What happens when you turn Congress over to market forces?

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
February 11, 2012

This is not intended to be a book or video review, at least in the normal sense. However, both a book and a video will be mentioned. The each cover opposite sides of recent events, though you will see the common ground — that both sides agree on.

It begins with Congress (and, yes, let’s include presidential candidates, as well) and their desire to seek or retain their office. This is often referred to as “The Campaign Trail”. Of course, that sounds nice, but when we think of a trail, we think of a dirt path with minimal effort in its constructions. The Campaign Trail, however, is paved with gold. It entails hundreds of millions of dollars, each year, to move the candidate into the public eye and, hopefully, get him elected.

When you consider that nearly half of Congress are multi-millionaires, you begin to understand that they are a part of an “economic aristocracy” to begin with. They move and shake with the wealthy, and rely upon those wealthy to assist them in securing their election.

These wealthy, however, have already learned that the fastest way to wealth is to have the law on your side; and, whenever possible, that their competition have the law against them. So, the question arises, how can they possibly grow and retain their wealth with the best assurance of their success? Quite simply, the answer is to manipulate the Congress to enact laws to their benefit and to enact laws that would hurt the competition. It is the legislation that provides “economic favor” to one and the legislation that denies “economic favor” to the other that is the motivating factor for what has become the mainstay of politics in Washington, D.C. That end is achieved by assuring that under the right conditions, those who are seeking to enter or retain office need a source, beyond mom & pop, to contribute to their campaign — for a job that pays about $200,000 a years plus benefits. The goal is to raise tens or hundreds of millions for “The Campaign Trail”. Now, if mom & pop were to pitch in say $200, to the campaign, it would take half a million such contributions to make the campaign fund come to the $100 million mark. It would be a lot easier if contributions in the tens or hundreds of thousands were made available, so, let’s put ethics aside and go for the easiest way to achieve the funds necessary for election or retention.

Now, to really understand how this works, I would suggest that you read Jack Abramoff’s book, “Capital Punishment” (available at Amazon). It is a self serving story of what led him to serve a prison sentence. He, of course, didn’t really realize that what he was doing was illegal, though he did manage to create a number of organizations so that there was, often, no direct trail from his lobby client to the Congress critter. All the Congress critter knew was that if he supported certain legislation, substantial contributions ended up in his campaign fund. Of course, he wasn’t smart enough to understand the causal relationship between the two, though he is smart enough to enact laws that have, to say the least, begun to destroy this country (more about that, later).

The other side, however, is a bit more enlightening. There is concurrence with much of what Abramoff says in his book, but the divisiveness of his activities comes out, clear as a bell, in Alex Gibney’s documentary, “Casino Jack” (available through Netflix and other on line sources). Abramoff’s downfall came when he received over $40 million from an Indian tribe to aid them in securing the right to reopen their casino, which, ironically, earlier activity by Abramoff caused to be closed. The bill was attached as a rider to an Election Bill. When a Senator refused to go along, Abramoff’s house of cards began to crumble, as did the leadership of the Indian tribe who had spent so much money on “a sure thing”.

As you review the events described in the book and video, you will read, or hear, names of many well known people (including a President). You will, in many cases, understand their gratitude for the “contributions” they received, just for being good Congressmen. When you are finished, you will wonder why only two Congressmen served time, and why their sentences were so short.

Finally, you will see that hundreds of millions of dollars began flowing from the Financial industry through lobbyists, just a few years ago, resulting in deregulation of the Banking industry and the subsequent failure of our economy.

If you have never before thought that something was too broken to fix, I’m sure that when you read and watch, you will then begin to understand that Congress has set up a creature that serves only them and their campaigns – and it is too broken to fix…or, if you prefer…”too big to fail.”

When Johnny Comes Marching Home…

Gary Hunt
Outpost-of-Freedom
December 22, 2011

The well known song, “When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again”, a song of praise and gratitude that gained popularity in this country during the Civil War, derived from an Irish anti-war song (“Johnny I Hardly Knew Ye”) from about 1820.  At the end of both World Wars, the song came back to us as our victorious soldiers returned from Europe, and in the Second, Asia.

If we look at the emergence of the multitude of wars since the end of World War II, we find that those words of pride and gratitude have lost their meaning, or, at least, have not found a place in our hearts, as they once did.

On December 18, 2011, “the last American Soldiers” left Iraq, after nine years of combat; 4,500 American lives lost (not included the tens of thousands who have been disfigured mentally, physically, or both); $800,000,000,000 dollars spent, and, according to 86% of the people, the goals of the “war” have been accomplished.  Of course, those goals have been constantly changing since our first incursion into the country (ignoring, of course, the first Gulf War back in 1991).  I find myself at a loss to understand just what the goals really were.

Though the capture and execution of Saddam Hussein might be considered a goal, it was denied as an objective, at the beginning.  We never found the weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) that were touted as the initial purpose, along with the claims that Hussein was buddy-buddy with Osama bin Laden — a wholly unsupportable pretext.  But, heck, we have to have some reason to peddle our success.

However, rather than signing “When Johnny Comes Marching Home” in every city, town and village, as was done in the past, it will only be sung in secure military installations, as troops arrive from the third, fourth or fifth tour of duty — and with the inherent mental dysfunction that has been ascribed to such service.

Soon, perhaps, we can expect the same for those who have given their lives, “fighting for our freedoms”, in Afghanistan.  And, most assuredly, we will be blessed with a list of goals accomplished in that land of American corpses, as well.  It is become blatantly obvious that “getting bin Laden” is not the ruse for that war, though it was the only pretext given to us after the events of September 11, 2001.

Let’s venture back even further, to just a few years after World War II, when we entered Korea to stop communist aggression (in a Korean civil war).  I still remember relatives coming home to no fanfare, with heads down and simply a desire to hide from the evils of what they had experienced.  Essentially, Johnny had to sneak in the back door.  Yet, with only an armistice, after half a century, we still have soldiers on duty securing the border of a foreign country, absent a surrender.  Fifty years of Johnny sneaking back to our own country, through the garden gate rather than Main Street.

Just more than a decade later, returnees from Vietnam not only had to sneak in the back door, they had to withstand abuse and ridicule for a war that was lost.  With so very few exceptions, the only “Welcome Home” greetings were from one veteran to another, at least until not too long ago.

Unlike Korea, where the war was not lost, only temporarily discontinued, Vietnam was an unequivocal loss, though through no fault of those soldiers who fought and suffered that “war”.  Still, there never have been real accolades on behalf of those millions who served there.

Perhaps we should look a bit more closely as our soldiers return home after any conflict.  If the outpouring of gratitude and praise is unprovoked, and from the heart, then the action they were involved in is, without question, one of national necessity — at least in the eyes of our citizens.  However, when the expression of gratitude and pride is non-existent, or at best, well orchestrated by government and press, we should, perhaps, begin to question just what and why that event warranted our involvement, in the first place.

Let me leave you with one additional thought.  The recent headlines regarding the last troops to leave Iraq are absent an essential truth.  They should read, “the last combat troops”, since we have left our legacy in Iraq, just as the British did in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, the largest United States Military Air Base outside of the United States (Latitude 30°56’12.39″N, Longitude 46°5’31.99″E, though if you look this up on Google Earth you will find that they are using February 2002 imagery, and the runways and much of the beginning of construction can be clearly seen).  Now, just how are they going to man this massive and expensive installation without troops?

Social and Political Superiority

Gary Hunt
August 15, 2011

The Founding Fathers, as we most often recognize them, were “gentlemen”.  They were men of leisure that had incomes to sustain that leisure, without effort on their part.  For the most part, they earned, in their earlier years, the status of gentlemen by establishing themselves as farmers, landowners or businessmen who had residual income, leaving them a great deal of time for social or political functions.  They seldom, if ever, received compensation for the efforts on behalf of the public.  Washington is, perhaps, the best known and recognized for this behavior by refusing to receive payment for service as either the Commander of the Continental Army, or, as the First Executive.  In both instances, he received only expenses related to the position.

They also maintained an indifference to political situations.  What this meant was that they were disinterested parties — they had no dog in the fight, so to speak.  They did not use their political influence for financial gain, and to do so would be a violation of the public trust that they had assumed.

Of course, there were exceptions. Two that never gained the status of gentleman were Thomas Paine and Samuel Adams.  One who was the only significant one to have been born a gentleman, though he used his influence for financial gain, was Aaron Burr.  Of these three, only Adams retains respect for his role in bringing about the new nation, the United States of America.

The Founders, when they wrote or spoke, directed their work to their peers — the other gentlemen.  They did sense that they had social and political superiority over the working class, and for decades, spoke of political philosophy only amongst themselves.

Much of what they said, especially the writings of Paine, brought to the common man the idea, that had not existed in England, that decisions could be made by them, as the common people — the body of the nation.

The secrecy of the Constitutional Convention, in Philadelphia, in 1787, was secretive so as to avoid outside influence, and, because these were gentlemen and their discussions were amongst themselves. However, the result of the Convention, especially when discussed in the state ratifying conventions, brought to light to those common people that they were able to participate in the selection, even from among themselves, of their representatives. The time of the gentlemen looking down their noses at the common people was expired, and, it was expired as a result of the actions of those gentlemen.

From that point on, the ability of those elected and appointed representatives of the people to influence legislation that would provide them financial gain, has continued to grow.  While the concept of social and political superiority had been substantially abolished, until recently.

Over the past few decades, we have not only seen the extremes of legislation to provide financial gain to the office holders, and, of course, their supporters, but have also seen an air of social and political superiority return, more manifest than ever, then in the days of the Founders.

If we return to the late thirties and early forties, the participation of the United States in World War II was not going to happen.  Public sympathy and the idea that it was not our war, held the government back from open participation, until the events of December 7, 1941, when Japan attack Pearl Harbor.

