Outpost of Freedom blog

Camp Lone Star – Show of Support for KC Massey

The Lone Warrior

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
October 1, 2015

Yesterday, September 30, 2015, was the big day for KC Massey’s challenge to the federal Felon in Possession of a Firearm law (18 USC §922(g)(1)). Though there were hopes that somehow Judge Andrew Hanen would rule, finding KC not guilty, that was not the case. However, there was a reason that Hanen could not come to that verdict, but had to rule Massey guilty.

What is known as “stare decisis” (The legal principle of determining points in litigation according to precedent), which requires that a Circuit Court judge must abide by previously decided cases from the Appellate or Supreme Courts, was held to. Unlike some District Court judges, Hanen abides by his responsibility to the law and cannot use the Wisdom of Solomon to make his decision.

However, as pointed out in previous posts, Hanen has gone overboard to assure that the record of the current case is loaded, as the Appellate Court can only rule on the record (official court documents) of this case. He has, twice, extended to Massey’s attorney, Louis Sorola, the opportunity to load that record so that there is sufficient argument to make a good case before the Appellate Court.

In an interview with Mike and Khristi, who attended the trial, I can provide a little insight into the proceedings. A more detailed explanation will be provided, once the transcripts of the trial are available.

The government brought in an expert witness that testified that the weapons that had been taken form Massey had been manufactured out of state, explaining, in detail, how he was able to come to that conclusion. This does raise an interesting question. It would require that someone who provided you a gun to patrol the border knew that it was manufactured out of state, and, it would also require that you knew that the gun was manufactured out of state. I suppose that the federal law, as interpreted by the government, requires specialized knowledge for the people to come to the conclusion that the firearm was manufactured elsewhere, though by their own admission, it took an expert to make that determination on behalf of the government.

There is another possibility, that the government’s interpretation of the law is other than what the law really means. And, that is the subject which keeps the door open for Massey’s case to make law, once it is heard before the Appellate Court.

What we have been referring to as the “Has/Had” argument challenges the government interpretation that any gun that has crossed state line cannot be possessed by a felon, regardless of how long ago that felon was committed, and sentence served. In Massey’s case, that was 28 years.

So, Hanen, in open court and on the record, stated that the “Has/Had” argument seemed valid and that it was “ripe for appeal”. That means that the particular “Has/Had” argument has never been decided by a higher court, and it appears that he sees merit in the argument and believes that the higher court, the one that makes “stare decisis” (law), based upon the wording in the statute, needs to hear this case on appeal.

After the trial, Louis told Khristi and Mike that Massey’s case would rewrite history. With this, I am inclined to agree. And, we can consider the consequences to those who are patriotic, though fearful of being charged and convicted under this federal law, when the law is misapplied by the government and falsely creates a crime where none exists. Even transporting, not for commerce, would no longer be criminal for those who have a felony on their record.

KC had expressed his desire to speak to the judge, though if he went on the stand, it would open for the prosecution the right to extensive cross-examination. However, during closing arguments, Massey kept trying to state his feelings. After some discussion, the Judge decided that he could, as a part of the closing statements, say what he felt.

What Massey managed to get on the records (not verbatim) is, “As a common man, all I have is the letter of the law to go by. And you f***ers screwed up on the law, so, what else am I supposed to do?” To this, the Judge said that he was sorry and that he was held by case precedence.

Twice, during the trial, the Judge said that he didn’t agree with what was going on, in his heart. That is not what a judge intent on holding up the government’s position would say, and that, too, is a part of the record.

In a brief conversation, after the trial, Hagen, the US Attorney, expressed is apprehensive as to the results of an appeal. I believe he knows that he will, eventually, loose this case.

At the end of the trial, Hagen ask for permission to take pictures of all of the guns and then destroy them. Judge Hanen refused to give permission, most likely because the guns will have to be returned to Massey, after the Appellate decision, as his property. Apparently, Hanen is that sure that the conviction will be overturned and case law adjusted to limited the federal felon in possession law to apply only, and specifically, where it belongs, to the government’s overstretched authority under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.

Though Massey and I have frequently, for the last twelve months, discussed the probability that this would have to go to the Appellate Court, when the finding of guilty was given, it had an effect on him.

He called me as soon as he got back to jail, but he was forlorn. He said that he can’t take any more, that this guilty verdict has sapped all of his strength. There was nothing that I could say that would cheer him up. He feels that he has been abandoned by the patriot community and his friends. And, this leads us to where we can help this brave soul as he fights a battle that will serve the patriot community more than any other act in recent years. We need to show our support for KC Massey. It doesn’t have to be a lot, but it has to be numerous, so that he knows that we are behind him. So, here is what you can do:

Show of Support for KC Massey

Note: changed to this permanent address as of July 2016

Kevin Massey  76555379
FCI Seagoville
Federal Correctional Institution
P.O. Box 9000
Seagoville, Texas  75159

KC is no longer at this address.

Remember, KC Massey is like a Prisoner of War, but still fighting the battle, the outcome of which will be a significant return to the Constitution, and curtailment of unwarranted government power.

Camp Lone Star — Down to the Wire

Ninth Amendment Rights

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
September 27, 2015

As was explained in “The King Can Do No Wrong, or Can He?“, Massey’s attorney had brought two matters up in his Second Motion to Dismiss Indictment. They were the Tenth Amendment and Intrastate v. Interstate commerce. The government, through their apparently novice attorney, Corley, argued that Massey did not have standing to challenge the government’s prosecution of him (sort of a “bend over, we will take care of everything” mentality).

This past Wednesday (September 23rd), Judge Andrew Hanen filed his Opinion and Order, addressing all three of the sought actions.

First, he addressed the government’s, stating that “Massey makes a… claim – that § 922(g)(1), as applied to him, impermissibly regulates intrastate activity. Therefore, he has standing to challenge § 922(g)(1).” So, we have dispensed with the government’s feeble effort to claim that Massey had n standing to challenge the government’s interpretation of the law he was charged with violating..

Next, he addresses the Tenth Amendment claim. Unfortunately, being a District Court, the Judge is bound by previous decisions of the Fifth Circuit, to which it is subordinate. Justice, perhaps not, but still the rules of the corrupt game for what passes for justice, in these times.

However the final ruling, this one has, apparently, not been addressed by the Fifth Circuit, at least to the extent that Massey’s attorney, Louis Sorola, has taken it. In what Hanen has described as “The Purely Intrastate Claim”, he states:

“Since the Government bears the burden of proving this element, and since the trial has yet to be held, the facts upon which Massey’s claim stands have not yet been established one way or the other. Until evidence has been presented, the Court is unable to evaluate this claim.”

“Therefore this argument is denied without prejudice because it is not yet ripe. Massey may reassert it at trial should he conclude that the evidence supports this claim.”

So, it appears that Judge Hanen is willing to venture into a substantive argument with regard to the difference between Interstate and Intrastate commerce. He has also placed the burden on the government to prove its jurisdiction. This leads us to review some things that have been brought up in discussion, though, perhaps, not in Court. We will revisit a previous article, “Massey is Protected by State Law” to put this argument before the people, if not the Court.

To begin with, the State of Texas has granted authority for federal agents certain powers with the enactment of Texas Penal Code, Art. 2.122. SPECIAL INVESTIGATORS. From that law (pertinent portions only):

(a) The following named criminal investigators of the United States shall not be deemed peace officers, but shall have the powers of arrest, search, and seizure under the laws of this state as to felony offenses only:

(1) Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(3) Special Agents of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement;

(4) Special Agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives;

(9) Marshals and Deputy Marshals of the United States Marshals Service;

 (c) A Customs and Border Protection Officer or Border Patrol Agent of the United States Customs and Border Protection or an immigration enforcement agent or deportation officer of the Department of Homeland Security is not a peace officer under the laws of this state but, on the premises of a port facility designated by the commissioner of the United States Customs and Border Protection as a port of entry for arrival in the United States by land transportation from the United Mexican States into the State of Texas or at a permanent established border patrol traffic check point, has the authority to detain a person pending transfer without unnecessary delay to a peace officer if the agent or officer has probable cause to believe that the person has engaged in conduct that is a violation of Section 49.02, 49.04, 49.07, or 49.08, Penal Code, regardless of whether the violation may be disposed of in a criminal proceeding or a juvenile justice proceeding.

So, the extent of the authority to arrest, which would also include detaining a person, is only “the powers of arrest and search and seizure as to any offense under the laws of this state [Texas].”

Though the Tenth Amendment argument has been denied, there can be little doubt that the above enactment, by the State of Texas, is an assertion of the State’s rights (not the individual’s right, as per denied motion) to limit federal authority within the State.

So, it would be rather interesting to discover if the government’s witnesses are aware of this grant of authority, and the limitations imposed upon them, by Article 2.122. If they are not, was the government remiss in advising them, or did the government hope that they would assert authority not granted to them so that the federal government would have a broad reign over activities within the State, in the hope that case law would help affirm authority beyond that which was left to them by the State grant?

So, if the federal authority is limited by “any offense under the laws of this state”, they exceeded their authority by the detention of people who were not witness to any crime that might have been a felony under state law, and the only possible violation of that law was committed by the BPS shooter, and, perhaps even those who illegally detained (kidnapped) Massey and Varner.

Let’s revisit state law regarding firearms. From Texas Penal Code Section 46.04 Unlawful Possession of Firearm

(a) A person who has been convicted of a felony commits an offense if he possess a firearm:

(1) After conviction and before the fifth anniversary of the persons release from confinement following conviction of the felony or the person’s release from supervision under community supervision, parole, or mandatory supervision, whichever date is later; or
(2) After the period described by Subdivision (1), at any location other than the premises at which the person lives.

So, this law makes it illegal to possess “at any location other than the premise”. However, apparently exception was made in another provision, Texas Penal Code, Sec. 46.02. UNLAWFUL CARRYING WEAPONS (again, pertinent portions):

(a-2) For purposes of this section, “premises” includes real property and a recreational vehicle that is being used as living quarters, regardless of whether that use is temporary or permanent. In this subsection, “recreational vehicle” means a motor vehicle primarily designed as temporary living quarters or a vehicle that contains temporary living quarters and is designed to be towed by a motor vehicle. The term includes a travel trailer, camping trailer, truck camper, motor home, and horse trailer with living quarters.

(a-3) For purposes of this section, “watercraft” means any boat, motorboat, vessel, or personal watercraft, other than a seaplane on water, used or capable of being used for transportation on water.

(b) Except as provided by Subsection (c), an offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

(c) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree if the offense is committed on any premises licensed or issued a permit by this state for the sale of alcoholic beverages.

