Outpost of Freedom blog

Camp Lone Star – The World Turned Upside Down

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
July 28, 2015

I believe that the prosecutor, Ass. US Attorney William Hagan, in the K. C. Massey felon in possession matter, is worried. Why would I think that to be the case? Well, Massey recently sat with Mr. Hagan to discuss the upcoming trail. Hagen has some interesting, and rather desperate, thoughts.

We’ll start with the fact that the “has-had” argument (See Camp Lone Star — A Favorable Ruling?) seems to have put him on the defensive. He explained to KC that what he was doing by stopping or detaining illegals at the border was “in or affecting commerce” (from the felon in possession law, 18 U. S. Code § 922 (g)(1). Interesting the illegally entering the country, and/or smuggling people, firearms, and drugs, is considered, by the Ass. US Attorney to be “commerce”.

So, what is commerce? Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, defines it as:

The exchange of goods, productions, or property of any kind; buying, selling, and exchanging of articles. The transportation of persons and property by land, water, and air [for payment].

So, let’s put some perspective on this — from our own history. John Hancock, and many others, would buy goods at one port, outside of the colonies, and bring them into the colonies. Often, much of the cargo would be off-loaded prior to entry into the port and then the taxes would be paid only on that portion of the cargo that was declared. That portion was “in or affecting commerce”. But, what of the cargo that had been offloaded? Was it “commerce”, which is legal, or was it smuggling, which is illegal? Since they only had tariffs and other fees for the cargo that was off-loaded in port, it was “commerce” and had no criminal penalties associated with it.

However, those goods that were off-loaded elsewhere, well, were consider “smuggled contraband”, and were in no wise considered to be commerce. If the transporter were caught, he would lose the goods, his ship, and, perhaps, serve time in jail.

Commerce, then, is legal transporting. Smuggling is criminal, and is not, in the least, any aspect of commerce. If caught, the property is not transferred to the owner, or the purchaser. It is confiscated by the government, and then sold or destroyed.

So, does 18 U. S. Code § 922 (g)(1) apply to legal transportation only, or does it apply to illegal transportation (smuggling), as well? If it also applies to smuggling, then we need to ask Mr. Hagen, and the government, why when they catch people entering illegal, with firearms or without, if they are in commerce, or not.

But, if we consider that the government doesn’t stop them, rather, they escort them to a bus or train station, sends them around the country to where they are not wanted, gives them our hard earned money so they don’t have to work, thereby rewarding them far better than those who wait, and abiding by the existing immigration laws, which are otherwise not enforced. Perhaps I am wrong, since government, apparently, considers smuggling to be “commerce”.

So, it could be rather confusing to those who think they know the law, as opposed to those who can read and comprehend the English language, and can differentiate between the meanings of words.

However, if we are a nation of laws, as we are led to believe, then should the precise wording of a law be the applicable interpretation? Or, have we become a nation subject to the rule of illiterate, or otherwise politically driven, prosecutors.

Let’s enter another interesting realm based upon the discussion between Massey and Hagen. Mr. Hagen states that Massey was not on the premises where he lived. Now, the discussion centered on whether the premises were the house – the building, or the property that the house was on. Black’s tells us that the estate, the premise, is “the land and buildings thereon”. So, here we have another discrepancy between the law (Texas Penal Code, Section 46.04) applicable in Texas, whereby Massey can posses a firearm, and the federal interpretation. Mr. Hagen says the house, the state law says the “premise”. This was discussed, absent the recent reinterpretation, in Camp Lone Star – Massey & The Clash of Laws.

But, that is not quite the point that we want to make. By Mr. Hagen even suggesting that Massey might have not been charged with a crime if he had been in his house, he also recognizes the validity of the state law. However, since Massey wasn’t in his house, then the feds can charge him with felon in possession (regardless of the wording of that law), because he is not in his house. Is the implication that Texas law would have applied, had Massey been in his house? If so, why would Texas law not apply if Massey were not in his house? And, if it did apply if Massey was not in his house, or on the premises, then it would still be Texas jurisdiction, since the Massey house is in Texas — and, if the feds can assume jurisdiction over any land in Texas, then can’t they also assume jurisdiction in Massey’s house?

Now, let’s visit one more part of the discussion that has to do with “erroneous” statements made during the hearing. This was discussed in a previous article, Camp Lone Star – Act Two: The Contradictions Scene 2: To Detain, or Not to Detain? That is the Question.

Mr. Hagen told Massey that it didn’t matter if the “government agents lied, misspoke, or misrepresented the facts in their testimony, as long as the meat of the story is true”. Let’s see if we can put a perspective on this, and then digest it.

Government agents are trained to observe and report. Some of those agents referred to their notes during their testimony at the March 30, 2015 hearing (referenced in the above link). That hearing was, among other purposes, to justify the procedure used to detain Massey — to make sure that it satisfied the ruling on stops, detentions, searches, etc, based upon Supreme Court rulings. So, what they “misspoke, or misrepresented, in court, at that hearing, were simple “errors” that made what the did appear to be lawful, in accord with the Supreme court rulings, what might have been deemed unlawful, if the truth were told.

Now, if you or I were to lie, misspeak, or misrepresent, under oath, we would be criminal under the federal perjury laws:

18 U.S.C. § 1621: Perjury generally

Whoever – (1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true; or (2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true; is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. This section is applicable whether the statement or subscription is made within or without the United States.

18 U.S.C. § 1622: Subornation of perjury

Whoever procures another to commit any perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury, and shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

So, the three important questions are:

1. Was there any testimony on “any material matter” that might have lead to a different determination as to whether the stop, or detention, satisfied the Supreme Court rulings? (§1621)
2. Did Mr. Hagen know that the information provided by the witnesses was misspoken, misrepresented, or a downright lie? (§1622)
3. What would happen to you, or me, if we lied, misspoke, or misrepresented, any material matter, as they did at the hearing?

So, being a nation of laws, or so we are told, we can revisit the words of James Madison, in Federalist #62, when he said, “Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?”

If it is to be known, is it to be known in the language we all understand, or a cryptic language, lacking logic, where the government can change “in or affecting commerce” to the “commerce” of illegal entry and smuggling.

If the federal government recognizes Texas law, if someone is in his house, does not Texas law apply equally throughout Texas, unless the person is on federal land, having jurisdiction ceded by the state?

And, can the (public) servants lie to the master (people), with impunity, and the master be held to the rigid interpretation and application of the law, if he “lies, misspeaks, or misrepresents”?

The British, after the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown, played an old tune, “The World Turned Upside Down”. It appears that the people need to begin playing that same tune.

Montana Malfeasance
Jesse Newsom and Writs of Assistance

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
July 22, 2015

There is little doubt that the government knew that Jesse Newsom was on the road when they chose to serve a search warrant, not on him but on the premise and a vehicle. This will be explained in a subsequent article dealing with his arrest.

Shawn Hill, Special (I always get a kick out of the adjective, as applied to FBI) Agent, out of the Kalispell FBI office, served the warrant on July 10, 2015. The Warrant, signed by Magistrate Judge John T. Johnston, United States District Court, District of Montana, is, as is common with federal warrants, incomplete. There are four check boxes on the form, none of which are checked. Rather, it leaves the discretion to the server of the warrant, much like the Writs of Assistance that James Otis spoke against, about 250 years ago, when the Writs were blanket authority to search wherever they wanted to, for whatever they wanted, and carried no requirement of specificity with regard to what they were looking for. The only difference between then and now is that, now, a judge has to sign the warrant, but that appears to be a “done deal” when the FBI requests a warrant.

The Warrant did have an “Attachment B”, but “Attachment A” was conspicuously missing. Presumably, Attachment A would have been the constitutionally required “Oath or affirmation” providing the “probable cause” deemed necessary to justify the issuance of the Warrant. The Amendment also states, “particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” This Amendment, in response to what the Writs of Assistance were, includes this provision to insure that the warrant is issued to seize only what is known to exist, hence the inclusion of “particularly describing” both place and objects to be seized.

The definition of “particularly” that the Framers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights would recognize can be found in Webster’s 1828 Dictionary. Here is what we find, “particularly – adv. Distinctly; singly.” So, now we can compare what was intended, at least as should be interpreted by both the People and the government, as to the wording in the warrant’s “Attachment B”. We’ll deal with just a couple of the items described to be seized, though you can review the wording of the Attachment and see that there are others that so general as to fall well outside the obvious intent of the Fourth Amendment. (image of Attachment B; text of Attachment B)

The first listed item is:

1. Any and all firearms, destructive device, or ammunition as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a), or any photographs of firearms or ammunition or of persons in possession of firearms or ammunition.

Now, the Constitution recognizes our right “to be confronted with the witnesses against[us]” (Sixth Amendment). What if that “witness” is our own camera, or pictures from friends? Is that a violation of the Fifth Amendment prohibition, “nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law“. And, what of the property that is not criminal in its nature; proof of a crime; or the proceeds of criminal activity? It is taken, as we will see, with a preposterous disregard for personal property rights — that which is supposed to be protected by the Constitution, and not to be taken just because they want to, well, fish.

Fish. Well, why would we use that word? Simply, the other item on the property to be seized raises no possible doubt that the government is “fishing”, an absolute contradiction to the intent of the Framers. From “Attachment B”:

9. Evidence of occupancy, control, or ownership of the property to be searched, including but not limited to, received mail, outgoing mail with a return address, concealed mail, deeds, leases, rental agreements, photographs, personal ledgers, utility and telephone bills, and statements, and identification documents.