More recently, however, the public is lead, by false claims, false flag waving, and any other means conceivable, to assure our willingness to let the decision be made in Washington, by those who act as our social and political superiors.

WE can look to the early nineties and the discussions about NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), where the “superiors” had decided that the Trade agreement must be adopted. Their underlings, those who aspired to join the elite as social and political superiors, took hold of the discussion and directed it toward which provisions were good, and which were bad, without regard to the whole concept of such a Free Trade Agreement.  We now understand that it was not the provisions, rather, the concept, that was flawed.

More recently, we have what is commonly referred to as ‘Obamacare’.  The discussions were directed, by the wannabes, to the discussing of the merit of the provisions, rather than the concept itself.  After all, both parties had, for years, attempted to foist national healthcare on us, and, as our social and political “superiors”, they knew what we wanted, and, finally, convinced us that we should participate in the discussion and accept the outcome.  Of course, those who would like to prove themselves as social and political “superiors” were the men (and women) on the ground who encouraged us to play along and accept what the elite had decided was best for us.

Just a couple of weeks ago, though the majority strongly held out against a debt ceiling increase (a near annual occurrence, though only recently brought to light), the social and political superiors, and their minions, have brought us perpetual, self-sustaining, debt.  Only, this time, they and their minions could not convert us to acceptance of their policy, without consideration of the people and their posterity, and, it appears, to most of the financial world, that their concept of philanthropy was destructive to the entire world.  It appears that in their arrogance, they have failed to even consider the consequences of their folly, so they remain in Washington, knowing that they were right, and wondering why the entire world cannot see things as they do.

Now, I don’t want to say that financial gain is all that they pursue, though when we consider the makeup of the country and the Congress, we find only 1% of the population is millionaires while 47% of the Congress is millionaires.

It does appear that we have returned to that age of gentlemen (and gentlewomen) being those who have social and political superiority make the decisions, yet the concept that deriving personal gain is unethical, is lost to history.  Absent prohibition of the latter, there are no practical constraints on the former.  There are no longer disinterested parties who will make rational decisions.  The decisions of the current government are made by those very interested in the outcome — and what they and their friends might derive therefrom.

“We the People”, but, Who are We? – Part IV

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
July 21, 2011

In Part I, we established what the Supreme Court determined to be “We the People”, or, “citizens of the United States”, prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In Part II, we saw that the Fourteenth Amendment conferred to those not of “We the People”, regardless of prior status, a new class of people who are granted “privileges and immunities”, though not the rights inherent with “We the People”.

In Part III, we see that within a few years of ratification of the 14th Amendment, the Supreme Court confirms that “rights” were not conveyed by the Amendment.

This must lead us to question whether there is any substance to these very significant acts and decision. Is there any long-lasting affect, as a result of them?  If so, has anything changed them? If there have been no changes, are there still two distinct classes of people in this country?

Do answer these questions, we need only jump forward another 34 years, to 1908.  This Supreme Court decision will clearly lay out that there are, indeed, two classes of people, and that one is subject to federal jurisdiction and protection, while the other is not.

The case is Twining v. State of New Jersey – 211 U.S. 78 (1908). It has two elements, at least pertinent to this discussion.  First was whether there was jurisdiction, under the Fourteenth Amendment, to a state citizen; and, what did the Fourteenth Amendment extend to a “citizen of the United States”.

Albert C. Twining and David C. Cornell were indicted by a Grand Jury, and, convicted of providing “false papers” to a state banking examiner.  They were sentenced to prison terms, and Twining appealed the action of the New Jersey Court.  He held that the requirement to turn over papers to the examiner, absent a court order, denied him “due process” under the Fourteenth Amendment.  He lost that case and pursued a remedy in the Supreme Court.

Justice Moody provided the decision of the Supreme Court.  In summing up the case, he posed the following:

“. . .  whether such a law [state law] violates the 14th Amendment, either by abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or by depriving persons of their life, liberty, or property without due process of law.  In order to bring themselves within the protection of the Constitution it is incumbent on the defendants to prove two propositions: First, that the exemption from compulsory self- incrimination is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution against impairment by the states; and, second, if it be so guaranteed, that the exemption was in fact impaired in the case at bar.  The first proposition naturally presents itself for earlier consideration.  If the right here asserted is not a Federal right, that is the end of the case.  We have no authority to go further and determine whether the state court has erred in the interpretation and enforcement of its own laws.

Well, that last point, “If the right here asserted is not a Federal right, that is the end of the case.”, will lead to the final decision of the Court, though we must first look at why they denied Twining the protection, under the Fourteenth Amendment, that he sought.

The Court brought out that two states, Iowa and New Jersey, had provisions that did not allow compulsory testimony against one’s self, and, that those two did have limits on compulsory testimony, though not as broad as the other states.  This was felt to satisfy the intent, since it was a state decision based upon their view of the intention of the Fifth Amendment (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself”), that established the right of the state to enact a law requiring the turning over of the papers to the examiner.

So, the question resolved itself to whether the federal interpretation of the Fifth Amendment was superior to the state law, and, if so, under what circumstances.

Since Twining and Cornel were both citizens of New Jersey, and the case was not between parties of different states, or any other qualifiers for federal intervention, they retained their status as state citizens, dealing with the laws of that state, without “Federal right[s]” being conferred to them.

Let’s separate the points of significance in this case:

1. Is there a difference between state citizens and “citizens of the United States”, as established by the Fourteenth Amendment?
2. If so, to what extent does the Fourteenth Amendment confer rights to those who are protected thereby?

The Court goes on to give us some insight into the second point.

“It is obvious . . . that it has been supposed by the states that, so far as the state courts are concerned, the privilege had its origin in the Constitutions and laws of the states, and that persons appealing to it must look to the state for their protection.  Indeed, since, by the unvarying decisions of this court, the first ten Amendments of the Federal Constitution are restrictive only of national action, there was nowhere else to look up to the time of the adoption of the 14th Amendment, and the state, at least until then, might give, modify, or withhold the privilege at its will.”

So, the states were within their rights, as they existed prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, and that those rights did not, until the Fourteenth was ratified, include the restrictive first ten amendments.  Prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court recognized that the Constitution did not apply to the states, so long as they were not in conflict with the Constitution.  Essentially, they are conferring all privileges of those first ten amendments, to those who so qualify, for the protections afforded by the Fourteenth.

The Court continues:

“The 14th Amendment withdrew from the states powers theretofore enjoyed by them to an extent not yet fully ascertained, or rather, to speak more accurately, limited those powers and restrained their exercise.  There is no doubt of the duty of this court to enforce the limitations and restraints whenever they exist, and there has been no hesitation in the performance of the duty.  But, whenever a new limitation or restriction is declared, it is a matter of grave import, since, to that extent, it diminishes the authority of the state, so necessary to the perpetuity of our dual form of government, and changes its relation to its people and to the Union.”

So, the Court recognizes an obligation to “enforce the limitations and restraints whenever they exist”.  This implies that they are addressing both points, mentioned above.  First, to determine the extent of the authority (jurisdiction of the state) imposed by the Fourteenth; and, Second, to determine to what extent the first ten amendments convey obligations to the state.

The Court continues:

“The defendants contend, in the first place, that the exemption from self incrimination is one of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States which the 14th Amendment forbids the states to abridge.  It is not argued that the defendants are protected by that part of the 5th Amendment which provides that ‘no person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,’ for it is recognized by counsel that, by a long line of decisions, the first ten Amendments are not operative on the states.”

Twining has asserted that he is of the nature of a “citizen of the United States”, and, therefore, the state may not abridge those “privileges and immunities”.  He has declared a status as a “citizen of the United States”.

The Court then, referring to a previous case (subsequent to the Fourteenth Amendment), In Re Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), and citing with the decision of that case, given by Justice Miller, in affirming that there were two classes of citizen.

“The 14th Amendment, it is observed by Mr. Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the court, removed the doubt whether there could be a citizenship of the United States independent of citizenship of the state, by recognizing or creating and defining the former. ‘  It is quite clear, then,’ he proceeds to say, ‘that there is a citizenship of the United States and a citizenship of a state, which are distinct from each other and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual.

So, this Court is affirming what the Court decided 34 years prior, in that there are distinct differences between the “citizenship of the United States and a citizenship of a State”.  One case, shortly after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and another, three decades later, that affirm the conclusion of just who are “We the People”.  Can there be any doubt as to the existence of a distinction between the two classes?

The Court, after a lengthy discussion of “due process”, concludes:

The decisions of this court, though they are silent on the precise question before us [due process], ought to be searched to discover if they present any analogies which are helpful in its decision.  The essential elements of due process of law, already established by them, are singularly few, though of wide application and deep significance.  We are not here concerned with the effect of due process in restraining substantive laws, as, for example, that which forbids the taking of private property for public use without compensation.  We need notice now only those cases which deal with the principles which must be observed in the trial of criminal and civil causes.  Due process requires that the court which assumes to determine the rights of parties shall have jurisdiction.

And, they conclude that the court that has jurisdiction over the parties will prevail in a conflict of interpretation.  Since they leave the interpretation to the state court, there must be an absence of federal jurisdiction in the current case.  The Court sees Twining and Cornell to be state citizens, therefore, not afforded the” privileges and immunities”, meaning that federal jurisdiction fails to include them — an absence of federal jurisdiction.

In affirming that view, the Court said:

“Much might be said in favor of the view that the privilege was guaranteed against state impairment as a privilege and immunity of national citizenship, but, as has been shown, the decisions of this court have foreclosed that view.”

They tighten up on that conclusion, to wit:

We do not pass upon the conflict, because, for the reasons given, we think that the exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in the courts of the states is not secured by any part of the Federal Constitution.

Now, this would not be true if the case involved a party of one state against a party from another state, nor would it be true in the extension of “privileges and immunities” conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment, to “citizens of the United States”.