Since Massey is no longer prohibited from possessing a weapon, and where we have a definition of “premises” (re: 46.04) and the ability to transport a weapon, then it is clear that Massey was not in violation of state law, and if in violation, it would only be a misdemeanor, unless he was in a place that sold alcoholic beverages, then clearly the state has no objection to his possession of a firearm under the circumstances surrounding Massey, throughout this entire ordeal.

Now, the enumerated right is the right to keep and bear arms. The government argues that 18 USC 922(g)(1) includes any firearm that is:

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person –

(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

Intrastate Commerce

Now, let’s look at how 18 US Code defines “interstate commerce”:

18 U.S.C. § 921 : US Code – Section 921: Definitions

(a) As used in this chapter –

(2) The term “interstate or foreign commerce” includes commerce between any place in a State and any place outside of that State, or within any possession of the United States (not including the Canal Zone) or the District of Columbia, but such term does not include commerce between places within the same State but through any place outside of that State…

However, I find no definition of “Commerce” in 18 US Code, so we will look at the legal authority, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Edition):

“The exchange of goods, productions, or property of any kind; the buying, selling, and exchange of articles…”

So, commerce is the exchange of goods, barter, sale, trade, or any other means, to be “in and affecting commerce” would require that one be involved in such a transaction.

Defining that even further, we have “interstate or foreign commerce” specifically excluding “intrastate” commerce, to wit:

“but such term does not include commerce between places within the same State but through any place outside of that State”

So, if Massey had purchased (commerce) a firearm within the state, it would take a real stretch to include “interstate”. However, Massey never purchased (commerce) any firearm, he merely possessed a firearm. Even if Massey had received it as a gift, it is inconceivable that this could create the necessary nexus to interstate commerce that the statute addresses. However, the government cannot even prove that he owns a firearm, and that is the burden that is placed upon them, by Hanen’s Opinion.

Now, that is twice removed from the apparent extent of the charges brought under 18 USC §922(g)(1). No interstate, and, no commerce.

Since the Fifth Circuit has ruled on the Tenth Amendment, and it is no longer a legal defense for Massey, it does not preclude the state from passing laws that are consistent with the Tenth Amendment, which, obviously, they have done.

So, let’s refer to this as the Ninth Amendment argument. The federal government has raised no objection to the state laws referred to above, so they must be constitutional. The Ninth Amendment reads:

“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”

The question is whether Massey has the right, under the Ninth Amendment, to possess a firearm, if he is totally in compliance with state law, and has not been involved in interstate commerce.

Camp Lone Star – The King Can Do No Wrong, or Can He?

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
September 13, 2015

At the last hearing, Judge Hanen had told KC’s attorney, Sorola, that the Motion to Dismiss Indictment wasn’t written correctly. That motion had been denied in, which is discussed in Act II – A Kangaroo Court – Scene 1 – How Case Law Subverts the Constitution. Judge Hanen allowed that Sorola might submit a supplemental motion, and said that he was willing to hear a jurisdictional argument. AUSA Hagen was not pleased with the decision; however, dates were set for both the motion and opposition to be submitted to the Court.

Sorola filed his Second Motion to Dismiss Indictment, which “incorporates” the previous Notion to Dismiss. So we will look at what has been entered in support of the jurisdictional aspect of the case.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) Violates The Tenth Amendment

The Tenth Amendment provides: the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. As this Amendment makes clear, and as the Supreme Court has long-recognized, the federal government is one of enumerated, limited powers. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland. Accordingly, the federal government may act only where the Constitution so authorizes. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).

A corollary to this rule is that Congress may not act in areas prohibited to it. As Justice Thomas noted in his concurrence in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring), the Constitution “places whole areas outside the reach of Congress,” such as the First Amendment’s preventing “Congress from ‘prohibiting the free exercise’ of religion or ‘abridging the freedom of speech.'” Id. Justice Thomas went on to explain that the “Second Amendment similarly appears to contain an express limitation on the government’s authority,” and stated: This Court has not had recent occasion to consider the nature of the substantive right safeguarded by the Second Amendment. If, however, the Second Amendment is read to confer a personal right to “keep and bear arms,” a colorable argument exists that the federal government’s regulatory scheme, at least as it pertains to the purely intrastate sale or possession of firearms, runs afoul of that Amendment’s protections. Although Printz dealt with a successful challenge to the Brady Act’s requirement that state law enforcement officers conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers, the logic of Justice Thomas’s reasoning is compelling with respect to § 922(g)(1): the Tenth Amendment limits federal power; the Second Amendment specifically prohibits the federal government from infringing the individual right to bear arms; thus, it surely cannot be constitutional for the federal government to prohibit a person’s purely intrastate possession of firearms.

For the reasons stated above, Mr. Massey respectfully requests that the Court find 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied to him and dismiss the pending indictment.

Of course, AUSA Hagen has to answer this Motion, who knows, maybe even his future as a United States Attorney is in jeopardy, since this is a high profile case and Hagen has stated that he has been pressured from above to win this case. However, it appears that Mr. Hagen was not up to answering Sorola’s Motion, so we have a new player, AUSA Jason Corley (the new King), who filed the “Government’s Response” to Massey’s Motion.

Massey’s motion was simply three pages, the above being the substantial portions thereof. However, the Government’s Response was 24 pages. And, as I began reading the Government’s Response, a quote from W. C. Fields popped into my mind:

“If you can’t dazzle them with brilliance, baffle them with bullshit.”

As I continued reading, I realized that the position Corley was taking, he was asserting as if he were King. He has his interpretation of what something means, and there is absolutely no attempt to balance justice with what he believes. This brought to mind another historical quote, most often expressed shortly before the ousting, or abdication, of a King, who refused to abide by the constitution or exercise any semblance of justice. – The King can do no Wrong!

Now, to restrain you from falling asleep or rolling on the floor laughing, I will only address some of the aspects of the government’s argument.

First, we will talk about legal theory, since that seems to be an important consideration on the government’s part. The following, though interspersed through the Motion, are consolidated simply to demonstrate their concern:

1. Defendant’s motion is not ripe for consideration as a factual matter. Defendant has presented merely a legal theory, namely that “purely” intrastate possession of a firearm cannot be infringed by the federal government of the United States. Defendant has not, however, presented any facts whatsoever let alone “sufficient facts which, if proven, would justify relief.” (page 4)
2. Defendant now files a motion to dismiss the indictment based solely on a proposed legal theory that “purely” intrastate possession of a firearm by a felon (or presumably any other individual) cannot be regulated or criminalized by the federal government. (page 6)
3. But this factual issue does not tangentially create a legal dispute on a matter not in controversy, namely an unrelated constitutional theory cloaked as a suppression issue. (page 7)
4. Article III of the United States Constitution grants the Court authority to adjudicate ‘cases’ or ‘controversies’, not irrelevant and tangential legal theory… Defendant does not have standing to challenge any supposed government regulation or criminalization of “purely” intrastate possession of a firearm. (page 8)
5. Because Defendant’s second motion to dismiss proposes an irrelevant and tangentially reached legal theory, and because Defendant does not have standing to challenge that issue, the government respectfully requests that the Court deny the motion to dismiss the indictment. (page 8)
6. Because both legal theory and binding case law are contrary to Defendant’s proposition, the Government respectfully requests that Defendant’s second motion to dismiss be denied. (page 11)
7. The legal theory postulated by Defendant is just that, a legal theory. Other legal theory supports the proposition that the federal government through an act of Congress may indeed have the authority to criminalize “purely” intrastate possession of a firearm by a felon should Congress make the requisite findings that it is necessary and proper to criminalize possession of a firearm by a felon to promote the general welfare of the American people, insure domestic tranquility, and establish justice. (page 15)

So, let’s look at what he has said. In #1 and #2, he suggests that it is a “legal theory” the “‘purely’ intrastate possession of a firearm cannot be infringed by the federal government”. Well, the Second Amendment notwithstanding, the Commerce Clause is based ” foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”. And, the government has yet to directly control intrastate commerce under the provision.

There is little doubt that the government has tried, by twisted abuse of our language (See Motion to Dismiss Indictment), tried to extent their authority to any firearm that had been in interstate commerce, though, as we will discuss, they change the language when it suits their purpose.

In #3 and #4, he suggests that it is an “unrelated constitutional theory”. In this same document, he cites the Constitution as the authority, as he sees it, as absolute, as if spoken by the King, himself. So, there is no theory allowed on the public side, since only the government side can cite their interpretation of the Constitution as legitimate. This kinda makes you wonder why they even use a pretext of justice when they simply want to imprison someone.

In both #4 and #5, he suggest that it is “irrelevant” that Massey challenge the Indictment because he has no standing, presumably, to defend himself. Once again, the King has spoken.

In 1936, in the Supreme Court decision of Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (297 US 288), Justice Brandeis, in a separate but concurring decision, provided insight into the evolving role of the United States Supreme Court, wherein he said:

The Court developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision. They are:

[Rule] 5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation…”

It was clear that the matter of standing had to do with matters brought to that Court, on certiorari, or error. It did not provide a means whereby a trial on criminal charges, in the lowest court of the federal system, could deny standing to challenge the law or the jurisdiction of the matter upon which one was charged.

In #6 and #7, he tends to give credence to the legal theory by stating that theory and case law are “contrary to [Massey’s] proposition”. However, we must understand that the government proposed another “legal theory”. That “theory” is suggested in the following excerpt:

Were Congress to make the proper findings and act in the interest of the “general Welfare” of the people of the United States, it is theoretically possible Congress could, and theoretically possible Congress does, have the constitutional power to regulate and criminalize all possession of firearms by felons. Congress, however, has not chosen to act pursuant to alternative powers and has instead relied on the Commerce Clause. Because of this, an interstate nexus relating to possession of the firearms is an element of the crime and any challenge the Defendant is raising in regard to “purely” intrastate possession is a factual challenge, not a constitutional one.

Now, this brings us into a whole new world of conjecture. He theorizes that Congress could, do, and does have the power to, criminalize any possession by any felon, anywhere within this (mythical) Kingdom. It has bee clearly established, when Equal Protection was discussed, that if a firearm or ammunition were manufactured in a state, those possessing such firearms and ammunition are not subject to criminal charges, since the firearm and/or ammunition had not entered interstate commerce. So, is Corley suggesting that Congress is too damned stupid to see the loophole that have left for those who live in certain states, or that they are wise enough to know that those living in those states are not the type that the felon in possession law was intended for, regardless of the fact that those with felony convictions are still felons. Or, his the King (government), perhaps, capable of doing wrong?

If his theory were correct, under the “general Welfare” provision of the Constitution, they (Congress) could dictate any, and every, aspect of our lives. Now, there is little doubt that they are slowly creeping in that direction, but AUSA Corley seems to think that we have already arrived.

