Administrative Agencies – The Fourth Branch of Government – Circumventing the Constitution

Administrative Agencies – The Fourth Branch of Government
Circumventing the Constitution
Constitution reversed

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
April 19, 2016

Suppose you lived in Washington state or Colorado.  Suppose, too, that consistent with state law, you grow, process, and use marijuana.  Now, state law says you can, but federal law says that you can’t.  What happens if the feds arrest you and charge you with a crime?

The Constitution/Bill of Rights says that the right to keep and bear arms “shall not be infringed”.  Would a federal requirement that demands that you register your firearms be such an infringement, if your state did not require such registration?  Could you be successfully prosecuted by the federal government if charged with failing to register your firearms?


The Way it Was During the Early Years of this Great Nation

To understand the changes that the government has made to the Constitution, without, abiding by Article V, the Ratification Process:

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress…

We will start with some cases and enactments that establish what limitations existed on the federal government in our early history.

Let’s start with Marbury v. Madison [5 US 137] in 1803.  In discussing legislative authority, Marshall says [at 176]:

The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written.  To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing; if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?  The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of equal obligation.  It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act.

In firming up these thoughts, he makes the point [at 177]:

Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void.

Later, he says [at 178]:

The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitution.  Could it be the intention of those who gave this power, to say that, in using it, the constitution should not be looked into?  That a case arising under the constitution should be decided without examining the instrument under which it arises?

He has made clear that the Constitution has to grant authority for any law enacted by the Congress, and likewise any matter before the courts created under that Constitution.

There is an earlier case that brings merit to what Marshall has stated.  When there is a written constitution, that Constitution establishes its government, and then it grants the authority for that government to act on behalf of the people.

The same year that the Constitutional Convention was held in Philadelphia, a matter came before the North Carolina Supreme Court.  North Carolina, like many other states, and created a Constitution in 1776, as directed by the Continental Congress.  In that Constitution, there were two provisions that are applicable to the subsequent decision:


12. That no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the law of the land.

14. That in all controversies at law, respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by jury is one of the best securities of the rights of the people, and ought to remain sacred and inviolable.

The North Carolina legislature later enacted a law that deprived absent Tories of their property.  This was in violation of both the Treaty of Paris (ending the war with Great Britain) and the above “rights“.  The North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the state legislature enacting that when they said, in Bayard v. Singleton [1 N.C. 42] 1787

But that it was clear that no act they could pass could by any means repeal or alter the constitution, because if they could do this, they would at the same instant of time destroy their own existence as a legislature and dissolve the government thereby established

Interestingly, they recognized that should such a law be upheld, it would have the effect of dissolving the government created by the North Carolina Constitution because that government violated the instrument of its own creation.  Does that concept also apply to the United States Constitution?

We have heard from two courts, so, what of the Congress?  There can be little doubt that many of those in the Congress in 1825 could have fought in the Revolutionary War, and many more who had rubbed shoulders, socially and politically, with those who wrote the Constitution.  So, let’s look at how Congress viewed their limited jurisdiction in 1825.

Needing to punish those who damaged or destroyed government property (which must have been a problem, at the time), Congress enacted a law, signed by the President, to give them though authority to do so.  Their authority was contained in Article I, § 8, cl. 17, which grants the Congress the Power,

To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings

[T]o exercise exclusive legislation” over lands ceded to the United States by the state in which the land lies.  The extent of that authority is explained in the Act of 1825:

An Act more effectually to provide for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States, and for other purposes.  (March 3, 1825)

“That if any person or persons, within any fort, dock-yard, navy-yard, arsenal, armory, or magazine, the site whereof is ceded to, and under the jurisdiction of the United States, or on a site of any lighthouse, or other needful building belonging to the United States, the sight whereof is ceded to them [United States], and under their jurisdiction, as aforesaid, shall, willfully…”

So, Congress can enact laws over certain lands, however, the two entities cannot have jurisdiction over the same land (concurrent jurisdiction) unless they have both agreed to and defined where the line between jurisdictions is drawn.  Otherwise, only one, or the other, can have jurisdiction on any given piece of land.