So, we can conclude that the “citizen of the United States” is a separate and distinct entity than the citizen of a state.  That the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court extends only to those who have been brought into jurisdiction by the Constitution (parties of different states, etc.) or by virtue of they being the subjects brought into that jurisdiction by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Now, some will say that this case is over one hundred years old, and things have changed, since then.  But, have they?  And, if so, how have they been changed?  I can find no amendment that changes what is presented here, and must suppose that nothing has been changed.

So, in the next Part, we will see if this decision, from 1908, still has merit over half a century later.

* * * * *

Part I can be found at “We the People”, but, Who are We? – Part I

Part II can be found at “We the People”, but, Who are We? – Part II

Part III can be found at “We the People”, but, Who are We? — Part III

—

Part V can be found at “We the People”, but, Who are We? — Part V 

“We the People”, but, Who are We? – Part III

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
July 20, 2011

So, we have established that “rights” were not conveyed by the Fourteenth Amendment, only “privileges and immunities”.  Or, have we?  Of course, to this point, it is only words and omission of words that can lead us to that conclusion.

Understand, however, that the Constitution, the Bill of Rights and early legislation was written so that all could understand what was being required.  After all, as James Madison said (Federalist Papers #62), “Law is defined to be a rule of action”.  If it is a rule of action, then it must be written so that anybody can understand it.

Let’s see if we can determine whether the premise that rights were not conveyed is properly construed, as presented.  To do so, we must, once again, return to the past — to those who lived the times and understood what the intention of the 14th Amendment really was.

Our answer can be found in another Supreme Court decision, decided just 7 years after the ratification of the 14th Amendment.  The case is Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874).

At issue was whether the Fourteenth Amendment conveyed the right to vote to a woman, since she was made “a citizen of the United States” by that Amendment.  Understand that many states did not recognize woman as being full citizens and they were denied the right to vote, own land, sue in court, inherit property, or hold office; or portions of some of these restrictions, depending on the state.

Understand that this case was heard just seven years after the ratification of the 14th Amendment, and all parties were fully aware of the Amendment, its interpretation and ramifications.  They lived the times, unlike those of us who have to search back to find the intent of laws and amendments.

The case introduces the problem with the following statement of facts:

The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in its first section, thus ordains:

‘All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law, which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.  Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction, the equal protection of the laws.’

And the constitution of the State of Missouri thus ordains:

‘Every male citizen of the United States shall be entitled to vote.’

Minor, as described by the Court, set forth the following arguments:

1st. As a citizen of the United States, the plaintiff was entitled to any and all the ‘privileges and immunities’ that belong to such position however defined; and as are held, exercised, and enjoyed by other citizens of the United States.

2d. The elective franchise is a ‘privilege’ of citizenship, in the highest sense of the word.  It is the privilege preservative of all rights and privileges; and especially of the right of the citizen to participate in his or her government.

3d. The denial or abridgment of this privilege, if it exist at all, must be sought only in the fundamental charter of government,-the Constitution of the United States.  If not found there, no inferior power or jurisdiction can legally claim the right to exercise it.

4th. But the Constitution of the United States, so far from recognizing or permitting any denial or abridgment of the privileges of its citizens, expressly declares that ‘no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.’

5th. It follows that the provisions of the Missouri constitution and registry law before recited, are in conflict with and must yield to the paramount authority of the Constitution of the United States.

The Court (in the decision) then posed the question:

The question is presented in this case, whether, since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, a woman, who is a citizen of the United States and of the State of Missouri, is a voter in that State, notwithstanding the provision of the constitution and laws of the State, which confine the right of suffrage to men alone.

In providing an answer to the question, we find:

Looking at the Constitution itself we find that it was ordained and established by ‘the people of the United States [Preamble to the Constitution],’ and then going further back, we find that these were the people of the several States that had before dissolved the political bonds which connected them with Great Britain, and assumed a separate and equal station among the powers of the earth [Declaration of Independence], and that had by Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, in which they took the name of ‘the United States of America,’ entered into a firm league of friendship with each other for their common defence, the security of their liberties and their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other against all force offered to or attack made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence whatever [Articles of Confederation].

Whoever, then, was one of the people of either of these States when the Constitution of the United States was adopted, became ipso facto a citizen-a member of the nation created by its adoption.  He was one of the persons associating together to form the nation, and was, consequently, one of its original citizens.  As to this there has never been a doubt.  Disputes have arisen as to whether or not certain persons or certain classes of persons were part of the people at the time, but never as to their citizenship if they were.

* * *

Other proof of like character might be found, but certainly more cannot be necessary to establish the fact that sex has never been made one of the elements of citizenship in the United States.  In this respect men have never had an advantage over women.  The same laws precisely apply to both.  The fourteenth amendment did not affect the citizenship of women any more than it did of men.  In this particular, therefore, the rights of Mrs. Minor do not depend upon the amendment.  She has always been a citizen from her birth, and entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizenship.  The amendment prohibited the State, of which she is a citizen, from abridging any of her privileges and immunities as a citizen of the United States; but it did not confer citizenship on her, that she had before its adoption.

* * *

It is clear, therefore, we think, that the Constitution has not added the right of suffrage to the privileges and immunities of citizenship as they existed at the time it was adopted.  This makes it proper to inquire whether suffrage was coextensive with the citizenship of the States at the time of its adoption.  If it was, then it may with force be argued that suffrage was one of the rights which belonged to citizenship, and in the enjoyment of which every citizen must be protected.  But if it was not, the contrary may with propriety be assumed.

When the Federal Constitution was adopted, all the States, with the exception of Rhode Island and Connecticut, had constitutions of their own.  These two continued to act under their charters from the Crown.  Upon an examination of those constitutions we find that in no State were all citizens permitted to vote.  Each State determined for itself who should have that power.  Thus, in New Hampshire, ‘every male inhabitant of each town and parish with town privileges, and places unincorporated in the State, of twenty-one years of age and upwards, excepting paupers and persons excused from paying taxes at their own request,’ were its voters; in Massachusetts ‘every male inhabitant of twenty-one years of age and upwards, having a freehold estate within the commonwealth of the annual income of three pounds, or any estate of the value of sixty pounds;’ in Rhode Island ‘such as are admitted free of the company and society’ of the colony; in Connecticut such persons as had ‘maturity in years, quiet and peaceable behavior, a civil conversation, and forty shillings freehold or forty pounds personal estate,’ if so certified by the selectmen; in New York ‘every male inhabitant of full age who shall have personally resided within one of the counties of the State for six months immediately preceding the day of election . . . if during the time aforesaid he shall have been a freeholder, possessing a freehold of the value of twenty pounds within the county, or have rented a tenement therein of the yearly value of forty shillings, and been rated and actually paid taxes to the State;’ in New Jersey ‘all inhabitants . . . of full age who are worth fifty pounds, proclamation-money, clear estate in the same, and have resided in the county in which they claim a vote for twelve months immediately preceding the election;’ in Pennsylvania ‘every freeman of the age of twenty-one years, having resided in the State two years next before the election, and within that time paid a State or county tax which shall have been assessed at least six months before the election;’ in Delaware and Virginia ‘as exercised by law at present;’ in Maryland ‘all freemen above twenty-one years of age having a freehold of fifty acres of land in the county in which they offer to vote and residing therein, and all freemen having property in the State above the value of thirty pounds current money, and having resided in the county in which they offer to vote one whole year next preceding the election;’ in North Carolina, for senators, ‘all freemen of the age of twenty-one years who have been inhabitants of any one county within the State twelve months immediately preceding the day of election, and possessed of a freehold within the same county of fifty acres of land for six months next before and at the day of election,’ and for members of the house of commons ‘all freemen of the age of twenty-one years who have been inhabitants in any one county within the State twelve months immediately preceding the day of any election, and shall have paid public taxes;’ in South Carolina ‘every free white man of the age of twenty-one years, being a citizen of the State and having resided therein two years previous to the day of election, and who hath a freehold of fifty acres of land, or a town lot of which he hath been legally seized and possessed at least six months before such election, or ( not having such freehold or town lot), hath been a resident within the election district in which he offers to give his vote six months before said election, and hath paid a tax the preceding year of three shillings sterling towards the support of the government;’ and in Georgia such ‘citizens and inhabitants of the State as shall have attained to the age of twenty-one years, and shall have paid tax for the year next preceding the election, and shall have resided six months within the county.’

[Note: you may want to review the list of voter qualifications, above, and consider that we were strong and building our country into the greatest nation in the world, when the voters had to be above debt to vote — rather than able to vote themselves “a chicken in every pot”.]

* * *

And still again, after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, it was deemed necessary to adopt a fifteenth, as follows: ‘The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.’  The fourteenth amendment had already provided that no State should make or enforce any law which should abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.  If suffrage was one of these privileges or immunities, why amend the Constitution to prevent its being denied on account of race, &c.?  Nothing is more evident than that the greater must include the less, and if all were already protected why go through with the form of amending the Constitution to protect a part?

* * *

… Women were excluded from suffrage in nearly all the States by the express provision of their constitutions and laws. If that had been equivalent to a bill of attainder, certainly its abrogation would not have been left to implication. Nothing less than express language would have been employed to effect so radical a change. So also of the amendment which declares that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, adopted as it was as early as 1791. If suffrage was intended to be included within its obligations, language better adapted to express that intent would most certainly have been employed. The right of suffrage, when granted, will be protected. He who has it can only be deprived of it by due process of law, but in order to claim protection he must first show that he has the right.

So, clearly, from this decision, rendered shortly after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, we see that there is a distinction between “rights” and “privileges and immunities”, and that any grant of right would require a constitutional amendment to confer it on any other than “We the People”.

This does beg the question of whether the Fifteenth Amendment confers more than the right to vote.  Does it also confer the right to hold office, when the requisite for that office is “Citizen of the United State” [Art. I. Section 2, clause 2, and, Art. I, Section 3, clause 3, Constitution], and, “a natural born Citizen of the United States” [Art. II, Section 1, clause 5, Constitution], unless such “right” is specifically conferred?

