Organizational Plan for Militia Response

Organizational Plan for Militia Response

Prepared by Gary Hunt, Outpost of Freedom

Additional input by Joe Martino, author of “Resistance to Tyranny” (jm)

Date of this version, April 29, 2014

 This will be updated as additional input is provided or changes are required.

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Organizational Plan for Militia Response



Based upon contributed after action reports from some who attended the Bundy Ranch Affair, and with discussions with the Militia Liaison at the Ranch, the following has been prepared to provide assistance to those who venture into harm’s way in subsequent events.

Lessons were learned, though through the Hand of Providence, nothing occurred that jeopardized the defense of the Bundys, their ranch and property.

The week prior to the Cattle Unrustling, on Saturday April 12, 2014, had its difficulties, all of which were surmounted. After that day, some command problems arose, and were quickly resolved by agreement with all the parties thereto. The concept of “shared command”, based upon Councils of War, prevalent in the Revolutionary War and the Civil War, were adopted for the purpose of diversifying command and creating a coordinated effort.

In the future, as events unfold, we may arrive at a point where a command structure, based upon performance of someone who has truly demonstrated his abilities, in conflict as well as in peace, may ascend to the position we have learned to understand as “supreme commander”. Until that time, we must wait and watch, trusting that someone will demonstrate his abilities to take that position. Until that time, we should be able to successfully defend our rights and Constitution, in an organized manner, as outlined herein.

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Initiation of Plan

This plan will be initiated upon acknowledgment, by any participating units or individuals, based upon their recognition of a need to respond to a situation to which they have been apprised.

The person requesting a response from militia must be the individual, or group, expecting imminent attack by Government Thugs (GT), or a clearly authorized representative thereof.

The requesting party will be known as the Host. Once a request is responded to, a liaison will be established between the host and the militia units, subject to the approval of the Host. From this point on, the Host will not be involved in strategic discussions, though he can object to any decision regarding issues that do not compromise the safety and security of the on ground personnel.

As soon as possible, when personnel become available, a Press Liaison will be established. Like the Militia Liaison, the Press Liaison will be the only contact with the Host, with regard to their respective areas of responsibility.

All liaisons are subject to acceptance by the Host, who can request, from the Defense Coordination Council, the replacement of a liaison, subject to the approval of the Council.


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Militia Structure and Command

Defense Coordination Council

The Defense Coordination Council will be comprised of:

  • Company Commanders, as elected by the Militia Companies
  • The Militia Liaison.

Each will have a vote in any decisions made.

Advisory members to the Defense Coordination Council will include the Press Liaison and the leader or designated representative (with written authorization of the leader) of patriotic organizations, provided that members of those organizations are responding to the call. This will not apply to militia units, who will participate only through their Company Commander. Advisory members may participate in discussion, but shall have no vote. Any threat of withdrawal or act of intimidation by any advisory member will be cause for his immediate removal from the Defense Coordination Council.


Militia Companies

Militia units arriving on scene, will sign in with the Militia Liaison. The militia unit leader will sign in with:

  • Name
  • Unit identification
  • Number of individuals in the unit
  • Basic armament
  • Qualification of personnel.

Independent militia members will sign in with the Militia Liaison with their name, home location, armament, and qualifications.

The Militia Liaison (until such time as the Defense Coordination Council is established) will assign units to alphabetically defined companies.

Ideally, Companies will be comprised of between 50 and 100 individuals, however, in smaller numbers, it is desirable to have at least 3 companies to provide for diversity on the Defense Coordination Council. Companies will be supplemented by additional volunteer units until the minimum of 50 members is achieved. Independent militia members will be assigned, likewise.

To avoid personality conflicts, any militia unit or individual can request from the Militia Liaison reassignment to another company, one time only. If that unit or individual requests reassignment to a specific company, it will be approved only if the receiving company approves the transfer. Otherwise, reassignment will be at the discretion of the Militia Liaison.

Once the requisite 50 member company is achieved, or the 3 company criteria met, an election will be held. Each individual within a company will have one vote to elect a Company Commander (to be rated as Captain), who will then become a voting member of the Defense Coordination Council. After said election, should the manpower of the company increase by 50% or more, a re-election may be called for by a majority of the members.

The Captain of any company may designate Lieutenants, within his command, as platoon leaders, subject to approval of the majority of those within the platoon. Platoons may be of any convenient size, and will take the role in the command structure as subordinate to the Captain.

Militia Company Designations:

Headquarters Company will be comprised of platoons identified as, and responsible for:

