Outpost of Freedom blog

Barbeau Qued in Seattle

The Government is Seeking the Last Drop of His Blood

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
September 4, 2017

Schuyler Barbeau’s Sentencing Recommendation, based upon his record, history, etc., recommends months of incarceration. This would be followed by 3 years of supervised release. It also recommends no monetary penalty, except the $200 Special Assessment. His Sentencing Hearing is scheduled for September 8, 2017, just a few days away. Schuyler was okay with this, as at least, he would be free (except the supervised release) in December or January.

Now, we must talk about the role of the United States Attorney. His role is to get a conviction. During trial, when Schuyler changed his pleas to Guilty, so the  that task was done. However, prosecutors are those people that will lie, falsify evidence, object to defendants putting on a defense, and use every conniving trick in their book, are also vindictive. The Sentencing Guidelines establish a check list for the punishment of guilty defendants. There wouldn’t be much need for the Guidelines if Congress felt that the punishment should be determined in the courtroom. However, they enacted the Guidelines in their quest for “equality”, and that should be the end of it.

However, those well-paid government attorneys seem to have a scorecard, like ticket quotas for police.  Their vindictive nature (since they are otherwise immune from nearly any remedy) shows when they can’t be satisfied with a job, well, well done, with the conviction.

Not so with USA Annette L. Hayes and AUSA Thomas M. Woods, with the United States Attorney in Seattle, Washington. They have prepared a 12 page “Government’s Sentencing Memorandum” in an effort to nearly triple Schuyler’s sentence, to 72 months.

That Memorandum says that:

“Barbeau has spent years telling the world that he will use deadly force against law enforcement officers who attempt to take any steps that interfere with his beliefs, including instances in which officers are simply carrying out Court-authorized orders. His conduct has not been limited to words—he built a fully-automatic machinegun that he repeatedly threatened to use against law enforcement. He sought to purchase a .50 caliber gun on the theory that it would be more effective in a shootout with law enforcement.”

The fact that this is a conclusion of the government, not a fact ruled on in court, seems to make no difference. Just because the government says it is so, it must be so.

The government goes on to say:

“Specifically, Barbeau has repeatedly stated that he will use deadly force to “protect himself” against an arrest where he believes that the arrest is unlawful. Thus, he repeatedly stated his intent to kill any law enforcement officers who sought to arrest him or his friends because of his view that none of them have done anything wrong. This conduct is not “self-defense”—it is murder.”

Now, this just shows how far away from our Constitution the government has drifted. In 1900, the Supreme Court ruled that John Bad Elk, who had shot and killed an officer who was armed, though the officer never raised his rifle, was guilty of a misdemeanor, or no crime at all, since the attempt to arrest him was not lawful. See The Right to Self Defense. I supposed, as we have all conjectured, the Constitution has been put aside by the government. With the crafty wording of enactments, and the “case law method”, they continue to circumvent the Constitution.

. Continue reading ‘Barbeau Qued in Seattle – The Government is Seeking the Last Drop of His Blood’ »

Freedom of the Press #18
The Big Guns

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
August 10, 2017

August 8, 2017, was the date set for the government to file their response.  They did so in the Government’s Reply to Respondent’s Opposition to Government’s Memorandum in Support of Civil Contempt.  That will be the subject of this article, however the recent background, since the May 9, 2017, Jurisdiction Hearing.

As a result of that Hearing, the government first filed the Government’s Memorandum in Support of Civil Contempt (June 12, 2017).  That was the subject “Freedom of the Press #16 – Jurisdiction Hearing“.  It appears that since January, when the government sought to have me held in Contempt of Court, they have yet to come up with a case citation that supports their position.

My response was filed as Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Government’s Memorandum in Support of Civil Contempt (July 21, 2017).  This Memorandum increases the burden on the government, separating articles published before the “Supplemental Protective Order” and the one article published after that Order.  The government has yet to meet any standard of proof with regard to their legal responsibility to do so.

So, the current government Reply endeavors to regurgitate some of the same arguments that the government has relied upon, through the course of this ordeal.  For example, they have, from the beginning, relied upon Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), when they state, “The substantial government interest in protecting confidential sources is long established.”  Where they fail in Roviaro, is that the protection is afforded by allowing the government to protect the identity of the informant.  In the words of the Roviaro decision, “What is usually referred to as the informer’s privilege is, in reality, the Government’s privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons…”  What it does not do is to extend any criminal liability to those that disclose an informant’s identity.  It simply gives the government the right to try to protect the identity.

In the current matter, that was done to the extent that the law allows, the Protective Order that sanctioned those who were given certain information from disclosing that information.  It is only that person, whether a defendant, defendant’s counsel, or even government employee, was subject to the Court’s order not to divulge the identity of the informants.