Part I can be found at “We the People”, but, Who are We? – Part I

Part II can be found at “We the People”, but, Who are We? – Part II

—

Part IV can be found at “We the People”, but, Who are We? — Part IV

Part V can be found at “We the People”, but, Who are We? — Part V 

“We the People”, but, Who are We? – Part II

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
July 19, 2011

In the first part, Justice Taney [Chief Justice of the Supreme Court who delivered the Decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856)], speaking from the past, explained who was, and, who was not of that class of people known as “We the People.  Recapping that post:

We think they [descendents of slaves, whether free, or not] are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States.  On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.

* * *

It is true, every person, and every class and description of persons, who were at the time of the adoption of the Constitution recognised as citizens in the several States, became also citizens of this new political body; but none other; it was formed by them, and for them and their posterity, but for no one else.  And the personal rights and privileges guaranteed to citizens of this new sovereignty were intended to embrace those only who were then members of the several State communities, or who should afterwards by birthright or otherwise become members, according to the provisions of the Constitution and the principles on which it was founded.  It was the union of those who were at that time members of distinct and separate political communities into one political family, whose power, for certain specified purposes, was to extend over the whole territory of the United States.  And it gave to each citizen rights and privileges outside of his State which he did not before possess, and placed him in every other State upon a perfect equality with its own citizens as to rights of person and rights of property; it made him a citizen of the United States.

So, the rights and privileges were not conferred upon those who were not citizens at the time of adoption of the Constitution, and their descendents and others.  Those rights, too, are defined as inclusive, regardless of whether he is in his state or another state.

So, in 1867, the 14th Amendment to the Constitution was ratified.  However, it did not convey rights, only privileges and immunities, to wit [Fourteenth Amendment]:

Section 1–All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

However, this Amendment did not change or undo that which Taney had described as the “citizens of the United States”, though a new class was created by the 14th Amendment.

Now, I know a lot of people don’t see it that way.  They believe that the 14th Amendment merged the ex-slaves and their descendents into the same class of people that had previously held the title of “citizens of the United States”, or, “We the People”.  However, if you will note the wording of the 14th Amendment, you will see that “rights” were not conveyed, only “privileges and immunities”.  Now, this may seem small, or insignificant, though that is because we have been subjected to “political correctness” and mountains of legislation establishing “civil rights”.  However, the Framers never referred to the rights protected by the Constitution as civil, since civil implies granted by government — which is exactly what the legislature has done — enact laws granting civil rights.  These fundamental rights granted by God are not granted by government, and, they are not civil rights.  They were the object and goal of the colonists from April 19, 1775 to the ratification of the Constitution, 14 years later.

What is very important to understand is that when a law is enacted, or a constitution or amendment ratified, the intent at the time of enactment or ratification is, and must be, what was intended — at that time.  To think otherwise is to allow the legislation, or even the Constitution, to mean what was not intended by the sleight of redefining words, concepts, or even enforcement.  If that is how we are to operate, we are not a nation of laws rather, of man, and that man who sits in Washington; Member of Congress, President,. Justice or Administrative Agency head is free to promulgate what he wants the law to be and applies not what was intended to be, rather, what he desires it to be.

As James Madison said, in Federalist Papers #62:

It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is today, can guess what it will be tomorrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?

So, as you contemplate what is said in this Part, understand that only the words of those who were alive at the time of these activities can tell is what they meant.  It is only their words, not what some ACLU lawyer might try to make them out to be, that we must be obedient to.  To be obedient to any other interpretation is, at best, disobedience to the Constitution.

We have seen the affect of the 14th Amendment on the right, privileges and immunities of those who were and were not of the class known as “We the People”.  Now the question arises as to whether the 14th Amendment changed who “We the People” are, and, if so, what proof do we have that only “privileges and immunities, not rights, were conveyed by that Amendment.  That will be the subject of the Part III.

Part I can be found at “We the People”, but, Who are We? – Part I

—

Part III can be found at “We the People”, but, Who are We? — Part III

Part IV can be found at “We the People”, but, Who are We? — Part IV

Part V can be found at “We the People”, but, Who are We? — Part V 

“We the People”, but, Who are We? – Part I

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
July 18, 2011

In some research for another article (The Fourteenth Article in Amendment to the Constitution), I ran across a rather enlightening revelation.  It was, just 60 years after the Constitution, a clear and concise definition of just (and only) who the “We the People”, in the Preamble to the Constitution, really are.

Now, most of us will assume that any citizen of the United States is one of, “We the People”.  I must admit that until recently, I, too, believed this to be the case.

Regardless of the (political) correctness of this assumption, we must understand that the law is what it was intended to be, not what we might want it to be.  There is only one means by which that can be changed, and that is the amendment process defined in Article V, of the Constitution.

So, here is what was revealed to us, by the Supreme Court of the United States, with regard to a definitive answer to the question.  The case is Dred Scott v. Sandford  –  60 U.S. 393 (1856)

As recently as ten years before the Fourteenth Amendment was submitted to the States by the Congress, an historical, and often referred to, case was heard by the Supreme Court.

Scott was born a slave, in Missouri.  As such, he was not a citizen.  His “owner” laid hands on Scott, his wife and 2 children.  Scott sued Sandford for assault.  Scott was awarded his freedom by a Saint Louis County, Missouri, Circuit Court.  The case was appealed to the State Supreme Court and reversed.  The Circuit Court then reheard the case.  Scott made exception to the instructions to the jury.  The jury then ruled against Scott.  Based upon the “Exception”.

The case eventually ended up in the Supreme Court.  In its decision (below), the Court pointed out that Scott had claimed to be a citizen of Missouri, which would give him standing to sue Sandford.  It found that though Scott was not a citizen of Missouri, or, of the United States, that standing for the Court to hear the case was based upon the Courts acting on the fact that the question of citizenship was not in the plea that brought the matter before the Court.

You will see that even though Scott had no standing, the Court decided to hear the case, anyway.  If you do not challenge jurisdiction (Sandford’s obligation), the Court may assume jurisdiction, the laws of the land notwithstanding..

Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the Court.  Excerpts are from that decision.

“That plea denies the right of the plaintiff to sue in a court of the United States, for the reasons therein stated.  If the question raised by it is legally before us, and the court should be of opinion that the facts stated in it disqualify the plaintiff from becoming a citizen, in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution of the United States, then the judgment of the Circuit Court is erroneous, and must be reversed.  It is suggested, however, that this plea is not before us; and that as the judgment in the court below on this plea was in favor of the plaintiff, he does not seek to reverse it, or bring it before the court for revision by his writ of error; and also that the defendant waived this defence by pleading over, and thereby admitted the jurisdiction of the court.“

Since the matter of citizenship was not in the plea that brought the matter before the Court, the Court will not rule on Scott’s standing.

However, the Court now finds that it has a forum to define just what a citizen is — a point that had only been addressed in rather ambiguous terms in the Constitution, and not since addressed by the Congress, or the Court.

Taney goes on to ask this important question:

Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guaranteed by that instrument to the citizen? “

Further defining the question, he says:

The only matter in issue before the court, therefore, is, whether the descendants of such slaves, when they shall be emancipated, or who are born of parents who had become free before their birth, are citizens of a State, in the sense in which the word citizen is used in the Constitution of the United States.

While the decision covers many aspects, and many ways, of addressing the question, I will provide only those that are concise and indicative of the sense of the Court and the decision held to.  Remember, as you read, that this decision predates the 14th Amendment.

The words ‘people of the United States’ and ‘citizens’ are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing.  They both describe the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the Government through their representatives.  They are what we familiarly call the ‘sovereign people,’ and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty.  The question before us is, whether the class of persons described in the plea in abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty?  We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States.  On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.

Well, there is an interesting phrase, used in the discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Senate, “remained subject to their authority”.

In discussing this question, we must not confound the rights of citizenship which a State may confer within its own limits, and the rights of citizenship as a member of the Union.  It does not by any means follow, because he has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State, that he must be a citizen of the United States.  He may have all of the rights and privileges of the citizen of a State, and yet not be entitled to the rights and privileges of a citizen in any other State.  For, previous to the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, every State had the undoubted right to confer on whomsoever it pleased the character of citizen, and to endow him with all its rights.  But this character of course was confined to the boundaries of the State, and gave him no rights or privileges in other States beyond those secured to him by the laws of nations and the comity of States.  Nor have the several States surrendered the power of conferring these rights and privileges by adopting the Constitution of the United States.  Each State may still confer them upon an alien, or any one it thinks proper, or upon any class or description of persons; yet he would not be a citizen in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution of the United States, nor entitled to sue as such in one of its courts, nor to the privileges and immunities of a citizen in the other States.  The rights which he would acquire would be restricted to the State which gave them.  The Constitution has conferred on Congress the right to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and this right is evidently exclusive, and has always been held by this court to be so.  Consequently, no State, since the adoption of the Constitution, can by naturalizing an alien invest him with the rights and privileges secured to a citizen of a State under the Federal Government, although, so far as the State alone was concerned, he would undoubtedly be entitled to the rights of a citizen, and clothed with all the rights and immunities which the Constitution and laws of the State attached to that character.

It is very clear, therefore, that no State can, by any act or law of its own, passed since the adoption of the Constitution, introduce a new member into the political community created by the Constitution of the United States.  It cannot make him a member of this community by making him a member of its own.  And for the same reason it cannot introduce any person, or description of persons, who were not intended to be embraced in this new political family, which the Constitution brought into existence, but were intended to be excluded from it.