  • Administration
    A log of daily “incidents” will be kept. A daily tally of militia units and members present should be maintained. Arrange procedure and control of monetary donations, including disbursement. (jm)
  • Communication (within the militia structure).
    Allocate frequencies and call signs, and record all communications. Develop non-radio communications (runners or couriers) for secure communication, including receipted delivery. Daily newsletter informing members of current status, information of interest, etc. If rumors begin circulating, endeavor to identify source and quash by positive information. Source of rumor propagation should be the subject of a report to intelligence.       Arrange for ham radio communication with family of those without cell phones. Log all incoming and outgoing communications, to be a part of the final incident report.
    A wireless Local Area Network (LAN) should be established to facilitate communication, report filing, record keeping, and other necessary functions, and should be available to all volunteer personnel; secure (passworded) communications to be provided for official uses. (jm)
  • Logistics
    Establish communication with Press Liaison, to provide information regarding needed supplies, equipment, food, etc, and instructions for delivery. It will not be the responsibility of Logistics Platoon to communicate outside of camp for donations, unless an alternative is not available.       Arrange with Administration Platoon for funding necessary Purchase Requisitions. Determine distribution procedure for new volunteers and replacement (DX). Assure that material is available for camouflage purposes, as required by the Intelligence Platoon. Endeavor to keep minimum equipage to all volunteers on site. Upon completion of event, arrange for DCC or Administration Platoon to accept remaining equipment and supplies. (jm)
  • Intelligence
    Operatives from the covert company (explained below), as well as Operatives from this Platoon, are to determine what organizations are represented in the Opposition Force (OpFor), number of personal in each organization, equipage, armament, communications equipment and frequencies, call signs, and passwords used, if any. This information should be continually updated.
    Analysts will compile and evaluate the information obtained and provide reports to the DCC, daily, if not more frequently based upon information obtained between regular reports.
    Requisition and assure installation of camouflage and other protective measures to minimize information available to the OpFor utilizing drone surveillance techniques. Institute measures against infiltration and prepare reports of questionable participation in the Free Force (FreeFor) encampment. Maintain dossiers on all known participants of the OpFor and FreeFor personnel. Publish, for the use of guards, Company commanders, and other necessary personal, a loose-leaf binder with pictures and basic information of identified personnel of the OpFor, to be updated as additional identifications are made. Establish a protocol for protection of individual’s identities of the FreeFor personnel, to include license plates, photos sent, email messages to etc., based upon the needs determined by the DCC. (jm)
  • Mess
    Store and distribute rations.       Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) will probably be the primary source of food, though consideration should be made to provide for normal meals, where possible. At least one prepared hot meal should be provided per day. Occasional local purchases of meals, including Subway, Burger King, KFC, etc., may serve until equipment and supplies are readily available.
    A Mess area should be provided, with sanitization and washing facilities available. If necessary, nominal charges to personnel for meals as an interim until funding becomes available.
    Water sanitization (Lister Bags and other means) must be provided and continually replenished. (jm)
  • Medical
    Many militia units will not have doctors or medical personnel with them. Those who have should detach their personnel to the Medical Platoon, with the right to recall them for specific duties. Likewise, if a company without any medical personnel has a duty that warrants having medical support, they should be temporarily assigned for that duty. Primary medical facilities and supplies should be maintained in a central facility, and “medic bags” should be kept on hand for use of patrols or other situations where the availability of medical treatment is likely. Arrangements should be made to be able to transport, if conditions allow, seriously injured or those needing specialized medical treatment to existing public medical facilities.
    Small individual first-aid packets should be made available to all personal with field duties.
    Daily sick call should be held to deal with minor injuries or medical problems. (jm)

Remaining companies will be designated, sequentially, “A” thru “Z”

Ideally, assignments to these companies should be made with consideration to individual capabilities. For example:

  • Those equipped with sniper equipment and training should be, where possible, within a single company so that they can, depending on current Defense Coordination Council strategy, be within a single unit to develop tactics.
  • Those with special operations training should be included in a one, or more, specific units for special operations, based upon equipment and training.
  • Those more physically fit should assigned to companies that will have patrol duties.
  • Those with physical limitations should be assigned to Headquarters Company, unless special skills warrant assignment to a regular company.

Remaining companies, unless the Defense Coordination Council determines a need for other specialization, will be infantry companies. One example might be designated as Military Police (MP) Company.


Enrollment of Participants

Each person assigned to any militia unit, duty, or other capacity, who will have access to the bivouac area or within the defense perimeter, will be required to “Enroll for Temporary Service in the ______ Militia”. That enrollment will include an agreement to abide by officers of his designated company, or, if none, the Headquarters Company; he agrees that if ordered, by an act of the Defense Coordination Council, to remove himself from the premises, he will obey, or be subject to further discipline. All visitors falling outside of this description will be properly escorted.

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Press Liaison

The Press Liaison, and assistants, if necessary, will be the only contact between the volunteer forces and the press.

He will:

  • Work with the Host to develop answers to questions, in advance when possible, assuring consistency and positive structure in the responses.
  • Prepare press releases, addressing difficult or complex concerns, or frequently asked questions.
  • Aid in establishing authorized on-line web presence concerning the event, as the only source(s) of authorized information.
  • Review any releases submitted by any units or individuals within the volunteers for content and acceptability. He may censor such submittal so as not to compromise security, or from misleading or incorrect statements.
  • He will assist the Host in determining qualifications of those requesting interviews, and will assist, as necessary, in the preparations for any such interview.
  • He will establish an appointment calendar of scheduled interviews and maintain a log of all press events. (jm)
  • He will establish a Press Center for printing and distribution of Press Releases and other information, as well as a call center, to communicate with outside news source. Preferably, the host will provide such facilities. If impractical, then a van or trailer should be set up for such purpose. (jm)
  • He shall establish a camera corp to record events, OpFor activities and personnel, hostile’s actions, events within the command, and other activities, creating a photographic/video record of the event for the historical record. (jm)
  • He shall prepare an after action report, with the assistance of the DCC, at the conclusion of the event, to be distributed to militia units for instructional purposed, to be approved by the DCC prior to release. (jm)
  • Liaison with the Defense Coordination Council to disseminate requests for additional personnel (volunteers), so as to keep such requests under control and not exceed the ability to absorb an excessive influx, greater than can be handled.