The government did so even prior to the Discovery being given to the defendants, when they redacted what they believed to be any information that would tend to expose the informants.  The informant’s names were redacted as where many hundreds of words that the government felt would identify the informants.  The government keeping that information away from the defendants (the identification of informants) was their exercise of the protection of the informants, as per Roviaro.

The government continues to persist in stating, rightfully, “this Court had the authority to issue the orders and that it continues to have the authority to enforce the orders.”  However, they have yet to address the relevant aspect of jurisdiction.  To put this in context, if a judge in Mexico issues an order, he has such authority.  He also has the right to enforce that order.  However, does he have the jurisdiction to first, apply that order to someone not within his jurisdiction?  And, second, the authority to enforce the order against someone not within his jurisdiction?

The government wants to spin the context of what I said into a confession that is very, very far from my belief and honest admission as to the authority of the judge.

As the government continues, they make this rather curious assertion:

“When Hunt complains that this Court’s orders “prohibit” him from publishing “certain investigative pieces,” his factual premise is simply inaccurate.  Second, the justification for the original Protective Order continues because there is an ongoing need to protect cooperating witnesses regardless of the status of the trial.”

So, let’s break this down.  I have never complained about anything, except the fact that I was arrested by the government, similar to this current contempt situation, wrongfully applying a statute that did not apply to me, resulting in my spending a week in the Sacramento County Jail.  It would have been substantially longer had not Judge Brown seen through the deceitful tactic of the government in attempting to punish me, by simply lying to have a warrant issued for my arrest.  See Freedom of the Press #17 – Is This Legal?

Then, the government shysters endeavored to make a point:

“We are not asking this Court to restrain Hunt’s ability generally to write about the case — or even the informants — we only want him to observe this Court’s Order, which means that he cannot publish the discovery material subject to the Court’s Order.”

How nice of them to say that they don’t have a problem with me writing “about the case — or even the informants.”  How gracious.  However, these shysters are supposed to present facts.  My reputation as a journalist (not a blogger) is based on presenting facts.  Let’s suppose that I wrote about the informants, but failed to justify my conclusions without facts to back up those conclusions.  Well, then, I might just be a blogger.  However, as facts are a requisite in our judicial system, they are also a matter of principle to a good journalist.  To make accusations without presenting the facts makes a mockery of journalism, as it would of the judicial system.

Besides, such accusations are prolific in the patriot community.  They tend to lack any substance and are often made over a simple disagreement between two people.  Should some rely upon simply my word that so and so is an informant, the informant would simply accuse the accuser of being an informant.  And, the louder voice would probably prevail.  Surely, the government shysters would love to see an expansion of the “he said; she said” sort of rhetoric in the community.

As we continue through the Reply, we find this rather subjective statement of ‘facts’:

“[T]he government’s interests far outweigh any First Amendment interest Hunt may assert.  First, we need to protect our confidential sources for all of the valid reasons identified in Roviaro.  Second, the Court has a significant interest in enforcing the terms of its own Protective Orders.  Without enforcement, Hunt’s defiance threatens to undermine our ability to exchange discovery in future criminal cases.”

Now, the first point has already been addressed, with regard to the government’s right to endeavor to protect their sources — which they did by denying the defendants the right to call the witnesses against them (6th Amendment).  Second, the Court wrote the Protective Order and subjected those identified as subject to that Protective Order.  Daniel Ellsberg was the criminal in the “Pentagon Papers”.  The New York Times was not.  Finally, and the most laughable, is that the government feels that the exchange of discovery might be undermined.  Well, there is little doubt that the shysters want to keep as many secrets as they can from the defense.  However, in an effort to attempt to maintain their unscrupulous cadre of spies amongst us, they would willingly subvert the Constitution.

. Continue reading ‘Freedom of the Press #18 – The Big Guns’ »

The Bundy Affair #21
Batson Challenge – in the Name of Injustice

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
July 31, 2017

Introduction

In “Liberty or Laws?  – Justice or Despotism?“, I discussed how the case law method provides the government, through judicial proceedings, to move, a decision at a time, away from the intent of the Constitution.  In recent events in the second Tier 3 trial, only two-thirds of the trial was declared a “mistrial”, while the other third was not declared a mistrial.  I say this because the first trial, by the government’s design, included six defendants, all of whom were accused of wielding firearms on April 12, 2014, when the Bureau of Land Management returned the surviving captured cattle to their rightful owner.  Two defendants were found guilty of some of the charges.  The remaining four were not found guilty of any of the charges, though they were also not found not guilty.  So, there was no mistrial on the two, but there was a mistrial in the same singular trial of the other four.

Now comes the second trial, and the subject of this article.  Jury selection occupied the first two days of the trial and much of the third day.  Now, in jury selection, each side, Prosecution and Defense, may challenge a juror for cause.  Each side also has what are called “peremptory challenges”.  This is the definition of peremptory challenges found in Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition:

Peremptory challenge.  A request from a party that a judge not allow a certain prospective juror to be a member of the jury.  No reason or “cause” need be stated for this type of challenge.  The number of peremptory challenges afforded each party is normally set by statute or court rule.