The question then arises, whether the provisions of the Constitution, in relation to the personal rights and privileges to which the citizen of a State should be entitled, embraced the negro African race, at that time in this country, or who might afterwards be imported, who had then or should afterwards be made free in any State; and to put it in the power of a single State to make him a citizen of the United States, and endow him with the full rights of citizenship in every other State without their consent? Does the Constitution of the United States act upon him whenever he shall be made free under the laws of a State, and raised there to the rank of a citizen, and immediately clothe him with all the privileges of a citizen in every other State, and in its own courts?

The court think the affirmative of these propositions cannot be maintained.  And if it cannot, the plaintiff in error could not be a citizen of the State of Missouri, within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and, consequently, was not entitled to sue in its courts.”

It is true, every person, and every class and description of persons, who were at the time of the adoption of the Constitution recognised as citizens in the several States, became also citizens of this new political body; but none other; it was formed by them, and for them and their posterity, but for no one else.  And the personal rights and privileges guaranteed to citizens of this new sovereignty were intended to embrace those only who were then members of the several State communities, or who should afterwards by birthright or otherwise become members, according to the provisions of the Constitution and the principles on which it was founded.  It was the union of those who were at that time members of distinct and separate political communities into one political family, whose power, for certain specified purposes, was to extend over the whole territory of the United States.  And it gave to each citizen rights and privileges outside of his State which he did not before possess, and placed him in every other State upon a perfect equality with its own citizens as to rights of person and rights of property; it made him a citizen of the United States.

Well, that makes pretty clear who could not be a “citizen of the United States”.  So, let us look, from the other side, at who was a “citizen of the United States”.

“It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine who were citizens of the several States when the Constitution was adopted.  And in order to do this, we must recur to the Governments and institutions of the thirteen colonies, when they separated from Great Britain and formed new sovereignties, and took their places in the family of independent nations.  We must inquire who, at that time, were recognised as the people or citizens of a State, whose rights and liberties had been outraged by the English Government; and who declared their independence, and assumed the powers of Government to defend their rights by force of arms.

In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of the times, and the language used in the Declaration of Independence, show, that neither the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general words used in that memorable instrument.

Now, clearly, it is those who initiated the fight for independence that are of the class recognized by the Constitution as “citizens of the United States”.  Many have pointed out that one of the first to “die for the cause” was a negro named Crispus Attucks, who was shot to death in the “Boston Massacre”, in 1770.  This, however, in the eyes of the Court, does not qualify him as one of the people — for which the country was intended.

Though the decision of the Court continues to give examples of just how the Court perceived this relationship, I would prefer to not include too many more of the over one-hundred and ten thousand words in the Decision.  There are some words, however, that warrant our attention in fully understanding what was intended by the founding of this nation, and so I will provide these few additional paragraphs:

“The language of the Declaration of Independence is equally conclusive:

It begins by declaring that, ‘when in the course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect for the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.’

It then proceeds to say: ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among them is life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, Governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.‘

The general words above quoted would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day would be so understood.  But it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration; for if the language, as understood in that day, would embrace them, the conduct of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independence would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted; and instead of the sympathy of mankind, to which they so confidently appealed, they would have deserved and received universal rebuke and reprobation.

Yet the men who framed this declaration were great men-high in literary acquirements-high in their sense of honor, and incapable of asserting principles inconsistent with those on which they were acting.  They perfectly understood the meaning of the language they used, and how it would be understood by others; and they knew that it would not in any part of the civilized world be supposed to embrace the negro race, which, by common consent, had been excluded from civilized Governments and the family of nations, and doomed to slavery.  They spoke and acted according to the then established doctrines and principles, and in the ordinary language of the day, and no one misunderstood them.  The unhappy black race were separated from the white by indelible marks, and laws long before established, and were never thought of or spoken of except as property, and when the claims of the owner or the profit of the trader were supposed to need protection.

This state of public opinion had undergone no change when the Constitution was adopted, as is equally evident from its provisions and language.

The brief preamble sets forth by whom it was formed, for what purposes, and for whose benefit and protection.  It declares that it is formed by the people of the United States; that is to say, by those who were members of the different political communities in the several States; and its great object is declared to be to secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity.  It speaks in general terms of the people of the United States, and of citizens of the several States, when it is providing for the exercise of the powers granted or the privileges secured to the citizen.  It does not define what description of persons are intended to be included under these terms, or who shall be regarded as a citizen and one of the people.  It uses them as terms so well understood, that no further description or definition was necessary.

Therefore, an attempt to apply the standards upon which this nation was founded to the morality of today, or, even, of 1856, when this case was heard, would be to deny the intention of the founders.  This does not preclude the utilization of the Fifth Article (Amendment Process) of the Constitution to effect change, which was to be partially achieved eleven years later.  It simply explains what a “citizen of the United States” was, prior to the Fourteenth Amendment.

Now the question arises as to whether the 14th Amendment changed who “We the People” are, or not. That will be the subject of the Part II.

* * * * *

Part II can be found at “We the People”, but, Who are We? – Part II

Part III can be found at “We the People”, but, Who are We? — Part III

Part IV can be found at “We the People”, but, Who are We? — Part IV

Part V can be found at “We the People”, but, Who are We? — Part V

The
Fourteenth Article
in Amendment to the Constitution

From the Ratification of the Constitution through today

What affect has it had on the concept of government intended by the Framers of the Constitution; on our Liberties and our Lives; and, is it really what we believe it to be?

A study of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment
and its effects

By
Gary Hunt

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

For nearly thirty years, I have attempted to resolve a series of questions that are common to the patriot, or constitutionalist, community.  These questions relate to what has happened to the legal system that we were supposed to have adopted, at the time of the formation of this country, based upon both the Common Law of England, as it existed on July 4, 1776, and, a concept of justice that removed us from the arbitrary control of government.

Over the years, I have listened to what others had to say I have watched their actions to see the results.  I have read cases that seemed to bear on the subject, and, I have “experimented”, when the opportunity to do so arose.

Over time, as will be explained in the following, the pieces seem to fit a pattern.  Rather than trying to wrap the facts around a theory, I developed a theory that fit all of the facts that I could find.  However, in finding that some of the facts were, inexplicably, unwilling to fit any theory, I realized that there must be two theories, and it was a matter, then, of determining which theory fit which facts.

The two outstanding theories, neither of which will recognize the other, are:

• We are subject to all laws enacted by the government, unless the Supreme Court overrules them.
• We are subject to no laws enacted by the Congress; instead, we are only subject to the common law.

The two sides (theories) have advocates who faced off with the other side, each insisting that they are right and the other is wrong.  While, in fact, both sides are partially right, and, partially wrong.

* * *

It does, however, appear that many of the intermediate jurisdictions (other than courts), institutions, and even private corporations, believe that the nexus is there, and, that they are bound by such laws they are told to abide by.  They assume that you, too, are bound by such laws.  To argue the point with them is fruitless, and, at best, will only create dissension.  They, too, have been duped, along with most of the people in this country, into believing that which is not true.

It is for the purpose of exposing that deception that the following has been prepared, for your consideration.

* * *

This Essay will provide insight into the beliefs of the Framers of the Constitution; the effect that the Civil War and Lincoln’s assassination; Court decisions and Congressional enactments have had on our relationship with the government.

You may be sorry after you have read it, but you will understand how the subversion of the Constitution has been achieved.

The entire Essay can be found on line at: http://www.outpost-of-freedom.com/hh04.htm

The PDF file can be download from The Fourteenth Article in Amendment to the Constitution – Essay (PDF)

The Constitution is NOT a Suicide Pact

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
March 30, 2011

Through the process of conditioning (programming), especially in government schools and the press, we have lost sight of what this country really is, and, what it stands for.

Though there have been many nations throughout the history of the world, there is only one that was established, independent of outside source, by the people of that nation.  It was a nation of independent people who had learned to cherish their freedom, primarily established by an absence of control from across the ocean.

They had found, though bound by English laws and English government, that absent a regular imposition of that authority, that they did quite well for themselves, taming a wilderness and establishing a productive society, within the limits imposed by that far away government. They were, for all intents and purposes, the first and only truly free civilized nation.

When that foreign government began to impose upon these people who had developed self-sufficiency, beyond any before them, they resented their treatment as “children” rather than being treated as adults, and true sons of England, with all of the rights enjoyed by Englishmen.

Just eleven years after their separation from the then greatest power on the Earth, they established a government in a form that would best suit them — developed, in part, by the political philosophers that preceded them; in part, from what they had learned from the natives of the land they shared; and, in part from their experiences with the previous government, which bonds they had so recently broken.

This new government was embodied in a document which was then styled, “Constitution for the United States of America”. It was, through conventions in the various states, truly a document approved by “We The People”, as its suggests in its preamble:

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

In this modern day, we have lost sight of the intention of the Framers of that great document. We can however, look to the past to understand just who embodied those “People” who set on forth this greatest venture in self-government that the world has ever seen.

Our best understanding can be found in a Supreme Court decision, rendered in Dred Scott v. Sandford [60 U.S. 393] , in 1856. Chief Justice Taney, who gave the decision of the Court, went into great detail in defining just who those “People” were.

The case hinges on who had standing, as a “citizen of the United States” (prior to the Fourteenth Amendment) to sue in court.  The details of the case is not necessary to understand the following.

The case ended up in the Supreme Court.  In its decision (below), the Court pointed out that Scott had claimed to be a citizen of Missouri, which would give him standing to sue Sandford.  It found that though Scott was not a citizen of Missouri, or of the United States, that standing for the Court to hear the case was based upon the Courts acting on the fact that the question of citizenship was not in the plea that brought the matter before the Court.