General provision regarding media:

  • The Press Liaison position should be assigned to someone with news media and/or PR experience. (jm)
  • Each arriving unit should be instructed to refer all news media inquiries to the Press Liaison. Each arriving militia member will be given a card with a standard response to anticipated media questions, and they should refrain from making any statements that might be construed to represent the whole rather than their own personal convictions. They should direct all inquiries to the Press Liaison. (jm)
  • The official position is to be presented only by specifically assigned personnel.       (jm)



  1. Gary Hunt says:

    With regard to Joe Martino’s book, “Resistance to Tyranny”, see

  2. walking crow says:

    Thanks for the info.
    I am 100% American patriot, veteran,

  3. Jester says:

    Thanks for a timely and solid blueprint Gary.

    Some considerations.

    1. It would seem necessary for militia groups who collectively adopt this plan that they determine and agree upon a hierarchy of command, even considering the implemetation of the war council shared command (defense coordination council) method. The reason being that among the militia groups who agree to adopt this plan, there is every chance only one will be first to respond to an emergent crisis, either invited by a host, or welcomed and recognized by a host upon arrival. The commander of that group will be the first to initiate “the plan” by choosing a militia liaison from his group. If there is not a pre-determined command hierarchy established amongst the groups adopting this organizational plan, it is safe to assume the commander of the first group on scene is the defacto supreme commander until he sees fit to transfer that power to another. It would seem better not to tempt a commander who is less qualified compared to those of other signatory militias, who may arrive in this initial “point” capacity, to retain supreme authority instead of passing it to someone they SHOULD recognize as more fit. Therefore, it seems prudent if possible to qualify, categorize, and rank commanders as they become signatories to “the plan”. In which case the ranking commander on scene will always direct motions, and hold veto power in the defense council.

    2. Regarding Advisory members from Patriotic organizations. This is a fine distinction necessary for all organizations who consider their purpose to be of dual function, such as the Oathkeepers. It is important that those members of such patriotic organizations who do train as cohesive militia groups to be formally recognized as such, sign on to the “plan” in their capacity as militia, and arrive at a crisis without consideration of the political or educational goals derived from their affiliation with their patriotic organization. That they may receive material support from the patriotic org. they are affiliated with should not be a bar to them being formally recognized as a viable militia group. If there is any group representing themselves as a patriotic organization that is deemed corrupted by the various militias who adopt “the plan”, they would be barred from seeking advisory status in the defense council, and likewise any militias who claim affiliation with those organizations should be suspect until they renounce that affiliation in a meaningful way that could be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the signatories to “the plan”.


  4. Steven Gaylord says:

    A good leader will always fight for what is right and to never let superficial differences get in the way of the big picture.

  5. Tom W. says:

    My concern is potential infiltration by .gov types. Which or who, and how will volunteers be vetted? Is there a staging area for individuals or small groups? What happens “if” SHTF? Based on other info I’ve read, this was/is still a concern at the Bundy ranch.
    This structure you presented is sound, but if it all goes to hell in a hand basket if drones and lead start to fly, what and who will be delegating appropriate tactical responses and actions?
    Thank you
    Tom in FL

  6. SFC Steven M Barry USA RET says:

    “Defense Coordination Council

    The Defense Coordination Council will be comprised of:

    Company Commanders, as elected by the Militia Companies
    The Militia Liaison.

    Each will have a vote in any decisions made.”

    The perennial failure. (!)

    Just how many times, exactly, is this sheer stupidity to be repeated?

    You civilians are hopeless.


    • Jester says:

      Well, until you non-civilians step up and take this country back from the grasp of the sociopaths who have wrongfully assumed the offices of government for their own aggrandizement, you are going to have to watch us make the best of a bad bargain.

      Do you think it is easy for disparate groups who barely know of one another to come together in a crisis, and accept a strict command hierarchy without coming to some reasonable assessment and consensus of who is who and being able to have their input heard and responded to? While having to contend with the looming thought that those righteous men left in the armed forces and national guard still haven’t rooted out the traitors in their ranks, and thus could be faced with opposition in the form of a few specially selected companies of brainwashed idiots with superior training and firepower?

      Council of War style can accomplish this building of trust in the beginning.

      Unless you have a better idea other than dismissive criticism.

    • Old Sarge says:

      Undeniable Truth #1: There Will Never Be Unity Among You.

      Undeniable Truth #2: Truth #1 Will Bring Ten Thousand Ruby Ridges.

      Undeniable Truth #3: You Will Never Take Orders From Anyone But Yourselves.

      • Dave says:

        I would agree with you Old Sarge if title 32 did not exist. Many states are creating true state militias. Some of the small self supporting militias may be destroyed, however more and more states are creating militias to protect their sovereignty.

        Under Title 32 of the USC, those State Defense Forces, or “SDFs”, *cannot* be forced into federal service. Unlike the National Guard forces, SDFs are intended to remain within the boundaries of their own state, and to remain under the exclusive command and control of each state’s Governor.