I have emphasized some of the items, but to all of them, what possible motive could there be to seize any of the listed items? Are they checking to see if he has permission to live where he lives? Are the concerned that he might not be paying his bills? Why would they want to know who he corresponds with? Federal law prohibits the government from opening mail. Is there a loophole that states that mail is sacred while in the hands of government, but is no longer sacred after it is received, or before it is sent? I can’t find one.

So, now, we can look at what was actually seized and inventoried, during the search.

• item 5 – No trespassing sign
• item 6 – Belt buckle
• item 8 – Black binder [presumably with un-“described papers “contained in the binder]
• item 10 – Camo shirt
• item 11 – Camo hat
• item 13 – Northwestern Energy Bill [concerned about his power usage?]
• item 14 – Camo hat
• item 15 – Camo pants, shirt and belt
• item 16 – Camo Backpack
• item 22 – Rental agreement [are they making sure that he pays his rent?]
• item 23 – Conviction from Washington State
• item 24 – Camo patch
• item 25 – Boots
• item 29 – Camo Clothing
• item 30 – Camo Coat
• item 39 – Catalogs
• item 41 – Camo clothing w/ Newsome [sic] name
• item 49 – Misc. targets
• item 52 – Identification cards and Militia Emblem
• item 56 – 2 empty shotgun shells

Though the other items are related to firearms, ammunition, etc., we have to wonder what those listed, above, have to do with anything that would be evidence of a crime. Power bill and rental agreement, are, perhaps, the most far-fetched. Clothing, boots, binder of paperwork — what role can these play?

According to federal statutes, specifically, 10 U.S. Code §311, Jesse is a member of the United States Militia, by law. And, the statute, though it excludes certain people, does not exclude those convicted of a felony (yes, Jesse has been convicted of a felony, but that will be covered in a subsequent article). So, why would they take clothing and other objects associated with militia? It is their law that binds him to that obligation as United States Militia.

We can only hope that Jesse has some civilian clothes, so that he doesn’t have to run around naked. And, we can contemplate, since many of these items cannot be associated with criminal activity, in any way, that he has been denied his property, “without due process of law“.

Now, I used the term “fishing”, earlier. So, let’s continue the journey into the fishing elements of this story. First, we will consider Mr. “A”. Mr. “A” was contacted by cell phone, while the agents were still at Jesse’s house. Mr. “A” was in town, Great Falls, when he received the call. He agreed to meet them at Jesse’s home. They waited until he arrived and then Special (there we go, again) Agent Mark D. Seyler, out of Helena FBI office, asked him questions, as Mr. “A” told me, they already had answers to. Did you know that Jesse was in a militia, and such. It appears that his “interview” was intended more as a threat, intimidation, or a warning.

From Jesse’s home, they went to the home of Mr. “B”. Here, it was a bit different, as they acknowledged that Mr. “B”‘s “name showed up on paperwork” that was taken during the search. Mr. B. did a good job of playing a government official with many, “I don’t recall”, or “I didn’t know that”. This, I suppose, is the first confirmed catch from the government’s “fishing expedition”. We can little doubt that there are many more names that will come under their scrutiny — to see how many more they can catch.

However, at one point, the agent stated that “about 10% of militia participants might be prone to violence”. They led Mr. “B” to the understanding that they didn’t consider him in that 10% (ha, ha, ha), and it appears that they were, again, attempting to intimidate or discourage Mr. “B”.

From what I have seen in the past, taking paperwork to expand their understanding of the militia networking is a new tactic, and though their pursuit has nothing to do with criminal activity. It is intelligence gathering, by unlawful use of search warrants and intimidation.

Camp Lone Star – Act III – A Kangaroo Court
Scene 2 – Presumption of Guilt

Massey’s own little Dungeon

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
June 25, 2015

We will begin with three definitions. The first is an amendment to the Constitution, that being limitations imposed upon the federal government and for the securing of our rights, as understood by the Framers of the Constitution, and, which are our birthright.

The second, the legal definition of one of the terms of that amendment, included to clarify that term.

The third, the description of what is known as a Kangaroo Court. As you read the following, you will see that all three of the definitions provided for such a Court are applicable in the case against K.C. Massey.

8th Amendment
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Bail [Black’s Law Dictionary – 5th Edition]
The Surety or sureties who procure the release of a person under arrest, by becoming responsible for his appearance at the time and place designated.

Kangaroo Court
1: a mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded or perverted
2: a court characterized by irresponsible, unauthorized, or irregular status or procedures
3: judgment or punishment given outside of legal procedure
(Merriam Webster)

In a previous article, Cruel and Unusual Punishments – Before Conviction, the conditions of release according to the Appearance Bond, were discussed. There were a number of conditions set, though the first three predicate the whole of the “Bond” that he was subject to. Those three were:

To appear for court proceedings

If convicted, to surrender to serve a sentence that the court may impose

To comply with all conditions set forth in the Order Setting Conditions of Release.

Now, based upon the definition of “bail” and the prohibition against “excessive bail”, when we look at the conditions, is it possible that the third condition, “to comply…”, might be deemed “excessive”, in that it goes beyond a requirement to appear, as per the definition, and the intent of the Bill of Rights?

Now, heed what we are discussing, for every patriot knows that he stands for the Constitution, and in so doing may be placing himself in a situation where he might find that he is charged and arrested for some made up crime.

However, since the government holds the guns, if Massey wanted to stay out of jail, pending trial, which he was more than willing to stand for, he would have to agree to the conditions.

The day that Massey was arrested, they did a UA (Urine Analysis) and find THC (from marijuana) in his test. So, they filled out the conditions as they would for someone charged with selling drugs, requiring random UA testing. Well, THC stays in your system for weeks, or longer. So, a scheduled test would have been sufficient to determine if he had not broken the law by using marijuana, since there is no federal law against use of marijuana. The random aspect of testing was detrimental to another condition, that he be gainfully employed, since he could be called from work to report for the UA, at any time, disrupting his reliability at work.

Massey agreed to the terms on November 3, 2014. He first refused the UA test in May 2015. He had gone over six months with absolute compliance with the conditions, even though he knew that they were unconstitutional. However, since half a year does not cut it for a speedy trial, and the confinement to home, not even allowed to maintain his property away from the immediate vicinity of the house, without prior permission from the Probation Officer (he is not on probation, he only, constitutionally, has to appear in court), and finding that when he was supposed to drive the ninety miles to Dallas for the UA, broke down, and refused the UA. Since he had taken that step, he continued to refuse subsequent calls for a UA.

That is until his next court appearance. Knowing that he would probably not pass the UA that he knew they would require when he arrived for the June 2 hearing, but he went to court, as required by the Constitution and the Conditions.

Now, the punishment that he received, prior to that June 10 hearing was bad enough. He was not a free, innocent man, until proven guilty. He was subject to conditions that were slightly less than if he had been in jail. He had such a limited amount of freedom that it could, nowise, be considered such.

Since he failed the UA on the 10th, he was sent to jail in the custody of the Brownsville Sheriff, though the contract with the federal government put him under the authority of the U. S. Marshall Service. The Marshall Service decided the Massey should be in Maximum Security. They have also imposed other conditions and restrictions that, along with general jail procedures, have imposed the following on Massey:

• His cell (sketch, above) is about 7′ by 10 feet, and includes bed, toilet, shower and table.
• He has only had only two 1-hour recreation periods since he has been in jail (three weeks).
• When he leaves the cell, for any reason, he first puts his hands through the food port and they are handcuffed. Then he is allowed out and told to face the wall while shackles are placed on his ankles and a chain around his waist. Then, he is handcuffed to the waist chain — yes, two bracelets on each hand.
• When he is out of his cell, he is always escorted by three guards, and the hallways are cleared before he can enter a hallway. One of the guards is constantly videotaping the procession.
• There is one window, in the cell door. That is where food is fed to the “animals”. It has a magnetic cover and is only open, with few exceptions, when they want to talk with him, pass food, or deliver the telephone to him so that he can make phone calls.
• Some guards will leave the door window cover off, at night, when the lights are dimmed, so they can do bed checks, about hourly. Other guards prefer to open the window, bang on the door, and make a lot of noise, then shine a flashlight in to see if he is there, and probably to make sure he is awake, every hour, during their shift.
• His cell walls are painted white, and the only constant sound is the whistling of the air-conditioning blowing into the call, keeping the temperature in the sixties. He only has one blanket.

As far as personal attention to his needs, he has gotten the many food gifts that were sent to him. He has had health problems. At one doctor call, he was found to have blood and high protein levels in his urine. For this, the doctor prescribed antibiotics. He tried them for three days and his stomach reacted, giving him pain, so he stopped taking the antibiotics. They have reported him for refusing to take his medicine, though they have not reported why he has refused it.

• He has a preexisting water on the knee problem that he has always treated with exercise, which provides relief.
• He has a pre-existing case of shingles, for which they have given him Triamcinolone, and he has had some relief.
• They had given him one Ibuprofen per day, taken in the presence of the guards, though he has had to quit taking them as it exacerbated the kidney problem.
• He has pain in his kidney, and, hopefully, will receive some treatment for that when he sees the doctor, again. He had been dealing with the kidney problem with exercise, to the point of perspiration to remove toxins, and cranberry juice. However, it is difficult to perspire in such a confined space with temperatures in to sixties.

If Massey is convicted, he will no longer be under the authority of the U. S. Marshall Service, but will be under Bureau of Prisons. At that point, being convicted, his living conditions will be far better than what he is currently enduring, and he will have regular exercise and will be able to seek necessary medical attention, without the constraints that are currently imposed upon him.