Moving right along, we find, on page 6 of the Government’s Response:

“Article III of the Constitution grants the Judicial Branch authority to adjudicate ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’ In our system of government, courts have ‘no business’ deciding legal disputes or expounding on law in the absence of such a case or controversy.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc. and DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno. “A controversy is mooted when there are no longer adverse parties with sufficient legal interests to maintain the litigation.” “Accordingly, an actual, live controversy must remain at all stages of federal court proceedings, both at trial and appellate levels.”

Talking about stretching the hell out of an argument, the controversy here is a criminal charge brought by the US government against Massey. It is not a dispute between parties, it is an accusation based upon the misapplication of a statute. Is it even conceivable that someone, especially a highly paid public servant attorney, could deny an accused person of challenging the misrepresentation? Or, can the King (Corley) do no wrong?

Now, I expect that you are getting as bored at reading this as I am at having to wade through it (I do have my boots on), to find the little gems that (if I were a psychiatrist) demonstrate the insanity, or at least the mental instability, of the person who prepared the Government’s Response. Surely, not even the King would allow him to pass the background check, on mental grounds, to own a firearm.

But, there are two more rather interesting point that warrant our attention. Sorola cited McCulloch v. Maryland with reference to “limited powers” of government, according to the Constitution. In what appears to be a DOJ (Department of Justice) boilerplate insert (page 10), he suggests that the limited powers of government have a broad interpretation. From the Government’s Response:

In citing from McCulloch:

“This government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers.

“But, there is no phrase in the instrument which, like the articles of confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers; and which requires that everything granted shall be expressly and minutely described. Even the Tenth Amendment, which was framed for the purpose of quieting excessive jealousies which had been excited, omits the word ‘expressly,’ and declares only, that the powers ‘not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states or the people;’ thus leaving the question, whether the particular power which may become subject of contest, has been delegated to the one government, or prohibited to the other, to depend upon a fair construction of the whole instrument.”

“So with respect to the whole penal code of the United States; whence arises the power to punish, in cases not prescribed by the constitution? All admit, that the government may, legitimately punish any violation of its laws; and yet, this is not among the enumerated powers of congress.”

Then, in Corley’s own words (the King has spoken):

It should come as no surprise then that the Supreme Court ruled in McCulloch v. Maryland that Congress had the power to incorporate a bank despite having no specifically enumerated power to do so. The precedent set nearly two hundred years ago in McCulloch v. Maryland works against Defendant, not for him.

Now, he talks about if not prohibited, and in the case of the matter of McCulloch, dealing with the creation of a bank, there is no prohibition against the government so doing.

But, the “legal theory” presented makes clear that there is a prohibition against the government’s intervention into the right to keep and bear arms, known as the Second Amendment, and the prohibition therein is called “infringement”.

Nowhere does the constitution address the government’s inability to infringe upon the creation of banks. In fact, there is much said about coin and currency, all implying such powers as necessary with regard to banks. So, just how does that work “against the Defendant”?

The second is an effort to conjoin “Militia” and “people”, as expressed in the Second Amendment, as only the “body of the people” (pages 11-13). He cites a “Second Amendment constitutional scholar”, which, apparently, he places the opinion of above the written laws.

If we consider that the framers of the Constitution were far more particular in the choice of words that the AUSA, we can easily dispute the effort to co-join, since they used both “Militia” and “people”. And Congress, surely, is more meticulous than the AUSA, when they enacted the following:

10 U.S.C. § 311: Militia: composition and classes

(a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section 313 of title 32, under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and of female citizens of the United States who are members of the National Guard.

(b) The classes of the militia are –

(1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and the Naval Militia; and

(2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia.

So, here we have “members of the militia”, who are, clearly, individuals, like people. However, that doesn’t stand as the only element that suggests individuality.

10 U.S.C. § 312: Militia duty: exemptions

(a) The following persons are exempt from militia duty:

(1) The Vice President.

(2) The judicial and executive officers of the United States, the several States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.

(3) Members of the armed forces, except members who are not on active duty.

(4) Customhouse clerks.

(5) Persons employed by the United States in the transmission of mail.

(6) Workmen employed in armories, arsenals, and naval shipyards of the United States.

(7) Pilots on navigable waters.

(8) Mariners in the sea service of a citizen of, or a merchant in, the United States.

(b) A person who claims exemption because of religious belief is exempt from militia duty in a combatant capacity, if the conscientious holding of that belief is established under such regulations as the President may prescribe. However, such a person is not exempt from militia duty that the President determines to be noncombatant.

Though some are general in nature, others are, without a doubt, applied to individuals of certain character. So, if the “theory” of the AUSA is correct, and whether the Congress wanted to us the “general Welfare” provision, or the Commerce Clause, they would have, if what Corley wants to suggest, surely have included a class of people known as “felons”.

So, I wonder what the King will have to say about the obvious, and rather discomforting, exclusion of “felons” from the most logical source of limitation of the right to bear arms. Is it possible that the King (Congress) can do no wrong, and accordingly, will not “infringe”, except via the “Commerce Clause”?

Camp Lone Star – Massey is Protected by State Law

Federal Government Violates State Law

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
August 28, 2015

There is a presumption in the minds of many people that the federal government has jurisdiction, anywhere. We even see the FBI investigating incidents in foreign, sometime hostile nations. Our purpose here however is to look at the extent, if any, of federal jurisdiction, within the geographic boundaries of the member States of the Union. It should be understood that there is a lot more to the extent of jurisdiction than will be discussed here. We are simply addressing those limitations as the apply to the recent events involving KC Massey and Camp Lone Star.

To its credit, the Texas State Legislature, in its wisdom and understanding of the relationship with the federal government, enacted Article 2.122 of the Texas Penal Code. This “law” provides for granting of certain authority to federal agents. The pertinent parts of that Act are as follows:

Art. 2.122. SPECIAL INVESTIGATORS.

(a) The following named criminal investigators of the United States shall not be deemed peace officers, but shall have the powers of arrest, search, and seizure under the laws of this state as to felony offenses only:

(1) Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(3) Special Agents of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement;

(4) Special Agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives;

(9) Marshals and Deputy Marshals of the United States Marshals Service;

(b) A person designated as a special policeman by the Federal Protective Services division of the General Services Administration under 40 U.S.C. Section 318 or 318d is not a peace officer but has the powers of arrest and search and seizure as to any offense under the laws of this state.

(c) A Customs and Border Protection Officer or Border Patrol Agent of the United States Customs and Border Protection or an immigration enforcement agent or deportation officer of the Department of Homeland Security is not a peace officer under the laws of this state but, on the premises of a port facility designated by the commissioner of the United States Customs and Border Protection as a port of entry for arrival in the United States by land transportation from the United Mexican States into the State of Texas or at a permanent established border patrol traffic check point, has the authority to detain a person pending transfer without unnecessary delay to a peace officer if the agent or officer has probable cause to believe that the person has engaged in conduct that is a violation of Section 49.02, 49.04, 49.07, or 49.08, Penal Code, regardless of whether the violation may be disposed of in a criminal proceeding or a juvenile justice proceeding.

So, the extent of the authority to arrest, which would also include detaining a person, is only “the powers of arrest and search and seizure as to any offense under the laws of this state [Texas].” We will address the limitation to the laws of the state, below.

BPS also has a greater degree of authority, but only at Ports of Entry and Checkpoints. So, at Sabal Palms, where the alleged “crime” took place, which may have been a violation of the laws of the state, the BPS agent who fired at Foerster had committed the only possible crime, and the BPS agent the only possible criminal. It might be stretching the point to say that Foerster, the only witness to the crime, might be detained, though that is a gray area that we need not address.

Clearly, Massey and Varner, not even witness to the crime, are well outside of the authority granted by the state to the designated federal agents. Take note, also, of the word “premises” in paragraph (c). We will also address that later.

So, the State of Texas saw fit to extend certain powers to certain agents of the federal government. The federal government has never contested the right of the State to enact such laws. If it had, and if they had the authority to refuse the state’s authority to limit their powers, then surely, there surely would have been a federal challenge, before now. If that is not correct, then, perhaps, the federal government needs to challenge that State authority now, or live by the law, as enacted.

Now, let’s revisit that word in paragraph (c), “premises”. Mr. Hagen has stated that KC was not on his premises, since he was not in his home. By that construct, we can assume that the word premises, in federal law led to Hagen’s presumption of the meaning under state law. However, I doubt that even Mr. Hagen would presume that the “premises of a port facility” would include ONLY the building that had “port facility” posted over the doorway. Surely, it includes the entire premises which comprises the entire port facility.

Now the federal government may have two definitions, though they have not provided an alternate definition. Texas Penal Code provides insight into the meaning of “premises”, under State law. Remember, the federal authority applies to felonies under State law. So, let’s look at Texas Penal Code:

Sec. 46.04.  UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF FIREARM.

(a)  A person who has been convicted of a felony commits an offense if he possesses a firearm:

(1)  after conviction and before the fifth anniversary of the person’s release from confinement following conviction of the felony or the person’s release from supervision under community supervision, parole, or mandatory supervision, whichever date is later

(2)  after the period described by Subdivision (1), at any location other than the premises at which the person lives.

Meaning that five years after the completion of all portions of the punishment, he regains the right to possess a firearm, subject to the limitation imposed by sub-paragraph (2).

Sec. 46.02. UNLAWFUL CARRYING WEAPONS.

(a) A person commits an offense if the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly carries on or about his or her person a handgun, illegal knife, or club if the person is not:

(1) on the person’s own premises or premises under the person’s control; or

(2) inside of or directly en route to a motor vehicle or watercraft that is owned by the person or under the person’s control.

(a-1) A person commits an offense if the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly carries on or about his or her person a handgun in a motor vehicle or watercraft that is owned by the person or under the person’s control at any time in which:

(1) the handgun is in plain view; or

(2) the person is:

(A) engaged in criminal activity, other than a Class C misdemeanor that is a violation of a law or ordinance regulating traffic or boating;

(B) prohibited by law from possessing a firearm; or

(C) a member of a criminal street gang, as defined by Section 71.01.

(a-2) For purposes of this section, “premises” includes real property and a recreational vehicle that is being used as living quarters, regardless of whether that use is temporary or permanent. In this subsection, “recreational vehicle” means a motor vehicle primarily designed as temporary living quarters or a vehicle that contains temporary living quarters and is designed to be towed by a motor vehicle. The term includes a travel trailer, camping trailer, truck camper, motor home, and horse trailer with living quarters.

(a-3) For purposes of this section, “watercraft” means any boat, motorboat, vessel, or personal watercraft, other than a seaplane on water, used or capable of being used for transportation on water.

(b) Except as provided by Subsection (c), an offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

(c) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree if the offense is committed on any premises licensed or issued a permit by this state for the sale of alcoholic beverages.

So, the “person commits an offense” if he is not “on the “person’s own premises or premises under the person’s control.” It also provides for en route travel, but our concern is what “premises” means. Then, from (a-2), we find that ” For purposes of this section, “premises” includes real property and a recreational vehicle that is being used as living quarters, regardless of whether that use is temporary or permanent. So, the “premises” is where you live, if you have control of it. It includes real property, not just the house. And, surely, if you were a guest, with the consent of the owner, to live on his property, or a motel, whether temporarily or permanently, then the premises would include his land, and any other land that you were on, if you had the consent of the owner and he had knowledge of your firearm. So, unless argued to the contrary by the federal government, Sabal Palms would be the recreational premises upon which Massey’s stay was temporary. Likewise, the motel room, over which he had control as the renter, though temporary, for recreational purposes, would include those “premises” where he was arrested. To assume that he can have a firearm in the motel room, though he cannot leave the motel room, then cross that premises to his vehicle, with the firearm is the sort of absurdity that the government excels in. To assume such would be to assume that a law with a specific purpose is impossible, since the construction that federal government has applied would say that you have a right, though there is no way in which you can exercise that right.

The question also arises as to whether the detail of the intent and application of the State Law is properly heard in the Federal District Court, or if the original jurisdiction can reside only in a state court, with the State of Texas as the Plaintiff.

Now, it may seem as if I am stretching the right to travel with a firearm, in support of the other provisions. However, Texas did clarify the broadness of the right to possess framers in their state, with Section 46.15 (pertinent parts):

Sec. 46.15. NONAPPLICABILITY.

(b) Section 46.02 [prohibition of possession] does not apply to a person who:

(2) is traveling;

(3) is engaging in lawful hunting, fishing, or other sporting activity on the immediate premises where the activity is conducted, or is en route between the premises and the actor’s residence, motor vehicle, or watercraft, if the weapon is a type commonly used in the activity;

Now, let’s ask ourselves just why Texas thought that they could enact these laws. Did they do so despite the Constitution and what other tend to believe is the federal government’s overarching authority to enact any law that they want? Especially if the law they are using specifically cites “commerce” as the authority for such enactment? Or, as has been discussed previously, are the stretching their authority under the commerce clause beyond the scope granted by the Constitution and affirmed by the authors and proponents of the Constitution? See Federal Gun Laws and the Commerce clause.

The ratification of the Constitution came with instruction for the submission of a Bill of Rights, to assure that the assertion of federal authority did not exceed that which was intended by the document. There are two amendments that are applicable, one with regard to the people, themselves, and the other with regard to both the States and the people.

First is the Ninth Amendment:

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

And, more importantly and appropriately to this discussion, the Tenth Amendment:

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

So, there can be no doubt that Texas, with powers not granted to the federal government, nor denied to the State, is, without question, acting within its purview, as were the Representatives in the State Government, in expressing the Will of the People in asserting their rights through the enactment of the laws cited above. None of those laws encroach, by any stretch of the imagination, on the powers granted to the federal government.

Camp Lone Star – Pressure Cooker of Just Us

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
August 24, 2015

A pressure cooker was used to make the bombs used in the Boston Marathon Bombing. However, besides cooking, there appears to be another form of pressure cooker used by the government. Pressure cookers use steam to build up pressure to increase the rate at which something cooks. It changes the normal conditions to conditions that have a more rapid effect on what is being, well, pressure-cooked.

KC Massey was returned to jail for violating his (innocent until proven guilty) pre-trial release conditions (Cruel and Unusual Punishments – Before Conviction). Prior to his pre-trial release, he had been held at Willacy Federal Detention Facility, and was placed in a solitary cell. After the violation, he was sent to a County Sheriff’s facility, Carrizales Rucker Detention Center, under federal authority. Again, he was placed in solitary confinement.

In solitary confinement, he has no exercise privileges, unless they decide to let him out of his cell. He had, while at Camp Lone Star, been active on patrols and had gotten plenty of exercise. However, his confinement and the poor quality of the food have had detrimental affect on his health. He suffers from kidney problems and was recently diagnosed with early stages of congestive heart failure.

So, why is he, not having yet been convicted, and only charged with a crime that is not violent in nature, treated worse than the many real thugs in jail, whether under either federal or local charges?

A couple of weeks ago, KC told me that another prisoner, a trustee, had told him that he was in solitary confinement because of his affiliation with Aryan Brotherhood. This was a surprise to KC, and, as he explained to me, he has never supported them and has often been critical of Aryan Brotherhood.

Just a few days ago, he asked Sgt. Campbell, one of the detention officers, if he would look in his (KC’s) file to see if it did say what he had been told. Sgt. Campbell responded, I don’t have to look, I know. The US Marshall Service put Aryan Brotherhood Affiliation on the outside of your jacket [folder].” So, KC is in solitary confinement because the US Marshall Service can lie, just to punish KC, because they, or someone above them, wants to punish him.

Through a fabrication, the pressure on KC to submit, psychologically and physically, to the pressure that was being applied to the cooker, had begun.

KC had been offered a plea agreement, plead guilty to one county and five years in prison, but stoically refused this offer, knowing that he was right and was not guilty of any crime.

Over time, I could hear and sense the frustration over the solitary confinement. His mood was quite often very low, and much of our conversation was an effort to boost his morale and to stand firmly behind his beliefs.

Within days of Sgt. Campbell explaining why he was in solitary confinement, and with just a few days to go before his trial, the government comes back, through KC’s attorney, with a new offer – Guilty to one count and he was told it would be three years in prison, by his attorney.

However, this offer came with additional information. They had been monitoring all of his phone calls, they had reviewed all of the text messages on his cell phone, they had gone over every post on his Facebook pages, and, had reviewed all of his radio shows. If he did not plea and the case went to trial, they would go after everybody that was named in any of the information gathered, if there was any chance of prosecution. They would also go after his wife, Khristi, who had bought an AK 47 that KC was charged with possession of, notwithstanding that under Texas law, there was no illegality to the purchase or to allowing KC to use her firearm.

This is the same tactic that they used against Robert Beecher (Who Does the Patriot Fight For?) to secure a plea agreement, rather than the government taking the rather risky task of trying to convince a jury that the government acted above board in their persecution of Beecher.

This morning, KC apparently stood his ground. He was willing to plea No Contest (nolo contendre), take the 3 years, however, his unwillingness to agree to their plea bargain offer, and finding that there was no specification on the three years, has result in the trial NOT being held today at 1:30 PM, but is put off until the end of September.

So, why did they schedule this second trial, and then cancel it? Well, both Sorola, KC’s attorney, and KC began talking jurisdiction (Massey & The Clash of Laws), this morning, in front of the Judge. Sorola pointed out that KC had brought up the jurisdictional matter back with his first attorney, Ed Cyganiewicz. Judge Hanen, favoring KC’s side, allowed for the September date to hear additional arguments, including a challenge to jurisdiction. Hagen resisted, but the Judge had made his decision.

Hagen, the prosecutor, seemed upset that KC would not plea, arguing that he has been made plea offers, and has refused to take them. The only other conceivable reason is that the trial is something that Hagen does not want. They want KC to plead guilty, period.

I will add, however, that KC called me as soon as he got back to jail from the hearing. He is exuberant, and he said that he feels that God is on his side, as this critical argument of Tenth Amendment State Rights, is going to get its day in court. He is more excited and up beat than he has been, in many months — even though it is another month in solitary. He feels that his suffering will have the appropriate reward, in the end.

This, my friends, is what Justice has become, in America. No trail, we will punish you until you agree that you are guilty, then we will imprison you, and you will carry that “conviction” with you, the rest of your life. But, KC intends to beat the system, and get out of the pressure cooker with only minor burns.

Camp Lone Star – Federal Gun Laws and the Commerce clause

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
August 20, 2015

The entire “Felon in Possession” federal law is hinged on Commerce. From its inception, it has been enforced by taxation, since the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms is an agency of the U. S. Treasury department.

We are dealing specifically with 18 U.S. Code 922 (g):

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person – [conditions omitted]

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

We are going to delve into the purpose of commerce, as defined by the Constitution. We can also wonder why someone charged with “felon in possession” is not taxed; instead, he is determined to be a criminal. We will start with some historical background.

Role of the Federalist Papers

James Madison, fourth president (1809-1817), and recognized as the “Father of the Constitution”, for his role in drafting as well as arguing for ratification, is the best single source for an understanding of the intent and purpose of the Constitution and the government created by that Constitution.

The Federalist Papers, being the arguments that led to ratification of the Constitution, have been used in legal justification to support, and to overturn, laws enacted by Congress. After all, the intent of the Constitution, as laid out in the Federalist Papers is what the American people, through their respective state conventions, relied upon as the original intent of the Framers, and therefore, must be what the Constitution truly means, wherever any ambiguity exists.

There are many hundreds of U.S. Supreme Court decisions where the Federalist Papers were cited in arguing and/or deciding decisions before that court. If the Federalist Papers, those words by Hamilton, Jay, and especially Madison, supported a decision, it was so supported. If they were inconsistent with an enactment, then the enactment was overturned.

An example of the strength of original intent might be demonstrated with an example. In United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), Lopez argued that the federal law regarding “gun free school zones” was outside of the scope of authority granted to Congress by the commerce clause, “The Congress shall have Power…[t]o regulate Commerce… among the several States…” (Art. I, §8, cl. 3). Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, and in so doing, said [at 457-458]:

The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers. As James Madison wrote, “[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.” The Federalist No. 45. This constitutionally mandated division of authority was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties. Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serves to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.

The decision removed from enforcement the federal gun free school zone law, as a determination of that nature resided solely with the state, by those powers not granted to the federal government, rather, retained by the state government.

In another instance, Alden et al. v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), this case dealt with the sovereignty of a American state government, Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court:

… Any doubt regarding the constitutional role of the States as sovereign entities is removed by the Tenth Amendment, which, like the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was enacted to allay lingering concerns about the extent of the national power. The Amendment confirms the promise implicit in the original document: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 10.

The federal system established by our Constitution preserves the sovereign status of the States in two ways. First, it reserves to them a substantial portion of the Nation’s primary sovereignty, together with the dignity and essential attributes inhering in that status. The States “form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere.” The Federalist No. 39.

Second, even as to matters within the competence of the National Government, the constitutional design secures the founding generation’s rejection of “the concept of a central government that would act upon and through the States” in favor of “a system in which the State and Federal Governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people–who were, in Hamilton’s words, `the only proper objects of government.'” (quoting The Federalist No. 15). In this the founders achieved a deliberate departure from the Articles of Confederation: Experience under the Articles had “exploded on all hands” the “practicality of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for the States as political bodies.” The Federalist No. 20.

Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association (2015), with Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, said:

When a party properly brings a case or controversy to an Article III court, that court is called upon to exercise the “judicial Power of the United States.” Art. III, §1. For the reasons I explain in this section, the judicial power, as originally understood, requires a court to exercise its independent judgment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws.

Those who ratified the Constitution knew that legal texts would often contain ambiguities. As James Madison explained, “All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal . . . .” The Federalist No. 37.

One of the key elements of the Federalists’ arguments in support of the allocation of power to make binding interpretations of the law was that Article III judges would exercise independent judgment. Although “judicial independence” is often discussed in terms of independence from external threats, the Framers understood the concept to also require independence from the “internal threat” of “human will.” The Federalist No. 78, “The judiciary . . . may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment . . . “. Independent judgment required judges to decide cases in accordance with the law of the land, not in accordance with pressures placed upon them through either internal or external sources. Internal sources might include personal biases, while external sources might include pressure from the political branches, the public, or other interested parties.

Necessary and Proper

Article I, §8, clause 18:

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

This clause is worthy of additional consideration. What may be necessary and proper for the function, and the fulfillment of the duties, of the federal government is, without question, within the realm of the intent. That comes under the portion which states, “the foregoing Powers”, meaning those enumeration within Article I, §8.

Next, we have to consider, “all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government”. Here, we can consider whether a “Power” exists, and whether, without express authority, the government can properly assert that “Power”. For example, Article II, §2 provides that the President is “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States”. clearly, laws enacted to facilitate that function are within the scope of the intent of clause 18. So, too, would be laws that set forth the operation of other functions within the various “Departments or Officers”, though the existence of those Departments and Officers must, by their creation, be consistent with the Constitution.

Now, here comes a stickler. The Preamble to the Constitution provides a description of the purpose of the Constitution and the government it created:

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

Let’s look at some adjectives (Definitions from Webster’s 1828 Dictionary, the words as understood by the Founders):

establish: To set and fix firmly or unalterably; to settle permanently. To found permanently; to erect and fix or settle; as, to establish a colony or an empire.

insure: To make sure or secure.

provide: To procure beforehand; to get, collect or make ready for future use; to prepare.

promote: To forward; to advance; to contribute to the growth, enlargement or excellence of any thing valuable, as, to promote learning, knowledge, virtue or religion.

secure: Free from fear or apprehension of danger.

(1) To set or fix firmly or unalterably a form of Justice; (2) To make sure that there is domestic Tranquility; (3) To procure beforehand, ready for future use, the common defence; (4) To forward (encourage) the general Welfare; and, (5) To make free from fear or apprehension, the Blessings of Liberty.

Of these, two are somewhat ambiguous, unless the on text is understood. How can enactments, for example, make sure that there is domestic Tranquility? Well, that Tranquility might best be described as the absence of government intrusion into our lives, so, it is absence of action rather than action that can produce the intended result. The other is to promote the general Welfare. It doesn’t say provide, therefore, providing the general welfare is not what was intended. Further, it says “general”, meaning creating a wholesome setting for the people to provide for their own welfare. These two, then, would, perhaps, require laws limiting activities of government that would be detrimental to the purposes.

The other three are rather straightforward. Establishing a judicial system that is focused on justice, rather than unconstitutional law. Providing for military protect for the country, should the need arise — it does say “defence”. And, to enact any law that assures that our posterity will enjoy the same “Blessings of Liberty that we intended to enjoy.

So, of these, “necessary and proper” must adhere to the achievement of the objectives. Anything contrary thereto would be unnecessary and improper.

Returning to “Departments and Officers”, the creation of Departments and the Officers within those departments would have to be within the confines of the defining powers of government. For example, if the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, is created under the authority of excise taxes, then it is a tax collection agency, and its sole purpose is the collection of those taxes. Would a law be necessary and proper if it made a criminal of someone who chose to not pay the tax, or would it be limited to collection, not by force, rather, by judicial process, of any taxes owed?

This is the fine line of what the Constitution means. It is left to proper judicial interpretation, and that interpretation was made in the Supreme Court decisions cited above.

The Lopez case determined that the commerce clause was limited in its reach, and that it was encroaching on the rights and jurisdiction of the states to determine whether someone could possess a firearm within a specified distance from a school.

Alden reinforces the authority of the states to retain their sovereignty, if there is not a specific “necessary and proper” aspect to a federal law enacted by the Congress, or a Rule administered by an Administrative Agency.

The Perez case demonstrates the necessity of the judges and justices to interpret the original intent of a legislative act, as intended by the wording in the law, as well as to weigh the constitutionality, the “necessary and proper” aspect of an enactment of Congress, or a Rule promulgated by an agency..

The Commerce Clause

In Federalist Papers 41-46, he provides a thorough explanation of the three branches, their separation, and their powers and limitations. He also points out that there is a distinction between “necessary and proper” (Art. I, §8, cl. 18) and what is “unnecessary or improper”.

As he continues through these six Papers, he raises two questions:

1.  Whether any part of the powers transferred to the general government be unnecessary or improper?
2.  Whether the entire mass of them be dangerous to the portion of jurisdiction left in the several States?

And, into doing, he provides insight into:

[T]he several powers conferred on the government of the Union; and that this may be the more conveniently done they may be reduced into different classes as they relate to the following different objects:
1. Security against foreign danger;
2. Regulation of the intercourse with foreign nations;
3. Maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the States;
4. Certain miscellaneous objects of general utility;
5. Restraint of the States from certain injurious acts;
6. Provisions for giving due efficacy to all these powers.

Now, the one that we are concerned with is that dealing with is number 3:

[The Power] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;

In particular, the second, “among the several States”, which he defined, above, as “3. Maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the States“.

One of the defects of the Articles of Confederation was that it had no means whereby it could control what one state did with regard to another state, as far as duties or taxes. If a ship came from a foreign port with goods to be delivered to a couple of different ports, in different states, it had an unfair impact on other than the first state visited. For example, if a ship came into New York, and had goods for New Jersey, New York would impose a duty on all of the goods aboard. Then the ship would cross the river to New Jersey, having already paid duties in New York, increasing the price of the goods offloaded in New Jersey.

Vermont and the already created Northwest Territories, being land bound, might be charged anything for any goods transported across any of the coastal states, to get to a shipping port — adding additional costs to those goods. Whereas the coastal states would have not additional charges on their goods.

It was with this problem, already existing, that lead to the inclusion of the commerce clause. Or, to put it in the words of James Madison (FP 42):

The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the commerce between its several members, is in the number of those which have been clearly pointed out by experience. To the proofs and remarks which former papers have brought into view on this subject, it may be added that without this supplemental provision, the great and essential power of regulating foreign commerce would have been incomplete and ineffectual. A very material object of this power was the relief of the States which import and export through other States, from the improper contributions levied on them by the latter. Were these at liberty to regulate the trade between State and State, it must be foreseen that ways would be found out to load the articles of import and export, during the passage through their jurisdiction, with duties which would fall on the makers of the latter and the consumers of the former. We may be assured by past experience, that such a practice would be introduced by future contrivances; and both by that and a common knowledge of human affairs, that it would nourish unceasing animosities, and not improbably terminate in serious interruptions of the public tranquility.

Now, to extend the ambiguous wording of the clause into means of enacting laws the step upon the toes, or the rights, of the States to determine what is acceptable within their sovereign lands, as, without a doubt, and abuse of the intent of that clause. It violates the very concept of a Union, making the federal government master of all, and the states, masters of naught, at least to the extent that the federal government intends to extend its influence.

So, when that provision for commerce becomes a uniform tax imposed by the federal government (Gun Control Act of 1934), rather than the intended purpose on not letting one state take advantage of another. Then the tax is removed and the act becomes a crime, (as discussed in Massey & The Clash of Laws) which is in opposition to the Texas Constitution and Statutes, we must, if the judiciary will not question what the intent is, and whether the federal “felon in possession” law is within that intent.

As was seen in the court decisions cited above, the Supreme Court does recognize the intent based upon the writings of Hamilton, Jay, and Madison. So, in the name of justice, should the lower court rule, with the wisdom intended, in favor of the Constitution? That is what Madison told us was intended. Thus leaving any challenge to seek an interpretation contrary to the Constitution as a burden on the government, rather than imprison someone, leaving the obligation on this victim of government oppression, the loss of his job, his family, and facing starting over, with the stigma of “convict” attached to his name, if the Supreme Court eventually rules that the law, as interpreted by the government agents, is in error, with regard to any authority granted by the Constitution? Is that not his proper role?

Camp Lone Star – The World Turned Upside Down

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
July 28, 2015

I believe that the prosecutor, Ass. US Attorney William Hagan, in the K. C. Massey felon in possession matter, is worried. Why would I think that to be the case? Well, Massey recently sat with Mr. Hagan to discuss the upcoming trail. Hagen has some interesting, and rather desperate, thoughts.

We’ll start with the fact that the “has-had” argument (See Camp Lone Star — A Favorable Ruling?) seems to have put him on the defensive. He explained to KC that what he was doing by stopping or detaining illegals at the border was “in or affecting commerce” (from the felon in possession law, 18 U. S. Code § 922 (g)(1). Interesting the illegally entering the country, and/or smuggling people, firearms, and drugs, is considered, by the Ass. US Attorney to be “commerce”.

So, what is commerce? Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, defines it as:

The exchange of goods, productions, or property of any kind; buying, selling, and exchanging of articles. The transportation of persons and property by land, water, and air [for payment].

So, let’s put some perspective on this — from our own history. John Hancock, and many others, would buy goods at one port, outside of the colonies, and bring them into the colonies. Often, much of the cargo would be off-loaded prior to entry into the port and then the taxes would be paid only on that portion of the cargo that was declared. That portion was “in or affecting commerce”. But, what of the cargo that had been offloaded? Was it “commerce”, which is legal, or was it smuggling, which is illegal? Since they only had tariffs and other fees for the cargo that was off-loaded in port, it was “commerce” and had no criminal penalties associated with it.

However, those goods that were off-loaded elsewhere, well, were consider “smuggled contraband”, and were in no wise considered to be commerce. If the transporter were caught, he would lose the goods, his ship, and, perhaps, serve time in jail.

Commerce, then, is legal transporting. Smuggling is criminal, and is not, in the least, any aspect of commerce. If caught, the property is not transferred to the owner, or the purchaser. It is confiscated by the government, and then sold or destroyed.

So, does 18 U. S. Code § 922 (g)(1) apply to legal transportation only, or does it apply to illegal transportation (smuggling), as well? If it also applies to smuggling, then we need to ask Mr. Hagen, and the government, why when they catch people entering illegal, with firearms or without, if they are in commerce, or not.