However, on the third day of trial, the government, apparently butt-hurt over the Defendant’s Peremptory Challenges, brought up what is known as a “Batson Challenge”, historically exercised by the defense, not by the prosecution.  They allege that the peremptory challenges were intentionally applied (state of mind) to exclude certain potential jurors.  Well, it appears that the Defendants cannot have a state of mind presented in Court as to why they went from their homes to Bunkerville, but they can be held accountable for their state of mind when it comes to jury selection.

Background of the Batson Challenge

The Batson Challenge is based upon a 1986 United States Supreme Court decision in Batson v Kentucky 476 US 79.  It deals with the Defendant’s right to challenge a jury makeup if the government’s peremptory challenges create a gender or racial bias in the jury.  First, a little background based upon earlier decisions.  In reviewing these cases, you will see that the original protection afforded to the people by the Constitution is slowly being chipped away.  In this current trial, the right protected for the people is now being used to afford the government the opportunity to claim a right that was intended to be a prohibition against the government.

As early as 1879, the United States Supreme Court ruled on the right of the defendant, with regard to the use by the prosecution of Peremptory Challenges, to stack the jury.  The case was Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 US 303.  Based upon the 14th Amendment, the decision stated, “that a State denies a black defendant equal protection when it puts him on trial before a jury from which members of his race have been purposefully excluded.”  [Quoted portion cited from Batson v. Kentucky.]

Strauder goes on to say that “A defendant has no right to a petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race.  However, the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race, or on the false assumption that members of his race as a group are not qualified to serve as jurors.  By denying a person participation in jury service on account of his race, the State also unconstitutionally discriminates against the excluded juror.”  [Quoted portion cited from Batson v. Kentucky.]

Interestingly, that underlined portion from Batson, “By denying a person participation in jury service on account of his race, the State also unconstitutionally discriminates against the excluded juror “, presumes that the juror has a right to sit on the jury, nearly equal to the right of the defendant.  This appears to be a very early example of Civil Rights (See Liberty or Laws? – Natural Rights versus Civil Rights), whereby the government grants a civil right at the expense of one who previously enjoyed a natural right.

However, note that since the Bill of Rights, particularly the Fifth Amendment, guarantees the people the right to a trial by jury, it does not grant that right to the jury.  If anything, the jury has no right to refuse jury service, unless they are otherwise exempted.  The Bill of Rights was to protect us from the government.  It was never intended to provide the government the means to remove our protection from the actions of that government.

What the Batson decision does not provide, however, is the background of Strauder.  Strauder was indicted for murder.  He was an ex-slave, and the indictment was tried in a West Virginia Circuit Court and found guilty.  His case then went to the West Virginia Supreme Court, where they upheld the lower court’s verdict.  It then went to the United States Supreme Court on a Writ of Error.  So, taking from the Strauder decision, we find what led to the composition of the jury in the Circuit Court trial, to wit:

In the Circuit Court of the State, before the trial of the indictment was commenced, the defendant presented his petition, verified by his oath, praying for a removal of the cause into the Circuit Court of the United States, assigning, as ground for the removal, that ‘by virtue of the laws of the State of West Virginia no colored man was eligible to be a member of the grand jury or to serve on a petit jury in the State; that white men are so eligible, and that by reason of his being a colored man and having been a slave, he had reason to believe, and did believe, he could not have the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings in the State of West Virginia for the security of his person as is enjoyed by white citizens, and that he had less chance of enforcing in the courts of the State his rights on the prosecution, as a citizen of the United States, and that the probabilities of a denial of them to him as such citizen on every trial which might take place on the indictment in the courts of the State were much more enhanced than if he was a white man.’

This led to West Virginia, not a seceding state that would have been required to rewrite its constitution, to revise its laws on jury makeup.  This, of course, was a consequence of the due process provision of the 14th Amendment.

As I have said in the past, the presumption of innocence was based upon the fact that the Indictment (the alleged story of events) was on trial, not the defendant.  However, we have lost sight of that concept and now perceive the guilt of the defendant (the focus) as the purpose of the trial, not the validity of the Indictment.  Subtle, but still effective.

The Batson decision also provides the following:

[T]he Kentucky Supreme Court observed that recently, in another case, it had relied on Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, and had held that a defendant alleging lack of a fair cross section must demonstrate systematic exclusion of a group of jurors from the venire.

So, in this citation, the defendant has the burden of proving that the prosecution has not used “systematic exclusion” in their use of their peremptory challenges.  However, as we will see, in the current case, that burden will be transferred to the prosecution, and the defendant is accused of “systematic exclusion”.