It appears that, perhaps, the government has taken the 8th Amendment literally, as it implies that once you are convicted, you can not be subjected to “cruel and unusual punishment”. It fails to prohibit cruel and unusual punishment prior to conviction, and, clearly, that is what Massey has been subjected to since his first arrest.

As far as “excessive bail”, the Conditions of Release were for an unsecured bond of $30,000. Whether that might be considered excessive, or not, is subjective, but let’s assume that it is not for the sake of discussion. If we assume that to be the point that anything over it would be excessive, then the conditions would, without a doubt, qualify as EXCESSIVE, and they go well beyond the simple historical concept of assuring that one be present in court, when required to.

As far as the Kangaroo Court, there is no doubt that “the principles of law and justice are disregarded or perverted“, and that this is “characterized by irresponsible, unauthorized, or irregular status or procedures“, and, finally, that “punishment [is] given outside of legal procedure“.

Quite simply put, some of the conditions that have been imposed upon Massey are outside of the constitutional framework created by the Founders, and some equate more toward medieval dungeon techniques resorted to by kings, tyrants, dictators, and other despots.

If we consider that if he is convicted of a crime, his conditions will improve, considerably, then we must also conclude that the justice system is based more upon punishment for Presumption of Guilt than upon any sense of justice.

“No bended knee for me”
Who Does the Patriot Fight For?

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
June 15, 2015

Almost every patriot I have met, when asked, “What are you willing to fight for?”, will answer, my family – my children and grandchildren. The Founders chose the word “Posterity” to explain their objective in both fighting and establishing a new government comprised of member States. What they did, they did for us, their posterity.

So, what happened when that government established upon those principles, as well as others, becomes the enemy of that very protection that they were, and we are, willing to fight for?

In 1997, Jennifer McVeigh was threatened with a charge of treason and the possibility of the death penalty (McVeigh’s Sister Tells Why She Aided U.S. Case Against Him) if she refused to testify against her brother. As tough at is it was, she opted to testify against her sibling.

Robert Beecher recently faced a similar situation. His daughter, Jessica, had owned two .22 caliber rifles that were found on the property that Beecher lived on, and one of which was included in the Indictment. She had also bought her father a .30-30 rifle for his birthday. This, too, was included in the Indictment and a picture of Robert holding the 30-30, pasted in Facebook, was instrumental in the government filing a Criminal Complaint, and securing search and arrest warrants for the property and Beecher.

During the initial interrogation of Beecher, FBI Special Agent Slater, having already ascertained that Jessica had purchased the firearms, suggested, “Maybe we should arrest her, instead”. Though the applicability of federal law is, and ought to be, questioned, 18 U. S. Code §922 (d)(1) does make it criminal to transfer a weapon to a know felon, regardless of state law (See “Felon in Possession of a Firearm” is Not Legal or Lawful).

With the possibility of Jessica serving ten years in prison for giving a birthday present, Robert had the unfortunate necessity of making one of the most difficult decisions of his life. It was whether he, or Jessica, or both, would spend ten years in prison.

The only decision that could be more severe than what Robert faced would be whether he would give his life for her. Now the latter decision, I think we all would agree, has only one proper answer. So, we must consider that the former also has only one answer.

Some questions arise as to whether the threat to go after Jessica would be carried out. Would it have gotten Robert off on his charges? Would the government even stoop so low as to make such a threat — to coerce someone into pleading guilty to what should not even be a crime, unless there was criminal intent in the activity?

We have been taught that we are a nation of laws, not a nation of men. So, just what laws are we a nation of?

In 1982, the Justice Department tried to determine how many federal criminal laws there were. Their answer was that there were over 3,000 criminal laws (however, many of those laws have multiple conditions that may be met, increasing the actual crimes to considerably more) contained within the 23,000 (currently 27,000) pages of U. S. Code.

When there are that many laws, we are not a nation of law; rather, we are a nation subject to the will of the men that administer those laws.

This brings to mind a quote from James Madison in Federalist #63:

It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is today, can guess what it will be tomorrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?

In Robert’s first letter to me, he said, “No bended knee for me”. Against what Robert was faced with, he stood firm to the principles that guide true patriots. He refused to bend a knee, though the force was overwhelming, and he had no choice but to succumb to that force. He was willing to sacrifice a portion of his life — for his Posterity.

His plea agreement, which he entered into to protect his family, especially his daughter, Jessica, committed him to 10 years in prison and 5 years supervised release. The government has promised (if any weight can be attributed to a government promise) to file for a sentence reduction within 360 days. Only time will tell if, and what, that will be.

In the meantime, we must all understand that those who speak out will find that the government will pull out all of the stops to put us in prison, if they can find just one violation of those 3,000 laws. This will continue to be true UNTIL such time as we find the need to replace the government that has deviated so far from what the Founders intended.

Camp Lone Star – Act III – A Kangaroo Court
Scene 1 – How Case Law Subverts the Constitution

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
June 8, 2015

Kangaroo Court
1: a mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded or perverted
2: a court characterized by irresponsible, unauthorized, or irregular status or procedures
3: judgment or punishment given outside of legal procedure
(Merriam Webster)

In a recent article, “Government Enforces Their Laws – Who Shall Enforce the Constitution?“, I raise a question that is now worthy of our consideration. If we want our birthright of Constitutional Government, as envisioned by the Founders, we cannot rely upon government for interpretation those laws passed which are applied contrary to the Constitution.

To quote Teddy Roosevelt, with regard to the “case law method”, “some of the teaching of the law books and of the classroom seemed to me to be against justice… we are concerned with [the] question of what law is, not what it ought to be.”

In my Constitution, government was granted powers and authorities, and had limitations imposed upon it. Here, we will deal with some authorities granted and some limitations imposed. And, we, as Americans concerned about our country and our posterity find that we are in a situation similar to that which the Founders recognized, 240 years ago. And, we, like they, must weigh, very carefully, the extent of encroachments into our rights and our lives, as they did, then.

On April 17, 2015, the final pre-trial motions were submitted to the Court. The Court has taken 7 weeks to prepare a Memorandum Opinion and Order, to address the argument presented to the Court by Massey’s attorney.

Rather than outright denying the motions, the extended interval tended to support the probability of a well-crafted reply, granting the motions and dismissing charges against Massey. I don’t doubt that, somewhere, that well crafted order still exists, though it has been replaced by a rather poorly crafted order, which will be the subject of this article, and was substituted solely because Massey created a situation in which the Judge, for reasons that many will not understand, chose not to pursue justice in that it would reflect on him as supporting someone who could not keep his promise — his agreement with the Court.

Honor, one’s word being good, is an important part of life. Massey, regardless of why, gave his word that he would not partake of any illegal substances — as a condition of his “home detention” (See Cruel and Unusual Punishments – Before Conviction) — rather than remaining in jail awaiting trial.

The dilemma this created for Judge Hanen is that he would be challenging the status quo by granting the motion, undermining the very strength of the federal “Felon in Possession” law, and putting it back in proper perspective with those limitations imposed by the Constitution. This would leave those in government who support the improper interpretation in a position to accuse Hanen of siding with a man lacking honor and unable to abide by an agreement that he willingly made as a condition of his pre-trial release.

We must put ourselves in a position to understand that this apparently minor infraction would probably have similar consequences, or at least should have them, within our own community. Suppose you supported someone whom you had faith in to a position of chairman, or some other leadership role, within your organization. Suppose, then, he gave his word to abide by a promise that he had made, and then broke that promise. Would you continue to support him in the office that he held? This is what the politicians do, and this is an intolerable situation — it cannot be supported, if we stand behind our belief that honor and trust are necessary elements of leadership.

This is similar to the situation in which Judge Hanen finds himself. If he was willing to challenge the system and return to a proper interpretation of the law, it could be career ending decision, and could subject him to ridicule by others in government, including some of his peers on the federal benches. For him to take upon himself that responsibility, he would have to know that the person he was supporting by his actions was one as honorable as the Judge would be, in standing for justice. This is typical “office politics” and is true in business and the patriot community, as well. Violate the trust and you lose support.

So, let’s look at the “Memorandum Opinion and Order” that denied the Motions to Dismiss the Indictment (there were two of them: Motion to Dismiss Indictment, and First Supplement to Opposed Motion to Dismiss Indictment).

The Order begins with a misrepresentation that sets an erroneous foundation for what follows in the three “arguments” that the court offers, when it says:

As detailed below, Massey’s Motion to Dismiss focuses on the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 922(g), which makes it a crime for a person who has previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year “to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment.

First, he implies that the entire question rests on “the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 922(g)“. Though challenges to constitutionality were made, there was an even stronger argument made with regard to the grammatical context of the statute, which, if correct, would allow other aspects of the law to fit, neatly, into earlier Congressional interpretations of the extent of the “commerce clause”. This will be addressed in the third point.

1. Second Amendment Argument:

Massey’s argument relies heavily on District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), which upheld the right of people to have firearms for their personal protection. He argues that, among others, you do not lose your right to freedom of speech for being a convicted felon, so you cannot lose, forever, your right to keep and bear arms. Perhaps, unfortunately, the argument did not bring up the fact that 10 U.S.C. § 311 does exclude some from being members of the militia, though “felons” are not among those exclusions, which is a direct contradiction of the felon in possession statute, as applied.

The Court then argues that Heller did not address the felon aspect, He does point out that the court has set up the “scrutiny” to be applied in weighing whether a statute unfairly limits the “not infringe” (my words) provision of the Second Amendment, but rather than compare it to real world, he simply builds upon case law, redefining the Constitution, one case at a time.