As explained in the beginning of this article, it becomes problematic if there are two sets of conflicting laws that apply in a single location.  Which one can one consider to apply to him?

Now, this law was enacted just 35 years after the first Congress sat under the Constitution.  What did they know that we do not know?  For them to punish you for crimes against property of the United States, the property had to be on land ceded to the United States, and jurisdiction also ceded to the United States.  That means the state had to relinquish its jurisdiction over the property.  Can there be any doubt that the Congress, in 1825, understood the limitations of their authority under the Constitution?

To establish the necessary distinct of limitation of authority, we must look at the federal Constitution and its relationship to the State constitution.  This can be readily understood, based upon original intent, by reviewing an 1833 Supreme Court decision.

Mr. Barron owned a dock in Baltimore, Maryland.  The City of Baltimore, in dredging the river, made the area in front of Barron’s dock too shallow for normal (deep draft) traffic.  Barron filed suit against the City of Baltimore, arguing that under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, his property was taken without just compensation.  This case was heard by the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall giving the opinion of the Court.  Understand that in this decision, the “general government” refers solely to the national government, and that “local government” refers to state and/or lesser governments.  Barron v. City of Baltimore [32 U.S. 243]:

The constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of the individual statesEach state established a constitution for itself, and in that constitution, provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular government, as its judgment dictated…  The powers they conferred on this government were to be exercised by itself; and the limitations on power, if expressed in general terms, are naturally, and, we think, necessarily, applicable to the government created by the instrument.

If these propositions be correct, the fifth amendment must be understood as restraining the power of the general government, not as applicable to the statesIn their several constitutions, they have imposed such restrictions on their respective governments, as their own wisdom suggested; such as they deemed most proper for themselves.  It is a subject on which they judge exclusively, and with which others interfere no further than they are supposed to have a common interest.

So, the Constitution was only between the people and the general government.  The people of each state were free to decide what constitution and laws best suited them.

Marshall then explains the evidence in support of the proposition of that separation by reference to Article I, Sections 9 and 10, of the Constitution:

If the original constitution, in the ninth and tenth sections of the first article, draws this plain and marked line of discrimination between the limitations it imposes on the powers of the general government, and on those of the state; if, in every inhibition intended to act on state power, words are employed, which directly express that intent; some strong reason must be assigned for departing from this safe and judicious course, in framing the amendments, before that departure can be assumed…Had the people of the several states, or any of them, required changes in their constitutions; had they required additional safe-guards to liberty from the apprehended encroachments of their particular governments; the remedy was in their own hands, and could have been applied by themselves.

The concerns that lead to this separation of powers are explained:

Serious fears were extensively entertained, that those powers which the patriot statesmen, who then watched over the interests of our country, deemed essential to union, and to the attainment of those unvaluable objects for which union was sought, might be exercised in a manner dangerous to liberty.  In almost every convention by which the constitution was adopted, amendments to guard against the abuse of power were recommended.  These amendments demanded security against the apprehended encroachments of the general government- [and] not against those of the local governments…These amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the state governments.  This court cannot so apply them.

We are of opinion, that the provision in the fifth amendment to the constitution, declaring that private property shall not be taken for public use, without just compensation, is intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the United States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the states.

What?  The Constitution does not foreclose protection from the state government; only from the national government.  Well, that is exactly what Chief Justice Marshall said.  And, that is, without a doubt the original intent of the Constitution and “general government”.

Next, we will look at the limitations of jurisdiction of federal law, as we saw in the Act of 1825.  We will also see what establishes those spheres, laws, and tribunals for enforcement, as well as where jurisdiction is limited by the geographic boundaries and current status of certain parts of the United States.

The incident, for which Charles Mason Lane was tried, occurred in the Oklahoma territory, or, Indian territory.  The trial was held in the “district court of the United States in and for the district of Kansas.”