        Title 32 State Defense Forces already exist in 23 states (plus the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico). Those states that have activated their State Defense Forces include California, New Mexico, and Texas. The fact is, Arizona is the only southern border state that does *not* have an active State Defense Force.

        • Old Sarge says:

          Very astute, Dave, and thank you for reminding us of Title 32 – and its limits.

          I am now addressing Gary and Joe: while I balk at the idea of a voting body in command, I give you full marks and extra credit for codifying the roles of Combat Support and Service Support. These are facets that are all too often ignored in planning, and any unit SOP must address them.

          We will find a Washington, a Marrion, a Lee and a Wayne soon enough. I personally would rather be Baron von Steuben.

          • Gary Hunt says:

            Don’t forget Nathaniel Greene, though late in command, a demonstrably excellent officer (with no previous experience, like Knox), who did the masterfully conducted Battle at the Cowpens.

          • Dave says:

            Old Sarge I agree with you on the voting. I never got a vote in the Marines. Discipline is paramount. Until Baron von Steuben began training the Militia thy often broke and ran from the battlefield.

    • 11Fsteve in the desert says:

      “You civilians are hopeless.”

      SFC Barry- You are an experienced SF NCO and a very good writer. Please write a proposal better than Gary Hunt’s submission.

    • Tom W. says:

      Civilians are hopeless? Perhaps Col. Jeff Cooper would disagree. Perhaps those at Lexington had enough. Last I checked the archives, most if not all were civilians against the strongest force at that time.

      So were not as regimented. Perhaps a bit of a looser bit of cannon, less disciplined than formal training at Parris Island.

      You are willing to cast us aside? Perhaps a 1788 article in the Philidelphia Gazzette written by Tench Cote could provide insight.

      ” Are we not the Militia? ”

      I find your arrogance and snobbery offensive to those that stand proud in this country, study history, teach our children, and have had enough. Your dismissive arrogance is something you need to reflect on, as I am not the enemy. But I don’t need your pompous ass either.



      • CB says:

        Well said. While the command structure initially, might be weak,it will wash out. Most military types, me included, are used to the “top down” hierarchy and cannot imagine “mere civilians” as a capable armed force. They seem to forget that once they too were “newbys”. Quite frankly they seem to forget that most members of militia have had military training and some pretty thorough.
        I suspect that some of the so called “experts” are perhaps trolls bent on causing problems.
        At any rate a well deserved salute to those have and will continue to respond to these threats to our freedoms. I only wish I were 50 years younger., I’d be right there with them.

      • Mike S. says:

        HERE! HERE! to that Tom W. as folks like us do not need any arrogance and/or snobbery. I choose to walk/stand alone than associate myself with that ilk as that is a ready made recipe for bringing of disaster amongst the best of ranks. Agreed?

    • Oregon Hobo says:

      I presume from your reply that you see deficiencies that you have seen enough times in your professional experience that you assume they should be obvious to anyone by now. I also presume that reading, let alone responding to these deficiencies and misconceptions is intensely aggravating for you. Perhaps you feel that you’ve been through it a thousand times already, and that you would rather hump your ruck 50 miles uphill through waist-deep sewage than repeat it yet again for people you presume too hopeless to it anyway.

      If events continue on their current trajectory, where do you suppose this aggravation will rank among the difficulties you and the rest of us will face?

      If you are faced with so many hordes of rookie volunteers that you have to repeat it 1000 or 10000 times, we should all be immensely grateful. …but if your arguments are solid and solidly stated, then presumably you would have a horde of converts proselytizing the word of SFC Barry long before your 1000th repetition.

      That said, I invite you to address the difficulties presently facing those concerned civilians reading (and writing) this blog. For example:

      1) If you are suggesting that small militia units and unaffiliated individuals alike subject ourselves to the absolute authority of a supreme commander that we just met that morning after travelling across half the continent, what is your proposed process for establishing who that supreme commander shall be?

      2) What are your recommendations for identifying and dealing with various classes of undesirables, especially opfor infiltrators?

      On the other hand, if you care so little that you can’t even muster sufficient patience to offer up your experience in the form of some clearly and convincingly stated ideas for the benefit of blue team, and especially for the benefit of those who actually showed up and stood in front of the BLM’s rifles, I have a hard time understanding why you’d invest even a second of your time reading (let alone responding to) any of this in the first place.


      • iusarmatus says:

        Ideally the solution to problem number one would be for the leadership of militia groups to hold joint training exercises, get to know other militia leadership, and develop a good working relationship within a hierarchy of command established while shit is not in imminent danger of hitting the fan. That eliminates your need to trust someone you or your leadership has never met before, as you’ll have worked with people who’ve worked with the commander, if not the commander himself in the past.

        Problem number two would best be handled by having interviews of militia recruits be rather more exacting, to weed out undesirables at the individual militia unit level. This could then be supplemented by communication between the leaders of various units, with potential problem men being interviewed upon arrival to a given area of need.

        I’ve never been in the military, but despite that and my tender young age of mid 20s, I can see at least these two easy to conceptualize solutions. If solutions are obvious to one without professional experience in military matters, one would hope solutions would be obvious to those who are actively involved in the organization of militia units.

    • AZ Ranger says:

      This country was founded on the principle that free men have the ability to govern themselves, and historically militias have always elected their leaders. These may be facts that you have forgotten. If the top down pyramid worked from a military perspective, then we would not be in the mess we are in right now!

