within the authority granted by the Constitution.

For those interested, there are a number of Supreme Court decisions that support the requirement for a Constitutional nexus for an enactment of Congress to be valid and applicable, outside of that limited jurisdiction. These can be found in the article, “Habeas Corpus – The Guardian of Liberty“.

Now, what we have been taught and have been inclined to believe for our entire lives, is eviscerated, if we heed a decision of the Supreme Court, In Re Lane (135 U.S. 443), ruled on in 1890, in which a man was charged with rape, under federal law. The rape took place in the Oklahoma (Indian) Territory (unorganized), though the case was tried in Kansas (statehood in 1861). Lane was convicted and imprisoned in Kansas. Kansas punishment being less harsh, Lane attempted to challenge federal jurisdiction, opting to be punished under Kansas law.

The law under which he was charged and convicted of, had the jurisdictional, “in the District of Columbia or other place, except the territories, over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction,” in its wording. Now, that wording, “other place, except the territories, over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction” can appear to be misleading. However, the Court clarified that rather confusing statement by explaining that “except territories”, was not in the context of Article IV, § 3, clause 2 (needful rules and regulations), but rather, as those organized territories, seeking statehood — those which had been granted, by Congress, the authority to propose a constitution and to create Legislative, Executive and Judicial Branches, and were authorized to enact laws, administer them, and the judicial branch to provide a forum for justice. These same grants of authority were endowed upon the states, within the limits of the state constitution, by adoption of the state constitution and the granting of statehood. The extent of federal jurisdiction, the laws, rules, and regulations, was limited solely to the unorganized territories.

Supreme Court (and Inferior Courts) Don’t Want to Rule on Constitutionality

In 1936, the Supreme Court ruled on a case known as Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (297 U.S. 288). The details of the case are not something that we need concern ourselves with, though we must heed the words of Justice Brandeis, as he explained the seven rules that the Court had adopted in applying their judicial authority. The applicable rules are:

1.  The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, nonadversary, proceeding, declining because to decide such questions ‘is legitimate only in the last resort…

4.  The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of… Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter…

5.  The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.

6.  The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.

7.  ‘When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.

As we can see, Rules 1, 4 and 7, are means by which the Court can avoid ruling on the constitutionality of a matter before them.

Rule 5 provides for a condition upon which one must have been injured to even challenge a statute, even as to constitutionality and jurisdiction. And, Rule 6 provides a bar against challenge, if a person “has availed himself of its benefits”.

So, we can see how extremely difficult it is to question constitutionality, jurisdiction, or to even find that you are in a position to challenge the lawfulness, of any act of Congress. But, we also have to understand the “nature” of those “statutes” referred to in the Rules.

In the Ashwander decision, it was pointed out that the Rules had been adopted over the past few decades, so this was really nothing new. Administrative agencies, though few at the time (Tennessee Valley Authority was one such agency), were relatively new. However, in an effort to expand constitutional authority beyond the limits imposed by the Constitution, and based upon the adoption of those Rules, Congress took another step, in 1946, to expand their authority beyond those limits. That will be the subject of Scene 2.

Camp Lone Star – Nor Shall Private Property be Taken…

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 22, 2015

Massey received at “Notice of Seizure and Administrative Forfeiture Proceeding” from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, dated November 19, 2014. In it, the government had listed weapons and ammunition, which, according to their assessment, total $1134.90. This included three .45 caliber and two 7.62 mm weapons, and over 2500 rounds of ammunition — do the math — the weapons, alone, would exceed the BATF total.

It contained both forms and inventories, listing the above items. And, there were explicit instructions on what to do to contest the forfeiture of the property. No compensation offered, just try as you might, ‘we are going to keep this stuff’.

It also cited various statutes, however, when Massey read the statutes, he did not see any applicability. If he goes to trial, the property would be evidence, and, if he doesn’t go to trial, the property should be returned. After all, it is theft to keep property if there was no crime committed with the property. But, after scrutinizing the documents, he realized that this was “civil forfeiture”, the taking of property just because they want to take it.

Now, Massey, not sure if they were trying to trick him into some sort of confession — professing to own weapons that he might not own, and realizing that there might be other traps in the forms that they wanted him to fill out, declined to complete the forms, and simply question their right to take property, under the circumstances.

So, within the time constraints in the document, he chose to respond, via correspondence, rather than government forms. After citing the many statutes that were referred to in the BATF letter, he writes, “I have read those cited sections, and I am at a loss as to what authority is being used to deny the owners said property. I see nothing that begins to suggest such authority within the context of those codes.”

He asks them to be more specific in their cited statute, and he reminded them that, according to the CAFRA Act of 2002, the Burden of Proof lies upon the Government, to wit:

18 USC 983 (c) Burden of Proof. – In a suit or action brought under any civil forfeiture statute for the civil forfeiture of any property –

(1) the burden of proof is on the Government to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture;

Don’t you suppose that the government should have some idea of their authority, instead of trying to trick somebody into doing something that the person has no obligation to do?