The charge was:

on or about the 4th day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-nine, at that part of the district of [judicial] Kansas aforesaid, the same being a place and district of country under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, and within the exclusive jurisdiction of this court, with force of arms in and upon one Frances M. Skeed, a female under the age of sixteen years, then and there being, violently and feloniously did make an assault, and her, the said Frances M. Skeed, then and there, forcibly and against her will, feloniously did ravish and carnally know [Skeed]…”

Associate Justice Samuel Miller gave the decision in In Re Lane [135 US 443], on April 28, 1890.

The law in which Lane was alleged to be in violation of was

the act of congress approved February, 9, 1889, c. 120, (25 St. 658,) under which defendant is indicted and convicted, it is provided ‘that every person who shall carnally and unlawfully know any female under the age of sixteen years, or who shall be accessory to such carnal and unlawful knowledge before the fact, in the District of Columbia or other place, except the territories, over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction, or on any vessel within the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any state or territory, shall be guilty of a felony, and when convicted thereof shall be punished by imprisonment at hard labor, for the first offense, for not more than fifteen years, and for each subsequent offense not more than thirty years.’

And in the decision, in which a writ of habeas corpus (jurisdiction) was denied, we find:

“We think the words ‘except the territories’ have reference exclusively to that system of organized government long existing within the United States, by which certain regions of the country have been erected into civil governments.  These governments have an executive, a legislative, and a judicial system.  They have the powers which all these departments of government have exercised, which are conferred upon them by act of congress; and their legislative acts are subject to the disapproval of the congress of the United States.  They are not in any sense independant governments…  Yet they exercise nearly all the powers of government under what are generally called ‘organic acts,’ passed by congress, conferring such powers on them.  It is this class of governments, long known by the name of ‘territories,’ that the act of congress excepts from the operation of this statute, while it extends it to all other places over which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction.  Oklahoma was not of this class of territories.  It [Oklahoma territory] had no legislative body.  It had no government.  It had no established or organized system of government for the control of the people within its limits, as the territories of the United States have, and have always had.”

What can we conclude from this?  The States each have “have an executive, a legislative, and a judicial system”; recognized, or organized, territories, “have an executive, a legislative, and a judicial system”.  However, those lands that are not within either a state or an organized territory, under the authority granted by the Constitution, in Article IV, § 3, clause 2, grants Congress the “Power to dispose of and make all needed Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belong to the United States…”

We have come to assume that all laws enacted by Congress, absent the limiting phraseology, act upon all of us.  That assumption, however, is in contradiction with the Constitution.  Clearly, in times past, those separate spheres; those limitations on jurisdiction; and the creation of laws, were well-defined and limited.  It is evident that the state had the right to make laws that were not in conflict with the Constitution.  How, then, could the federal government enact laws that would be in conflict, or contradiction, to state laws that are not in conflict with the Constitution?  It is an untenable situation to think that one would have to decide which of two conflicting laws he was bound to abide by.

Let us see if there is another situation that might allow the general government to act upon someone that it does not have lawful authority to act upon.

To understand “standing”, the right, or obligation to appear in a certain court, we have to look as things were before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.  This matter comes to light, and understand this, that it is a very significant point in dealing with the judicial system, in Dred Scott v. Sandford [60 U.S. 393], heard in 1856.  In this decision, notwithstanding the subject of the case, rather, with consideration of a rather obscure but significant portion of the decision, we find that Scott had no standing.  Scott was a freed slave, as such, he was not deemed a citizen capable of entering the federal judicial system.  At that time, most states would not allow a negro to testify against a white man, or sit on a jury.  Regardless of your present perspective, that was the law, at that time.  However, the Court decided to hear the case, anyway.

That plea denies the right of the plaintiff to sue in a court of the United States, for the reasons therein stated.  If the question raised by it is legally before us, and the court should be of opinion that the facts stated in it disqualify the plaintiff from becoming a citizen, in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution of the United States, then the judgment of the Circuit Court is erroneous, and must be reversed.  It is suggested, however, that this plea is not before us; and that as the judgment in the court below on this plea was in favor of the plaintiff, he does not seek to reverse it, or bring it before the court for revision by his writ of error; and also that the defendant waived this defence by pleading over, and thereby admitted the jurisdiction of the court.