      • Gary Hunt says:

        You failed to read far enough to see the structure. Each company would elect its own Captain. That Captain would be a member of the DCC (Defense Coordination Counsel).
        Any member of a company would not have to take orders from from other than his Captain, unless a higher chain of command, say Battalion Major, were created.

  7. B-dog says:

    A “representative” voting body such as the aforementioned DCC is but a political entity and should NOT be part of the Militia command structure, and generally should not be comprised of military leaders. This is a sure recipe for disaster.

    A commander commands. There is no voting. At best, the representative DCC places limits on, or gives broad-based goals to the Militia and the Commander (and his/her leading subordinates) figure out how to best accomplish said goals WITHOUT interference from the DCC.

    Avoiding, marginalizing, and subverting (or better yet controlling) government infiltrators and instigators will be the biggest key to the ultimate success of any FREEFOR operation.

    • Dan Morgan says:

      SFC Barry, Old Sarge and B-dog are giving you some pretty good advice based on experience. A Commander commands, no questions asked. That is the boiled down essence of all successful military operations. That’s why the term “Commander’s Intent” is so important. At the very least, have your Company Commander’s elect one overall Commander, but then understand, his decisions must stand without question or hesitation. If not, then chaos and defeat are the expected result.

  8. StukaPilot says:

    the actual organization and leadership of FreeFor will distill out in the course of Coming Events. And it won’t look anything like this over-structured, sitting-duck nightmare

  9. Tcumseh says:

    Mr. Hunt, Thank you sir for putting forth this effort. And I hope our .mil brethren out there understand that civilian forces are not what they are used to dealing with. I had a situation a few years ago that required a night watch in a very dicey place under very bad circumstances. I was fortunate to have two friends who put their shit on the line for me. If they called tomorrow I would be there.

    We unorganized retards stood watch and kept our shit tight until dawn. We were tested thrice including what could have been a bad Treyvon moment. There was no “leadership” just us 3 unorganized grabasstic pieces of amphibian shit. I have never been in combat and I don’t want to be, but I won’t run. I”ll do everything I can til God calls me.

    Your former friends will be dealing with the same on their side. Where we are going is a long way from Ft. Bragg.

  10. DTG says:

    “Easy” was never in the equation. Nothing ever worth while is.

    And it doesn’t matter how far from ‘Ft. Bragg’ you think you are (comment below). It doesn’t even matter if you are in a formal organization or an informal group. What matters is that these seasoned veterans are giving you ‘pearls of wisdom,’ even when you get butt-hurt while reading what they have to say, which is right on target, by the way.

    Command is absolute. It’s not a vote; it’s not a democracy. It’s an organized team with roles, responsibilities, varying skill levels, and personalities that must be subordinated to the overall mission executed within the commander’s intent. When you join a properly set up group, you’ll see they’re operating in this manner. If you don’t trust the commander, you should not have joined the group. You’ll be wasting their time and yours. In fact, they’ll see right off you don’t measure up and will ask you to leave, or they should.

    This is the kind of group that gives you the chance to live, let alone win.

    Councils only have one good purpose and they should only be chosen from trusted, vetted members: That purpose is to advise the commander so that he can make a better decision based upon the expertise of his council members. But once he makes the decision, council and all group members MUST give 150% to make the plan work. Otherwise, everyone is just a dead man walking, and worse, the cause will suffer greatly and most likely fail.

    The intelligent man will put aside the romanticism learned from war stories or novels or movies, and embrace the realities of becoming a valuable team member and work toward that objective. It’s a hard road, but worth the effort.

    You can have all the protocols you want; compare them to successful movements/operations/struggles/wars for freedom. Keep that which moves the objective forward. Lastly, make the enemy play by their own rules; don’t weigh your team down by playing by the enemy’s rules, too.

    My .02

  11. Jim Klein says:

    Obviously a commander has to command, period. It’s not even worth discussing. But that’s not the question; the issue is how he becomes the commander.

    In that, this War will be different than others. The commander will be chosen by those who choose to follow him, however they come to choose it. That much is certain, so there’s no point in trying to design a fixed alternative. It’ll happen, however it happens.

    Nice organized plan, Gary. We were bound to completely agree about something eventually, and you wrote it earlier—this War sure ’nuff did start on April 12; no wondering now.

    • Gary Hunt says:

      Yes, and it has also brought people with differences to put aside those differences:
      Maryland Resolves

      On December 12, 1774. the deputies of the province of Maryland met at Annapolis. Their seventh of seven resolves:

      Resolved unanimously, that it is recommended to the several colonies and provinces to enter into such or the like resolutions, for mutual defense and protection, as are entered into by this province. As our opposition to the settled plan of the British administration to enslave America will be strengthened by a union of all ranks of men in this province,

        we do most earnestly recommend that all former differences about religion or politics, and all private animosities and quarrels of every kind, from henceforth cease and be forever buried in oblivion

      ; and we entreat, we conjure every man by his duty to God, his country, and his posterity, cordially to unite in defense of our common rights and liberties.

  12. Elizabeth says:

    I find very disingenuous, nigh onto self-serving, the opinion that only military can handle this issue, since military hasn’t handled this issue, heretofore. What military has done heretofore, at best, is stand down, while looking down, on the people who have paid for every uniform, every bullet, every minute of training, with every piece of weaponry…war-gaming against the people, while simultaneously maintaining near total silence in the face of absolute treason, against you, against us, against the supreme law of the land.