Going directly to the Final Decision, given my Justice Taney, we have the Court’s determination of just who was a “citizen of the United Sates:

“The words ‘people of the United States’ and ‘citizens’ are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing.  They both describe the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the Government through their representatives.  They are what we familiarly call the ‘sovereign people,’ and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty.  The question before us is, whether the class of persons described in the plea in abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty?  We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States.  On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.  “

* * *

The question then arises, whether the provisions of the Constitution, in relation to the personal rights and privileges to which the citizen of a State should be entitled, embraced the negro African race, at that time in this country, or who might afterwards be imported, who had then or should afterwards be made free in any State; and to put it in the power of a single State to make him a citizen of the United States, and endow him with the full rights of citizenship in every other State without their consent? Does the Constitution of the United States act upon him whenever he shall be made free under the laws of a State, and raised there to the rank of a citizen, and immediately clothe him with all the privileges of a citizen in every other State, and in its own courts?

The court think the affirmative of these propositions cannot be maintained.  And if it cannot, the plaintiff in error could not be a citizen of the State of Missouri, within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and, consequently, was not entitled to sue in its courts.”

It is true, every person, and every class and description of persons, who were at the time of the adoption of the Constitution recognised as citizens in the several States, became also citizens of this new political body; but none other; it was formed by them, and for them and their posterity, but for no one else.  And the personal rights and privileges guaranteed to citizens of this new sovereignty were intended to embrace those only who were then members of the several State communities, or who should afterwards by birthright or otherwise become members, according to the provisions of the Constitution and the principles on which it was founded.  It was the union of those who were at that time members of distinct and separate political communities into one political family, whose power, for certain specified purposes, was to extend over the whole territory of the United States.  And it gave to each citizen rights and privileges outside of his State which he did not before possess, and placed him in every other State upon a perfect equality with its own citizens as to rights of person and rights of property; it made him a citizen of the United States.

* * *

“It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine who were citizens of the several States when the Constitution was adopted.  And in order to do this, we must recur to the Governments and institutions of the thirteen colonies, when they separated from Great Britain and formed new sovereignties, and took their places in the family of independent nations.  We must inquire who, at that time, were recognised as the people or citizens of a State, whose rights and liberties had been outraged by the English Government; and who declared their independence, and assumed the powers of Government to defend their rights by force of arms.

In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of the times, and the language used in the Declaration of Independence, show, that neither the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general words used in that memorable instrument.

Now, clearly, it is those who initiated the fight for independence that are of the class recognized by the Constitution as “citizens of the United States”.  Many have pointed out that one of the first to “die for the cause” was a negro named Crispus Attucks, who was shot to death in the “Boston Massacre”, in 1770.  This, however, in the eyes of the Court, does not qualify him as one of the people — for which the country was intended.

Though the decision of the Court continues to give examples of just how the Court perceived this relationship, I would prefer to not include too many more of the over one-hundred and ten thousand words in the Decision.  There are some words, however, that warrant our attention in fully understanding what was intended by the founding of this nation, and so I will provide these few paragraphs:

“The language of the Declaration of Independence is equally conclusive:

It begins by declaring that, ‘when in the course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect for the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.’

It then proceeds to say: ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among them is life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, Governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.‘

The general words above quoted would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day would be so understood.  But it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration; for if the language, as understood in that day, would embrace them, the conduct of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independence would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted; and instead of the sympathy of mankind, to which they so confidently appealed, they would have deserved and received universal rebuke and reprobation.

Yet the men who framed this declaration were great men-high in literary acquirements-high in their sense of honor, and incapable of asserting principles inconsistent with those on which they were acting.  They perfectly understood the meaning of the language they used, and how it would be understood by others; and they knew that it would not in any part of the civilized world be supposed to embrace the negro race, which, by common consent, had been excluded from civilized Governments and the family of nations, and doomed to slavery.  They spoke and acted according to the then established doctrines and principles, and in the ordinary language of the day, and no one misunderstood them.  The unhappy black race were separated from the white by indelible marks, and laws long before established, and were never thought of or spoken of except as property, and when the claims of the owner or the profit of the trader were supposed to need protection.

This state of public opinion had undergone no change when the Constitution was adopted, as is equally evident from its provisions and language.

The brief preamble sets forth by whom it was formed, for what purposes, and for whose benefit and protection.  It declares that it is formed by the people of the United States; that is to say, by those who were members of the different political communities in the several States; and its great object is declared to be to secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity.  It speaks in general terms of the people of the United States, and of citizens of the several States, when it is providing for the exercise of the powers granted or the privileges secured to the citizen.  It does not define what description of persons are intended to be included under these terms, or who shall be regarded as a citizen and one of the people.  It uses them as terms so well understood, that no further description or definition was necessary.

So, we have, from many angles, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of who the Constitution was written both by, and, for.  It was never intended to be a catch all for the diverse populations, cultures, and religions of the world.

In 1867, the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified. Though many of the Congressmen believed that its purpose was to provide a place, in this country, for the negro population (recently freed slaves, as well as those negros previously freed), it has since been interpreted, by the government, not the Court, to be inclusive of all walks of life.

The Amendment first made “[a]ll persons born or naturalized. . . . citizens of the United States”. It then prohibited any state from passing laws which would “abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States”.

Since the Fourteenth Amendment extended the privileges and immunities to those who were henceforth known as “citizens of the United States”, it made no mention, nor is there any wording that would confer upon them, the status of those “sovereign people” who had established this government, and nation. It simply granted to them the “privileges and immunities”.

This left the original intent in place, though extended only certain rights to those who had, prior to the Amendment, no access to those “privileges and immunities”.

The country was still, as intended, only for those who were as described by Justice Taney, “it was formed by them, and for them and their posterity, but for no one else,” though it was then willing to share some of the bounty of this great land with others. In essence, it took  phrase, “citizen of the United States”, and made it a legal term. It did not remove the meaning of “citizen of the United States”, as it existed prior to the amendment, it simply created a second meaning, which, in legal context, conveyed only certain specified rights, and nothing more.

Regardless of the Amendment, we can clearly understand that if the door were opened to include any who wished to walk in and enjoy that bounty, it would absolutely destroy the context in which the country was formed. It was, after all, the heritage and culture, and the moral foundation espoused by Christianity, that was the very foundation for the great experiment. To allow that a single amendment, with an alleged purpose of only extending certain rights, could not be subsequently interpreted to be the means by which all that was embodied in the document to retracted  whiteout specific wording nullifying that original intent.

A nation has to have some binding force. In most nations, that force is the common language, heritage, and, culture, of the dominant people of the nation.  In the United States, that language is English; the heritage is English and the culture is European.  It is under such conditions that the United States evolved into an effective world force between its inception (the Declaration of Independence in 1776) and its ability to defend itself against outside forces (the War of 1812).

Its growth in prestige, power, influence, productivity, and pride, continued to grow, providing what became the deciding factor in World Wars I and II.  It had, without a doubt, become the dominant world power, especially considering that it did not suffer the devastation that most other countries realized in those conflicts.

Since that time, we have begun a downward spiral, destructive of both the nation (integrity of) and the Constitution, with but few exceptions.

In 1954, the Congress enacted the Communist Control Act of 1954. This act recognized that the Communist Party posed an eminent threat to the United States and its Constitution.  The codification of that act, at 50 U.S.C. § 842 , provides that:

The Communist Party of the United States, or any successors of such party regardless of the assumed name, whose object or purpose is to overthrow the Government of the United States, or the government of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein by force and violence, are not entitled to any of the rights, privileges, and immunities attendant upon legal bodies created under the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States or any political subdivision thereof; and whatever rights, privileges, and immunities which have heretofore been granted to said party or any subsidiary organization by reason of the laws of the United States or any political subdivision thereof, are terminated. . .

Clearly, there is legitimate concern that the Communist Party might use force to overthrow the government. Unfortunately, at the time, there was no due consideration of an overthrow by other means, such as subversion of the Constitution by political chicanery.  After all, subversive means had not then been developed to the fine art that has been achieved in the past half-century.

The authority within the Constitution, however, to enact laws that would protect the Constitution were, clearly, within the means and authority of the government.  Would it make any sense to be able to outlaw force as a means of supervision of the Constitution and not to allow means to avoid such an overthrow, without force?

What has effectively happened is that the manipulation, without Amendment to the Constitution, and with the abrogation of the Supreme Court’s responsibility to rule upon the constitutionality of laws (see About Ashwander v. TVA), we have seen a dilution of the Constitution which has resulted in a de facto revision to the Preamble, as follows:

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect workers Union, establish Justice Injustice, insure domestic Tranquility disharmony, provide for the common defence of any nation we see fit, promote provide the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to all but ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America, which shall continue in effect until such time as the people decide that they will burden their posterity with unmanageable debt and allow revision to this Constitution, without regard to the provision in Article V for amendment hereto.

Unless we stand firm and demand that the Nation be retained, as intended by the Framers of the Constitution, we will find that our children will be living in a third world country by the time they have grandchildren.  There is no middle ground.

We must understand that any organization, association, political philosophy, or, religion, which is not consistent with the Constitution, and, our way of life, should of necessity, be made unlawful, since its purpose would be to allow the Constitution to be the weapon of its own demise

The Communist Party and the Socialist Party espouse a politics of government control of, and, redistribution of, wealth.  Islam, though a religion, retains social, political and legal requirements that are inconsistent with our Constitution. Labor unions, though they may have served a useful purpose, in times past, before the government instituted laws that were protective of labor, are now too powerful and political to be consistent with the intention of the Constitution. They have become manipulators of the law, to their own favor, and with total disregard to the economy and our world trade situation.  These serve no useful purpose to the continuation of our way of life, and must be outlawed.

If we don’t act, firmly and soon, we will find that the new Preamble to the Constitution will be taught, at our expense, to our own children:

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a workers Union, establish Injustice, insure domestic disharmony, provide the defence of any nation we see fit, provide the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to all but ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America, which shall continue in effect until such time as the people decide that they will burden their posterity with unmanageable debt and allow revision to this Constitution, without regard to the provision in Article V for amendment hereto.