. Continue reading ‘The Bundy Affair #21 – Batson Challenge – in the Name of Injustice’ »

Liberty or Laws?

Justice or Despotism?

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
July 10, 2017

When the colonies severed their allegiance to England, in 1776, through the adoption of the Constitution in 1789, they had to have some form of law upon which to deal with matters, both criminal and civil.  To do so, they adopted the Common Law of England, as it existed on July 4, 1776.  This, then, became the foundation of laws upon which both the federal government and state governments began the process of developing their judicial systems.

What is important to understand is that the laws that they adopted were concerned with Justice.  For example, though Webster’s 1828 dictionary has no definition of “judicial”, an adjective, it does have one for that body that is responsible for that function of government, the Judiciary:

JUDI’CIARY, n.  That branch of government which is concerned in the trial and determination of controversies between parties, and of criminal prosecutions; the system of courts of justice in a government.  An independent judiciary is the firmest bulwark of freedom.

Through our history, there have been legal scholars who stand well above the current lot, in that their concern for justice was paramount in their considerations, and the subject of much of their scholarly writings.

Perhaps the best known of these legal scholars was Sir William Blackstone (1723-1780), and his seminal “Blackstone’s Commentaries.  From Book 1 of those Commentaries, we find some familiar phraseology:

“[A] subordinate right of every Englishman is that of applying to the courts of justice for redress of injuries.  Since the law is in England the supreme arbiter of every man’s life, liberty, and property, courts of justice must at all times be open to the subject, and the law be duly administered therein.”

“And we have seen that these rights consist, primarily, in the free enjoyment of personal security, of personal liberty, and of private property.”

Of course, personal security is best defined as “life”, as without it, we have nothing.  And, Blackstone used the common term, “property”, as did most of the declarations of independence that predate Jefferson’s more poetic version.

What else did Sir Blackstone tells us about justice that was of extreme importance then, and should be equally so, now.  When he discusses Felony Guilt, he states his understanding and then refers to another scholar, Sir Matthew Hale (1609-1676), from Book 4:

“Presumptive Evidence of Felony.  All presumptive evidence of felony should be admitted cautiously; for the law holds it better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent party suffer.  Sir Matthew Hale lays down two rules: (1) Never to convict a man for stealing the goods of a person unknown, merely because he will not account how he came by them; unless an actual felony be proved of such goods.  (2) Never to convict any person of murder or manslaughter, till at least the body be found dead.”

This subject can easily be set aside by the government simply stating that “times have changed”, since Blackstone wrote the Commentaries in the 1760s.  However, that discounts the fact that justice cannot change, only the misapplication of justice can change.  That latter is quite simply defined as injustice.

The Constitution provided two means by which the constitutionality of a law could be challenged.  The first, found in Article I, § 9, clause 2:

. Continue reading ‘Liberty or Laws – Justice or Despotism’ »

Camp Lone Star
Massey Appeal Denied

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
March 27, 2017

My last article in this series was congratulations to Massey on being moved to the minimum-security camp.  After nearly two years of being treated as a threat, often being thrown in solitary confinement, just a few months after leaving the control of the US Marshal Service, he entered the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) authority.

Massey was more than willing to serve peaceably, if they didn’t mess with him.  He was just biding his time, awaiting the Appellate Court’s decision on his appeal, which was heard (oral arguments) on February 9, 2017.

Though the Decision was made on February 22, his attorney did not advise Massey of the decision until March 24.  Shortly after speaking with his attorney, he called to give me the bad news.  Massey and I agree it has become abundantly clear the judicial process has become one without consideration of written law, but rather, a tool in the persecution of those deemed unfavorable to the policies of government.

The Decision is so ambiguously written it appears the arguments Massey had set forth were never heard by the Court.  Until we receive copies of the transcript, we have nothing upon which to evaluate what transpired in the Halls of “Just US”.  We can, however, review the Decision that suggests the court seem to speak a different language than the rest of us.  We, the People, are bound by the words, as written, in the Constitution and those laws in pursuance thereof.  The Court, however, appears more inclined to the aforementioned policies.

From that Decision, we find the following:

Massey was charged with four counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He moved to dismiss on the grounds that he was complying with Texas’s felon-in-possession statute and that Section 922(g) is unconstitutional as applied to him. He also maintained that, to satisfy the jurisdictional element of Section 922(g), the government was required to prove more than just that the firearms had traveled in interstate commerce.

Here, the Court has set forth two elements of Massey’s arguments.  The First had to do with the authority of the State.  Article IV, § 4 of the Constitution states:

The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government…

That means, even before the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, that the States could enact their own laws, so long as the were not in conflict with those law “which shall be made in Pursuance [to the Constitution]” (Article VI, cl. 2).