    How about this…you guys go put a damn plan together, execute that plan, and get back to us with results which justify the expenditure and investment we have made in you? Otherwise… can put you on burial details, and you can earn your living, burying us.

    I don’t want to be unkind…but truly, shut up. You have done such a good job of standing down to every intimidation thrown at you thus far, by those to whom you answer…let’s not interrupt that near perfect record now.

    Either find a way to be helpful, or go lick your masters’ boots, but don’t be thinking that your arrogance and hostility is any more acceptable than the hostility and arrogance of your commanders.

    • DTG says:

      Elizabeth, where’d you get, “…the opinion that only military can handle this issue, since military hasn’t handled this issue, heretofore.”

      I’ve re-read every post by anyone I can deduece that has military experience, including the authors, Mr. Hunt and Dr. Martino, and I haven’t found one statement that “only military people can handle this issue.”

      All I’ve been able to read are some opinions by very seasoned vets say that the voting idea is terrible, because it doesn’t work. Effective operations don’t run as a committee–not when lives are on the line.

      So, rather than blame the former military types (who’ve only offered personal opinions based on experience on one small facet of the original plan) for the failures of the American public to ‘jealously guard the public liberty,’ why not ask the vets you have an issue with exactly why they view the topic of command not to be subject to voting, which is the only criticism of the plan presented, save for ‘Old Sarge’ and his “Undeniable Truths” which support the command v. voting criticism and gives reasons why voting won’t work to the criticism?

      It might add to the discussion if you did…or if you choose not to do that, please take your own advice and ‘shut up.’

      Have a nice day!

      • Elizabeth says:

        I have not blamed “former military types…for failures of the American public”…(as though former military types are somehow not a part of that “public” in the first place) but I do hold to some account, unlike most of our “flag waving, support our troops” cadres of “civilians” the failures of our military who have been taught, continuously,from the first day of basic training, to hold civilians in contempt. You’ll need forgive me for pointing out that “contempt” is not a very positive first step.

        I hold the American public responsible for the failure to ‘jealously guard the public liberty’ by not jealously guarding the public purse strings, in the first place.

        The American public has financed the metastasis of our decline, almost without question.

        The “military types” have for the most part, remained utterly silent. Until now, that is…and the first thing done is to point out, both at Bundy Ranch and now here, just how justified they are in that contempt.

        The militias need help, but military types should be required to declare a major, and if that “major” is to gate-keep the line that separates us, the civilians need to call it out, and jealously guard themselves.

  13. juat a few thoughts: first, a thank you to “Elizabeth” for her challenge to those who think that structure is the key to winning any effort… it seems they’ve been “structured” into thinking they have all the answers…

    second, given my unworthy, ill-spent time in my beloved Corps, I see this effort much like a recently arrived load of recruits to Parris Island – their primary problem being the lack of discipline… the above plan provides it for the outset… perfect..?? hardly… but it recognizes the primary issue afflicting even the smallest of groups: bringing individuals together to face a common issue… fault that if you must from your lofty positions of master strategist and tactician – just remember that it was such a group that defeated the most modern, well-trained and best-equipped military of it’s day…

    third, and finally, morale is of importance as well as training… my consideration would be to somewhere insert a “chaplain corps”

    overall, someone had to do this so let it start here… I can still hear the Drill Instructors: “GET OUT OF THE BUS AND GET ON LINE !!! FEET ON THE YELLOW FOOTPRINTS!!! MOVE !! MOVE !! MOVE !! Yes, it’s time for some order to be instilled in our ragtag movement.

    PP III to III

    • Elizabeth says:

      You are absolutely correct. The most glaring hole in this plan is the absence of a Chaplain Corp.

      I had hoped someone with particular knowledge and experience would offer that, and so, you have.

      Thank you.

  14. Sandman says:


    We have had our issues and basic disagreements in the past concerning the use of Committees of Safety and Common Law Courts in modern times. But those issues aside,
    this plan seems workable of face value PROVIDED we follow the advice of those prior service personnel who have offered pointers for successful command structure. They may have a gruff way of expressing themselves that rankles many Citizens who have not served. But I believe their hearts are in the right place. As one of the disparaged “civilian” Militia Commanders I would add some points to the discussion.

    1) The Militia are NOT professional soldiers, and former service members need to stop applying that standard.
    2) The Militia is unorganized by nature, yet contains many capable individuals and small units.
    3) No political organization, ie:Oathkeepers, III% Movement (Citadel Branch, Sipsey Branch or Kessler branch), OMA, Tea Party, etc truly represents the interests of the Unorganized Miltia.
    4) No Patriot/Liberty Movement group has stepped forward to embrace the Militia (with all its shortcomings).

    A couple of images come to mind when observing Militia interaction with the rest of the Freedom Movement. We are the red-headed step-child that no-one wants to claim, yet we exist and have been fighting the Leviathan for decades. Secondly leading/commanding Militia is exactly like herding cats. This is both an asset and a liability. (think about that for a bit)

    I could support this Plan, AND recommend it to other CO’s I am in contact with (many of whom are Prior service Mil.) provided the following caveats were added.