Sandford “plead over” (he filed with the court), and, in so doing, he failed to challenge the prohibition (absence of jurisdiction) of Scott’s lack of right to enter the jurisdiction of the court.  So, what we have is, if I don’t challenge the jurisdiction of the court, instead, I plead, or otherwise fail to challenge jurisdiction, the court may deem that the right to challenge as waived and the court is free to proceed.

Now, we understand that if we assume that we have to submit to the court, when charged with any crime, then the court will assume that we have granted them jurisdiction.  This does not mean that you are not subject to the court’s jurisdiction in certain cases, such as counterfeiting, treason, or any law passed within the authority granted by the enumerated powers.

As you have just seen, Scott was allowed to proceed in court, since Sandford failed to object.  If Sandford had objected to Scott’s right to go to that court, the case would have stood, as had been previously decided by the state court – and in Sandford’s favor.  It was Scott that appealed the lower court’s decision.  Therefore, when there are two classes of people, it is important to differentiate between those two classes, and, to determine which class you are, and, whether the law, you are charged to be in violation of actually applies to you.


The Fourteenth Amendment and its effect on the citizen

In 1868, something occurred that changed the nature of the government and the people of the United States; the 14th Amendment was ratified.  (For an extensive study of the 14th Amendment, see The Fourteenth Article in Amendment to the Constitution – an Essay).  It reads, in part:

Section 1–All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.

Let’s look closely at this sentence.  “All persons born or naturalized in the United States,” well, that is pretty inclusive.  However, the next phrase, “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” limits that inclusiveness to those “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.”

As we have seen from the previous cases, those who were citizens before the 14th Amendment was ratified, were not “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” except when there was a constitutional nexus.

We have one class of people (Citizens), who created the Constitution.  We have another class of people (citizens) that were created by the Constitution.  There is nothing in the Constitution, or the 14th Amendment, that dissolved the first class; therefore, we must assume that it still exists, and, we will see that the Supreme Court still recognizes this fact.

So, the question arises, did the 14th Amendment change the nature of those who were already citizens?  The answer can be found in the next case.

It was over 40 years after the 14th amendment was ratified (1908) that this next case was heard.  Albert C. Twining and David C. Cornell were convicted of providing “false papers” to the state banking examiner.  They were sentenced to prison and Twining appealed to the United States Supreme Court, based upon his Fourth Amendment rights.  He argued that the requirement to turn over papers to the examiner, absent a court order, denied him due process clause under the 14th Amendment.  Twining and Cornell were both citizens of New Jersey.  Since they were citizens of New Jersey (a state government with a constitution), they were not within the jurisdiction of the Court; therefore, the Court had no jurisdiction (federal) over them.

Justice Moody provided the decision of the court in Twining v. State of New Jersey [211 US 78]:

In order to bring themselves within the protection of the Constitution it is incumbent on the defendants to prove two propositions: First, that the exemption from compulsory self- incrimination is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution against impairment by the states; and, second, if it be so guaranteed, that the exemption was in fact impaired in the case at bar.  The first proposition naturally presents itself for earlier consideration.  If the right here asserted is not a Federal right, that is the end of the case.  We have no authority to go further and determine whether the state court has erred in the interpretation and enforcement of its own laws.

That last point, “If the right here asserted is not a Federal right, that is the end of the case“, will lead to the final decision of the Court.  Does it also hold that if no right is conferred, that there is an absence of jurisdiction?

We do not pass upon the conflict, because, for the reasons given, we think that the exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in the courts of the states is not secured by any part of the Federal Constitution.

This tells us that there is, without a doubt, a limitation on the jurisdiction of the federal government.  If the Constitution does not provide for jurisdiction, they cannot assume to have jurisdiction, except as was noted.  If Twining had been a citizen created by the 14th Amendment, he would have been afforded the due process protection of the 14th Amendment.  Not being of that class of citizen, he came solely under state laws and protection of the state Constitution.

