Burns Chronicles N^o 30
Officer?   What Officer?

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
September 26, 2016

In the Indictments, both in Oregon and Nevada, there is one Count that raises some serious questions.  The exact wording, to the extent of understanding the charges being made, is as follows:

For Oregon:

COUNT 1

(Conspiracy to Impede Officers of the United States)

(18 u.s.c. § 372)

On or about November 5, 2015, and continuing through February 12, 2016, in the District of Oregon, defendants…

It then goes on to list the Defendants and makes some rather general accusations, WITHOUT naming “Officers” or, how they were impeded.

Next, we look to the Nevada Indictment:

COUNT TWO

Conspiracy to Impede or Injure a Federal Officer

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 372)

Then, they go into a narrative, missing, of course, any named “Officers”, or any specific acts that constitute impeding.

The statute cited reads:

18 U.S.C. § 372 : US Code – Section 372: Conspiracy to impede or injure officer

If two or more persons in any State, Territory, Possession, or District conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust, or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof, or to induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave the place, where his duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duties, each of such persons shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than six years, or both.

Now, our concern, as much as with the Indictments lacking specificity, is the Statute, itself.  So, let’s first trace the history of the Statute, and then we will look into just who an “Officer” might be.

. Continue reading ‘Burns Chronicles No 30 – Officer? What Officer?’ »

Burns Chronicles N^o 29
Public Lands – Part 2
The Federal Government Has No Jurisdiction

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
September 21, 2016

In a previous article, “It’s a Matter of Jurisdiction“, we looked at the constitutional aspect of jurisdiction.  Many will simply ignore that aspect, since they believe that the government is not bound by the Constitution, anymore.  So, we must wonder whether those who enacted laws, more recently, regarding jurisdiction, especially on lands that were obtained for certain purposes, were as doubtful of the intent of the Constitution.

The original buildings on the Refuge were built during the Great Depression under one of the various work programs intended to provide employment.  The land that they were built on was acquired by the government on February 18, 1935.  The remainder of the government-owned land in Section 35, as the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge was expanded, was acquired on November 22, 1948.

Shortly after the first parcel was acquired, on April 27, 1935, Congress enacted “AN ACT To provide for the protection of land resources against soil erosion, and for other purposes”, at 49 STAT 163.  Those “other purposes did include uses anticipated “to preserve public lands and relieve unemployment“.  That Act applied:

(a) On lands owned or controlled by the United States or any of its agencies, with the cooperation of the agency having jurisdiction thereof; and
(b) On any other lands, upon obtaining proper consent or the necessary rights or interests in such lands.

So, it was recognized that the federal government need not have jurisdiction, but more about why, later.

The benefits of the Act would be extended where local government would extend “reasonable safeguards for the enforcement of State and local laws imposing suitable permanent restrictions on the use of such lands…”

So, we see no effort to presume prior jurisdiction, to make all needful rules and regulations, as per Article IX, § 3, cl. 2, or to presume a necessity to require the State to cede the lands to the federal government, as per Article I, § 8, cl. 17, since there were no “Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings”.

Then, on June 29, 1936, Congress went even further in abiding by the Constitution by clarifying their position on “exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever” (I:8:17), with “AN ACT To waive any exclusive jurisdiction over premises of resettlement or rural-rehabilitation projects…; and for other purposes”, at 49 STAT 2035.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the acquisition by the United States of any real property heretofore or hereafter acquired for any resettlement project or any rural-rehabilitation project for resettlement purposes heretofore or hereafter constructed with funds allotted or transferred to the Resettlement Administration pursuant to the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, or any other law, shall not be held to deprive any State or political subdivision thereof of its civil and criminal jurisdiction in and over such property, or to impair the civil rights under the local law of the tenants or inhabitants on such property ; and insofar as any such jurisdiction has been taken away from any such State or subdivision, or any such rights have been impaired, jurisdiction over any such property is hereby ceded back to such State or subdivision.

So, not only did they relinquish all “civil or criminal jurisdiction“, but they ceded back any jurisdiction that had been taken away from any State or subdivision.  Now the record had been set straight, in accordance with the Constitution.