    The DCC should act as an advisory staff for the On Scene Commander.
    The OSC should only be prior service Military, with recent infantry combat command experience.
    The OSC should be required to be vetted thru verifiable long term involvement in the Liberty Movement.(Important!)
    The OSC should be elected by the present Militia Captains, who agree to follow his commands without question as far as their conscience will allow.
    The OSC can be removed from command by 2/3 majority vote of Militia Captains.
    The Militia Officers assigned to Logistics/Supply, Medical, Media will reports directly to the OCS via the DCC.
    If a local Militia Commander is present and NOT elected to the OSC position, he will serve as second-in-command and XO to the OSC.

    Just some ideas to solidify the Command structure, without requiring days of debate and ego-stroking.

    • Gary Hunt says:

      You suggest that “we follow their advice”. Well, wouldn’t that put them in command, and subject us to the top down mentality that has been recognized here?
      Perhaps we should listen to their advice, then decide for ourselves. After all, it is the militia that has come forward, yet the ex-military seem to think that we are stupid. And, in the past few weeks, a number of those top-downs have sought direct access to the Bundys, through me, or professed that given an invite, the can straighten everything out, real quick. S
      should we presume they all have the same ideas? Or, do they each have different ideas on the solution (like, maybe, just put them in charge)?
      Maybe, after all, since the call was not answered by the, at least those who claim to hold the solution, the ex-Army Sgt. that has, based upon both is military service and dealing with the situation in Bunkerville, and thinks that this Plan is foundational to gaining the support of the troops and avoiding submitting to a “leader”, unproven, untested, and unknown, is, perhaps, the best solution. And, this “theory” is, as I said, proven to work.

    • Elizabeth says:

      I see the beginnings here, Sandman and Gary. This is a worthy discussion. It won’t all iron out at once, but structure is needed. Experience is helpful.

  15. T.L. Davis says:

    I appreciate your work on this Gary, though in trying to contact those at Bunkerville, I find many distressing issues. If the very formal means of contact are followed it neuters one of the movements greatest assets, which is spontaneous and overwhelming support. Taking advantage of the impulse to support must be addressed.

    Anyway, I will not go into a detailed critique of the actual operation at Bunkerville, but this is a good plan. Still, I caution not to wall off support with regulations and requirements.

    • Gary Hunt says:

      This “Plan” does not go into security (perhaps for reasons of security), though that is a significant consideration. Why? Because infiltration is expected. Blanket acceptance because of ones “bona fides”, whether military background or organizational affiliation (did I say Oath Keepers?) would subject the entire effort to undo, and perhaps destructive, subjugation. Therefore, that which is in place is not to be bypassed, only cooperated with, and influenced, if that existing system recognizes the quality of both the individual and the advice. BTW, now I know who “cat” is.

      • T.L. Davis says:

        My concern is for the movement as a whole. The action at Bunkerville is crucial and I don’t have any reservations about those in command doing what they need to do to maintain their own security. My offer was an offer and their rejection of that offer does me no disservice nor does it engender any dismay. They have to do what they think is right and in accordance with their own policies. My support is not diminished, but neither is it blind and unconditional. Were I present, I would follow their dictates and structure with absolute fidelity as I would any command structure in place wherever I finally serve the movement.

        This is not the only action to take place in this struggle. This is but the first.

        • Gary Hunt says:

          Perhaps a misunderstanding on my part. Access to the “Host” is explained in the Organizational Plan, and avoids legal ramifications. I (mis?)understood that direct access was sought.

          • T.L. Davis says:

            My intial intent, with a week or so to give, was to help provide some support to the troops on the ground (perhaps relief so they could rest) in the form of reinforcement. I was not seeking an interaction with the Host. I had hoped to assess comm capability, methods, etc in order to instruct other groups as to necessary equipment and lessons learned on the ground, to assess their needs and to see if needed equipment could be acquired and delivered.

            Time is running short now, but a commitment for the future is possible.

          • Gary Hunt says:

            You continued support is appreciated. When your time allows, I will be happy to get you in touch with the proper people — who will, without a doubt, appreciate what you have to offer.
            Thank you,

  16. ten smiths says:

    hmmm….. i don’t recall sun tzu saying, “we should all become like the central planners, so we can better fight the central planners.” maybe he said, “fight where they are not”. assymetrical warfare will require many different methods be applied for a common end. unless you think dressing like them, training like them, and organizing like them will let you go toe-to-toe with them. that will only make you predictable, like them. old johann rommel wrote a whole detailed book on warfare. turned out to be the roadmap to his defeat.

  17. Deanna Baldwin says:

    Keeping in mind that the forces liberty-minded folks will be facing are other AMERICANS, I firmly agree that it is wise to be controlled and careful. Both NIMS (National Incident Management System) and Red Cross Disaster Services have models that WORK and that could easily be used/adapted. Strive for not an angry mob, but a calmly organized resistance that casts into sharp relief the violent and unconstitutional acts of the opposition.

  18. We’ve been handed an example of what happens when people who don’t know each other arrive at a “hot spot” and try to work together. Let’s learn from it. The leaders of militia units need to become acquainted with each other before the next “incident.” At the very least, eacy leader should know all t he other leaders in his state. Beyond that know the leaders in adjacent states.

    Yes, the point of voting is not to vote on what to do, but to vote on who will be in charge. Once that’s settled, everyone’s option is to follow orders or leave. Eventually a George Washington will emerge. I just hope there isn’t too much blood spilled before that happens.