So, just like in a ping pong game, another mailing from the BATF, in which they state:

As stated in your Notice of Forfeiture Proceedings letter, dated November 19, 2014, the Claim must identify the specific property being claimed; state the claimant’s interest in such property; and be made under oath, subject to penalty of perjury.

Are my eyes deceiving me? The government already listed the property, now they want Massey to list the property. They also want him to “claim an interest in [the] property“. But, they started the game. First, they took the property from Massey. Then, they told him what property they wanted him to forfeit. Now, they act as if they don’t know what property they are talking about, and they question his interest in the property.

Let’s get real. When they took the property from Massey, whether it was his, or belonged to someone else, he had taken responsibility for the property, unless, of course, it was stolen. So, he would also have the obligation to return the property to its rightful owner, one the government finishes with the circle-jerk. It makes me begin to wonder (well, I have wondered since back in 1993, Waco, Texas) whether the BATF (back then, we referred to them as Bat F#$ks) only hired retards, since they can’t seem to do anything right, and are more prone to screw it up worse than it was, one they set their minds (perhaps overly gracious) to work on it.

Anyway, that last BATF notice was dated December 18, 2014, and it also had attached lists of the mysterious property that they wanted Massey to identify.

So, on December 29, Massey responded. Now, though his response is linked, here, it is simply too wonderful to not insert portions of the response, here in this article. In response to BATF alleging that he had submitted a claim:

I am in receipt of your letter of December 18. It misrepresents that I submitted a claim for the return of property. What I sent you was an explanation as to the circumstances surrounding the property that you are endeavoring to seize.

So, now that they may have gotten that right, let’s move on to why Massey cannot respond to deal with the property and ownership, as the BATF would like him to:

First, the Court has barred me from any communication with members of Rusty’s Rangers. The property that you are seizing is owned by members of what the government refers to as “Rusty’s Rangers”. You have not noticed them regarding their property, though you have put upon me a requirement that I violate a court order, or make me responsible for the loss of property owned by members of “Rusty’s Rangers”. If I don’t violate the court order, then you will deny the rightful owners their property.

Then, he returns to the very laws that BATF is attempting to enforce or misinterpret,

I also brought to your attention that you have not stated why the property was seized and subject to forfeiture. You throw a number of codes out, though each of them is so broad in its construction, that I have yet to find any presumed authority for the forfeiture.

Notwithstanding that what you are attempting to do is clearly in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, I find that you also fail to meet your statutory obligation under 18 U.S.C. § 983

(c) Burden of Proof. – In a suit or action brought under any civil forfeiture statute for the civil forfeiture of any property –

(1) the burden of proof is on the Government to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture;

So, how can the government demonstrate a burden of proof, when there is no charge associated with which the burden can be demonstrated? A specific criminal, or other act, under the laws of the United States would have to be submitted as a cause of action, and then the burden of proof, by a preponderance of evidence. I see no evidence with which you might, in the most ludicrous manner, attach a “burden of proof”. It is that which I am seeking, and, it would appear that this would have to be provided prior to any requirement for me to file a claim for the property of others.

Well, that was sent to the BATF via Fed Ex, so they have had over 5 months in which to see if they can do more than sling words, without meaning or context. And, since no Order has been filed on the case, or provided to Massy, we must presume that the whole matter of forfeiture is on hold, and that Massey will be able to return all of the property to the rightful owners, once the case is dismissed (see next article).

In the meantime, maybe those BATF officials have returned to school to learn something other than intimidation is behind the laws of this country.

Wolf Trap – Wolf Speaks from Jail

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 14, 2015

I received the following from William Wolf, through a circuitous route, since the government has decided that he should not be allowed to communicate with me. In fact, his communicating with me has so disturbed them that they will be moving him from the Yellowstone County Detention Facility, in Billings (where the Courthouse is) to the Crossroads Correctional Center (pictured above), in Shelby, Montana, about 300 miles, and a five hour drive to the Courthouse. Also, over 200 miles from his friends in Bozeman. Rather odd, since he will have to make the 600 mile round trip for very court appearance, but, heck, it is not their money, it is ours. It is, however, the first story that I have covered where the driving time to court, at least prior to conviction, has always kept down to very reasonable –which this is not.

We had identified Ed Grey (CHS in the Criminal Complaint) as the informant for the government. The Criminal Complaint even states that he “has provided reliable information to the FBI in the past and has not been known to provide false or misleading information and some of the information has been able to be corroborated by independent investigative means.”

We can add another player, Jeff Howard, who may have known that Ed Grey was bad, or was just duped by Grey into an introduction with Wolf.

For whatever reason, wolf has yet to provide a name for the UCE (FBI Undercover Employee), though he has referred to him as “Dirty” in the following presentation of Wolf’s side of the story.

Remember, there are always at least two sides to every story. The government will always get theirs out, first, making it the Prima Facie Story, which results in premature condemnation, as explained in Thought Crimes. So, clear your head, if you have read the Criminal Complaint, and try to be objective in learning the other side of that story.