. Continue reading ‘Burns Chronicles No 29 – Public Lands – Part 2 – The Federal Government Has No Jurisdiction’ »

Burns Chronicles N^o 28
Public Trial
Mistrial? What stinking Mistrial?

Judge Anna Brown

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
September 19, 2016

A rather interesting what, and from a lay standpoint unjust, occurrence, happened both in the paper chase (at this point, nearly 1300 docket entries) and in the courtroom. It had to do with the testimony of the government’s first witness, Harney County Sheriff David Ward. It was a Motion for Mistrial.

An interesting note on the Motion is that we obtained a copy shortly before it was “SEALED”. This led to the admonishment that is addressed below.

It all began on the 2nd day of the trial (Wednesday, September 14), during cross-examination by Ammon Bundy’s attorney, Marcus R. Mumford is questioning Sheriff Ward.  Here are excerpts from the Motion, taken from the rough-draft transcripts:

Q.  And you had conducted some investigation, into Bunkerville?

A.  I had.

Q.  And did that investigation come – that was in the process of those meetings that you had with the U.S. attorney, and the FBI?

A.  I had – I had gone on to the Internet and googled it, it’s amazing what you can find on there.

I found videos from the things that happened at Bunkerville. I – I looked at a lot of different – lot of different things that happened, throughout that incident. And the thought that have happening in my community scared the hell out of me, where I saw armed people lined up on both sides, advancing, you know, with – with one side advancing against another.

I had learned some of unstable people who had left that situation, and killed two police officers, while they were eating lunch in a restaurant.

I think that there are – there are a lot of circumstances I was attempting to avoid in my community, sir.

Then, Mumford asked that some of Ward’s testimony be stricken:

MUMFORD: Your Honor, I would move to strike that.

THE COURT: Move to strike what, sir?

MUMFORD: The nonresponsive part of the –

THE COURT: I don’t know what you identify as nonresponsive.

The answer seemed responsive to your question, so be specific.

MUMFORD: Okay. Well – I think it was a yes-or-no question, your Honor.

THE COURT: Is there another objection?

Mumford, failing to make any progress, is simply abandoned by Judge Brown. However, Ryan Bundy, acting pro se (representing himself), jumps in, once the Judge recognizes that he, too, has an objection.

DEFENDANT RYAN BUNDY: Yes, my objection, your Honor, hearsay, there, it alludes to events that were not necessarily related to – to the situation.

THE COURT: The court reporter is not hearing you, Mr. Bundy, because of your microphone not being on.

Would you –

DEFENDANT RYAN BUNDY: The mic is on.

THE COURT: Let’s try again. The court reporter wasn’t hearing, would you please restate your objection?

DEFENDANT RYAN BUNDY: Yes, hearsay.

He’s tying in persons that were not involved it (pause, conferring.)

Prejudicial, I change that to prejudicial.

About the folks supposedly killing people that were not associated with us.

THE COURT: Jurors, I’m going to ask you to disregard the witness’s references to events that occurred in Nevada that had to do with the police officers being killed, and whether they were or weren’t associated with Bunkerville.

The answer generally was responsive, in that it reflected the witness’s state of mind, but you’re not to consider that particular part of his answer in any part of your consideration of this evidence.

Now, the transcript is a “rough-draft transcript”, and we are told that there was an Order made by the Judge, referencing “Court’s Sealed Order 1141”. Then, she goes on to admonish Mumford for using quotes from the “rough-draft transcript” in his Motion.

. Continue reading ‘Burns Chronicles No 28 – Public Trial – Mistrial? – What stinking Mistrial?’ »

Burns Chronicles N^o 27
Public Lands – Part 1
It’s a Matter of Jurisdiction

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
September 13, 2016

Thomas Jefferson had proposed an ordinance to deal with the lands won along with independence from Britain in 1784, and not belonging to any State, any lands that might be relinquished when considered to have been granted by Royal Charter.  The Continental Congress ratified the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 on July 13, 1787.  The First Congress under the newly ratified Constitution, which met from March 4, 1789, to March 4, 1791, then reaffirmed that same ordinance.  This slightly revised version reaffirmed on July 13, 1789, and is known as the Northwest Ordinance of 1789.

The Fourth Article, unchanged in the two versions, reads, in part:

Article the Fourth.  The said territory, and the States which may be formed therein, shall forever remain a part of this Confederacy of the United States of America…  The legislatures of those districts or new States, shall never interfere with the primary disposal of the soil by the United States in Congress assembled, nor with any regulations Congress may find necessary for securing the title in such soil to the bona fide purchasers.  No tax shall be imposed on lands the property of the United States; and, in no case, shall nonresident proprietors be taxed higher than residents.

Note that “primary disposal” seems to be the objective of holding the land.  That disposal would serve two very significant purposes in the creation of a nation that would grow from those first thirteen states.  First, it would raise revenue for the payment of the debt incurred because of the War of Independence, and it continued to provide revenue for the fledgling nation.

Second, it would provide land for people to populate the barren regions, first, across the Allegheny Mountains, then on to the Mississippi River, next to the Rocky Mountains, and finally to the Pacific Ocean.  With each of these principal movements, as those people moved westward, the resources of the most resource rich country in the world would develop into the greatest nation in the world.

. Continue reading ‘Burns Chronicles No 27 – Public Lands – Part 1 – It’s a Matter of Jurisdiction’ »

Liberty or Laws?

Are You a Voter, or, an Elector?

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
September 6, 2016

During this current election cycle, a matter has constantly recurred, that of the federal government mandating, primarily through the District and Circuit Courts, who can vote and what requirements, if any, are necessary to do so.

To understand what has gone wrong, we will have to look to the Constitution, what was required to vote in national elections in the past, and how the federal government has supplanted the States regarding the authority over who may vote.  There is also concern about the Electoral College, so we need to see what was intended when the Constitution was written.  It is necessary to follow this history of voting to understand just how Article IV, § 4 of the Constitution has become moot.  The pertinent part of that Article reads:

The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government…

So, let’s begin with references to voting and elections in the Constitution.  In Article I (Legislative Branch), we find:

Section 2 — The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

Well, clearly, it is the prerogative of the State to determine what “Qualifications [are] requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”  The federal then yields to the state’s authority concerning who is qualified to vote in federal elections.  The use of the term “Electors”, in this section, is what most would simply call “voters”.  They elect the Representatives, but their qualifications are based upon the qualifications that State has set for its most “numerous Branch.”  There is no such condition for the Senate, like the Senators, prior to the 17th Amendment, were chosen by the state legislatures.

Next, we see that the Constitution leaves a degree of discretion to the federal government, though quite limited:

Section 4 — The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.

It says that “Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations…”, though since it refers to itself, when it says “alter such regulation”, it can only refer to “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections…”  Otherwise, the previous (Section 2) provision would be without substance.  The same power or authority cannot be granted to two different parties, the federal government and the State governments.  That would be contrary to any practical possibility that both would agree to any acceptable determination of who could vote, especially if one had the guarantee of a Republican Form of Government.  As we will see, the states that existed in 1874 had diverse requirements.  There was some commonality, but the federal government could only intervene to assure that such voting was done timely, not done at a place that would limit access to voting, and of the manner (not requirements), such as paper ballots.  At that time (before the Seventeenth Amendment), the state legislatures elected the Senators.

Next, we have:

Section 5 — Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members…

Now, there is another grant to the federal government, but only to “Judge… the Elections“.  That, obviously, could only extend to judging the results of the elections, as they cannot be judged before being completed.  This would include Returns.  The Qualifications, of course, is to satisfy the requirements regarding who may serve in the House of Representatives and the Senate, found in Article I. Section 2, clause 2 and Section 3, clause 3.

Initially, Article II (Executive Branch) set forth the method by which the President would be elected:

Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.

The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves.  And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate.  The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted.  The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President.  But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; A quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice.  In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President.  But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice President.

The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.

Now, in the election of the President, the Electors are selected according to the “Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct“.  In the subsequent section on the “Electoral College“, the disparity of this method has become problematic.  However, we can see that the federal government may only “determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes.”

This procedure was changed in 1804 with the ratification of the 12th Amendment.  The Constitution had the second highest vote receiver as Vice-President, and it was determined that the two highest vote getters, running in opposition to each other, would then share the responsibilities of the Executive Branch of Government.  The 12th Amendment changed the voting by the Electors to one vote for President and one vote for Vice-President, rather than, as described above, where they voted for “two Persons.”

The only other amendment to affect the election of the President was ratified in 1961 as the 23rd Amendment; it simply gave Washington, D.C., the District of Columbia, the ability to participate by allowing it to select Electors for the election of the President and Vice-President, just as the States.

. Continue reading ‘Liberty or Laws – Are You a Voter, or, an Elector?’ »

Burns Chronicles N^o 25
Juror Shopping & Secrecy

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
August 22, 2016

The government may have given the Grand Jury sufficient information to properly find “probable cause”.  It is also possible that they may have simply convinced the Grand Jury to find “probable cause” based upon explaining to them that they had given them enough information for them to indict the 26 people charged in the final (third) Grand Jury Superseding Indictment.  We will be looking at the Indictment, Case Law, the Grand Jury selection process, and the information provided to the Grand Jury.

. Continue reading ‘Burns Chronicles No 25 – Juror Shopping & Secrecy’ »

The Bundy Affair – #14
“public trial” v. Star Chamber

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
August 11, 2016

Recently, the Las Vegas Review Journal petitioned the Court to allow access to certain evidence that would be used against the Defendants.  They even asserted that they would have no problem if names were omitted from the documents.  This was filed in response to the government’s Proposed Protective Order, a request that the Court seal and keep from the public some of the discovery materials, certain evidentiary documents, and exhibits that could be used in the trial against the Defendants.  Quite simply, it is all of the evidence acquired by the government in their pursuit of the persecution of 19 people that were involved in the Bundy Ranch Affair, nearly two years before the matter was indicted by a Grand Jury.  The Court has yet to rule on the matter.

Before we proceed, the discovery material would show what the government did, what they acquired, what their practices are, and whether they had subversive agents embedded within the group that afforded protection to the Bundy Ranch in April 2014.

As you follow along in pursuit of the government’s position, and the legal precedence, some of it even distorted perversions regarding the original intent of the Founders, also keep in mind that, historically, spies and entrapment were used against enemies, and spies against foreign governments, but never sent within the population that was supposed to be protected by that government.  For, to do so essentially, makes the people an enemy of the government, or, rather, the government the enemy of the people.

So, let’s look at what the Supreme Court has said, with regard to the Sixth Amendment.

In 1979, the United States Supreme Court, in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 US 368, addressed whether the press and public could be denied access to the court and evidence in a pre-trial hearing.  Although the decision was based solely (and rightfully) on a pre-trial hearing, the decision of the Court ventured further into the entire concept of the intent and purpose of a “public trial”, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.

The Petitioner, Gannett Co., is a publisher and among others, published USA Today.  Greathouse and Jones were defendants in a state prosecution for second-degree murder, robbery, and grand larceny.  They requested that the public and the press be excluded from the hearing, arguing that the unabated buildup of adverse publicity had jeopardized their ability to receive a fair trial.  The trial judge granted the motion.  The following are excerpts from that decision:

Petitioner [Gannett] then moved to have the closure order set aside but the trial judge, after a hearing, refused to vacate the order or grant petitioner immediate access to the transcript, ruling that the interest of the press and the public was outweighed by the defendants’ right to a fair trial.

The New York Court of Appeals… [held] the exclusion of the press and the public from the pretrial proceeding.

The Constitution does not give petitioner [Gannett] an affirmative right of access to the pretrial proceeding, all the participants in the litigation having agreed that it should be closed to protect the fair-trial rights of the defendants.

Publicity concerning pretrial suppression hearings poses special risks of unfairness because it may influence public opinion against a defendant and inform potential jurors of inculpatory information wholly inadmissible at the actual trial.

The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a public trial is for the benefit of the defendant alone.  The Constitution nowhere mentions any right of access to a criminal trial on the part of the public.  While there is a strong societal interest in public trials, nevertheless members of the public do not have an enforceable right to a public trial that can be asserted independently of the parties in the litigation.  The adversary system of criminal justice is premised upon the proposition that the public interest is fully protected by the participants in the litigation. Continue reading ‘The Bundy Affair #14 – “public trial” v. Star Chamber’ »

Burns Chronicles N^o 23
Terrorism Enhanced Penalties v. Due Process

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
August 10, 2016

So far, ten of those charged in United States v. Ammon Bundy, et al, have pled guilty, and the eleventh is soon to follow. They are, as follows:

• Jason Blomgren (Joker J), pleaded guilty to a federal conspiracy charge.
• Brian Cavalier (Booda), pleaded guilty to a federal conspiracy charge and a charge of possessing firearms or dangerous weapons in a federal facility.
• Blaine Cooper, pleaded guilty to a federal conspiracy charge.
• Travis Cox, pleaded guilty to a federal conspiracy charge.
• Eric Flores, pleaded guilty to a federal conspiracy charge.
• Wesley Kjar, pleaded guilty to a federal conspiracy
• Corey Lequieu, pleaded guilty to a federal conspiracy charge.
• Joseph O’Shaughnessy, pleaded guilty to a federal conspiracy
• Ryan Payne, pleaded guilty to a federal conspiracy charge.
• Geoffrey Stanek, pleaded guilty to a federal conspiracy charge.
• Jon Ritzheimer, scheduled to plea

So, why are they pleading? Is it because they really think that they are guilty?

Most, if not all, of those above have been “intimidated” or “threatened“, by federal prosecutors, either directly, or through their appointed counsel, that a Terrorism Enhancement could result in a sentence of 30 years, possibly for each count.

For a little background, over twenty years ago, I reported on a trial (see below) that I would eventually learn to be one where the Federal Sentencing Guidelines had brought into our judicial system something that was very foreign to the system of justice, as implemented by the Founders. Perhaps it would be beneficial to begin with an understanding of the judicial system that was intended, based upon many centuries of evolution in the British Common Law.

The English Constitution, even before the Magna Carta (1215 AD), began evolving in 1080 AD, and was also the beginning of a legal evolutionary process that sometimes went backwards, but most often went forward, in an effort to provide justice rather than blind obedience to laws. It was the English Common Law that was the foundation of jurisprudence for the Founders.

This foundation is evidenced even in current statutes, such as Florida Statutes (2015), where we find:

2.01 Common law and certain statutes declared in force.—The common and statute laws of England which are of a general and not a local nature, with the exception hereinafter mentioned, down to the 4th day of July, 1776, are declared to be of force in this state; provided, the said statutes and common law be not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the acts of the Legislature of this state.

We can also look to the Maryland Constitution (2008), which provides, in its Declaration of Rights:

Art. 5. (a)
(1) That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that Law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity…

In the same Declaration of Rights, we also find:

Art. 23. In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.

Now, the Maryland Constitution predates the United States Constitution, as it was first ratified by the People on November 11, 1776 – over a decade before the Constitution. Clearly, the understanding (original intent) of the Maryland Constitution and the United States Constitution were predicated upon those laws that then existed, and definition, or intent, of the words used, were as they were understood at the time. Absent a lawful change of definition, those definitions and intentions are still the body of the law and should be recognized as such.

Also true of the Common Law, at that time, and remember, the intention is still the same, is that a jury determines law and fact. However, there is one more aspect that comes into play. The jury also imposed the sentence, as they were the judge of facts, those which determined the severity of the crime; the law, what was intended and the extent applicable to the case at hand; and, by combining the two, would determine the sentence to be imposed, if the accused were found to be guilty.

. Continue reading ‘Burns Chronicles No 23 – Terrorism Enhanced Penalties v. Due Process’ »

The Harassment of the Hammonds
Act III – Finale – “a long train of abuses and usurpations…”

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
August 3, 2016

Upon examination of the government’s trail of paperwork spanning a period of nearly two decades , between the Hammonds and the US Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) at the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge (MNWR), it is apparent that they were being persecuted by the federal government for simply insisting upon exercising their historical right to trail cattle. This began long before the controlled burn in 2002 and the backfire in 2006 that resulted in them being sentenced to five years in federal prison.