As we saw in Barron v. Baltimore (1833), the federal Constitution provided only protection from the federal government.  Twining v. State of New Jersey (1908), shows that such federal jurisdiction did not apply to those who were not of the nature of the citizens created by the 14th Amendment.

Dred Scott v. Sandford (1856) demonstrated that if we acquiesce to the jurisdiction of the court, whether proper or not, the court may assume that you are there properly, and proceed, absent any other consideration of jurisdiction.

Twining v. State of New Jersey, particularly, brings home the point that, more than two generations after the 14th Amendment was ratified, there was still a distinction between those who were citizens of a state and those who were not afforded the protection of the Constitution, if the matter was between them and state laws and their respective constitutions.


The Fourth Branch of Government, and,
who is subject to that unconstitutional branch

We are lead to believe that the United States Supreme Court rules on the constitutionality of a law when a case is brought before it.  We are often quite surprised when it appears that the Supreme Court ruled contrary to the Constitution.

For at least a few decades, those with direct relationships with the federal government were being subjected to decisions that did not seem quite consistent with the Constitution.  It was not until 1936, however, that Justice Brandeis provided insight into the changing nature, or perhaps more correctly, expanding nature of the court.  The case was Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority [297 US 288].  Justice Brandeis, in a separate but concurring decision, provided insight into the evolving role of the United States Supreme Court, wherein he said:

The Court developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision.  They are:

  1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, nonadversary, proceeding, declining because to decide such questions ‘is legitimate only in the last resort…
  2. The Court will not ‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.’ ‘It is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.’
  3. The Court will not ‘formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.’
  4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter…
  5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained.
  6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
  7. ‘When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.

Didn’t Justice Brandeis just tell us that they would not rule on the constitutionality of a matter before them, if they could find any way to avoid such ruling?

He also speaks of “statutes”.  What statutes could be enacted by Congress, if they were not consistent with the Constitution?  Well, Congress has the power of “exclusive Legislation” (Article I, § 8, cl. 17), and the power to “make all needed Rules and Regulations” (Article IV, § 3, cl. 2) that authorize enacting laws under certain circumstances.  Suppose they enact a law that would fall within this scope; however, they allowed people to voluntarily “subject” themselves to that law by partaking in perceived benefits, or, that the people do not fully realize the true nature of such a law and whom it applies to.

To simplify this, let’s suppose that you are watching some people playing a game of Monopoly.  If you decide to join a game of Monopoly, once you have rolled the dice, you are bound by the rules of the game.  If, however, you do not choose to play Monopoly, you are not bound by the rules of the game.

After all, Justice Brandeis said, “The court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.”  So, by some intricate means, if you have sought a benefit, under a statute, you may have just left the Constitution behind.

Now, this would be understandable if particular circumstances, say your business, warranted cooperation with a government agency.  This appears to be the case, at the time of the Ashwander decision.  However, in the next 10 years, things were to change.

We all know that we have a tripartite (composed of or divided into three parts) form of government.  The three branches, legislative, executive, and judicial, were created by the Constitution, in the first three articles of the Constitution.

What if we had four branches of government?  Would not that fourth branch be unconstitutional?  Or, could it exist under the provisions of the previously mentioned Article I, § 8, cl. 17, and/or, Article IV, § 3, cl. 2, respectively?

The Congress shall have the Power…  To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings…

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needed Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States

Just 10 years after the Ashwander decision, the Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.  Representative Pat McCarran (a Democrat from Nevada) submitted the Bill, who also gave us some insight into its purpose, when he said (from the Congressional Record, March 12, 1946):

We have set up a fourth order in the tripartite plan of government which was initiated by the founding fathers of our democracy.  They set up the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches; but since that time we have set up a fourth dimension, if I may so term it, which is now popularly known as administrative in natureSo we have the legislative, the executive, the judicial, and the administrative.