Though the Constitution may be equated to a “birth certificate” for the new nation conceived and embodied within it, unlike a birth certificate that certifies that you and I have entered life, only to leave it at some point in the future, that “birth certificate” was written to include posterity — it was the birth of a perpetual union – intended to live as long as free men do.

* * *

For more information on  who “We the People”, those whom the Constitution was written, by and for, are, see the five part series beginning with “We the People”, but, Who are We? – Part I    and the four part series beginning with Factions — The Chains of Oppression – Part I.

Some Thoughts on Taxation

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
November 24, 2010

 Introduction

Taxation is often considered one of the most burdensome and oppressive duties of government.  “There are only two things certain; Death and Taxes”, quite adequately describes the effect of taxes upon our daily lives.

Though far from truth, schoolbooks have, for generations, proclaimed that “No Taxation without Representation” was the cause of the Revolutionary War.  There is no doubt that the fact that the colonies had no representation in Parliament was one of many points of contention between colonies and Crown.  This very fact was the subject of many speeches, on both sides of the Atlantic.

It has been suggested, on the western side of the Atlantic, that if the colonies were allowed to raise their own taxes, based upon both their needs and requisitions from Parliament, this objection would have been overcome.  So, let’s keep that thought in mind as we look at our history with regard to the subject of taxation.

We need to understand that the Framers had to deal with the touchy subject of taxation based upon the role it played in leading up to separation from England as well as the brief history and problems posed between Independence and the Constitution.  The former has just been addressed, so we will look at the later.

Two situations provided the Framers some concern in dealing with the subject.  The first was that the requisitions imposed by the Continental Congress, both before and under the Articles of Confederation were ignored by a number of states, ultimately resulting in abandoning efforts to collect the requisitions and relieving those debts not paid.

The second situation was known as Shay’s Rebellion [1787].  Farmers in Western Massachusetts had been taxed by the State, the purpose being for the State to be able to pay its obligations to the Congress, as well as have operating funds for the function of the Massachusetts government.  This was compounded by the absence of specie (gold or silver) through the colonies.  Repayment of debt on foreign loans required specie.

Now, to source documents:

Constitution

Article I, Section 2, clause 3:

Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons…

Article I, Section 7, clause 1:

All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.

Article I, Section 8, clause 1:

The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

Article I, Section 9, clause 1:

The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.

Article I, Section 9, clauses 4 & 5:

No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.

No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.

Article I, Section 10, clauses 1 thru 3:

No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts;

No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it’s inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

Amendment 16 [1913]:

The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.

Amendment [XVII] [1913]

The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote.  The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.

Amendment 19 [1964]:

Section 1–The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.

Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers are accepted as an indication of the intent to the Framers, and, of those who ratified that Constitution.

Federalist Papers #12, Alexander Hamilton:

The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by all enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the most productive source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a primary object of their political cares….  It has been found in various countries that, in proportion as commerce has flourished, land has risen in value.

***

The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be proportioned, in a great degree, to the quantity of money in circulation, and to the celerity with which it circulates.  Commerce, contributing to both these objects, must of necessity render the payment of taxes easier, and facilitate the requisite supplies to the treasury.

***

But it is not in this aspect of the subject alone that Union will be seen to conduce to the purpose of revenue.  There are other points of view, in which its influence will appear more immediate and decisive.  It is evident from the state of the country, from the habits of the people, from the experience we have had on the point itself, that it is impracticable to raise any very considerable sums by direct taxation.  Tax laws have in vain been multiplied; new methods to enforce the collection have in vain been tried; the public expectation has been uniformly disappointed, and the treasuries of the States have remained empty.

***

No person acquainted with what happens in other countries will be surprised at this circumstance.  In so opulent a nation as that of Britain, where direct taxes from superior wealth must be much more tolerable, and, from the vigor of the government, much more practicable, than in America, far the greatest part of the national revenue is derived from taxes of the indirect kind, from imposts, and from excises.  Duties on imported articles form a large branch of this latter description.

***

Revenue, therefore, must be had at all events.  In this country, if the principal part be not drawn from commerce, it must fall with oppressive weight upon land.

Federalist Papers #30, Alexander Hamilton:

Let us attend to what would be the effects of this situation in the very first war in which we should happen to be engaged.  We will presume, for argument’s sake, that the revenue arising from the impost duties answers the purposes of a provision for the public debt and of a peace establishment for the Union.  Thus circumstanced, a war breaks out.  What would be the probable conduct of the government in such an emergency?  Taught by experience that proper dependence could not be placed on the success of requisitions, unable by its own authority to lay hold of fresh resources, and urged by considerations of national danger, would it not be driven to the expedient of diverting the funds already appropriated from their proper objects to the defence of the State?  It is not easy to see how a step of this kind could be avoided; and if it should be taken, it is evident that it would prove the destruction of public credit at the very moment that it was becoming essential to the public safety.

Federalist Papers #45, James Madison:

If the federal government is to have collectors of revenue, the State governments will have theirs also.  And as those of the former will be principally on the sea-coast, and not very numerous, whilst those of the latter will be spread over the face of the country, and will be very numerous, the advantage in this view also lies on the same side.  It is true, that the Confederacy is to possess, and may exercise, the power of collecting internal as well as external taxes throughout the States; but it is probable that this power will not be resorted to, except for supplemental purposes of revenue; then an option will then be given to the States to supply their quotas by previous collections of their own; and that the eventual collection, under the immediate authority of the Union, will generally be made by the officers, and according to the rules, appointed by the several States.

***

The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.  Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.  The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected.  The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs; concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.

Constitutional Intent

“Representation and Direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States” provides an insight into one of the methods of funding for the federal government.  Representation was to be based upon population, and, the funds needed in excess of those derived by other means were to be supplemented proportioned on the strength of voting power of each state in the House of Representatives.

Let’s look at the relationship between taxation, spending, and representation.  First, we have “All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives“, giving that representative body the exclusive power to raise taxes, though concurrence by the Senate and the President were still required.

Now, let’s look at the Senate.  Senators were appointed by the State legislatures, prior to the adoption of the 17th Amendment, and, consequently, would look out for the interest of the State, while the representatives would look out for the interests of the people who comprised their constituency.  So, we have both the people and the state with representation to look out for their respective interests.

If the Representatives felt a need for raising revenue, the would “originate” a bill to that effect.  The Senate, if the burden were put upon the states to raise the revenue, might be concerned and refuse to approve the bill, saving the respective legislatures from having to raise taxes to raise revenues to meet the needs of the federal government.

In a sense, we would have three, independent bodies exerting caution over any increase in revenue; the House of Representatives ; the Senate; and, the respective state legislatures, which would have the responsibility of raising additional revenue, as well as the ire of the people in so doing. 

If we delve a bit deeper into this concept, we can see that there is a consistency with the feelings of the Founders when they coined the phrase, “No Taxation without Representation“.  If we equate the Parliament with the Congress, and, the state legislatures with the colonial assemblies, we can see a parallel, which would require the state legislature (colonial assembly) to enact revenue laws based upon requisitions by the Congress (Parliament).  Clearly, this concept has strong support from our history books.

To address the Founders concerns, perhaps it would be appropriate to have representatives in the Congress to enact and approve revenue bills, and then, requisition to the states; the state legislature to raise the revenues so required.

Also, the intent of the involvement of the states in collecting the revenue was made clear by James Madison (FP #45), when he said, “It is true, that the Confederacy is to possess, and may exercise, the power of collecting internal as well as external taxes throughout the States; but it is probable that this power will not be resorted to, except for supplemental purposes of revenue; then an option will then be given to the States to supply their quotas by previous collections of their own.” 

We need not wonder why this method, of the state paying quotas, was not primary.  The experience of the recent past had proven, under the Articles of Confederation, that collection would be, at best, difficult.  There had been no experience under the Constitution and strengthened federal government to dispel such concern.  Recent history, however, has demonstrated that the federal government is quite able to enforce compliance, which makes moot this concern.

Madison also points out, in the same number, that the primary need for additional revenue would be consistent with, “The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government [which] will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected.”

Subsequently, in 1913, this whole concept of taxation was turned on end.  With the enactment of the 16th and 17th Amendments to the Constitution (coincidently, the same year that the Federal Reserve Act and currency contrary to the Constitution) were ratified, changing our whole economic structure by rendering gold and silver equal to, or subordinate to, promissory notes (Federal Reserve Notes).  Money was relegated to a system without value.

Clearly, the type of expenditures we have today were not within the scope imagined by Madison.  Quite possibly, if the tax structure was maintained along the original concepts, we would not have the enormous debt to repay.

Continuing on with the subject, let’s see what Alexander Hamilton thought should be the primary source of revenue. 

In Federalist Papers # 12, he said, “The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by all enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the most productive source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a primary object of their political cares…” 

He continues, “The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be proportioned, in a great degree, to the quantity of money in circulation, and to the celerity with which it circulates.  Commerce, contributing to both these objects, must of necessity render the payment of taxes easier, and facilitate the requisite supplies to the treasury.”

He then advises that, “[i]t is evident from the state of the country, from the habits of the people, from the experience we have had on the point itself, that it is impracticable to raise any very considerable sums by direct taxation…”

In support of the use of commerce as the primary source of revenue, he says, “No person acquainted with what happens in other countries will be surprised at this circumstance.  In so opulent a nation as that of Britain, where direct taxes from superior wealth must be much more tolerable, and, from the vigor of the government, much more practicable, than in America, for the greatest part of the national revenue is derived from taxes of the indirect kind, from imposts, and from excises.  Duties on imported articles form a large branch of this latter description.”  Included in this is a comparison to England, where the rich are well defined, and a source of revenue.  Something that might be worthy of consideration.

Finally, in this number, he concludes with the significance of the burden on other sources than revenue, when he says, “Revenue, therefore, must be had at all events.  In this country, if the principal part be not drawn from commerce, it must fall with oppressive weight upon land.”