But, if we consider that the government doesn’t stop them, rather, they escort them to a bus or train station, sends them around the country to where they are not wanted, gives them our hard earned money so they don’t have to work, thereby rewarding them far better than those who wait, and abiding by the existing immigration laws, which are otherwise not enforced. Perhaps I am wrong, since government, apparently, considers smuggling to be “commerce”.

So, it could be rather confusing to those who think they know the law, as opposed to those who can read and comprehend the English language, and can differentiate between the meanings of words.

However, if we are a nation of laws, as we are led to believe, then should the precise wording of a law be the applicable interpretation? Or, have we become a nation subject to the rule of illiterate, or otherwise politically driven, prosecutors.

Let’s enter another interesting realm based upon the discussion between Massey and Hagen. Mr. Hagen states that Massey was not on the premises where he lived. Now, the discussion centered on whether the premises were the house – the building, or the property that the house was on. Black’s tells us that the estate, the premise, is “the land and buildings thereon”. So, here we have another discrepancy between the law (Texas Penal Code, Section 46.04) applicable in Texas, whereby Massey can posses a firearm, and the federal interpretation. Mr. Hagen says the house, the state law says the “premise”. This was discussed, absent the recent reinterpretation, in Camp Lone Star – Massey & The Clash of Laws.

But, that is not quite the point that we want to make. By Mr. Hagen even suggesting that Massey might have not been charged with a crime if he had been in his house, he also recognizes the validity of the state law. However, since Massey wasn’t in his house, then the feds can charge him with felon in possession (regardless of the wording of that law), because he is not in his house. Is the implication that Texas law would have applied, had Massey been in his house? If so, why would Texas law not apply if Massey were not in his house? And, if it did apply if Massey was not in his house, or on the premises, then it would still be Texas jurisdiction, since the Massey house is in Texas — and, if the feds can assume jurisdiction over any land in Texas, then can’t they also assume jurisdiction in Massey’s house?

Now, let’s visit one more part of the discussion that has to do with “erroneous” statements made during the hearing. This was discussed in a previous article, Camp Lone Star – Act Two: The Contradictions Scene 2: To Detain, or Not to Detain? That is the Question.

Mr. Hagen told Massey that it didn’t matter if the “government agents lied, misspoke, or misrepresented the facts in their testimony, as long as the meat of the story is true”. Let’s see if we can put a perspective on this, and then digest it.

Government agents are trained to observe and report. Some of those agents referred to their notes during their testimony at the March 30, 2015 hearing (referenced in the above link). That hearing was, among other purposes, to justify the procedure used to detain Massey — to make sure that it satisfied the ruling on stops, detentions, searches, etc, based upon Supreme Court rulings. So, what they “misspoke, or misrepresented, in court, at that hearing, were simple “errors” that made what the did appear to be lawful, in accord with the Supreme court rulings, what might have been deemed unlawful, if the truth were told.

Now, if you or I were to lie, misspeak, or misrepresent, under oath, we would be criminal under the federal perjury laws:

18 U.S.C. § 1621: Perjury generally

Whoever – (1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true; or (2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true; is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. This section is applicable whether the statement or subscription is made within or without the United States.

18 U.S.C. § 1622: Subornation of perjury

Whoever procures another to commit any perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury, and shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

So, the three important questions are:

1. Was there any testimony on “any material matter” that might have lead to a different determination as to whether the stop, or detention, satisfied the Supreme Court rulings? (§1621)
2. Did Mr. Hagen know that the information provided by the witnesses was misspoken, misrepresented, or a downright lie? (§1622)
3. What would happen to you, or me, if we lied, misspoke, or misrepresented, any material matter, as they did at the hearing?

So, being a nation of laws, or so we are told, we can revisit the words of James Madison, in Federalist #62, when he said, “Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?”

If it is to be known, is it to be known in the language we all understand, or a cryptic language, lacking logic, where the government can change “in or affecting commerce” to the “commerce” of illegal entry and smuggling.

If the federal government recognizes Texas law, if someone is in his house, does not Texas law apply equally throughout Texas, unless the person is on federal land, having jurisdiction ceded by the state?

And, can the (public) servants lie to the master (people), with impunity, and the master be held to the rigid interpretation and application of the law, if he “lies, misspeaks, or misrepresents”?

The British, after the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown, played an old tune, “The World Turned Upside Down”. It appears that the people need to begin playing that same tune.

Camp Lone Star – Act III – A Kangaroo Court
Scene 3 – The Patriot Community

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
June 29, 2015

I suppose that it would be best to start out with a confession. Back in 1966, I smoked my first marijuana. I was on R&R in Nha Trang, Vietnam and staying in a hotel on the American side of the city. As I understand it, part of the city was for R&R for us, and the other part (a no go zone) was used by the Vietcong for R&R.

I had checked into the hotel and was going up to my room when I met three guys that were part of a LRRP (Long Range Recon Patrol). We got talking and they invited me into their room to share a Park Lane ‘cigarette’. They did explain that it was not a tobacco cigarette, rather, some of Vietnam’s finest. I have to say, it was very fine, and began leading me down the path…

Upon my return to the states, I found that all of my high school buddies, well, most of them, chose to smoke a joint from time to time. I found myself no different from those “most”, and continued using ‘pot’ to relax, after a hard day’s work, for many years.

In March 1993, I went to Waco, Texas and began my career of writing about the “Misdeeds of Government” –when the guns are pointed in the wrong direction. When I returned to Florida, I realized that if I was to continue what I was doing, it would be wise to provide the government no “handles” with which to grab me, charge me, and then throw me in prison. Back then, two years for possession was about the minimum –but, the world has changed.

So, why do I even mention this? Well, it is foundational to the question I am going to ask:

Does my smoking pot, from time to time, have any effect on the relevance of my writing, what I write about, or any other aspect of what sense you had of me before I made this confession?

My guess is that you will say “no”, though in the back of your mind, you will, as you do when you see a cop behind you, have a slightly tinged opinion of Gary Hunt. But, that’s okay, so long as you keep reading and learning from what I write.

Now, let’s look at our history. Granted, I am older. When I went to school, we looked up to George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, et al, and venerated them. They were the source from which this then great nation emerged.

A few decades ago, I cannot say where it sprang from; it became popular to denigrate those heroes of the Revolution and the creation of OUR country. Both were slaveholders (a practice acceptable throughout most of the world, at the time), so that was a chink in their armor. Schools picked up the banner and lessened the sanctity of our history. Then, to compound matters, the claim that Jefferson fathered children through Sally Henning was foisted upon us. No tangible proof, since the DNA models lead to Jefferson, though equally, to his father, who was known to, well, take advantage of his slaves. But, heck, let’s hang it on Thomas, since we need to establish a foundation for denigrating those we once revered.

However, when we do so, by association, we also denigrate our own heritage and culture. We assign “guilt by association”, of both other individuals who did not object, at the time, and to the by-product of their efforts, the Constitution and the United States of America.

Today, we have a concept that covers this sort of subtle manipulation of our thought process. It is called “political correctness”.

However, most will say that they will not fall into that trap. They believe that they are immune to its effects. At the same time, they call a homosexual a “gay person” rather than a “queer” or “faggot” (See Freedom of Speech). But, they simply do not realize that they have been manipulated into restricting their own thought process by submission to subliminal suggestions.

Let’s look at three fairly recent events in which we can see how this comes into play. First is David Stone’s Hutaree Militia. Mainstream Media (MSM) told us that the Hutaree were going to set up and kill cops. There was a rush to distance ourselves from any association with, or support for, the Hutaree, since they were going to do something bad. However, nearly a year later, the judge in the case dismissed it as there was nothing sufficient to even suggest that what we had been told was true (See Thought Crimes). The Hutaree Militia will forever be stigmatized by the unfounded accusation made upon them.

Next, we can look at a more recent and well-known event, when hundreds of militia members went to Nevada to protect a rancher and his cattle. The initial call was put out by Operation Mutual Aid (OMA), and was headed up by Ryan Payne. The wide variety of individuals who showed up created a bit of a nightmare, as far as keeping things organized enough to be able to respond, after nearly a week, and force the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to leave, with their tails between their legs. Most of the cattle were recovered, and now, a year later, the Bundys continue to graze their cattle where they had for decades. However, immediately after the event on April 12, the “Unrustling” of the cattle, attacks were made on Ryan Payne, accusing him of claiming to be, in military service, what he was not — stolen valor. The claims have yet to be substantiated (See Stealing Valor), though the vestiges of those claims still linger. Payne has stepped aside from the patriot community because of the unfounded accusations.

Before we look at a current situation that warrants our attention, let’s go back about twenty years. Someone who had gone to Waco and seen, first hand, what was going on — unlike most, not seeing only what MSM wanted us to see, struck back at government by doing what our own government does in other countries, blowing up a government building. MSM played up the death of some children, ignoring that the Government Accounting Office had recommended the removal of the day care center nearly a year before the bombing.

Most of the patriot community still speaks poorly of Timothy McVeigh. They tend to ignore the fact that just two years early, the government burned to death over twenty children who were not placed in the care of others, but stayed at home and in their church, when they were killed. The general outrage over what the government did pales in comparison with the way that most people look at McVeigh — who simply did what others had talked about, and, in the current light, are talking about, again — attacking government buildings.

I have always taken the position that I applaud McVeigh for having the courage to attack a government building, as he did (Why I bombed the Murrah Federal Building). I cannot take that away from him. However, I do know that if it were my mission, I would not have done it the same way.

So, why is it that we hold our own, or fellow patriots, to a higher standard than we do the government? Why is it that if a patriot, who has done good is found to have a blemish, either real or concocted, all of the good that he may have done is obscured by the often minor, but always initiated by the government and/or MSM, human acts that can be criticized?

Before I get to the point of this article, let me demonstrate the effect of the stigmatization, by association, when one is not “politically correct” in the patriot community.

For a while, now, every one of my articles was reposted on two blogs, both being of the patriotic nature. The both mail out lists of articles, and show my articles on their web pages — or, they did. After the first article in which I mentioned the KC Massey had smoked a joint, they stopped posting any of my articles, even one that was not related to Massey, at all. It appears that my reporting the truth was enough to get me “banned” by those who had, previously, though my articles worthy of their time and consideration.

In another example, there was a Facebook page, with about 500 followers, that was very supportive of Massey — until the smoking of the joint was published. They have decided, as a group, that they can no longer associate themselves with Massey, and have withdrawn their support.

Ironically, a news page that is about the closest I will ever get to MSM, and would probably associate more with the Tea Party crowd, has continued to post my articles. Apparently, they have overcome “political correctness”.

Now, I can only surmise why those mentioned have chosen to discontinue posting my articles. I can attribute an explanation of what may be the cause, based upon some conversations with friends who have objected to Massey’s “indiscretion”. They dwell on Massey, not the punitive system that was described in my last article, Act III – A Kangaroo Court – Scene 2 – Presumption of Guilt. The focus, as MSM has directed us, is to demean those who have done well rather than looking at the government, or the fact that we are all human. We have succumbed to that political correctness and attack those who have shown the potential, having the ultimate effect of discouraging them from participating, where they once stood out.

Ryan Payne is probably the best example of this. Though the “blemish” was based upon unsubstantiated allegations, it made him shy away from participation. We have lost a potential leader in what is to come. Massey, too, seems to have lost his enthusiasm, since he has found that the support for his efforts has diminished the only reward he received from his efforts, the approbation for what he had accomplished. He is now looked down upon by many who have allowed the blemish to override his accomplishments.

So, we blame someone for smoking a joint, because it is against the law, though we do not damn those who might be on psychotropic drugs, because they are legal — at least, not until he shoots up a schoolhouse. And, in so doing, we end up shooting ourselves in the foot.

What we have accomplished is to discourage those who might be leaders in the coming battles from even taking a role that, though it might make them champions, might also lead to them being treated as a pariah. It has become an incentive to avoid acting, rather than acting, as the risk of condemnation increases, proportionate to the effort exerted.

Quite simply, for us to abandon those who have put out the effort, simply because of a trivial blemish, plays right into the hands of the opposition. If we denigrate those who can lead us, we eliminate that leadership before it even begins, and we are left with nothing — for we have destroyed ourselves, in our own eyes, saving the enemy the task of undermining any effort of significance in achieving our objective.

Camp Lone Star – Act III – A Kangaroo Court
Scene 2 – Presumption of Guilt

Massey’s own little Dungeon

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
June 25, 2015

We will begin with three definitions. The first is an amendment to the Constitution, that being limitations imposed upon the federal government and for the securing of our rights, as understood by the Framers of the Constitution, and, which are our birthright.

The second, the legal definition of one of the terms of that amendment, included to clarify that term.

The third, the description of what is known as a Kangaroo Court. As you read the following, you will see that all three of the definitions provided for such a Court are applicable in the case against K.C. Massey.

8th Amendment
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Bail [Black’s Law Dictionary – 5th Edition]
The Surety or sureties who procure the release of a person under arrest, by becoming responsible for his appearance at the time and place designated.

Kangaroo Court
1: a mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded or perverted
2: a court characterized by irresponsible, unauthorized, or irregular status or procedures
3: judgment or punishment given outside of legal procedure
(Merriam Webster)

In a previous article, Cruel and Unusual Punishments – Before Conviction, the conditions of release according to the Appearance Bond, were discussed. There were a number of conditions set, though the first three predicate the whole of the “Bond” that he was subject to. Those three were:

To appear for court proceedings

If convicted, to surrender to serve a sentence that the court may impose

To comply with all conditions set forth in the Order Setting Conditions of Release.

Now, based upon the definition of “bail” and the prohibition against “excessive bail”, when we look at the conditions, is it possible that the third condition, “to comply…”, might be deemed “excessive”, in that it goes beyond a requirement to appear, as per the definition, and the intent of the Bill of Rights?

Now, heed what we are discussing, for every patriot knows that he stands for the Constitution, and in so doing may be placing himself in a situation where he might find that he is charged and arrested for some made up crime.

However, since the government holds the guns, if Massey wanted to stay out of jail, pending trial, which he was more than willing to stand for, he would have to agree to the conditions.

The day that Massey was arrested, they did a UA (Urine Analysis) and find THC (from marijuana) in his test. So, they filled out the conditions as they would for someone charged with selling drugs, requiring random UA testing. Well, THC stays in your system for weeks, or longer. So, a scheduled test would have been sufficient to determine if he had not broken the law by using marijuana, since there is no federal law against use of marijuana. The random aspect of testing was detrimental to another condition, that he be gainfully employed, since he could be called from work to report for the UA, at any time, disrupting his reliability at work.

Massey agreed to the terms on November 3, 2014. He first refused the UA test in May 2015. He had gone over six months with absolute compliance with the conditions, even though he knew that they were unconstitutional. However, since half a year does not cut it for a speedy trial, and the confinement to home, not even allowed to maintain his property away from the immediate vicinity of the house, without prior permission from the Probation Officer (he is not on probation, he only, constitutionally, has to appear in court), and finding that when he was supposed to drive the ninety miles to Dallas for the UA, broke down, and refused the UA. Since he had taken that step, he continued to refuse subsequent calls for a UA.

That is until his next court appearance. Knowing that he would probably not pass the UA that he knew they would require when he arrived for the June 2 hearing, but he went to court, as required by the Constitution and the Conditions.

Now, the punishment that he received, prior to that June 10 hearing was bad enough. He was not a free, innocent man, until proven guilty. He was subject to conditions that were slightly less than if he had been in jail. He had such a limited amount of freedom that it could, nowise, be considered such.

Since he failed the UA on the 10th, he was sent to jail in the custody of the Brownsville Sheriff, though the contract with the federal government put him under the authority of the U. S. Marshall Service. The Marshall Service decided the Massey should be in Maximum Security. They have also imposed other conditions and restrictions that, along with general jail procedures, have imposed the following on Massey:

• His cell (sketch, above) is about 7′ by 10 feet, and includes bed, toilet, shower and table.
• He has only had only two 1-hour recreation periods since he has been in jail (three weeks).
• When he leaves the cell, for any reason, he first puts his hands through the food port and they are handcuffed. Then he is allowed out and told to face the wall while shackles are placed on his ankles and a chain around his waist. Then, he is handcuffed to the waist chain — yes, two bracelets on each hand.
• When he is out of his cell, he is always escorted by three guards, and the hallways are cleared before he can enter a hallway. One of the guards is constantly videotaping the procession.
• There is one window, in the cell door. That is where food is fed to the “animals”. It has a magnetic cover and is only open, with few exceptions, when they want to talk with him, pass food, or deliver the telephone to him so that he can make phone calls.
• Some guards will leave the door window cover off, at night, when the lights are dimmed, so they can do bed checks, about hourly. Other guards prefer to open the window, bang on the door, and make a lot of noise, then shine a flashlight in to see if he is there, and probably to make sure he is awake, every hour, during their shift.
• His cell walls are painted white, and the only constant sound is the whistling of the air-conditioning blowing into the call, keeping the temperature in the sixties. He only has one blanket.

As far as personal attention to his needs, he has gotten the many food gifts that were sent to him. He has had health problems. At one doctor call, he was found to have blood and high protein levels in his urine. For this, the doctor prescribed antibiotics. He tried them for three days and his stomach reacted, giving him pain, so he stopped taking the antibiotics. They have reported him for refusing to take his medicine, though they have not reported why he has refused it.

• He has a preexisting water on the knee problem that he has always treated with exercise, which provides relief.
• He has a pre-existing case of shingles, for which they have given him Triamcinolone, and he has had some relief.
• They had given him one Ibuprofen per day, taken in the presence of the guards, though he has had to quit taking them as it exacerbated the kidney problem.
• He has pain in his kidney, and, hopefully, will receive some treatment for that when he sees the doctor, again. He had been dealing with the kidney problem with exercise, to the point of perspiration to remove toxins, and cranberry juice. However, it is difficult to perspire in such a confined space with temperatures in to sixties.

If Massey is convicted, he will no longer be under the authority of the U. S. Marshall Service, but will be under Bureau of Prisons. At that point, being convicted, his living conditions will be far better than what he is currently enduring, and he will have regular exercise and will be able to seek necessary medical attention, without the constraints that are currently imposed upon him.

It appears that, perhaps, the government has taken the 8th Amendment literally, as it implies that once you are convicted, you can not be subjected to “cruel and unusual punishment”. It fails to prohibit cruel and unusual punishment prior to conviction, and, clearly, that is what Massey has been subjected to since his first arrest.

As far as “excessive bail”, the Conditions of Release were for an unsecured bond of $30,000. Whether that might be considered excessive, or not, is subjective, but let’s assume that it is not for the sake of discussion. If we assume that to be the point that anything over it would be excessive, then the conditions would, without a doubt, qualify as EXCESSIVE, and they go well beyond the simple historical concept of assuring that one be present in court, when required to.

As far as the Kangaroo Court, there is no doubt that “the principles of law and justice are disregarded or perverted“, and that this is “characterized by irresponsible, unauthorized, or irregular status or procedures“, and, finally, that “punishment [is] given outside of legal procedure“.

Quite simply put, some of the conditions that have been imposed upon Massey are outside of the constitutional framework created by the Founders, and some equate more toward medieval dungeon techniques resorted to by kings, tyrants, dictators, and other despots.

If we consider that if he is convicted of a crime, his conditions will improve, considerably, then we must also conclude that the justice system is based more upon punishment for Presumption of Guilt than upon any sense of justice.

Camp Lone Star – Act III – A Kangaroo Court
Scene 1 – How Case Law Subverts the Constitution

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
June 8, 2015

Kangaroo Court
1: a mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded or perverted
2: a court characterized by irresponsible, unauthorized, or irregular status or procedures
3: judgment or punishment given outside of legal procedure
(Merriam Webster)

In a recent article, “Government Enforces Their Laws – Who Shall Enforce the Constitution?“, I raise a question that is now worthy of our consideration. If we want our birthright of Constitutional Government, as envisioned by the Founders, we cannot rely upon government for interpretation those laws passed which are applied contrary to the Constitution.

To quote Teddy Roosevelt, with regard to the “case law method”, “some of the teaching of the law books and of the classroom seemed to me to be against justice… we are concerned with [the] question of what law is, not what it ought to be.”

In my Constitution, government was granted powers and authorities, and had limitations imposed upon it. Here, we will deal with some authorities granted and some limitations imposed. And, we, as Americans concerned about our country and our posterity find that we are in a situation similar to that which the Founders recognized, 240 years ago. And, we, like they, must weigh, very carefully, the extent of encroachments into our rights and our lives, as they did, then.

On April 17, 2015, the final pre-trial motions were submitted to the Court. The Court has taken 7 weeks to prepare a Memorandum Opinion and Order, to address the argument presented to the Court by Massey’s attorney.

Rather than outright denying the motions, the extended interval tended to support the probability of a well-crafted reply, granting the motions and dismissing charges against Massey. I don’t doubt that, somewhere, that well crafted order still exists, though it has been replaced by a rather poorly crafted order, which will be the subject of this article, and was substituted solely because Massey created a situation in which the Judge, for reasons that many will not understand, chose not to pursue justice in that it would reflect on him as supporting someone who could not keep his promise — his agreement with the Court.

Honor, one’s word being good, is an important part of life. Massey, regardless of why, gave his word that he would not partake of any illegal substances — as a condition of his “home detention” (See Cruel and Unusual Punishments – Before Conviction) — rather than remaining in jail awaiting trial.