In the dismissing nature of the current judicial system, he says:

The Second Amendment, at its core, protects “law-abiding” citizens. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. It is clear that convicted felons are not such citizens and thus fall outside of the Second Amendment’s protection. Accordingly, the Court need not consider the second inquiry because Section 922(g)(1) does not burden conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment.

So, unlike Texas, that being the location of the private property in which the alleged crime (possession) was committed, he determines that the rehabilitation program, under the various penal systems, cannot achieve its stated goal of rehabilitation, during the course of one’s life. In direct contravention of that “philosophy”, we have the opportunity to look at Massey’s life, since that rehabilitation, in “Who is K. C. Massey?“. What he does not address is the question of jurisdiction. If the “crime” was committed on private property (affirmed, in the next argument), is it constitutional to supersede Texas law absent an act that was committed on public lands? This doesn’t address an even more serious breach of jurisdictional limitations, which is quiet apparent in Massey’s case, as Massey was absolutely sure that they were on private land, with permission of the owner, to protect the owner’s property.

2. Equal Protection Clause Argument:

This argument, in the Order, addresses only that challenge brought up in the first of Massey’s Motions. It is, perhaps, inserted here to avoid addressing the ramifications of the subsequent challenge to “equal protection” brought up in the second Motion — a legal sleight of hand.

Hanen, in citing a previous decision, says, “a law is subject to strict scrutiny review in the face of an equal protection challenge only if (1) there is a fundamental right affected or (2) the law targets a suspect class. He continues, “does not impermissibly impinge upon a right protected by the Second Amendment because it regulates conduct that falls outside the scope of the Amendment’s guarantee.”

So, let’s look, first, at (1), where the law in question, “felon in possession, affects the Second Amendment. As mentioned above, 10 U.S.C. § 311 is the codification of the Second Amendment. That statute has a solidly placed foundation in the Constitution, as it clearly defines what at least the one provision of the Second is the militia. It makes exception for some, as far as being, without question, in the militia, though “felons”, or any descriptor that would imply such, is not exclude from the mandatory inclusion in the militia.

Now, let’s look at (2), whether it targets a “suspect class”. Here, we enter more into the First Supplement (the second motion to dismiss the indictment), though Hanen refused to address that part of that motion. If it refused people in one state, merely because they lived in that state, and approved those in another state, simply because they lived in that state, would they not be creating a “suspect class” of those who lived in one of the “refused” states? Quite simply, living in one state makes you a “suspect”, while living in another allows you all of the privileges of firearms possession and ownership. So, if we consider the asserted Second Amendment right, including the codification, and compare that to the “commerce clause”, what do we come up with?

Back in 1934, the Congress enacted the first firearms control act. The concern was expressed in the record (Congressional Record, reference: keep and bear arms, pg 42 “}, which says:

Mr. FREDERICK. That takes me into the purposes of this bill. This bill, as I see it, is intended to be a bill for the suppression of crime and is proposed to the United States Congress which ordinarily has no power in such matters, under the guise of a revenue raising bill.

So, we have, “which ordinarily has no power in such matters, under the guise of a revenue bill”. Now, they were using the commerce clause, as that original acts required that interstate commerce be involved. However, since they had no power to “suppress crime”, they used their power to tax (“revenue raising bill”), to both fund and track firearms. That was the only way that they could mount a challenge to the Second Amendment — by taxing, not by criminal charges, unless the tax was ignored. That was what the Constitution, even loosely construed in the act, allowed. There are no amendments that would extend that authority beyond what existed in 1934 — except the machinations of “case law”, which disregards the Constitution if one can manipulate the words of a previous decision to extend government authority where it had no constitutional authority to go. This is precisely why I suggest that we, the People, need to interpret Our Constitution, as the government is intent upon subverting it.

3. Commerce Clause Challenge:

Now, let’s look at the statute, in detail:

18 USC 922

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person –

(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

There are two key elements that we need to consider. First, “possess in or affecting commerce“. “In” is easily understood. That would clearly be in the act of shipping or transporting. “Affecting”, while that would mean that the possession affected, had an effect on, the transporting.

Here, the Judge cites United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1996), which says that the “in or affecting commerce’ element can be satisfied if the firearm possessed by a convicted felon had previously traveled in interstate commerce.” Damn, I need to return to school and take English Grammar all over, again. I cannot draw the same conclusion that the Court did in Rawls, though apparently, Judge Hanen apparently, can make that broad leap — away from the Constitution and into the lap of a government that wants to have absolute control over every aspect of our lives (Hint: That was once known as slavery). So, in a sense, the wording from Rawls rewrites the wording of the statute (922 (g)(1)) into something that is not written as law, rather, is interpreted into something that is not written in law, thereby making it law because the judges of the Fifth Circuit wanted it to be; not what it was intended to be when passed into law (or regulation). It is bad enough when the Congress can go from taxing to criminalization, however, when they allow the Courts to go even further and make something that does not exist, and then they can be described as nothing less than a Kangaroo Court.

But, wait, we’re not done, yet. That second part of the statute states, “to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate… commerce“, was discussed in A Favorable Ruling?. This, too, stretches our comprehension of the English Language. Here is how it is presented in Massey’s motion:

The word “has”, as opposed to the word “had” was used in the statute. “Has” is the third person singular, present indicative, verb meaning active in the action just completed, where “had” is past tense and participle of the verb have, meaning in a previous situation. So, if one were the direct recipient, then the word “has” would be appropriate. However, if it were expansive, intended to include any firearm shipped in interstate commerce, then “had” would be the proper verb. The use of “had” would have meant to include any and all that “had” been so transported any time prior.

That cannot be too difficult to understand, unless they teach a different grammar in law school, or have judicial indoctrination classes that they have not told us about. It has to do with tense. So, who is to interpret the laws? Will it be the government? Or, will it be we, the People, who have a vested interest in the laws of this nation, and, more importantly, in the Constitution that created that government that is now ignoring that document to increase their power over our very lives?

The Order says, “The Indictment, in all four counts, charges that Massey “did knowingly possess in and affecting interstate commerce a firearm . . . said firearm having been shipped in interstate commerce.” Now, the wording of the statute has been conveniently rearranged as it was presented to the Grand Jury that issued the Indictment. If that Grand Jury accepts that the wording of a law (statute) is what they are told, and probably in writing, how are they to know that it differs from the law that they are asked to weigh against Massey’s actions? If they did choose to question the wording, I’m sure that the US Attorney would explain to them that he, being a lawyer, has said that “this is what the law is, and, if Massey is in violation of this law, as I present it to you, you must come back with an Indictment”.

Let’s compare the wording from the Indictment

… did knowingly possess in and affecting interstate commerce a firearm . . . said firearm having been shipped in interstate commerce.

And the statute:

… to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

Darn look at that. They have introduced another verb, “having”.

“Had” and “having” are both past tense, as described in the First Supplement. However, “has”, is present tense (present indicative). So, the statute says “has”, while the proper verb should have been “had”, if what the government claims was intended was really intended when the statute was written. However, the Grand Jury was led to believe the even more broadly expressed “having”, which is very inclusive.

Has – present 3d singular of have
Had – past and past participle of have
Having – To be in possession of already

So, do we allow the government to redefine words so that they can imprison those that they want to punish? Or, do we decide that you don’t have to be a lawyer, or a judge, to understand the Constitution and the statutes alleged to be written in “Pursuance” to the Constitution?

Here is what James Madison said regarding laws:

It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is today, can guess what it will be tomorrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?

They will be “incoherent” if the Courts use a different language than the People. We cannot know what the law is, today, if that law is not based upon the language that we understand. The law is little known and less fixed when previous decisions of the courts have redefined the words, moving slowly but steadily away from the Constitution, for it is unfixed with subsequent decisions, and little known unless we make a daily habit of reading what the courts have done to both our language and the Constitution.

There is even more that troubles the patriot’s heart, and you will find those points highlighted in the linked Order. Suffice to say that if we fit the analogy of frogs in the water approaching its boiling point, we have, so far complained of the rising temperature, have failed to get out of the water.

Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus
Scene 4 – Government Fears Habeas Corpus

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 27, 2015

Setting the Stage: Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum (the sacred writ) has not been addressed at the Supreme Court since 1890. A recent effort resulted in the Supreme Court simply refusing to rule on a Petition for Habeas Corpus, even after all of the lower courts refused to even acknowledge that right. Now, in the current story, the Court has paid “token” acknowledgment of the right, while endeavoring to quash it — rather than pursuing Justice, as is its constitutional responsibility. Instead, as you will see, the Federal District Court in Montana is there to make sure that the government has no chance of losing a case.

The Government is Afraid of Habeas Corpus

William Krisstofer Wolf (that’s is how the government refers to a friend that we know simply as “Wolf”) and I have known each other for over a year. We have never met, but we have shared many hours of phone conversation, email correspondence, and I can’t count the number of times I was a guest on his radio show on “The Montana Republic”.

Among the subjects discussed in those appearances were “The Plan for Restoration of Constitutional Government“, “Declaration of Dissolution of Government”, “Targeting“, “Committees of Safety“, and “Habeas Corpus – The Guardian of Liberty“. The last, regarding the “Sacred Writ”, Habeas Corpus, was also the subject of some of our private conversations. Wolf fully understands what I had learned, over the past three years, though we had never anticipated having to call upon the sacred writ on his behalf — until he was arrested on March 25, 2015.