You will note that this was an FBI operation directed at enforcing firearms violations. Normally, that would be the purview of the BATF, not the FBI. Therefore, there is good reason to believe that this factor is proof of what Wolf is claiming that it was entrapment because of his political views.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

Summer 2014. Met Ed Grey on a jobsite. Jeff Howard said he was a friend, so possibly Jeff is involved, also. Ed said he listens to my shows and radio broadcasts. We met a few times over lunch, and talked about world issues. Always in public, never in private.

Late September. The Bozeman, Montana, City Commission met concerning an outcry over the Bearcat Armored Vehicle. I spoke openly against it. Ed contacted me and wanted to talk, since he missed the meeting. We met at Old Chicago pizza joint and had lunch. We talked about that vehicle and how it was illegally obtained. He told me he had a friend who was a patriot that wanted to build a bunker up here. So I said I would ask around. I contacted a friend, Kate R. of a local realtor company. See she said she knew of a place. I relayed the info to Ed Grey.

October. Ed Grey’s friend (UCE) “Dirty” was introduced at the Yellowstone Truck Stop, out in the open. We discussed what he wanted in property. We discussed the Bearcat and world issues. He said he was a private security contractor and had worldwide contacts. He said he could get things that could deal with the Bearcat like RPG’s. I never inquired about those. He told me he was selling his business and moving to Montana.

November. Ed Grey came to my home to help with a well pump. We talked on a variety of issues, and then he wanted to see the property. We talked about Dirty wanting to move to Montana again, and that he could get all kinds of military hardware. I told him I was interested in a military grade shotgun, either the Atchisson AA-12 or SAIGA 12 gauge military version. He told me that Dirty did, in fact, have a Class III dealer license for his company’s weapons and repairs. I had asked because of wanting it legally purchased and converted. Both Saiga and Atchisson full auto shotguns, the military version had an identical civilian version, except for manufacturing standards, but compatible and interchangeable parts.

December. Ed told me Dirty is passing through and wanted to meet. We met at the Corner Cafe in Four Corners, Montana (formerly known as the Cinnamon Bear). We sat out in the open. We talked about the property, world issues, and the Committee of Safety meeting. Ed mentioned about the shotgun after Dirty talked about how he wanted property he could have a gun range on for his automatic weapons. I told him I wanted the Saiga 12 fully automatic for its super durability over its civilian counterpart and how one could easily be converted to the other. He confirmed that his Class III licensee could convert it and had access to military surplus. I was very clear on wanting his Class III dealer to purchase and convert it and wanted that then to be a private sale (that is legal).

January 2015. Met with Ed and Dirty at the Flying J Truck Stop and we went to view the property. We talked of many things, including the shotgun and how he had seen the Yahoo video and how impressive it was. I agreed it would be great to own one and that it was an impressively designed firearm. He said his guy could get me six at $600 each. Again, I confirmed it was the Saiga 12 fully automatic version and his Class III could buy and convert it. He said yes.

We met with the realtor and viewed the property. We talked about modifying the property. We also talked about the Committee of Safety meeting Dirty wanted to attend.

Held the Committee of Safety meeting. Dirty and Ed attended and stayed after the meeting. He told me he could get me the exact model I wanted. I again asked about his Class III, converting it and he said yes.

February. Ed Grey texted me asking what length barrel. I said shortest possible (I believe I did and need the text messages from AT&T to prove it). He then asked the strange question of if I wanted it to be Mil Spec. So I said yes, knowing that Mil Spec meant higher quality metals.

March. Met with Ed Grey in his truck, as we had conflicting schedules. He showed a video of a Saiga 12 full automatic in action. He fired two clips. He then said, “yours will look just like this except converted and it will cost $125 more for the internal parts.” I asked Ed Grey if the $125 was for the fully auto converted. He said yes.

March 25. Met with Dirty at Yellowstone Truck Stop and ate. I did not see his vehicle. He talked about the Saiga 12 fully automatic he had bought for himself. He even said he had purchased five of them. He said how it emptied the clip and 1.9 seconds. I said I wanted a pistol grip on the front of mind. He said his Class III dealer had done that, as a favor for finding him the property. I asked again if mine had been converted and he said yes. His vehicle was parked in the back because the lot was full. I moved mine into the back. He showed me a Saiga 12 shotgun that I never touched. Again, I asked if it was converted. He said yes. I made the purchase and was arrested by a multitude of armed agents. Dirty was cuffed and taken away.

Points Of Fact

The Saiga 12 automatic shotgun line has two identical versions. The Saiga 12 fully automatic is made for the Russian military and is a superior manufactured firearm meeting military design/durability specs. It comes with a 14-inch barrel only.

The Saiga 12 semi automatic shotgun is identical to its fully automatic sibling, except it is semi automatic and inferior in construction. It is licensed here, in America, and sold off the shelf. The parts are fully interchangeable, with no modification needed. That is why I wanted a shotgun designed to withstand military rigors that could be legally converted.

Multiple times, I was told I was getting a Saiga 12 fully automatic shotgun from his factory (military surplus) and his Class III dealer could convert it. Dirty even charged me for the internal parts.

There is no way to make a fully automatic weapon more fully automatic with any factory conversion kit; ergo the only conversion is to semi automatic. Also, the barrel statement shows entrapment as the fully military version comes standard with it.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *