Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus Scene 4 – Government Fears Habeas Corpus

Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus
Scene 4 – Government Fears Habeas Corpus

paper_shredder

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 27, 2015

Setting the Stage: Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum (the sacred writ) has not been addressed at the Supreme Court since 1890. A recent effort resulted in the Supreme Court simply refusing to rule on a Petition for Habeas Corpus, even after all of the lower courts refused to even acknowledge that right. Now, in the current story, the Court has paid “token” acknowledgment of the right, while endeavoring to quash it — rather than pursuing Justice, as is its constitutional responsibility. Instead, as you will see, the Federal District Court in Montana is there to make sure that the government has no chance of losing a case.

The Government is Afraid of Habeas Corpus

William Krisstofer Wolf (that’s is how the government refers to a friend that we know simply as “Wolf”) and I have known each other for over a year. We have never met, but we have shared many hours of phone conversation, email correspondence, and I can’t count the number of times I was a guest on his radio show on “The Montana Republic”.

Among the subjects discussed in those appearances were “The Plan for Restoration of Constitutional Government“, “Declaration of Dissolution of Government”, “Targeting“, “Committees of Safety“, and “Habeas Corpus – The Guardian of Liberty“. The last, regarding the “Sacred Writ”, Habeas Corpus, was also the subject of some of our private conversations. Wolf fully understands what I had learned, over the past three years, though we had never anticipated having to call upon the sacred writ on his behalf — until he was arrested on March 25, 2015.

Based upon our previous conversations on the subject, I prepared a simple demand for Habeas Corpus (3 pages) and a Power of Attorney authorizing me to speak o his behalf regarding Habeas Corpus. These were Priority mailed to him on March 27, and he executed and attempted to have them delivered to the Court. After numerous attempts to have the guards take and deliver the documents to the Court, and the Court refusing to recognize the prepared Habeas Corpus, Wolf resorted to a one page, handwritten, Habeas Corpus (Court Doc. 1), dated April 1, to wit:

United States of America
v.                                             15-                  -BIL-CSO
William Krisstofer Wolf

In the Honorable Court of:
UNITED STATES Magistrate Judge Carol S. Ostby
On April 1, 2015, I, William Krisstofer Wolf, by the only means available. in Yellowstone Corrections Facility interoffice mail, SERVE on the court a DEMAND FOR HABEAS CORPUS.
In as such, I, William Krisstofer Wolf hereby request to be put on the Docket to Schedule a hearing date on the DEMAND FOR HABEAS CORPUS. This docket request for a scheduling here is needed to allow my Attorney in Fact, who has a Power of Attorney – Specific, time to travel to this Honorable Court to speak on my behalf, by authority of the case of Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 US 146.

Done on this Day, April 1, 2015
/s/William Krisstofer Wolf
Defendant

This was sufficient for the Court to finally take notice of Wolf’s right to challenge both unconstitutional laws and absence of jurisdiction. On April 15, the Court “Received” the document. The Court stated that they would not let the Habeas Corpus hold the Court hostage, so they opened a civil case, on April 16, and filed the handwritten Habeas Corpus and then filed an ORDER (Court Doc. 2), immediately thereafter.

The Court’s Efforts to Quash Habeas Corpus

Here are some of the “claims” made in the ORDER (Court Doc. 2):

  1. [T]he document does not specify the number of the criminal case or indicate in any other way that it is meant to be filed in the criminal case.
  2. [T]he document states that Wolf is acting “by the only means available”; yet counsel was appointed for Wolf in the criminal case on March 26, 2015.
  3. Wolf did not pay the filing fee of $5.00 or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
  4. “In all courts of the United States, the parties may plead and conduct their own causes personally or by counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (emphasis added); see also Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). [She concludes this claim with the statement] “Wolf may litigate this matter pro se, or he may appear through duly qualified and admitted counsel without an attorney-in-fact.
  5. [T]he “‘demand for habeas corpus’ does not set forth any allegations of fact”. “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Wolf cannot mount such an attack until he alleges facts he believes demonstrate that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2242. If Wolf intends to proceed, he must submit an amended petition alleging such facts and explaining why his custody violates the law.
  6. If Wolf intended to seek a detention hearing in the criminal case that is pending against him, he should discuss this with his attorney, who can file a motion for a detention hearing under the criminal case number, CR 15-20-MJ-BLG-CSO. If Wolf wishes to file the motion on his own, the Court will then need to consider the motion and decide whether to entertain the motion from Wolf personally, notwithstanding his representation by counsel. But the rule that an attorney-in-fact may not act for Wolf in court applies in all federal cases, civil or criminal. Kelley, 539 F.2d at 1201-03. Moreover, in the criminal case, Wolf’s attorney-in-fact can play no role at all. Wolf is the person charged.

Response to The Court’s Efforts to Quash Habeas Corpus

So, let’s look at what the correct response is to the above claims:

As far as Claim #1, Wolf had no access to documents, and by this time, he was “blocked” from calling some of his friends on the phone. At the time that he wrote the handwritten, which was long after the typed 3 page version (Court Doc. 3), he had only the “Criminal Complaint“, and from that, was only able to extract “15-     -BIL-CSO”, which he properly quoted in the handwritten document, and it was styled as all subsequent filings, “United States of America v. William Krisstofer Wolf”, just as the Court did. So, that doesn’t take rocket science, heck, even the Post Office could have figured that out.

To Claim #2, that he is acting “by the only means available”, raises an interesting question. Wolf stated to the Judge, at his next appearance, that he does not recognize the jurisdiction of the Court and he had no intention of entering a plea. So, if he were to go through the court appointed attorney, an officer of that court, would he not be submitting to the jurisdiction that that Court? There is little doubt, as you will see, that the Court will resort to obfuscation and chicanery in an effort to undermine his right to challenge that persecution that is currently being conducted against him.

Claim #3 says that he “did not pay the filing fee of $5.00”. I can find no reference to the filing fee in the “UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA – Local Rules of Procedure“. However, with regard to:

Rule 3.1 Filing a New Case.

(a) Required Items. The following items are required to file a new case:

(1) a complaint, petition, or other originating document;

(2) unless the originating document is a petition for writ of habeas corpus, payment of the full amount of the filing fee or a motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); and

(3) a civil cover sheet, unless the plaintiff or petitioner is proceeding pro se.

So, the originating document (1)was provided, though they refused the first and opened the case based upon the handwritten document. As to the fee, there is an exception for Habeas Corpus (2), and otherwise, only the full amount can be accepted. It does not address any partial, or alternate fee, such as $5.00, it simply exempts Habeas Corpus from fees. As it exempts the requirement for a cover sheet (3), if he is proceeding pro se (presumably, that would also apply to someone proceeding “pro per”. So, why the effort to extort (yes, that is the legal term) $5.00 from Wolf? Or, is it an effort to simply place obstructions in the way, to discourage his attempt to seek his right to challenge the Court?

Now, with Claim #4, we enter into a rather interesting aspect, which deals directly with our rights and efforts to force us into submission to the dictates of the government. This will be similar to those in #5 and #6, though we will consider them separately. The claim cites both 28 U.S.C. § 1654 and the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). Consequently, “[a]ny individual acting without an attorney must appear personally and may not delegate that duty to any other person who is not a member of the bar of this Court.” D. Mont. L.R. 83.8(a) [Local Rules of Procedure]; see also United States v. Kelley, 539 F.2d 1199, 1201-03 (9th Cir. 1976).

28 U.S. Code § 1654 – Appearance personally or by counsel
In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.

As stated earlier, a writ “is a form of written command in the name of a court or other legal authority to act, or abstain from acting, in some way.” It requires no plea, nor is it a case; it is a request for the court to command an action, which, in the matter of Habeas Corpus, is to issue the writ to raise the questions posed by the person requesting the writ. From that point, it’s not a matter of innocence or guilt, it is to assure that there is proper legal authority regarding the action upon which it is based.

The next citation is the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35:

And be it further enacted, That in all courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by assistance of such counsel or attorneys at law as by the rules of the said courts respectively shall be permitted to manage and conduct causes therein… for crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United States, and all civil actions in which the United States shall be concerned… in the respective courts before which the suits or prosecutions shall be.

In the broadest construction, that “assistance of counsel”, which clearly is not an “attorney at law”, hence the “or”, nor the party, himself, hence the other “or”, which leaves the possibility that a party, a person, may, since he is also capable of taking all responsibility upon himself, assign another to speak on his behalf, as an “attorney in fact”.

The Court references D. Mont. L.R. 83.8(a):

83.8 Self-Represented Litigants.

(a) Any individual acting without an attorney must appear personally and may not delegate that duty to any other person who is not a member of the bar of this Court. A selfrepresented person is bound by the Federal Rules and all applicable local rules. Sanctions, including but not limited to entry of default judgment or dismissal with prejudice, may be imposed for failure to comply with local rules.

This Rule applies to “litigants. This will be addressed along with the cited Kelley case.

Regarding United States v. Kelley, as we look at that case, we might wonder just what the Court was thinking, or was it stabbing blindly, in the dark, to endeavor to equate Kelley with the current matter, the writ. Kelley was being prosecuted. He was not seeking to question the constitutionality of the law, nor the jurisdiction. First, “he argues that he had a right to be represented by a non-lawyer.” Then, “Kelley sought to have his trusted friend Hurd, who was well-versed on Kelley’s monetary theory, serve as trial counsel. Hurd is a roofer and not a licensed attorney. The district court denied the request and prohibited Hurd from sitting at the counsel table or consulting with Kelley during the course of the trial.”

It is well known that if you don’t assert a right, the Court will not grant you that right. Kelley wanted Hurd to sit with him and counsel him. Kelley did not provide a “power of attorney”, according to the decision, he just wanted Hurd to sit and advise him. It doesn’t begin to approach the question at hand. This case is not on point, since it is silent on the point that the Court is trying to make about power of attorney and attorney in fact, and whether this is applicable to a writ, instead of litigation.

Finally, she says that he “may litigate this matter pro se, or he may appear through duly qualified and admitted counsel without an attorney-in-fact.” “Litigate means, “To dispute or contend in form of law; to settle a dispute or seek relief in a court of law; to carry on a suit… a judicial contest.” This is not a dispute, it is simply seeking an answer to a challenge to jurisdiction and constitutionality. As stated before, it is “a form of written command in the name of a court… to act, or abstain from acting, in some way.” It is not an adversarial proceeding.

Wolf had provided a “Power of Attorney”, making Gary Hunt his “Attorney in Fact”, and that was submitted to the Court and filed in the case. Therefore, it is before the Court. The Court, however, challenges Wolf’s right to have someone other than the court appointed attorney, or another “attorney at law”, speak for him on this matter that is not a suit, and, is not a prosecution, it is a “writ of right”, asking the Court to rule on the question presented — that being whether the laws upon which the charges are based, are, in fact, constitutional as applied to Wolf, and whether he falls under the jurisdiction of the authority behind those laws, and the Court, itself (or should I say, “herself”?).

So, let’s see what both “power of attorney” and “attorney in fact” mean (Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition):

Power of attorney: An instrument authorizing another to act as one’s agent or attorney. The agent is attorney in fact and his power is revoked on the death of the principal by operation of law. Such power may be either general or special. [no citations given]

Attorney in fact: An attorney authorized to act in his place and stead, either for some particular purpose, as to do a particular act, or for the transaction of business in general, not of legal character. This authority is conferred by an instrument in writing, called a “letter of attorney,” or more commonly a “power of attorney”. [no citations given]

Now, so as not to be misunderstood, that phrase, “not of a legal character” applies only to the “general business”, which is separated from the “particular act” by the “or”.

So, what the Court has said is, well, not on point to the entire matter before it.

So, let’s move on to Claim #5:

Though she does cite, correctly, from the case, when she says, “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody”, she has the subject of custody out of context to what is applicable in Wolf’s case. Wolf has not been convicted. He is challenging his detention based upon absence of jurisdiction as well as absence of constitutional authority of the charges against him. In Preiser, Rodriguez had been convicted and had already served some time in prison. He had sought relief from the length of his sentence, well, in the words of the decision:

Respondents were state prisoners who had elected to participate in New York’s conditional-release program, by which a prisoner serving an indeterminate sentence may earn up to 10 days per month good-behavior-time credits toward reduction of his maximum sentence… Held: When a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his physical imprisonment and by way of relief seeks a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

This decision, Preiser, as stated in the decision, is an action under 28 U.S, Code §2254:

(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 US Code § 2251: Stay of State court proceedings, begins the subject of dealing with state prisoners challenging through the federal court system. Wolf’ case is purely federal, so we need not concern ourselves, though the court has, with this,. Even if we did, we are really discussing what it says in §2241 (b), below, so I have no idea what her majesty was thinking; she should no that this is a federal matter — I think.