Based upon our previous conversations on the subject, I prepared a simple demand for Habeas Corpus (3 pages) and a Power of Attorney authorizing me to speak o his behalf regarding Habeas Corpus. These were Priority mailed to him on March 27, and he executed and attempted to have them delivered to the Court. After numerous attempts to have the guards take and deliver the documents to the Court, and the Court refusing to recognize the prepared Habeas Corpus, Wolf resorted to a one page, handwritten, Habeas Corpus (Court Doc. 1), dated April 1, to wit:

United States of America
v.                                             15-                  -BIL-CSO
William Krisstofer Wolf

In the Honorable Court of:
UNITED STATES Magistrate Judge Carol S. Ostby
On April 1, 2015, I, William Krisstofer Wolf, by the only means available. in Yellowstone Corrections Facility interoffice mail, SERVE on the court a DEMAND FOR HABEAS CORPUS.
In as such, I, William Krisstofer Wolf hereby request to be put on the Docket to Schedule a hearing date on the DEMAND FOR HABEAS CORPUS. This docket request for a scheduling here is needed to allow my Attorney in Fact, who has a Power of Attorney – Specific, time to travel to this Honorable Court to speak on my behalf, by authority of the case of Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 US 146.

Done on this Day, April 1, 2015
/s/William Krisstofer Wolf
Defendant

This was sufficient for the Court to finally take notice of Wolf’s right to challenge both unconstitutional laws and absence of jurisdiction. On April 15, the Court “Received” the document. The Court stated that they would not let the Habeas Corpus hold the Court hostage, so they opened a civil case, on April 16, and filed the handwritten Habeas Corpus and then filed an ORDER (Court Doc. 2), immediately thereafter.

The Court’s Efforts to Quash Habeas Corpus

Here are some of the “claims” made in the ORDER (Court Doc. 2):

1. [T]he document does not specify the number of the criminal case or indicate in any other way that it is meant to be filed in the criminal case.
2. [T]he document states that Wolf is acting “by the only means available”; yet counsel was appointed for Wolf in the criminal case on March 26, 2015.
3. Wolf did not pay the filing fee of $5.00 or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
4. “In all courts of the United States, the parties may plead and conduct their own causes personally or by counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (emphasis added); see also Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). [She concludes this claim with the statement] “Wolf may litigate this matter pro se, or he may appear through duly qualified and admitted counsel without an attorney-in-fact.
5. [T]he “‘demand for habeas corpus’ does not set forth any allegations of fact”. “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Wolf cannot mount such an attack until he alleges facts he believes demonstrate that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2242. If Wolf intends to proceed, he must submit an amended petition alleging such facts and explaining why his custody violates the law.
6. If Wolf intended to seek a detention hearing in the criminal case that is pending against him, he should discuss this with his attorney, who can file a motion for a detention hearing under the criminal case number, CR 15-20-MJ-BLG-CSO. If Wolf wishes to file the motion on his own, the Court will then need to consider the motion and decide whether to entertain the motion from Wolf personally, notwithstanding his representation by counsel. But the rule that an attorney-in-fact may not act for Wolf in court applies in all federal cases, civil or criminal. Kelley, 539 F.2d at 1201-03. Moreover, in the criminal case, Wolf’s attorney-in-fact can play no role at all. Wolf is the person charged.

Response to The Court’s Efforts to Quash Habeas Corpus

So, let’s look at what the correct response is to the above claims:

As far as Claim #1, Wolf had no access to documents, and by this time, he was “blocked” from calling some of his friends on the phone. At the time that he wrote the handwritten, which was long after the typed 3 page version (Court Doc. 3), he had only the “Criminal Complaint“, and from that, was only able to extract “15-     -BIL-CSO”, which he properly quoted in the handwritten document, and it was styled as all subsequent filings, “United States of America v. William Krisstofer Wolf”, just as the Court did. So, that doesn’t take rocket science, heck, even the Post Office could have figured that out.

To Claim #2, that he is acting “by the only means available”, raises an interesting question. Wolf stated to the Judge, at his next appearance, that he does not recognize the jurisdiction of the Court and he had no intention of entering a plea. So, if he were to go through the court appointed attorney, an officer of that court, would he not be submitting to the jurisdiction that that Court? There is little doubt, as you will see, that the Court will resort to obfuscation and chicanery in an effort to undermine his right to challenge that persecution that is currently being conducted against him.

Claim #3 says that he “did not pay the filing fee of $5.00”. I can find no reference to the filing fee in the “UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA – Local Rules of Procedure“. However, with regard to:

Rule 3.1 Filing a New Case.

(a) Required Items. The following items are required to file a new case:

(1) a complaint, petition, or other originating document;

(2) unless the originating document is a petition for writ of habeas corpus, payment of the full amount of the filing fee or a motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); and

(3) a civil cover sheet, unless the plaintiff or petitioner is proceeding pro se.

So, the originating document (1)was provided, though they refused the first and opened the case based upon the handwritten document. As to the fee, there is an exception for Habeas Corpus (2), and otherwise, only the full amount can be accepted. It does not address any partial, or alternate fee, such as $5.00, it simply exempts Habeas Corpus from fees. As it exempts the requirement for a cover sheet (3), if he is proceeding pro se (presumably, that would also apply to someone proceeding “pro per”. So, why the effort to extort (yes, that is the legal term) $5.00 from Wolf? Or, is it an effort to simply place obstructions in the way, to discourage his attempt to seek his right to challenge the Court?

Now, with Claim #4, we enter into a rather interesting aspect, which deals directly with our rights and efforts to force us into submission to the dictates of the government. This will be similar to those in #5 and #6, though we will consider them separately. The claim cites both 28 U.S.C. § 1654 and the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). Consequently, “[a]ny individual acting without an attorney must appear personally and may not delegate that duty to any other person who is not a member of the bar of this Court.” D. Mont. L.R. 83.8(a) [Local Rules of Procedure]; see also United States v. Kelley, 539 F.2d 1199, 1201-03 (9th Cir. 1976).

28 U.S. Code § 1654 – Appearance personally or by counsel
In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.

As stated earlier, a writ “is a form of written command in the name of a court or other legal authority to act, or abstain from acting, in some way.” It requires no plea, nor is it a case; it is a request for the court to command an action, which, in the matter of Habeas Corpus, is to issue the writ to raise the questions posed by the person requesting the writ. From that point, it’s not a matter of innocence or guilt, it is to assure that there is proper legal authority regarding the action upon which it is based.

The next citation is the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35:

And be it further enacted, That in all courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by assistance of such counsel or attorneys at law as by the rules of the said courts respectively shall be permitted to manage and conduct causes therein… for crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United States, and all civil actions in which the United States shall be concerned… in the respective courts before which the suits or prosecutions shall be.

In the broadest construction, that “assistance of counsel”, which clearly is not an “attorney at law”, hence the “or”, nor the party, himself, hence the other “or”, which leaves the possibility that a party, a person, may, since he is also capable of taking all responsibility upon himself, assign another to speak on his behalf, as an “attorney in fact”.

The Court references D. Mont. L.R. 83.8(a):

83.8 Self-Represented Litigants.

(a) Any individual acting without an attorney must appear personally and may not delegate that duty to any other person who is not a member of the bar of this Court. A selfrepresented person is bound by the Federal Rules and all applicable local rules. Sanctions, including but not limited to entry of default judgment or dismissal with prejudice, may be imposed for failure to comply with local rules.

This Rule applies to “litigants. This will be addressed along with the cited Kelley case.

Regarding United States v. Kelley, as we look at that case, we might wonder just what the Court was thinking, or was it stabbing blindly, in the dark, to endeavor to equate Kelley with the current matter, the writ. Kelley was being prosecuted. He was not seeking to question the constitutionality of the law, nor the jurisdiction. First, “he argues that he had a right to be represented by a non-lawyer.” Then, “Kelley sought to have his trusted friend Hurd, who was well-versed on Kelley’s monetary theory, serve as trial counsel. Hurd is a roofer and not a licensed attorney. The district court denied the request and prohibited Hurd from sitting at the counsel table or consulting with Kelley during the course of the trial.”

It is well known that if you don’t assert a right, the Court will not grant you that right. Kelley wanted Hurd to sit with him and counsel him. Kelley did not provide a “power of attorney”, according to the decision, he just wanted Hurd to sit and advise him. It doesn’t begin to approach the question at hand. This case is not on point, since it is silent on the point that the Court is trying to make about power of attorney and attorney in fact, and whether this is applicable to a writ, instead of litigation.

Finally, she says that he “may litigate this matter pro se, or he may appear through duly qualified and admitted counsel without an attorney-in-fact.” “Litigate means, “To dispute or contend in form of law; to settle a dispute or seek relief in a court of law; to carry on a suit… a judicial contest.” This is not a dispute, it is simply seeking an answer to a challenge to jurisdiction and constitutionality. As stated before, it is “a form of written command in the name of a court… to act, or abstain from acting, in some way.” It is not an adversarial proceeding.

Wolf had provided a “Power of Attorney”, making Gary Hunt his “Attorney in Fact”, and that was submitted to the Court and filed in the case. Therefore, it is before the Court. The Court, however, challenges Wolf’s right to have someone other than the court appointed attorney, or another “attorney at law”, speak for him on this matter that is not a suit, and, is not a prosecution, it is a “writ of right”, asking the Court to rule on the question presented — that being whether the laws upon which the charges are based, are, in fact, constitutional as applied to Wolf, and whether he falls under the jurisdiction of the authority behind those laws, and the Court, itself (or should I say, “herself”?).

So, let’s see what both “power of attorney” and “attorney in fact” mean (Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition):

Power of attorney: An instrument authorizing another to act as one’s agent or attorney. The agent is attorney in fact and his power is revoked on the death of the principal by operation of law. Such power may be either general or special. [no citations given]

Attorney in fact: An attorney authorized to act in his place and stead, either for some particular purpose, as to do a particular act, or for the transaction of business in general, not of legal character. This authority is conferred by an instrument in writing, called a “letter of attorney,” or more commonly a “power of attorney”. [no citations given]

Now, so as not to be misunderstood, that phrase, “not of a legal character” applies only to the “general business”, which is separated from the “particular act” by the “or”.

So, what the Court has said is, well, not on point to the entire matter before it.

So, let’s move on to Claim #5:

Though she does cite, correctly, from the case, when she says, “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody”, she has the subject of custody out of context to what is applicable in Wolf’s case. Wolf has not been convicted. He is challenging his detention based upon absence of jurisdiction as well as absence of constitutional authority of the charges against him. In Preiser, Rodriguez had been convicted and had already served some time in prison. He had sought relief from the length of his sentence, well, in the words of the decision:

Respondents were state prisoners who had elected to participate in New York’s conditional-release program, by which a prisoner serving an indeterminate sentence may earn up to 10 days per month good-behavior-time credits toward reduction of his maximum sentence… Held: When a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his physical imprisonment and by way of relief seeks a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

This decision, Preiser, as stated in the decision, is an action under 28 U.S, Code §2254:

(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 US Code § 2251: Stay of State court proceedings, begins the subject of dealing with state prisoners challenging through the federal court system. Wolf’ case is purely federal, so we need not concern ourselves, though the court has, with this,. Even if we did, we are really discussing what it says in §2241 (b), below, so I have no idea what her majesty was thinking; she should no that this is a federal matter — I think.

Though the ORDER does not cite §2254, as the case does, it does, properly, cite §§2241-2242, below. However, this citation is really apples and oranges, as the Preiser decision has no bearing on the subject of this current matter. §2254 has no relevance, at all, to the Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum Wolf is seeking, and that the Court is required to respond (answer) to.

So, let’s look at the pertinent parts of 28 U. S. Code §§2241-2242:

28 U.S.C. § 2241 : US Code – Section 2241: Power to grant writ

(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had.

(b) The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit judge may decline to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer the application for hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it.

(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless –

(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or

(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United States; or

(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States; or

28 U.S.C. § 2242 : US Code – Section 2242: Application

Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf. It shall allege the facts concerning the applicant’s commitment or detention, the name of the person who has custody over him and by virtue of what claim or authority, if known. It may be amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions. If addressed to the Supreme Court, a justice thereof or a circuit judge it shall state the reasons for not making application to the district court of the district in which the applicant is held.

So, the District Court is the proper place in which to initiate a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum. Now, under subparagraph (c), we find two applicable qualifiers for who may Petition for such writ. The ORDER cites subparagraph (3), though seems to skip right over subparagraph (1). However, until the person detaining Wolf has answered the writ, that determination cannot be made. Though that last sentence may seem confusing, we will shed some light on it as we venture into the next relevant section, that the Court seemed to have completely, or conveniently, overlooked.

28 U.S.C. § 2243 : US Code – Section 2243: Issuance of writ; return; hearing; decision

A court, justice or judge entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.

The respondent is, of course, the person who has detained Wolf, or that Wolf is detained under the authority thereof. So, unless the Court can show that the applicant (“attorney in fact”, or, “next friend”) is not entitled thereto, which it has, perhaps, insufficiently, attempted to do, must either grant or require the respondent to “show cause”. By the way, “forthwith” is without delay, immediately, etc., It does not provide for excuses, only action.

The writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained. It shall be returned within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.

Now, the civil case was opened on April 15, fully two weeks after the Habeas Corpus was submitted, “by the only means available”, and the Court has still not, over a month later, even begun the process that §2243 requires. So, from the “forthwith”, being the starting of the clock required for what Madison, the father of the Constitution, described as “in the most expeditious and ample manner“, the respondent then has three days to return, which is “to show cause”. Remember, the Fourth Amendment states that you have the right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation”.

Further, the Court states, “Wolf cannot mount such an attack until he alleges facts he believes demonstrate that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”. But, wait just a minute. The Amendment says that the government has to show “nature” and “cause”, not the accused. This is supported by the wording in §2243, that the “order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained.” It sort of makes you wonder if law school has any courses on English comprehension.

Continuing with §2243:

The person to whom the writ or order is directed shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention. When the writ or order is returned a day shall be set for hearing, not more than five days after the return unless for good cause additional time is allowed.

There it is, again. The person making the return, that would be the person detaining, not the person detained, “shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention.” How could that have possible been overlooked by a District Judge, in whose hands lie the lives and futures of those who are required to stand before her for judgment? And, when is that damned hearing going to be held? Wolf sits in detention, denied his liberty, while the judge fritters away that very object that brought the colonies to rebel against England, and part ways with a corrupted judicial system.

The remainder of §2243:

Unless the application for the writ and the return present only issues of law the person to whom the writ is directed shall be required to produce at the hearing the body of the person detained. The applicant or the person detained may, under oath, deny any of the facts set forth in the return or allege any other material facts.

The return and all suggestions made against it may be amended, by leave of court, before or after being filed.

The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.

Now, that last line says it all, that “The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.”

As to Claim #6, Wolf does not seek a detention hearing, as to do so would admit to jurisdiction. The other points in this Claim have already been addressed.

Stay tuned for Act I, Scene 5.

Camp Lone Star — A Favorable Ruling?

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 26, 2015

On March 30, Massey attended a hearing with testimony that was discussed in Camp “Lone Star — The Setup – Get Massey“. At the end of that hearing, since the government had not responded directly to the existing “Motion to Dismiss”, Judge Hanen allowed the Prosecutor until April 10, and the Defense until April 17, to file supplemental motions.

Massey’s attorney, Louis Sorola, submitted a First Supplement to Opposed Motion to Dismiss Indictment. However, rather than just arguing “case law”, though some was included, he ventured into the realm of “substantive law”, arguing two points with regard to the Constitution, and not just previous decisions.

Massey wanted to challenge jurisdiction, though he was too late to do so, having pled “not guilty”. He also wanted to question the constitutionality of the charges against him, for a number of reasons — most significantly, those discussed in “Camp Lone Star – Massey & The Clash of Laws“. However, his former attorney, Ed Cyganiewicz, refused to take the battle to the courtroom, preferring to go along with the game of “let’s make a deal”. Fortunately, Massey’s insistence in fighting, rather than just giving in, caused Cyganiewicz to withdraw from the case.

Providence, then, provided his next attorney, Mr. Louis Sorola. Sorola listened to Massey, and Massey provided him a copy of an article, Liberty or Laws? “Felon in Possession of a Firearm” is Not Legal or Lawful“, which addressed, among other questions, what Massey refers to as the “has-had” argument and the “equal justice” argument.

Sorola, faithful to his client (unusual, nowadays), did research, found that the “has-had” argument had not been argued, and then prepared the “First Supplement…” (linked above), and served it on the Court and Judge Hagen within the time allowed.

Word came back that after receiving the “First Supplement…”, the courthouse was “abuzz”. Apparently, Hagen was taken aback, and had no idea just how to deal with this new stick in the federal spokes.

The Argument

Let’s first look at the wording of the “felon in possession” statute, 18 USC § 922 (g), that is pertinent to the argument.

“to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”

That is it. The question is what does “has” mean, as written in the statute.

Now, we will look at the “has-had” argument (paragraph #4), from the “First Supplement…”:

The word “has”, as opposed to the word “had” was used in the statute. “Has” is the third person singular, present indicative, verb meaning active in the action just completed, where “had” is past tense and participle of the verb have, meaning in a previous situation. So, if one were the direct recipient, then the word “has” would be appropriate. However, if it were expansive, intended to include any firearm shipped in interstate commerce, then “had” would be the proper verb. The use of “had” would have meant to include any and all that “had” been so transported any time prior

Keep that in mind as we visit the “equal justice” argument “(paragraphs #14, 15), again from the “First Supplement…”:

[I]f you live in a state that manufactures a firearm, then you can possess it, as it has not been involved in interstate commerce. However, if you have ammunition that was manufactured in another state, then you are guilty because of the ammunition. If you live in a state that manufactures both weapons and ammunition, you can possess those “firearms” and ammunition. However, if you live in a state that manufactures one, the other, or neither, then you may have but one, or none. That seems to give preference to one state over another.

Further, this absolutely defies the concept of equal justice; it would defy the concept of Article IV, § 2, which states, “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all of the Privileges and Immunities of the Citizens of the several States.” It would mean that if one moved to another state, with what was legal, from the federal standpoint, in the state from which he began, he would be a criminal in the other state.

Before we look back to put some perspective on our argument, let’s visit another provision of the Constitution, not included in the argument, but relevant to our consideration, is Article IV, § 4:

“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government…”

Under the authority so guaranteed, Texas enacted their own “felon in possession” statute, many decades ago. It provides that:

Sec. 46.04. UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF FIREARM.

(a) A person who has been convicted of a felony commits an offense if he possesses a firearm:

(1) after conviction and before the fifth anniversary of the person’s release from confinement following conviction of the felony or the person’s release from supervision under community supervision, parole, or mandatory supervision, whichever date is later;

So, one “commits an offense”, unless his sentence for a felony, and any other supervision, etc., is five years, or more, behind him. Texas recognizes that the right to bear arms is restored when one has rehabilitated himself, and “stayed clean” for five years.