    When it comes to vetting, the individual militia units should have vetted their members before they joined up. The issue of vetting members of organized units should not even arise at an “incident.” However, there will likely be independent volunteers arriving at an “incident,” and some means must be found to vet them. This should be done as part of fitting them into the on-the-ground organization, depending on their skills and experience.

  19. Dick Lawson says:

    A good start! You’re all on the right track (including commenters). Just need to smooth out the bumps, but that will come.

  20. Kyle Rearden says:

    Although certainly an intriguing proposal, Gary, I had a few questions I’d like to ask:

    1) Should leaderless resistance be considered incompatible with this militia organization plan?

    2) Are there geographical limits for these militia units to operate under according to this plan?

    3) Who is the civil authority for the militia units according to this plan?

    4) How will the militia units be financially supported under this plan?

    and just for good humour:

    5) Without this militia organizational plan, who will build the roads? 😉

    • Gary Hunt says:

      1) Those who enroll in the ____ Militia, are not to be considered a part of anything else, regardless of what other units they may belong to. Their temporary attachment to the ____ Militia remain, as long as they remain, in good standing.
      2) No, they have come as citizens to enroll in the _____ Militia.
      3) The civil authority emanates from the Militia Liaison, to act in the capacity of shared self-defense, absent an official of the de facto government willing to operate in that civil capacity. This focuses on the fact that we have inherent rights as militia, as defined and intended by every state constitution and the federal Constitution. To exert those rights, we cannot be prohibited by virtue of statutes that seem to undermine those rights. The expedient applied here is the most efficient means of consolidating militia to be an effect force against the wrongs of government.
      4) Though not addressed in the Plan, even though portions of the Headquarters Company would have to make provisional for such, other organizations are beginning to adopt means that would provide funding in support of such operations.
      5) The roads are there.

  21. Steve Minor says:

    1st and foremost, those with Battle Experience should lead those who have none.
    You think you know what to do until someone starts shooting at you and rounds are bouncing around and people begin to die.
    With live experience you can grow into positions of authority and not until then.

    You think you know how you will respond, you don’t.
    Put your egos away and learn.

    Our goal is to win our country back.

    Major Minor

    Those who have been there should show and train you how to handle these situations, less you get others and yourself killed.

    • Dave says:

      Very well stated Steve. Gary Hunt has started a great conversation that I hope will lead to people stepping forward and doing just what you recommend. Veterans do not need to debase the civilians they need to step forward and begin developing a training scenario. Nothing beats real world experience.

      • Gary Hunt says:

        To Steve and Dave,
        I have considered, even as I was writing the Organizational Plan, the implication of asserting military experiences as necessary for the success of the Plan.
        During the Revolutionary War, adoption of alternate methods were necessary to obtain victory over the British. Likewise, in the Civil War, generals like Jackson adopted tactics that were unheard of, and he was probably the most successful of the lesser generals, of the war, until his death.
        I was trained for Vietnam. When I reflect on that training, and the training of today, I see what appears to be a completely different army. Today’s army is nothing more than a police force, and it has the “them or us” mentality, however, that mentality is directed at foreigners, not Americans.
        But, what they are taught would probably not serve us as well as assumed, in that the battles that we would fight would be, primarily, defensive, and must begin, at least, with the other side (such as Iraqi and Afghani) of the material of war equipage.
        Account for the duration of the war in Afghanistan, at this time, being the longest war in our history — against ragtags. We would do better with an Afghani patriot, since that will be the position that we are fighting from.
        Though the command structure is intended to emulate the modern military, it is probably far more difficult to “untrain” then train than it would be to just have to train those who come without experience.
        Even worse is to consider that command had to “untrain” to retrain for the means by which we would fight, rather than allow thinkers like many of the historical war generals (schoolteachers, book sellers, etc.) to play a significant role in command.
        I don’t deny the benefit of experience of those trained in modern tactics fro a superior platform, though to assume that they would be the sole means of victory is to court potential disaster, as it would still voices that might better perceive than thos who are already in the “box”.

        • Dave says:

          All voices must be a part of the process. There are many natural tacticians that have never spent a day in the service. They will be quickly identified and utilized under a wise leadership. Structure is imperative or we will be divided and slowly eliminated.

          The sniper will play a huge roll in any insurgency. Here in the United States we have more crack shots than any nation on the planet. The Russians proved the efficacy of mass sniper deployments in Stalingrad. Snipers are tough on moral.

          I am also an old timer as well and have not been in the military for many years. However I have worked all over the globe in many civil war regions. I worked in Algeria during the civil war 20+ years ago. The U.S. military based much of their strategy in Iraq on that civil war. The government armed much of the civilian population with AK47’s to destroy the terrorist logistical supply lines and identify specific terrorist. They gave the population a 2nd amendment and it worked. The Marines followed that policy in Anbar Province in Iraq and quickly killed off many of the insurgents in that region. An armed populace is devastatingly effective. We can throw off the shackles of tyranny with good organization.

          Time is on the side of an insurgency, so always strive to survive and fight another day. We cannot stand toe to toe with a true professional military. My greatest fear is that our current regime would bring in United Nations troops if they think they are losing.

  22. Dave says:

    Great video on the description of a sniper

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