Perhaps there are reasons for that arrangement.  We found that the legislative branch, although it might enact a law, could not very well administer it.  So the legislative branch enunciated the legal precepts and ordained that commissions or groups should be established by the executive branch with power to promulgate rules and regulations.  These rules and regulations are the very things that impinge upon, curb, or permit the citizen who is touched by the law, as every citizen of this democracy is.

Senate bill 7, the purpose of which is to improve the administration of justice by prescribing fair administrative procedure, is a bill of rights for the hundreds of thousands of Americans whose affairs are controlled or regulated in one way or another by agencies of the Federal governmentIt is designed to provide guarantees of due process in administrative procedure.

The subject of the administrative law and procedure is not expressly mentioned in the constitution, and there is no recognizable body of such law, as there is for the courts in the Judicial Code.

Problems of administrative law and procedure have been increased and aggravated by the continued growth of the Government, particularly in the executive branch.

Therefore, the question arises as to whether the administrative branch of government, “the fourth dimension“, extends to all people, or just “the hundreds of thousands of Americans whose affairs are controlled or regulated in one way or another by agencies of the Federal government“.  Given that the estimated population of the United States in 1946 was over 141 million people, which would mean that less than one percent were among those “hundreds of thousands of Americans“.

If we assume the former, that it only applies to those who come under the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, that leaves cause to wonder whether the remaining 99 percent have fallen under the influence of the Act by other means, or simple inattention.  If inattention, is it because they entered the court not understanding that they are entering the court that was acting in the capacity of an administrative tribunal?

If we recall what Taney said in Dred Scott v. Sandford, if one fails to challenge jurisdiction, the Court will assume that it has the authority to hear the matter before it.

Later, on May 24 (from the Congressional Record), Representative John Gwynne of Iowa provides insight into what “rule-making” is, when he said:

After a law has been passed by the Congress, before it applies to the individual citizens there are about three steps that must be taken.  First, the bureau having charge of enforcement must write rules and regulations to amplify, interpret, or expand the statute that we passed; rulemaking, we call it.  Second, there must be some procedure whereby the individual citizen who has some contact with the law can be brought before the bureau and his case adjudicated…  Finally, there must be some procedure whereby the individual may appeal to the courts from the action taken by the bureau.

Amplify, interpret, or expand“?  Was the intention of the Act to apply only to the hundreds of thousands, who were among that less than one percent?  Or, was the intention to circumvent the Constitution by establishing a despotic regime that was no longer bound by the Constitution?


Summation – that puts all of the pieces neatly into place

If we recall what Taney said in Dred Scott v. Sandford, if one fails to challenge jurisdiction, the Court will assume that it has the authority to hear the matter before it.  If so, then Habeas Corpus is the only means by which that overreaching government can be challenged as to the constitutionality of a law whereby they have sought to detain someone for a crime that is not within their jurisdiction.

Then, just 10 years later, with the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, we find Congress, refining the means of avoidance of the Constitution by creating a fourth branch of government.

Now that we have the historical elements, from prior to the Constitution through recent times, we can put these pieces together so that we may understand the deviation of the limited authority of the federal government to one that reaches into all of our lives.  How we can restore it to its proper role.  Since we have now put aside our misconceptions and preconceptions, we will put it together from the beginning.

We have seen that in 1833, in Barron v.  City of Baltimore, though Barron sought protection under the Fourth Amendment, there was an absence of jurisdiction; that the Constitution applied only to the federal government; and, that the people of each state were able to determine which laws would apply to them, since they had legislative, executive, and judicial branches, within their respective states.  As Justice Marshall said, the Constitution “is intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the United States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the states.”

We have also seen that, in the Act of 1825, an enactment by Congress to provide for punishing those who damage government property was limited to land, “ceded to, and under the jurisdiction of the United States.”  We also saw that the 1890 enactment that In Re Lane was used to charge Lane with applied only “in the district of Columbia, or other place, except for the territories, over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction… and out of the jurisdiction of any state or territory.”