So, the Texas statute is in conflict with 922 (g) if we accept that “has” means “had”, and the impediment, the prohibition of possession, was not limited to the act of commerce, but was applicable to the rest of one’s life.

And, the “equal justice” provision, Article IV, § 2, is in conflict with 922 (g) if we accept that “has” means “had”, in that the application would be solely dependent upon the state that one lived in, rather than any sense of justice..

However, if we consider that “has”, as written, means “has”, as written and intended, and improperly applied in the “administration” of that law by the government, then there is no conflict between 922 (g) and either Article IV, § 2, or the right of Texas to enact laws under “a Republican Form of Government”.

* * *

Since April 20, when the court first received the “First Supplement…”, Massey and Sorola have been waiting, anxiously, for Judge Hanen’s ruling on the motions before it. Now Judge Hanen is busy dealing with the Department of Justice and their deceitful practice of defying his order in the Amnesty case, but after 4 weeks, there was still no ruling.

It seems that if Judge Hanen were going to rule against Sorola’s motions, it would be a no-brainer to simply rule, and get on with the trial. However, there was nothing except a very loud SILENCE from the Court, until May 20, when Judge Hanen delivered a rather interesting “Order“. The order indicates that Hanen still has to rule on two motions before the Court, and opens the door for another round of paperwork, (amendments to the previous positions), giving until May 29 to answer. He does cite the recent Henderson v. United States decision out of the Supreme Court, and though he finds that there is no “impact on the pending motions”, he leaves the door open, to allow the Prosecution every latitude.

Massey’s apprehension in quite understandable. He has been wearing an “ankle bracelet” since November 12, 2014, and has been under “Home Detention”, since that time (See “Camp Lone Star – Cruel and Unusual Punishments – Before Conviction“. His last motion was submitted on April 20, and so a month later, he finds that there will be nine more days of agonizing waiting for the ruling that will determine whether the Constitution and the laws of the State of Texas are supreme, or if Administrative Rules and Regulations override them.

So, why is Judge Hanen waiting so long to rule? Denying the motions would be such a simple task, though ruling that “Felon in Possession” is, well, unconstitutional, is not so easily accomplished. There is a likelihood that the government, facing such a loss, would appeal. Most judges prefer to not have a decision overturned by a higher court, so if he is going to grant the Motion to Dismiss, he apparently afforded every opportunity for the Prosecutor to attempt a challenge to the position presented in the “First Supplement…”, thereby minimizing the possibility of a successful appeal. And, of course, knowing that the government does not like to have its authority challenged, it might well be a career ending decision for Hanen to make. However, if others are willing to give their lives for the Constitution, then to end one’s career for such purpose is an act worthy of a true patriot.

Further, Judge Hanen has not rescheduled the planned June 4 Jury Selection, nor the Pre-Trial Conference, set for June 2, leaving just one working day from the final motions to trial start. This would lend one to believe that his intention is to rule in favor of the Motion to Dismiss Indictment, unless the government can scrape together a non-existent argument in opposition to “has-had” and “equal justice”. In which case, the trial would have to be scheduled even further down the road to allow for preparation.

It does appear that when Judge Hanen does pick up his gavel, it will come down declaring freedom for KC Massey, and a quandary for the government, as all those who have been convicted, or even pled guilty to “Felon in Possession” may have pled, or been convicted, of a non-crime.

Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus
Scene 3 – Guardian of Personal Liberty

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 26, 2015

Setting the Stage: Joseph Story called Habeas Corpus “the great bulwark of personal liberty.” He did so as he, as well as did other legal scholars and various Supreme Court decision, because the founders knew that overarching government might attempt to suppress the rights of the people that had been so recently won, at great cost to the people. The inclusion of the “sacred writ” in the Constitution was to assure that their posterity would always have a means of challenging the federal government, when it went beyond those limits set by the Constitution.

The Truth About Habeas Corpus, the “Sacred Writ”

Now, let’s visit the remedy the Founders provided us, in the Constitution. It is fair to say that the Constitution was written with an understanding of both human nature and the incessant obsession in some to seek power solely for the sake of wielding that power.

In Article I, which is the Legislative Branch, § 9, clause 2, it provides that:

The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.

A privilege is a right that can be suspended.

So, exactly what does it mean? Let’s see what some early judicial scholars had to say.

In 1768, William Blackstone, in his Commentaries, provides insight into the necessity and requirements associated with this Writ of Right.

But the great and efficacious writ in all manner of illegal confinement, is that of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum; directed to the person detaining another, and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner with the day and cause of his caption and detention…

[I]f a probable ground be shewn, that the party is imprisoned without just cause, and therefore hath a right to be delivered, the writ of habeas corpus is then a writ of right, which “may not be denied, but ought to be granted to every man that is committed, or detained in prison, or otherwise restrained, though it be by the command of the king, the privy council, or any other.”

In a former part of these commentaries we expatiated at large on the personal liberty of the subject. It was shewn to be a natural inherent right, which could not be surrendered or forfeited unless by the commission of some great and atrocious crime, nor ought to be abridged in any case without the special permission of law.

A remedy the more necessary, because the oppression does not always arise from the ill-nature, but sometimes from the mere inattention of government.

From the Constitutional Convention, we have Madison’s Records of the Federal Convention.

“The privileges and benefits of the writ of habeas corpus shall be enjoyed in this government in the most expeditious and ample manner: and shall not be suspended by the Legislature, except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a limited time, not exceeding [blank] months.”

“Expeditious and ample” are easily understood, and, clearly, the intention of the inclusion of the “Sacred Writ” within the protection of the Constitution. Being the only “right” defined as a “privilege”, we need simply understand that it is the only enumerated right that is subject to legislative suspension, though only legislative.

William Rawle, in “A View of the Constitution of the United States” (1829), provides us insight into the perception of the Writ just forty years after the Ratification of the Constitution, and, clearly, as it was envisioned at the time.

Reasons will be given hereafter for considering many of the restrictions, contained in the amendments to the Constitution, as extending to the states as well as to the United States, but the nature of the writ of habeas corpus seems peculiarly to call for this construction. It is the great remedy of the citizen or subject against arbitrary or illegal imprisonment; it is the mode by which the judicial power speedily and effectually protects the personal liberty of every individual, and repels the injustice of unconstitutional laws or despotic governors. After erecting the distinct government which we are considering, and after declaring what should constitute the supreme law in every state in the Union, fearful minds might entertain jealousies of this great and all-controlling power, if some protection against its energies when misdirected, was not provided by itself.

If this provision had been omitted, the existing powers under the state governments, none of whom are without it, might be questioned, and a person imprisoned on a mandate of the president or other officer, under colour of lawful authority derived from the United States, might be denied relief.

The Honorable Justice Joseph Story, in “Commentaries on the Constitution“, will provide even more insight.

1333. In order to understand the meaning of the terms here used, it will be necessary to have recourse to the common law; for in no other way can we arrive at the true definition of the writ of habeas corpus. At the common law there are various writs, called writs of habeas corpus. But the particular one here spoken of is that great and celebrated writ, used in all cases of illegal confinement, known by the name of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, directed to the person detaining another, and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner, with the day and cause of his caption and detention… It is, therefore, justly esteemed the great bulwark of personal liberty; since it is the appropriate remedy to ascertain, whether any person is rightfully in confinement or not, and the cause of his confinement; and if no sufficient ground of detention appears, the party is entitled to his immediate discharge. This writ is most beneficially construed; and is applied to every case of illegal restraint, whatever it may be; for every restraint upon a man’s liberty is, in the eye of the law, an imprisonment, wherever may be the place, or whatever may be the manner, in which the restraint is effected.

Finally, we will visit Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856):

HABEAS CORPUS, remedies A writ of habeas corpus is an order in writing, signed by the judge who grants the same, and sealed with the seal of the court of which he is a judge, issued in the name of the sovereign power where it is granted, by such a court or a judge thereof, having lawful authority to issue the same, directed to any one having a person in his custody or under his restraint, commanding him to produce, such person at a certain time and place, and to state the reasons why he is held in custody, or under restraint.

7.  The Constitution of the United State Article 1, s. 9, n. 2, provides, that ” the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it and the same principle is contained in many of the state constitutions. In order still more to secure the citizen the benefit of this great writ, a heavy penalty is inflicted upon the judges who are bound to grant it, in case of refusal.

It is pro8.  per to consider, 1. When it is to be granted. 2. How it is to be served. 3. What return is to be made to it. 4. The bearing. 5. The effect of the judgment upon it.

9. – 1. The writ is to be granted whenever a person is in actual confinement, committed or detained as aforesaid, either for a criminal charge, or, …under any color or pretence whatsoever…

10. – 2. The writ may be served by any free person, by leaving it with the person to whom it is directed, or left at the gaol or prison with any of the under officers, under keepers, or deputy of the said officers or keepers...

16.  The habeas corpus can be suspended only by authority of the legislature. The constitution of the United States provides, that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of invasion and rebellion, the public safety may require it. Whether this writ ought to be suspended depends on political considerations, of which the legislature, is to decide…

It is apparent that the inclusion of Article I, Section 3, clause 3, was included in the Constitution as a bar against overarching government, unconstitutional laws, and jurisdiction beyond that authorized by the Constitution.

Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus
Scene 2 – Who is in Charge Now?