. Continue reading ‘Camp Lone Star – Massey Appeal Denied’ »

Freedom of the Press #7
“Judicial Discretion” and Tyranny

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
February 20, 2017

Let’s review this whole situation from the beginning.  After all, it has taken a month and a half to get to this point, so perhaps a refresher is in order.

On January 5, 2017, I was hand served a “Cease and Desist Letter” by an FBI agent.  Since the service was disclosed on Facebook, I wrote a “Statement with regard to  the Freedom of the Press“, on January 6.  That was followed with a series entitled “Freedom of the Press“, beginning on January 7 entitled Freedom of the Press #1 – Meeting with the FBI.  The following day, January 8, I explained the Cease and Desist Letter with Freedom of the Press #2 – Cease and Desist.

These events were preceded by a number of articles that I had written in the “Burns Chronicles” series.  In those articles, I exposed FBI informants associated with the occupation of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge outside of Burns, Oregon.  The information used to identify and expose the informants was derived from some Discovery documents I had obtained.

The original Protective Order, dated March 24, 2016, lays out the restrictions placed upon certain described individuals.  Those prohibited from “disseminating” information contained in the Discovery are described in that Protective Order:

ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 16(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, defense counsel may provide copies of discovery only to the following individuals:

(1) The defendants in this case;

(2) Persons employed by the attorney of record who are necessary to assist counsel of record in preparation for trial or other proceedings in this case; and

(3) Persons who defense counsel deems necessary to further legitimate investigation and preparation of this case.

Upon my indicating to the FBI agent that hand-delivered the Cease and Desist Letter, that it was not applicable to me, the government filed a Motion to Enforce Protective Order (Expedited Consideration Requested), dated January 6, 2017.  That Motion states:

Pamala R. Holsinger, Assistant United States Attorneys, hereby moves this Court for an order enforcing the Protective Order against a third party illegally in possession of protected sensitive discovery materials in this case.

Now, the wording of the Protective Order says nothing about a third party, nor does it say anything about the possession of the material is illegal.  If it were illegal, it would be against the law.  However, you can only be in violation of a Protective Order if you are among those to which the Order applies.

The government makes a rather interesting statement in that Motion, “This Court has jurisdiction to enjoin a non-party from disseminating confidential documents produced in reliance upon and subject to this Court’s Protective Order.”  However, they cite a Second Circuit Court decision, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gottstein, 617 F.3d 186, which I addressed in a subsequent article.  It does not corroborate their claim, to the contrary, it supports the limited jurisdiction that I had already stated exists.

The Motion is supported by an Affidavit, of the same date.  That Affidavit refers to some of my articles.  In so doing, they have entered those articles, which would include the entire series, into the Court’s record.  Those specifically mentioned were from “Burns Chronicles”, to include #40, #41, and #49.  Also quoted is my statement regarding the “prohibited material” taken from #40.  That statement serves as prima facie evidence of my intent.  But, the government is insistent upon twisting the truth, in order to create a wholly different characterization of my actions.  This would allow them to charge culpability on my part.

Let’s get to the heart of the matter. To do so, I will be referring to FBI documents that I have obtained. They are marked, at the bottom left comer, “Dissemination Limited by Court Order”. So, let me make this perfectly clear- I have no intention of “disseminating” the documents, nor am I bound by any “Court Order”. I am writing about a Public Trial, which was held in September and October 2016

I had been working on a response to that Affidavit and its erroneous presumptions, though I never completed it (maybe I will, when time allows), when the government came back with a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Enforce Protective Order, dated January 10, 2017.  That Motion has a rather interesting statement made when they refer to the Affidavit filed in support of the Motion.  It states:

In a Facebook post regarding the FBI’s February 5, 2017, visit to Gary Hunt to serve the cease and desist letter, a person asks “who is Gary Hunt?” On defendant Duane Ehmer’s Facebook account a response is posted, “He is working with our lawyers.”

The Ronnie Walker Affidavit in Support of that Motion, also filed on January 10, 2017, states:

On January 6, 2017, another individual posted a question on that same page asking “Who is Gary Hunt?” That same day, the message “He is working with our lawyers” was posted in reply from defendant Duane EHMER’s Facebook account. Sarah Redd-Buck and Duane EHMER’s Facebook accounts are not private and can be viewed by anyone accessing Facebook.

So, the Motion states, “He is working with our Lawyers” is a response to the question, “Who is Gary Hunt?”

On the other hand, the Affidavit states “a question on that same page asking, “Who is Gary Hunt?”.  Then states, “He is working with our lawyers” were posted in reply from defendant Duane EHMER’s Facebook account.”

Now, there is a subtle difference between the two, however, the Affidavit is more accurate than the statement made on the Motion.  Perhaps we should go to the source and see what was really said (this image is taken from the Affidavit):

Well, son of a gun, the question was actually asked a full 17 minutes after it was answered.  Who would believe that the FBI (Ronnie Walker) and the US Shyster (See Freedom of the Press #6 – “Tilting at Windmills” – Redux) would attempt to mislead the Judge?  This sequence begs a question, just to whom is Ehmer referring to by “He”?