The dilemma this created for Judge Hanen is that he would be challenging the status quo by granting the motion, undermining the very strength of the federal “Felon in Possession” law, and putting it back in proper perspective with those limitations imposed by the Constitution. This would leave those in government who support the improper interpretation in a position to accuse Hanen of siding with a man lacking honor and unable to abide by an agreement that he willingly made as a condition of his pre-trial release.

We must put ourselves in a position to understand that this apparently minor infraction would probably have similar consequences, or at least should have them, within our own community. Suppose you supported someone whom you had faith in to a position of chairman, or some other leadership role, within your organization. Suppose, then, he gave his word to abide by a promise that he had made, and then broke that promise. Would you continue to support him in the office that he held? This is what the politicians do, and this is an intolerable situation — it cannot be supported, if we stand behind our belief that honor and trust are necessary elements of leadership.

This is similar to the situation in which Judge Hanen finds himself. If he was willing to challenge the system and return to a proper interpretation of the law, it could be career ending decision, and could subject him to ridicule by others in government, including some of his peers on the federal benches. For him to take upon himself that responsibility, he would have to know that the person he was supporting by his actions was one as honorable as the Judge would be, in standing for justice. This is typical “office politics” and is true in business and the patriot community, as well. Violate the trust and you lose support.

So, let’s look at the “Memorandum Opinion and Order” that denied the Motions to Dismiss the Indictment (there were two of them: Motion to Dismiss Indictment, and First Supplement to Opposed Motion to Dismiss Indictment).

The Order begins with a misrepresentation that sets an erroneous foundation for what follows in the three “arguments” that the court offers, when it says:

As detailed below, Massey’s Motion to Dismiss focuses on the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 922(g), which makes it a crime for a person who has previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year “to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment.

First, he implies that the entire question rests on “the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 922(g)“. Though challenges to constitutionality were made, there was an even stronger argument made with regard to the grammatical context of the statute, which, if correct, would allow other aspects of the law to fit, neatly, into earlier Congressional interpretations of the extent of the “commerce clause”. This will be addressed in the third point.

1. Second Amendment Argument:

Massey’s argument relies heavily on District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), which upheld the right of people to have firearms for their personal protection. He argues that, among others, you do not lose your right to freedom of speech for being a convicted felon, so you cannot lose, forever, your right to keep and bear arms. Perhaps, unfortunately, the argument did not bring up the fact that 10 U.S.C. § 311 does exclude some from being members of the militia, though “felons” are not among those exclusions, which is a direct contradiction of the felon in possession statute, as applied.

The Court then argues that Heller did not address the felon aspect, He does point out that the court has set up the “scrutiny” to be applied in weighing whether a statute unfairly limits the “not infringe” (my words) provision of the Second Amendment, but rather than compare it to real world, he simply builds upon case law, redefining the Constitution, one case at a time.

In the dismissing nature of the current judicial system, he says:

The Second Amendment, at its core, protects “law-abiding” citizens. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. It is clear that convicted felons are not such citizens and thus fall outside of the Second Amendment’s protection. Accordingly, the Court need not consider the second inquiry because Section 922(g)(1) does not burden conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment.

So, unlike Texas, that being the location of the private property in which the alleged crime (possession) was committed, he determines that the rehabilitation program, under the various penal systems, cannot achieve its stated goal of rehabilitation, during the course of one’s life. In direct contravention of that “philosophy”, we have the opportunity to look at Massey’s life, since that rehabilitation, in “Who is K. C. Massey?“. What he does not address is the question of jurisdiction. If the “crime” was committed on private property (affirmed, in the next argument), is it constitutional to supersede Texas law absent an act that was committed on public lands? This doesn’t address an even more serious breach of jurisdictional limitations, which is quiet apparent in Massey’s case, as Massey was absolutely sure that they were on private land, with permission of the owner, to protect the owner’s property.

2. Equal Protection Clause Argument:

This argument, in the Order, addresses only that challenge brought up in the first of Massey’s Motions. It is, perhaps, inserted here to avoid addressing the ramifications of the subsequent challenge to “equal protection” brought up in the second Motion — a legal sleight of hand.

Hanen, in citing a previous decision, says, “a law is subject to strict scrutiny review in the face of an equal protection challenge only if (1) there is a fundamental right affected or (2) the law targets a suspect class. He continues, “does not impermissibly impinge upon a right protected by the Second Amendment because it regulates conduct that falls outside the scope of the Amendment’s guarantee.”

So, let’s look, first, at (1), where the law in question, “felon in possession, affects the Second Amendment. As mentioned above, 10 U.S.C. § 311 is the codification of the Second Amendment. That statute has a solidly placed foundation in the Constitution, as it clearly defines what at least the one provision of the Second is the militia. It makes exception for some, as far as being, without question, in the militia, though “felons”, or any descriptor that would imply such, is not exclude from the mandatory inclusion in the militia.

Now, let’s look at (2), whether it targets a “suspect class”. Here, we enter more into the First Supplement (the second motion to dismiss the indictment), though Hanen refused to address that part of that motion. If it refused people in one state, merely because they lived in that state, and approved those in another state, simply because they lived in that state, would they not be creating a “suspect class” of those who lived in one of the “refused” states? Quite simply, living in one state makes you a “suspect”, while living in another allows you all of the privileges of firearms possession and ownership. So, if we consider the asserted Second Amendment right, including the codification, and compare that to the “commerce clause”, what do we come up with?

Back in 1934, the Congress enacted the first firearms control act. The concern was expressed in the record (Congressional Record, reference: keep and bear arms, pg 42 “}, which says:

Mr. FREDERICK. That takes me into the purposes of this bill. This bill, as I see it, is intended to be a bill for the suppression of crime and is proposed to the United States Congress which ordinarily has no power in such matters, under the guise of a revenue raising bill.

So, we have, “which ordinarily has no power in such matters, under the guise of a revenue bill”. Now, they were using the commerce clause, as that original acts required that interstate commerce be involved. However, since they had no power to “suppress crime”, they used their power to tax (“revenue raising bill”), to both fund and track firearms. That was the only way that they could mount a challenge to the Second Amendment — by taxing, not by criminal charges, unless the tax was ignored. That was what the Constitution, even loosely construed in the act, allowed. There are no amendments that would extend that authority beyond what existed in 1934 — except the machinations of “case law”, which disregards the Constitution if one can manipulate the words of a previous decision to extend government authority where it had no constitutional authority to go. This is precisely why I suggest that we, the People, need to interpret Our Constitution, as the government is intent upon subverting it.

3. Commerce Clause Challenge:

Now, let’s look at the statute, in detail:

18 USC 922

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person –

(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

There are two key elements that we need to consider. First, “possess in or affecting commerce“. “In” is easily understood. That would clearly be in the act of shipping or transporting. “Affecting”, while that would mean that the possession affected, had an effect on, the transporting.

Here, the Judge cites United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1996), which says that the “in or affecting commerce’ element can be satisfied if the firearm possessed by a convicted felon had previously traveled in interstate commerce.” Damn, I need to return to school and take English Grammar all over, again. I cannot draw the same conclusion that the Court did in Rawls, though apparently, Judge Hanen apparently, can make that broad leap — away from the Constitution and into the lap of a government that wants to have absolute control over every aspect of our lives (Hint: That was once known as slavery). So, in a sense, the wording from Rawls rewrites the wording of the statute (922 (g)(1)) into something that is not written as law, rather, is interpreted into something that is not written in law, thereby making it law because the judges of the Fifth Circuit wanted it to be; not what it was intended to be when passed into law (or regulation). It is bad enough when the Congress can go from taxing to criminalization, however, when they allow the Courts to go even further and make something that does not exist, and then they can be described as nothing less than a Kangaroo Court.

But, wait, we’re not done, yet. That second part of the statute states, “to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate… commerce“, was discussed in A Favorable Ruling?. This, too, stretches our comprehension of the English Language. Here is how it is presented in Massey’s motion:

The word “has”, as opposed to the word “had” was used in the statute. “Has” is the third person singular, present indicative, verb meaning active in the action just completed, where “had” is past tense and participle of the verb have, meaning in a previous situation. So, if one were the direct recipient, then the word “has” would be appropriate. However, if it were expansive, intended to include any firearm shipped in interstate commerce, then “had” would be the proper verb. The use of “had” would have meant to include any and all that “had” been so transported any time prior.

That cannot be too difficult to understand, unless they teach a different grammar in law school, or have judicial indoctrination classes that they have not told us about. It has to do with tense. So, who is to interpret the laws? Will it be the government? Or, will it be we, the People, who have a vested interest in the laws of this nation, and, more importantly, in the Constitution that created that government that is now ignoring that document to increase their power over our very lives?

The Order says, “The Indictment, in all four counts, charges that Massey “did knowingly possess in and affecting interstate commerce a firearm . . . said firearm having been shipped in interstate commerce.” Now, the wording of the statute has been conveniently rearranged as it was presented to the Grand Jury that issued the Indictment. If that Grand Jury accepts that the wording of a law (statute) is what they are told, and probably in writing, how are they to know that it differs from the law that they are asked to weigh against Massey’s actions? If they did choose to question the wording, I’m sure that the US Attorney would explain to them that he, being a lawyer, has said that “this is what the law is, and, if Massey is in violation of this law, as I present it to you, you must come back with an Indictment”.

Let’s compare the wording from the Indictment

… did knowingly possess in and affecting interstate commerce a firearm . . . said firearm having been shipped in interstate commerce.

And the statute:

… to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

Darn look at that. They have introduced another verb, “having”.

“Had” and “having” are both past tense, as described in the First Supplement. However, “has”, is present tense (present indicative). So, the statute says “has”, while the proper verb should have been “had”, if what the government claims was intended was really intended when the statute was written. However, the Grand Jury was led to believe the even more broadly expressed “having”, which is very inclusive.

Has – present 3d singular of have
Had – past and past participle of have
Having – To be in possession of already

So, do we allow the government to redefine words so that they can imprison those that they want to punish? Or, do we decide that you don’t have to be a lawyer, or a judge, to understand the Constitution and the statutes alleged to be written in “Pursuance” to the Constitution?

Here is what James Madison said regarding laws:

It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is today, can guess what it will be tomorrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?

They will be “incoherent” if the Courts use a different language than the People. We cannot know what the law is, today, if that law is not based upon the language that we understand. The law is little known and less fixed when previous decisions of the courts have redefined the words, moving slowly but steadily away from the Constitution, for it is unfixed with subsequent decisions, and little known unless we make a daily habit of reading what the courts have done to both our language and the Constitution.

There is even more that troubles the patriot’s heart, and you will find those points highlighted in the linked Order. Suffice to say that if we fit the analogy of frogs in the water approaching its boiling point, we have, so far complained of the rising temperature, have failed to get out of the water.