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 23, 2015

Setting the Stage: Ten years after the Ashwander Decision, an Act of Congress established a far more authoritative agency structure, creating a Fourth Branch of Government. Though intended to affect less than 1% of the population, or so they said, it now affects nearly every one of us.

bu·reauc·ra·cy. noun

A system of government in which most of the important decisions are made by state officials rather than by elected representatives.

Administrative Agencies Rule Our Lives

The “Administrative Procedures Act of 1946” was submitted by Representative Pat McCarran, Democrat, Nevada, who gave us some insight into its purpose, when, in the Congressional Record, he said:

“We have set up a fourth order in the tripartite plan of government which was initiated by the founding fathers of our democracy. They set up the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches; but since that time we have set up fourth dimension, if I may so term it, which is now popularly known as administrative in nature. So we have the legislative, the executive, the judicial, and the administrative.”

What? A fourth branch of government? My Constitution only has three. Wouldn’t an Amendment be required to create a fourth branch?

He then goes on to say:

“[This bill], the purpose of which is to improve the administration of justice by prescribing fair administrative procedure, is a bill of rights for the hundreds of thousands of Americans whose affairs are controlled or regulated in one way or another by agencies of the Federal government. It is designed to provide guarantees of due process in administrative procedure.

So, he says that there are hundreds of thousands of people “whose affairs are controlled or regulated in one way or another by agencies of the Federal government.” The population of the United States, in 1946, was 150 million people. So, the “hundreds of thousands”, he didn’t say anything about a million, would constitute well less than one percent of the population.

There is an old saying that if you give an inch, they will take a mile. This appears to be an understatement when you consider that the less than 1% has expanded, in these past 69 years, to incorporate probably 99.9% of the people in this country.

This is, most certainly, NOT the limited government that was given to us by the Founding Fathers. Though we find that their foresight provided a means by which we could challenge that expansion (let’s be honest, usurpation) of authority in the limitations imposed upon that government. However, before we do, we need to look at what those men of integrity also told us of the consequences of such usurpations.

The Founders on Constitutional Limitations

Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No 78, made clear the judiciary, especially the Supreme Court (which is the only court proposed at the date of his writing) was “the citadel of the public justice and the public security“, and, that “No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid“.

Further, Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137), says that “an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void“.

Prior to the ratification of the federal Constitution, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in 1787, first nullified an enacted statutes that was contrary to the North Carolina Constitution, in Bayard v Singleton (1 N.C. 42). They said that “if they could [enact legislation contrary to the constitution], they would at the same instant of time destroy their own existence as a legislature and dissolve the government thereby established“.

The next Scene will explain what the Founders did to protect us from such encroachments by the government that we created.

Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus
Scene 1 – Limited Federal Jurisdiction

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 22, 2015

Setting the Scene: This Act is a series of scenes that will lead up to the events, the paper chase, that are going on in Montana, in an effort to persuade the Court to recognize that rights of William wolf and the limitations of federal authority, as conceived by the Founders. It will provide an understanding of what was, why it was, and what happened to deceive us into believing that it no longer existed. It will conclude with the ongoing effort to restore the proper relationship between the federal government and us.

* * *

From my early school years, I heard explanations pertaining to Habeas Corpus, the “Sacred Writ”. It could be used to remove you from unlawful detention; it could be written on a scrap of paper to be served; it could be served, on your behalf, by anyone who wanted to assist you in being removed from unlawful detention, and, perhaps even more. It was championed as fundamental to our liberty. However, little more was said of it, and it remained only as a mental symbol of something that, though not well explained, was one of the most important inclusions in the Constitution. So important that it was not included in the Bill of Rights, rather, it was part of that first venture into the creation of the new government that we have, today, the Constitution.

Understanding that circumstances might warrant the suspension of that “Sacred Writ”, the power to do so was left solely to the Legislative Branch of the government, and only “in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”

Interestingly, this fits nicely within that portion of the Fourth Amendment that states that you have a right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation” against you. But, what do “nature” and “cause” mean? So, we will visit the language of the Founders; from Webster’s 1828 Dictionary, we find that “nature” is a noun, and that the appropriate definition is, ” The essence, essential qualities or attributes of a thing, which constitute it; what it is”. So, nature is the element (essence) from which the charges are brought. The “cause” is, quite simply, that which brings it about — the act.

So, the “cause” is the act that brings about the charges, and the nature is the source from which the law acquires its authority. And, in any act, for which a “cause” is brought by the federal government, it must also have a source of authority, that being only, and limited to, the Constitution. The Constitution provides for both authority of enactment of laws and limitations upon the jurisdiction within which it can apply those laws and impose penalties, if convicted of the act.

After all, we know that the Constitution was written to set limits upon the government that was created by that document. They granted to that government so created, both powers and authorities, and they imposed limitations upon it.

Most cases that go to the United States Supreme Court are based upon certiorari; that is to see if there were irregularities, or errors, at trial in the inferior court. These writs deal solely with whether the applicable laws, or standards of justice (due process), were properly applied. The decisions in such cases often have the appearance of creating not only detailed instruction as to interpretation of a law, rule, or regulation, but also often they go beyond that written law, serving to extend the authority of such law beyond that was intended by the Congress, when it was enacted. This, however, is based upon the presumption that it if a law is enacted by, or under the authority (rules and regulations), of Congress, it must be constitutional in its enactment.

What is does not do, at least in recent years, is question whether the law, even if constitutionally enacted, is imposed where the constitutional limitations preclude its applicability, i.e. jurisdiction.

Before we proceed further, perhaps understanding what a “writ” is, and what it is not, is necessary for perspective. It is not a court case, nor a lawsuit, nor a criminal prosecution against a person. Quite simply, it is “a form of written command in the name of a court or other legal authority to act, or abstain from acting, in some way.”

Limited federal Jurisdiction

Under Article I, § 8, clause 17, Congress has “exclusive legislative jurisdiction”. Under Article IV, § 3, clause 2, Congress may “make all needed Rules and Regulations”, with the caveat, “respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” So, under these authorities, many ‘laws” are enacted that apply only to the extent that jurisdiction also applies. A good example of this is a law enacted in 1825 that gave the government the authority to punish “certain crimes against the United States”. We’ll let the act speak for itself:

“That if any person or persons, within any fort, dock-yard, navy-yard, arsenal, armory, or magazine, the site whereof is ceded to, and under the jurisdiction of the United States, or on a site of any lighthouse, or other needful building belonging to the United States, the sight whereof is ceded to them [United States], and under their jurisdiction, as aforesaid, shall, willfully…”

Take note that this does not apply to government property outside of that limited jurisdiction. The property must be to be on lands that are ceded and jurisdiction also ceded, within the authority granted by the Constitution.

For those interested, there are a number of Supreme Court decisions that support the requirement for a Constitutional nexus for an enactment of Congress to be valid and applicable, outside of that limited jurisdiction. These can be found in the article, “Habeas Corpus – The Guardian of Liberty“.

Now, what we have been taught and have been inclined to believe for our entire lives, is eviscerated, if we heed a decision of the Supreme Court, In Re Lane (135 U.S. 443), ruled on in 1890, in which a man was charged with rape, under federal law. The rape took place in the Oklahoma (Indian) Territory (unorganized), though the case was tried in Kansas (statehood in 1861). Lane was convicted and imprisoned in Kansas. Kansas punishment being less harsh, Lane attempted to challenge federal jurisdiction, opting to be punished under Kansas law.

The law under which he was charged and convicted of, had the jurisdictional, “in the District of Columbia or other place, except the territories, over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction,” in its wording. Now, that wording, “other place, except the territories, over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction” can appear to be misleading. However, the Court clarified that rather confusing statement by explaining that “except territories”, was not in the context of Article IV, § 3, clause 2 (needful rules and regulations), but rather, as those organized territories, seeking statehood — those which had been granted, by Congress, the authority to propose a constitution and to create Legislative, Executive and Judicial Branches, and were authorized to enact laws, administer them, and the judicial branch to provide a forum for justice. These same grants of authority were endowed upon the states, within the limits of the state constitution, by adoption of the state constitution and the granting of statehood. The extent of federal jurisdiction, the laws, rules, and regulations, was limited solely to the unorganized territories.

Supreme Court (and Inferior Courts) Don’t Want to Rule on Constitutionality

In 1936, the Supreme Court ruled on a case known as Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (297 U.S. 288). The details of the case are not something that we need concern ourselves with, though we must heed the words of Justice Brandeis, as he explained the seven rules that the Court had adopted in applying their judicial authority. The applicable rules are:

1.  The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, nonadversary, proceeding, declining because to decide such questions ‘is legitimate only in the last resort…

4.  The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of… Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter…

5.  The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.

6.  The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.

7.  ‘When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.

As we can see, Rules 1, 4 and 7, are means by which the Court can avoid ruling on the constitutionality of a matter before them.

Rule 5 provides for a condition upon which one must have been injured to even challenge a statute, even as to constitutionality and jurisdiction. And, Rule 6 provides a bar against challenge, if a person “has availed himself of its benefits”.

So, we can see how extremely difficult it is to question constitutionality, jurisdiction, or to even find that you are in a position to challenge the lawfulness, of any act of Congress. But, we also have to understand the “nature” of those “statutes” referred to in the Rules.

In the Ashwander decision, it was pointed out that the Rules had been adopted over the past few decades, so this was really nothing new. Administrative agencies, though few at the time (Tennessee Valley Authority was one such agency), were relatively new. However, in an effort to expand constitutional authority beyond the limits imposed by the Constitution, and based upon the adoption of those Rules, Congress took another step, in 1946, to expand their authority beyond those limits. That will be the subject of Scene 2.