. Continue reading ‘Freedom of the Press #7 – “Judicial Discretion” and Tyranny’ »

Freedom of the Press #3
“Contemptuous Postings”

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
January 11, 2017.

Well, even though there were many interruptions, I was working on a response to SA Ronnie Walker’s first Affidavit.  Then, on January 9, 2017, Judge Brown, in a Minute Order (See “Freedom of the Press Update – A Grateful Thank You“), told the US Attorney that what they had filed with the Court was insufficient, and they had to go back and “do over”, to justify what they were asking the Court to do.

I will assume that they were up late, as they did make the deadline of providing a Memorandum, supported by an Affidavit, in Response to Judge Brown’s Order.  So, let’s look into the minds of these well-paid defenders of justice (just kidding).  We will deal with the Memorandum, though it will refer to, in one instance, the Affidavit.  There is no need to address the Affidavit.  It is simply a review of recent events with regard to this matter, but does provides a smidgen of hearsay supported by another smidgen of hearsay.  When one is desperate, one digs deep.

Now to the Memorandum; I will include all pertinent text, I will underline and address the more significant parts..

The United States of America, by Billy J. Williams, United States Attorney for the District of Oregon, and through Ethan D. Knight, Geoffrey A. Barrow, Craig J. Gabriel, and Pamala R. Holsinger, Assistant United States Attorneys, hereby submits this supplemental memorandum in support of the Government’s Motion to Enforce Protective Order.

On January 6, 2017, the government filed a Motion to Enforce Protective Order seeking an order from this Court enjoining third party Gary Hunt from further dissemination of discovery materials subject to this Court’s March 4, 2016, Protective Order. The Motion was supported by the Affidavit of FBI Special Agent Ronnie Walker.  On January 9, 2017, this Court directed the government to file a supplemental memorandum addressing the following issues:

Well, I suppose they could be, at once, be paying attention and not paying attention.  The Cease and Desist letter stated, “dissemination and publication of any excerpts of that material“.

To which I responded in “Freedom of the Press #2 – Cease and Desist“, when I wrote, “Holsinger has added a new twist by separating ‘dissemination’ from ‘publication of any excerpts’ with an ‘and’, making them separate and distinct elements.  However, the Order only addresses dissemination.”

So, we are back to dissemination.  Readers will recall that I have consistently stated that I was “excerpting, not disseminating“.  Of course, I first drew that distinction back on October 15, 2016, in “Burns Chronicles N^o 40 – Allen Varner (Wolf)“.  So, are there two elements, each different from the other, as in the Letter, or, only one element, as in the Protective Order?  Again, we must look at the letter of the law, and not what some government attorney wants it to be, at any given moment.

This is what Judge Brown has ordered the US Attorney to address.

1. The Court’s authority to enjoin the actions of a third party under the existing terms of the Protective Order and without advanced notice to the third party and an opportunity for that third party to be heard;

2. The Court’s jurisdiction to compel an individual who is not present within the district of Oregon to respond to the government’s arguments raised in the Motion via an order to show cause or other form of order; and

3. Whether the Court should amend the existing Protective Order in any respect to address the issues raised in the government’s Motion.

Now, these three items were deficient in this latest attempt to intimidate me into acquiescing to their unlawful demands.  Thankfully, Judge Brown saw through their charade and held their feet to the fire.

Now, let’s be clear that I don’t disagree with the title of this next section.  I think that it is easily understood that any Court has the authority to enforce its own lawful orders.  As an example, Mexico has the right to enforce its own lawful orders, within its own jurisdiction.  Come to think of it, so does California.  Even the Ninth Circuit Court can enforce its own awful orders, within its jurisdiction.  Now, the Ninth Circuit, coincidentally, includes both Oregon and California.  However, the Oregon District, while fully able to enforce its lawful orders within its own jurisdiction, it is not able to enforce in another jurisdiction, such as Mexico, or California.

Let’s see what the legal eagles in Portland have to say.

. Continue reading ‘Freedom of the Press #3 – “Contemptuous Postings”’ »

Freedom of the Press #1
Meeting with the FBI

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
January 7, 2017

On the morning of January 5, 2017, I received a phone call from Special Agent Matthew Catalano, out of the Chico, California, FBI Office. I recognized the name from my research. It appears that he has been assigned to do Internet investigations on Gary Hunt. His research included articles in Mainstream Media that mentioned my name, and my own articles. However, I do know that he has been reading the “Burns Chronicles” series, as most of the earlier ones are in evidence in the Ammon Bundy, et al, trial discovery.