What is plainly “a long train of abuses” has been well documented by the documents obtained by those who made copies of public records (not classified) that were found at the headquarters of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge. Though there were many more incidents, this review of the paper trail of correspondence between the Hammonds and the FWS , as well as other intergovernmental records, clearly demonstrates that abuse. This provides us a bit of transparency to the federal government’s treatment of those who had every right to their historical usage of those public lands.

On October 26, Dwight Hammond notified Fish and Wildlife Services (FWS) at MNWR, some 30 miles south of Burns, Oregon, and explained that historically, he did not have to notify anyone to “trail” his cattle (for you city folk, this means herding cattle along a route from one point to another). FWS attempted to impose a requirement that they be notified as to the number of cattle, the route, the time, and the date of such movements. The new policy also disallowed grazing off of the trail while the cattle were being moved, held Dwight to a schedule by FWS, and demanded that he obtain a permit from them for each move.

During March of 1987, Dwight traveled to Portland, taking maps and explaining to higher-level bureaucrats the problems with the implementation of this new “policy” that was contrary to his historical rights. Subsequently, Dwight wondered whether anyone at FWS even paid attention to anything he had to say. Revealingly, one bureaucrat admitted that the government acknowledged his right to trail cattle through the MNWR over the historic route, yet, he still insisted that Dwight trail his cattle as quickly as possible so as not to damage the rehabilitation of vegetation along Bridge Creek.

Accusations that Dwight had been “verbally abusive” against MNWR personnel cropped up the following month, particularly revolving around the issue of the government fencing, resulting in limiting access to certain areas, including water. Over the course of the subsequent months, right into 1988, internal MNWR memos revealed that some of the bureaucrats realized they contributed to the “soured personal relationships,” which created a climate of “serious mutual distrust.” Flip-flopping on whether the Hammonds enjoyed a right or privilege to trail their cattle, constructing a boundary fence that impeded such trailing, which admittedly increased costs, were but just two elements that exacerbated an already tense relationship between the Hammond ranchers and the MNWR personnel. The long and short of it is that the MNWR bureaucrats unilaterally imposed their interpretation of the “regulations” upon the Hammonds with little warning, and then acted as if the Hammonds were being “uncooperative” for simply insisting that they abide by the previous agreement for conducting operations.

In 1994, the Hammonds received a letter from the MNWR manager stating that a “special use permit” will not be reissued to the Hammonds because their lack of “compliance” with Refuge “regulations” over the past several years, despite the fact that there had been a six year hiatus once MNWR personnel had realized they had overstepped their bounds. Dwight appeals the manager’s decision, arguing that there was a failure to provide full disclosure of the circumstances leading to the denial of not only the permit, but also all FOIA requests. Two months later in April, a higher-level bureaucrat denies Dwight’s appeal on the grounds that he made threats against MNWR personnel. A flurry of notices and appeals are sent out for the remainder of the year, going all the way up to the Department of the Interior; parallel to all of this, a federal Circuit Court awarded the Hammonds right to the use of the Bird Waterhole.

Unknown criminal charges against the Hammonds were proposed by the MNWR manager to be dropped by an Assistant United States Attorney for events that occurred on August 3, 1994 provided that the Hammonds not sue FWS and that they agree to notify MNWR personnel when they intended to trail their cattle, which they still, inexplicably, need a special use permit for. Obviously, the precedent of Revised Statute 2477 recognizes the historic right of the Hammonds to trail their cattle; this is further bolster by the Ash, Wetzel, and Miller Affidavit.

Whether it be the subsequent removal of culverts, or hauling gravel from a pit, this history of the Hammond’s relationship with the federal government is indicative of the notorious failure of a system that allows such broad discretion to bureaucrats. The MNWR and FWS administrative agencies tried to convert a right of the Hammonds to trail their cattle into a privilege, and when both the legal research and court decisions supported the Hammonds’ position, the bureaucrats scurried like frightened rats in their attempt to demonize the law-abiding ranchers.