Though the ORDER does not cite §2254, as the case does, it does, properly, cite §§2241-2242, below. However, this citation is really apples and oranges, as the Preiser decision has no bearing on the subject of this current matter. §2254 has no relevance, at all, to the Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum Wolf is seeking, and that the Court is required to respond (answer) to.

So, let’s look at the pertinent parts of 28 U. S. Code §§2241-2242:

28 U.S.C. § 2241 : US Code – Section 2241: Power to grant writ

(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had.

(b) The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit judge may decline to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer the application for hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it.

(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless

(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or

(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United States; or

(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States; or

28 U.S.C. § 2242 : US Code – Section 2242: Application

Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf. It shall allege the facts concerning the applicant’s commitment or detention, the name of the person who has custody over him and by virtue of what claim or authority, if known. It may be amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions. If addressed to the Supreme Court, a justice thereof or a circuit judge it shall state the reasons for not making application to the district court of the district in which the applicant is held.

So, the District Court is the proper place in which to initiate a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum. Now, under subparagraph (c), we find two applicable qualifiers for who may Petition for such writ. The ORDER cites subparagraph (3), though seems to skip right over subparagraph (1). However, until the person detaining Wolf has answered the writ, that determination cannot be made. Though that last sentence may seem confusing, we will shed some light on it as we venture into the next relevant section, that the Court seemed to have completely, or conveniently, overlooked.

28 U.S.C. § 2243 : US Code – Section 2243: Issuance of writ; return; hearing; decision

A court, justice or judge entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.

The respondent is, of course, the person who has detained Wolf, or that Wolf is detained under the authority thereof. So, unless the Court can show that the applicant (“attorney in fact”, or, “next friend”) is not entitled thereto, which it has, perhaps, insufficiently, attempted to do, must either grant or require the respondent to “show cause”. By the way, “forthwith” is without delay, immediately, etc., It does not provide for excuses, only action.

The writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained. It shall be returned within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.

Now, the civil case was opened on April 15, fully two weeks after the Habeas Corpus was submitted, “by the only means available”, and the Court has still not, over a month later, even begun the process that §2243 requires. So, from the “forthwith”, being the starting of the clock required for what Madison, the father of the Constitution, described as “in the most expeditious and ample manner“, the respondent then has three days to return, which is “to show cause”. Remember, the Fourth Amendment states that you have the right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation”.

Further, the Court states, “Wolf cannot mount such an attack until he alleges facts he believes demonstrate that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”. But, wait just a minute. The Amendment says that the government has to show “nature” and “cause”, not the accused. This is supported by the wording in §2243, that the “order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained.” It sort of makes you wonder if law school has any courses on English comprehension.

Continuing with §2243:

The person to whom the writ or order is directed shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention. When the writ or order is returned a day shall be set for hearing, not more than five days after the return unless for good cause additional time is allowed.

There it is, again. The person making the return, that would be the person detaining, not the person detained, “shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention.” How could that have possible been overlooked by a District Judge, in whose hands lie the lives and futures of those who are required to stand before her for judgment? And, when is that damned hearing going to be held? Wolf sits in detention, denied his liberty, while the judge fritters away that very object that brought the colonies to rebel against England, and part ways with a corrupted judicial system.

The remainder of §2243:

Unless the application for the writ and the return present only issues of law the person to whom the writ is directed shall be required to produce at the hearing the body of the person detained. The applicant or the person detained may, under oath, deny any of the facts set forth in the return or allege any other material facts.

The return and all suggestions made against it may be amended, by leave of court, before or after being filed.

The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.

Now, that last line says it all, that “The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.”

As to Claim #6, Wolf does not seek a detention hearing, as to do so would admit to jurisdiction. The other points in this Claim have already been addressed.

Stay tuned for Act I, Scene 5.

 

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One Response to “Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus Scene 4 – Government Fears Habeas Corpus”

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