Back to the phone call. He told me that he had a letter from Portland that he wanted to deliver to me. He asked if I was going to be in Chico, which is about 25 miles away, and I seldom go there. I told him no. He then offered to meet me at the local Sheriff’s Office. That is about 15 miles from me, so I said that I would be glad to meet him in a restaurant, here in Los Molinos. That was agreed to. I then asked him if he had a warrant. He said that there was no warrant, only the letter. We then arranged the meeting, and he then informed that he was bringing a fellow agent along with him.

As arranged, we met at the restaurant just before noon. We sat in the front booth, my back toward the window and daylight in their faces.  There was an older man in the booth immediately behind them, and once he heard the words “F B I”, he turned towards us and listened, intently. Apparently, FBI presence in Los Molinos (population about 1200 and rural) is not quite an everyday occurrence.

After introductions, they ordered coffee and me, iced tea. Then, he handed me the Letter. I asked the agent what statute that bound me to the Cease and Desist portion of the letter. He answered that he didn’t know. When I asked him what he thought of the verdict in the Portland Group One trial, he answered that he was surprised by it and by the election results (Presidential). I had the distinct impression that he was pleased with the election results. We discussed the Roviaro decision (See “Informants – What to do About Them #2“) and I wondered, aloud, why the government chose to intentionally out Mark McConnell when Oregon State Police (OSP) Officer Beckert testified. He seemed somewhat surprised that the government outed McConnell, so it appeared that he had not followed the trial.

I told him that no informants had received any serious threats, though McConnell, and his girlfriend, Shannon Vita, had displayed weapons when they went to a restaurant where Jon and some friends were eating. (See “Informant Mark McConnell Receives Surprise Christmas Gift From Activist Jon Ritzheimer“)

I explained to Catalano that for over twenty years, I have always had respect for the FBI, as they have always been courteous and respectful (I know that many will disagree with this), with the exception of the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT). I explained to him about how the HRT overrode the regular negotiators in Waco, resulting in the deaths of over 80 people. He said that he was only 4-years old at that time, making him about 31 years old, now.

. Continue reading ‘Freedom of the Press #1 – Meeting with the FBI’ »

Burns Chronicles N^o 53
Plea Withdrawal – A Privilege or a Right?

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
January 2, 2017

On October 12, 2016, Ryan Payne submitted to the Court a Motion to Withdraw his Plea Agreement.  This was filed over two weeks before the Jury verdict (October 27, 2016), finding the defendants “Not Guilty” of the charges that included Payne in the original Indictment.

Payne pled guilty, in a Plea Agreement, on July 19, 2016.  In the hearing on the Plea Agreement, when asked how he pled, he stated, “In pursuing that effort [the occupation of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge], I understand I — I have come to understand that folks who were — who work for the Government, that that Constitution ordained, perceived my actions as threatening or intimidating.  And, thereby, I – I understand myself to have been guilty of the charge that I’m charged with.”

Clearly, he did not say that he was guilty.  He said that he understood himself “to have been guilty of the charges“.  So, we have to wonder why the equivocation that was apparent in his statement to the Court.  And, we will get to that.  However, let’s continue from where we are.

The Court (Queen Judge Anna Brown) gave her Order Denying Defendant Ryan Payne’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.  From that document, we can get some dates with regard to the timing of Payne’s plea agreement and other contributing factors.

            Standard

Judge Brown sets out the “Standard” upon which the Court is to determine if a plea should be withdrawn.  The citations she uses are all from the 9th Circuit, as they should be.

“Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B) provides that a defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty prior to sentencing if he “‘can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.’” United States v. Mayweather, 634 F.3d 498, 504 (9th Cir. 2010). “The defendant has the burden of demonstrating a fair and just reason for withdrawal of a plea.” United States v. Davis, 428 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2005). “‘Fair and just reasons for withdrawal include inadequate Rule 11 plea colloquies, newly discovered evidence, intervening circumstances, or any other reason for withdrawing the plea that did not exist when the defendant entered his plea.’” Mayweather, 634 F.3d at 504 (quoting United States v. Ortega–Ascanio, 376 F.3d 879, 883 (9th Cir. 2004)). “‘While the defendant is not permitted to withdraw his plea ‘simply on a lark,’ the ‘fair and just standard’ is generous and must be applied liberally.’” Mayweather, 634 F.3d at 504 (quoting United States v. McTiernan, 546 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2008)).

You will note that the standard is based upon “fair and just”, and that the burden is on the defendant.  However, the last citation makes clear that the “‘fair and just standard’ is generous and must be liberally applied.”

Continue reading ‘Burns Chronicles No 53 – Plea Withdrawal – A Privilege or a Right?’ »

Burns Chronicles N^o 35
From the Law Giver: “the law as I give it to you!”