The story of the Hammonds prior to the fires reveals the federal administrative agencies use of “lawfare”* to restrict and infringe historic rights involving public lands. Although some might insist that the Hammonds could have avoided their current fate by selling the ranch and “getting out of Dodge,” would this really be the American tradition that made this once great nation — to just pull up stakes at the slightest difficulty? It should come as no surprise, now, that Dwight and Steven Hammond’s status as political prisoners is indicative of what might easily befall many other Americans, should they fail to force the government back to its constitutional limitations.

* The use of laws to conduct a form of warfare against the rights of individuals.

FINISH

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

REFERENCE

• Hammond Legal Trailing Part I (Documents from the Eighties)
• Hammond Legal Trailing Part II (Documents from the Nineties)
• Ash, Wetzel, & Miller’s Affidavit

THE SERIES

1. The Harassment of the Hammonds – Act I (Decade of the Eighties), Scene 1: Introduction
2. The Harassment of the Hammonds – Act I (Decade of the Eighties), Scene 2: October 24, 1986 – March 20, 1987
3. The Harassment of the Hammonds – Act I (Decade of the Eighties), Scene 3: April 2, 1987 – April 15, 1987
4. The Harassment of the Hammonds – Act I (Decade of the Eighties), Scene 4: May 6, 1987 – April 22, 1988
5. The Harassment of the Hammonds – Act I (Decade of the Eighties), Scene 5: May 2, 1988 – May 9, 1988
6. The Harassment of the Hammonds – Act II (Decade of the Nineties), Scene 1: Feb. 18, 1994 – June 9, 1994
7. The Harassment of the Hammonds – Act II (Decade of the Nineties), Scene 2: June 28, 1994 – January 22, 1997
8. The Harassment of the Hammonds – Act II (Decade of the Nineties), Scene 3: February 28, 1997 – May 21, 1997
9. The Harassment of the Hammonds – Act II (Decade of the Nineties), Scene 4: May 22, 1997
10. The Harassment of the Hammonds – Act II (Decade of the Nineties), Scene 5: June 30, 1997 – Aug. 4, 1997
11. The Harassment of the Hammonds – Act II (Decade of the Nineties), Scene 6: Feb. 26, 1998 – Jan. 12, 2004

The Harassment of the Hammonds
Act II – Decade of the Nineties
Scene 6 – Feb. 25, 1998 – Jan. 12, 2004

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
June 20, 2016

This series is not about the two fires and subsequent conviction of Dwight and Steven Hammond.  It is about the abuse, by government agencies, in the two decades prior to the first fire.

Note: Numbers shown thus, {nn} refer to PDF page numbers in the “Hammond Legal Trailing File Part II” pdf file.

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On February 25, 1998, Steven Hammond wrote a letter to the Oregon State Police regarding trespass and hunting in a no hunting area {351-352}. It appears that the OSP had stopped issuing citations to violators after speaking to Refuge personnel. This led to a follow up letter to Dick Munoz, FWS, Portland, addressing the concern and the failure of Malheur FWS to enforce the hunting regulations {353-354}.

On May 12, 1998, Dave Stanbrough faxes Munoz telling him he will draft a response to Steven Hammond’s letter {356}. Munoz implies that the decision not to prosecute the trespassing hunters was in the hands of the OSP, not the Refuge {357-358}.

July 6, 1999, the Bureau of Land Management in Hines, in a letter to Dwight Hammond, advises him that, in response to Dwight’s request of June 9, 1999 (No copy of the request in the obtained documents), they are denying him permission to use his own fencing to control cattle crossing Bridge Creek to get to the Mud Creek Allotment {359-360}. Dave Ward, “Rangeland Management Specialist” in this correspondence.

[Note: This is not the David Ward, Sheriff of Harney County.]

In an undated memo, from Anne Sittauer, MNWR, to Dave Stanborough, a third party report of a meeting on site between Dave Ward and Steven Hammond was supposed to have resulted in a written report by Ward {361-362}.  Steven never received the report but was told that he could not be allowed to trail his cattle to get to the “next allotment”.  Steven did agreed to give 24 hours notice of trailing, but refused to sign any request to trail. Continue reading ‘The Harassment of the Hammonds – Act II – Decade of the Nineties – Scene 6 – Feb. 25, 1998 – Jan. 12, 2004’ »