To demonstrate the nature of change in how government operates, we can look at the concerns that Mr. Hamilton placed upon the ability of the country to borrow money, should the need arise, in Federalist Papers #30:

Let us attend to what would be the effects of this situation in the very first war in which we should happen to be engaged.  We will presume, for argument’s sake, that the revenue arising from the impost duties answers the purposes of a provision for the public debt and of a peace establishment for the Union.  Thus circumstanced, a war breaks out.  What would be the probable conduct of the government in such an emergency?  Taught by experience that proper dependence could not be placed on the success of requisitions, unable by its own authority to lay hold of fresh resources, and urged by considerations of national danger, would it not be driven to the expedient of diverting the funds already appropriated from their proper objects to the defence of the State?  It is not easy to see how a step of this kind could be avoided; and if it should be taken, it is evident that it would prove the destruction of public credit at the very moment that it was becoming essential to the public safety.

Clearly, times have changed.  The ability of the government to borrow money on the “public credit” is, without question, indisputable.  So, many of the concerns of the Framers have fallen by the wayside.  Perhaps legitimate under the then circumstances, times, and the new federal government under the Constitution, have changed.  Perhaps, now, it is time to reevaluate the method of federal taxation to be consistent with what was expressed, then, though not put into service because of those concerns.

Some Definitions

From Webster’s 1828 Dictionary:

Apportion, v. t.
To divide and assign in just proportion; to distribute among two or more, a just part or share to each; as, to apportion undivided rights; to apportion time among various employments.

Duty, n.
Tax, toll, impost, or customs; excise; any sum of money required by government to be paid on the importation, exportation, or consumption of goods.  An impost on land or other real estate, and on stock of farmers, is not called a duty, but a direct tax.

Impost, n.
1.  Any tax or tribute imposed by authority; particularly, a duty or tax laid by governments on goods imported, and paid or secured by the importer at the time of importation.

Excise, n.
An inland duty or impost, laid on commodities consumed, or on the retail, which is the last stage before consumption; as an excise on coffee, soap, candles, which a person consumes in his family.  But many articles are excised at the manufactories, as spirit at the distillery, printed silks and linens at the printers, &c.

Capitation, n.
1.  Numeration by the head; a numbering of persons.
2.  The tax, or imposition upon each head or persons; a poll tax.

Income, n.
That gain which proceeds from labor, business or property of any kind; the produce of a farm; the rent of houses; the proceeds of professional business; the profits of commerce or of occupation; the interest of money or stock in funds.

Tarif, n.
1.  Properly, a list or table of goods with the duties or customs to be paid for the same, either on importation or exportation, whether such duties are imposed by the government of a country, or agreed on by the princes or governments of two countries holding commerce with each other.
2.  A list or table of duties or customs to be paid on goods imported or exported.

Considerations

There can be little doubt that the structure of government and apportionment had a purpose, in the minds of the Framers.  At the time of the Federal Reserve Act, 16th and 17th Amendments [1913], the national debt had remained relatively level with that of just after the Civil War, about 2.5 billion dollars.  Within just a few years, it has gone from that stable 2.5 billion to nearly 5,000 times that amount in 2010.  Can there be any question as to the ability of the government to borrow money.  The problem remains, however, that as we continue to borrow, can that debt be repaid.  Taxation has become a means to pay the interest, though it is not sufficient to retire the debt.

By having direct taxes, without apportionment, easily imposed upon us, we have implemented a direct line from our wallets to the government.  Considering that all direct taxes were intended to be apportioned, we can look at the Sixteenth Amendment to see what it really says.  Remember, the Constitution required apportionment, and, it anticipated that direct taxes would be on land, not on the earnings of a workingman.  The Amendment reads:

The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.

Rather than going in to the legal ramifications of the Amendment, which has yet to be resolved by the courts, we can wonder what “gain” (definition of income) meant, then, as well as, if it was a direct tax upon something not previously granted, why it had to include the exclusion of apportionment.

If our debt had not grown since the civil war, and there was no need for additional revenue, why would Congress propose, and the states ratify, an amendment that created a completely new method of taxation.  After all, they had not exercised all of those taxes anticipated by the Framers, though in the slow evolution of the “income tax” to what it has become, invading our private records for information; multitudes of new officers to seize our property.  After all, from an historical perspective, we can look to the Declaration of Independence to see that such a means as was to be used to collect this new tax was well defined in the objections to the British Rule that resulted in our independency.  From the enumerated complaints in the Declaration, “He has erected a multitude of new offices, and sent hither swarms of officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance”.  What conceivable method of taxation could require more new offices and officers to harass our people and eat out their substance?

Now, with this in mind, what impelled Congress to establish the most burdensome and intrusive means of tax collection possible?  Duties are based upon tariffs, and easily collected at ports of entry.  Excise taxes are collected by those licensed for the particular activity upon which the tax applies.  Finally, land, which doesn’t move, is already assessed as to value, and has collection methods in place.  Instead, the Congress established a new form of taxation, never before conceived as to being practical, and at present, requiring review and collecting from over two hundred million people, along with the forces necessary to review, audit and collect those taxes.  To add to the idiocy of that system, how many of the people’s own hours of life are committed, each year, to the production of the necessary records to satisfy those tens of thousands of agents, taking that time away from them, their families, their leisure, and their productive pursuits?

We need to consider, too, a couple more events in our history that reflect on taxation.  First was the excise tax on WHISKEY, resulting in the Whiskey Rebellion in 1791.  The country needed money.  They imposed a tax on the production of whiskey.  Whiskey was a product of surplus grain. Since the producers of whiskey in Pennsylvania had very little in the way of circulating money, they were unable to pay the taxes.  So, they would either have to stop producing, which meant that they could not barter with the whiskey, or they would have to find some “hard currency” to pay the taxes.  They were put down by force, and all we have to gain from this event is the experience of the effect of misplaced excise taxes.

The other situation lead to the bloodiest war in our history.  Contrary to popular belief, the slave issue was not the primary event leading to the Civil War.  Slavery did not become an issue until well into the war, though states had seceded from the Union even before Lincoln was inaugurated.

Congress, however, had enacted tariffs that were unequal, and detrimental to the South and its economy.  High important tariffs forced them to buy manufactured goods from the North, paying more than what overseas source would require for the same products.  It was based upon forms of taxes more than slavery that forced the disjointing of the Union.

Conclusion

Federal taxes must be Constitutional, and should be as little burden on the people as possible.  Regardless of what the tax is imposed on, the people will ultimately be the source of that revenue.  If on import duties, the people will pay higher prices.  If on excise taxes, the people will pay higher prices.  The importers and manufacturers will simply add the cost to the product to recover the cost of the taxes.

Excise, impost and duties can be applied in an equitable manner if due consideration (not benefit for contributions to campaigns) of their source is considered. 

Let’s look at Duty taxes.  If the duty is on a product produced in a foreign country, and also produced in the United States, a duty tax that penalized the foreign importer in favor of the American producer might be warranted, unless it was high enough to be protective of the American product, allowing excessive profit to the American Manufacturer.  Balance of trade should also be considered with regard to import duties.  If we allow too many imports and reduce our exports, we create an imbalance of trade whereby we owe foreign nations more than they owe us.  Ultimately, this will have a detrimental effect on our whole economy.

Consideration should also be made as to whether a product is a necessity, or, for comfortable life, or, a luxury, something only desired by a small portion of our population.  Consideration of the circumstance that lead to the Civil War, where the duties tended to place an economic burden on an entire region should be avoided.

To provide fairness in such taxes, perhaps a list of general categories could be developed and all products within that category be taxed at the same rate, or a very small range within that category.

Excise taxes pose a different sort of problem.  When the tax is applied to one object, the price of that object is increased.  In many instances, today, the tax on an item may well exceed the cost to produce, distribute, and sell that item.  This amounts to an extremely unfair burden on those who use that product.  It might also provide an economic favor to a similar item that is not subject to the same excise tax.

* * *

Now, let us look at the direct taxes.  At the time of the Constitution, there were two forms of direct tax.  One was on land; the other was a capitation tax, which was an equal tax on each ‘head’.  One form of capitation tax was the poll tax, which was made illegal by the 19th Amendment.  The only tax even remotely similar to the Capitation Tax, that we have, today, though not envisioned by the Framers, is the income tax.  It is not apportioned, though the Framers considered apportioning to be absolutely necessary in both direct taxes and representation.  Surely, the impracticality, along with the expense associated with collecting the income tax, makes it a likely candidate for history, not for a means of efficiently and effectively raising revenue.

Perhaps an alternative in the method of collection, consistent with what Mr. Madison gave us, would be in order.  Suppose we realize that the federal government will never again face the difficulty in receiving monies due from requisitions to the states.  Can there be any doubt that the means, and, more than likely, the willingness to “pay up”, by the states, exists?  Especially, if the 17th Amendment is repealed, thereby returning to the state legislatures the means to resist excessive taxation that they will have to eat out [the] substance of their constituent’s pockets?  Clearly, they understand more than the federal government the economic abilities of their own state.  Clearly, they would best represent us in defending against excessive spending by the federal government.

We can include another benefit to this method of collection.  Today, the federal government collects taxes through their burdensome system.  They then establish a bureaucracy, which is assigned the responsibility to determine redistribution back to the states, based upon evaluation of need determined by people appointed, not elected, into that capacity.  How susceptible to undue influence is such a system?  And, how many dollars are squandered in the re-administration of funds that left the state only to be returned to them?  Finally, how much influence has the redistribution given to the state and local government by simply putting conditions, probably detrimental to the people, on those agencies that are the beneficiary of these returned funds?  Are not our local and state governments more qualified to determine where this money should go to support the needs of the state?  Need we pay federal people to ask state people, whom we also have to pay, to decide the what, where and how much will come back to the state, and pay both ends of this middleman when he is not even necessary if the State collects the funds before settling the requisition, and then retains that which is left?