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
October 25, 2016

Having obtained a copy of the Jury Instructions, as given to the jury in the U. S. v. Ammon Bundy, et al, by Judge Anna Brown.  I had sought them, as I was curious as to whether the instructions, at least, conform to the laws.  In Camp Lone Star #31 – The Case of Kevin KC Massey – Challenging the Interpretation vs. the Wording of a Statute, an example of what is referred to as “Pattern Jury Instructions”, and how the wording of the instructions is contrary to the wording of the Statute.  So, let’s delve into Anna Brown’s mental state and cognitive abilities in advising the jury on the “letter of the law”.  (A PDF format of the Jury Instructions.  References will be to {page} number.)

What is the Law?

Regarding the obligation of the jury, with regard to their deliberations, on {4}, she says:

“Upon your return to the jury room, it is your duty to weigh and to evaluate all of the evidence calmly and dispassionately and, in that process, to decide what the facts are.  To the facts as you find them, you must apply the law as I give it to you, whether you agree with the law or not, which is just as you promised to do in the Oath that you took at the beginning of the case.”

John Peter Zenger was tried in a New York court, in 1735.  He had violated the written law on sedition by an article he had printed.  Though in violation of the working of the law, the jury acquitted him, and in so doing, vacated the law.

Later, when the Constitution was written, the jury’s action in that trial provided an understanding that the People were the final arbiters of the laws enacted by Congress, as the colonists did with regard to Crown written laws.

Now, I do not intend to discuss FIJA (Fully Informed Jury Association), though I would suggest that you would find them a source for what was intended to be the role of a jury in our justice system.  I am going to provide an historical context as to what “jury” meant in the age of the Founders, and what one State did to assure that the original intent would be adhered to.

Maryland ratified their Constitution on November 11, 1776.  From that Documents Declaration of Rights, we find:

III. That the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the common law of England, and the trial by Jury, according that law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes, as existed at the time of their first emigration, and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and other circumstances

XVII. That every freeman, for any injury done him in his person or property, ought to have remedy, by the course of the law of the land, and ought to have justice and right freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the law of the land.

XIX. That, in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be informed of the accusation against him; to have a copy of the indictment or charge in due time (if required) to prepare for his defence; to be allowed counsel; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have process for his witnesses; to examine the witnesses, for and against him, on oath; and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be found guilty.

Now, those are the only references to juries, and I will suggest that it was understood by everyone, in all of the colonies, that the jury could judge both facts and law.  To support this, we also find that the People are the ultimate authority under that Constitution.

I. That all government of right originates from the people, is founded in compact only, and instituted solely for the good of the whole.

II. That the people of this State ought to have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the internal government and police thereof.

But, I wouldn’t want you to take my word for it, so let’s look at their 1867 Constitution.  This was ratified after the chaos and turmoil created by the Civil War.  Apparently, concerns over the acceptance of the past understanding of both the jury process and the authority of the People, we find these changes in the new Constitution, ratified on September 18, 1867.  Again, from the Declaration of Rights:

Article 1.  That all Government of right originates from the People, is founded in compact only, and instituted solely for the good of the whole; and they have, at all times, the inalienable right to alter, reform or abolish their Form of Government in such manner as they may deem expedient.

So, they have the right (not the Legislature) to alter or reform.  However, it does not say how that would be accomplished.

So, since the power resides with the People, they have provided, and reinstituted, a means by which those laws enacted by the legislature can be judged by the people.

Art. 23. In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.

For a final affirmation of what was intended, and readily understood, back in 1852, we have an “Essay on Trial by Jury“, by Lysander Spooner.  We find Spooner’s explanation of the right to judge the laws in Chapter I, Section I (page 4 of the PDF.):

“FOR more than six hundred years that is, since Magna Carta, in 1215 there has been no clearer principle of English or American constitutional law, than that, in criminal cases, it is not only the right and duty of juries to judge what are the facts, what is the law, and what was the moral intent of the accused; but that it is also their right, and their primary and paramount duty, to judge of the justice of the law, and to hold all laws invalid, that are, in their opinion, unjust or oppressive, and all persons guiltless in violating, or resisting the execution of, such laws.”

He goes into a greater explanation, though I believe that this is sufficient for our purposes.  Unfortunately, today, the Rules being used by the Court allow the Judge to deny that which is in the Constitution, by the intent of the Founders, and clearly what was understood to be the right of the jury, without question.

However, as we see by the instructions, the Rules and the words of Judge Anna Brown obviously circumvent the intent of the Constitution.  And, isn’t that what this trial is about?

Later, on {4}, she says:

“Because you must base your verdicts only on the evidence and on the Court’s instructions, it remains essential that you not be exposed to any information about the case or to the issues it involves beyond what has been received here in open court in your presence and the presence of the parties.”

She reaffirms that her “instructions” must be obeyed, and, by the way, don’t think very hard.  I’ll do that for you”.

Government’s Use of Informants

. Continue reading ‘Burns Chronicles No 35 – From the Law Giver: “the law as I give it to you!”’ »