In the former, was it because Congress did not intend to protect their property if it was not in land ceded, or was it because they were explicit in defining the extent of that authority granted by the Constitution?  If the latter, did they not care if it occurred in a state or established territory, or did they realize that when executive, legislative, and judicial branches existed under the will of the people, that federal jurisdiction ceased, unless authorized specifically by the Constitution?

Before we begin looking into the chicanery that led to the obfuscation over jurisdiction, we must first look at our relationship with the court.  In 1856, the case was Dred Scott v. Sandford, we find that Scott had no standing, under the laws of the United States, to take his matter before the United States Supreme Court.  Sandford, however, failed to challenge Scott’s standing, leaving it upon the court to decide whether to hear the case or not.  This established precedence that allows the court to proceed, if objection is not made timely.  Quite simply, if you enter court and do not properly object, the court may assume jurisdiction, even though not warranted by the law.

Now, we have learned that, except in certain circumstances, we were not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.  So, if 14th Amendment says that it extended to those who were “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States, would it also include those who, prior to the amendment, were not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States?

The 14th Amendment, then, only applied to those who were not citizens at the time of its enactment.

We see this confirmed, in 1908, in Twining v. State of New Jersey.  Twining and Cornell were citizens of New Jersey.  They had not been incorporated into that new class of citizen created by the 14th Amendment.  Since they were not citizens under the 14th Amendment, they were treated just as Barron was in 1833 – they were outside of federal jurisdiction.  Had they been citizens under the 14th Amendment, they would have been under the jurisdiction of, and afforded the protection of, the 14th Amendment.

By 1936, with the Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority decision, we have conclusive proof that the United States Supreme Court, which, as suggested by Chief Justice Marshall, is the interpreter of the Constitution, has been transformed into one that will avoid addressing constitutionality of a matter before it, “unless absolutely necessary”.  Since the court cannot offer legal advice, their decision is based solely upon that information presented to them.  They have not violated the Constitution; they have simply assumed that you have entered into an agreement with an agency of the government, and therefore you are bound by all of the conditions of that agreement.

So, the courts are willing to take a case presented to them, whether proper or not; and to avoid ruling on the constitutionality, if at all possible.  What else could go wrong?

Though there had been administrative agencies prior to the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, there had not been a codification that provided for the enforcement of Administrative Agency rules.  Therefore, Congress created, by their own admission, a fourth branch of government.  At that time, this fourth branch affected less than one percent of the population.  However, by failure, on the part of the people, to realize their evolving relationship with the federal government, we have come to a point in time where over 99% of the people find themselves subject to the these administrative agencies.


According to Senator Mike Lee, Utah, the affect of the Administrative Agencies far exceeds the Congress in affecting our lives, as he says in a video presentation:

In 2014, 3,291 pages of new laws were passed by Congress – the branch of government with the constitutional authority to make law – and signed by the president.  During this same period, unelected bureaucrats at dozens of federal departments and agencies issued 79,066 pages of new and updated regulations. 

More than 24 times the amount of paperwork was generated by the Administrative Agencies than by the only constitutionally recognized legislative body, the Congress.  And, nothing requires, not even the courts, that those regulation (rules) be constitutional.

Don’t think Maritime, Admiralty, or Martial, Law.  Know that it is Administrative Law that is our greatest enemy and evil.


  1. […] have also created a Fourth Branch of Government, which is explained in greater detail, in “Administrative Agencies – The Fourth Branch of Government“.  Perhaps, since they are rules promulgated by administrative agencies, they really are not […]

  2. […] have also created a Fourth Branch of Government, which is explained in greater detail, in “Administrative Agencies – The Fourth Branch of Government“.  Perhaps, since they are rules promulgated by administrative agencies, they really are not […]

  3. […] definition.  Unfortunately, most often, the disagreement is not even recognized, such as when an administrative agency promulgates a rule, using the delegated authority granted by Congress, in an […]

  4. […] definition.  Unfortunately, most often, the disagreement is not even recognized, such as when an administrative agency promulgates a rule, using the delegated authority granted by Congress, in an […]

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