Outpost of Freedom blog

Camp Lone Star — Down to the Wire

Ninth Amendment Rights

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
September 27, 2015

As was explained in “The King Can Do No Wrong, or Can He?“, Massey’s attorney had brought two matters up in his Second Motion to Dismiss Indictment. They were the Tenth Amendment and Intrastate v. Interstate commerce. The government, through their apparently novice attorney, Corley, argued that Massey did not have standing to challenge the government’s prosecution of him (sort of a “bend over, we will take care of everything” mentality).

This past Wednesday (September 23rd), Judge Andrew Hanen filed his Opinion and Order, addressing all three of the sought actions.

First, he addressed the government’s, stating that “Massey makes a… claim – that § 922(g)(1), as applied to him, impermissibly regulates intrastate activity. Therefore, he has standing to challenge § 922(g)(1).” So, we have dispensed with the government’s feeble effort to claim that Massey had n standing to challenge the government’s interpretation of the law he was charged with violating..

Next, he addresses the Tenth Amendment claim. Unfortunately, being a District Court, the Judge is bound by previous decisions of the Fifth Circuit, to which it is subordinate. Justice, perhaps not, but still the rules of the corrupt game for what passes for justice, in these times.

However the final ruling, this one has, apparently, not been addressed by the Fifth Circuit, at least to the extent that Massey’s attorney, Louis Sorola, has taken it. In what Hanen has described as “The Purely Intrastate Claim”, he states:

“Since the Government bears the burden of proving this element, and since the trial has yet to be held, the facts upon which Massey’s claim stands have not yet been established one way or the other. Until evidence has been presented, the Court is unable to evaluate this claim.”

“Therefore this argument is denied without prejudice because it is not yet ripe. Massey may reassert it at trial should he conclude that the evidence supports this claim.”

So, it appears that Judge Hanen is willing to venture into a substantive argument with regard to the difference between Interstate and Intrastate commerce. He has also placed the burden on the government to prove its jurisdiction. This leads us to review some things that have been brought up in discussion, though, perhaps, not in Court. We will revisit a previous article, “Massey is Protected by State Law” to put this argument before the people, if not the Court.

To begin with, the State of Texas has granted authority for federal agents certain powers with the enactment of Texas Penal Code, Art. 2.122. SPECIAL INVESTIGATORS. From that law (pertinent portions only):

(a) The following named criminal investigators of the United States shall not be deemed peace officers, but shall have the powers of arrest, search, and seizure under the laws of this state as to felony offenses only:

(1) Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(3) Special Agents of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement;

(4) Special Agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives;

(9) Marshals and Deputy Marshals of the United States Marshals Service;

 (c) A Customs and Border Protection Officer or Border Patrol Agent of the United States Customs and Border Protection or an immigration enforcement agent or deportation officer of the Department of Homeland Security is not a peace officer under the laws of this state but, on the premises of a port facility designated by the commissioner of the United States Customs and Border Protection as a port of entry for arrival in the United States by land transportation from the United Mexican States into the State of Texas or at a permanent established border patrol traffic check point, has the authority to detain a person pending transfer without unnecessary delay to a peace officer if the agent or officer has probable cause to believe that the person has engaged in conduct that is a violation of Section 49.02, 49.04, 49.07, or 49.08, Penal Code, regardless of whether the violation may be disposed of in a criminal proceeding or a juvenile justice proceeding.

So, the extent of the authority to arrest, which would also include detaining a person, is only “the powers of arrest and search and seizure as to any offense under the laws of this state [Texas].”

Though the Tenth Amendment argument has been denied, there can be little doubt that the above enactment, by the State of Texas, is an assertion of the State’s rights (not the individual’s right, as per denied motion) to limit federal authority within the State.

So, it would be rather interesting to discover if the government’s witnesses are aware of this grant of authority, and the limitations imposed upon them, by Article 2.122. If they are not, was the government remiss in advising them, or did the government hope that they would assert authority not granted to them so that the federal government would have a broad reign over activities within the State, in the hope that case law would help affirm authority beyond that which was left to them by the State grant?

So, if the federal authority is limited by “any offense under the laws of this state”, they exceeded their authority by the detention of people who were not witness to any crime that might have been a felony under state law, and the only possible violation of that law was committed by the BPS shooter, and, perhaps even those who illegally detained (kidnapped) Massey and Varner.

Let’s revisit state law regarding firearms. From Texas Penal Code Section 46.04 Unlawful Possession of Firearm

(a) A person who has been convicted of a felony commits an offense if he possess a firearm:

(1) After conviction and before the fifth anniversary of the persons release from confinement following conviction of the felony or the person’s release from supervision under community supervision, parole, or mandatory supervision, whichever date is later; or
(2) After the period described by Subdivision (1), at any location other than the premises at which the person lives.

So, this law makes it illegal to possess “at any location other than the premise”. However, apparently exception was made in another provision, Texas Penal Code, Sec. 46.02. UNLAWFUL CARRYING WEAPONS (again, pertinent portions):

(a-2) For purposes of this section, “premises” includes real property and a recreational vehicle that is being used as living quarters, regardless of whether that use is temporary or permanent. In this subsection, “recreational vehicle” means a motor vehicle primarily designed as temporary living quarters or a vehicle that contains temporary living quarters and is designed to be towed by a motor vehicle. The term includes a travel trailer, camping trailer, truck camper, motor home, and horse trailer with living quarters.

(a-3) For purposes of this section, “watercraft” means any boat, motorboat, vessel, or personal watercraft, other than a seaplane on water, used or capable of being used for transportation on water.

(b) Except as provided by Subsection (c), an offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

(c) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree if the offense is committed on any premises licensed or issued a permit by this state for the sale of alcoholic beverages.

Since Massey is no longer prohibited from possessing a weapon, and where we have a definition of “premises” (re: 46.04) and the ability to transport a weapon, then it is clear that Massey was not in violation of state law, and if in violation, it would only be a misdemeanor, unless he was in a place that sold alcoholic beverages, then clearly the state has no objection to his possession of a firearm under the circumstances surrounding Massey, throughout this entire ordeal.

Now, the enumerated right is the right to keep and bear arms. The government argues that 18 USC 922(g)(1) includes any firearm that is:

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person –

(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

Intrastate Commerce

Now, let’s look at how 18 US Code defines “interstate commerce”:

18 U.S.C. § 921 : US Code – Section 921: Definitions

(a) As used in this chapter –

(2) The term “interstate or foreign commerce” includes commerce between any place in a State and any place outside of that State, or within any possession of the United States (not including the Canal Zone) or the District of Columbia, but such term does not include commerce between places within the same State but through any place outside of that State…

However, I find no definition of “Commerce” in 18 US Code, so we will look at the legal authority, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Edition):

“The exchange of goods, productions, or property of any kind; the buying, selling, and exchange of articles…”

So, commerce is the exchange of goods, barter, sale, trade, or any other means, to be “in and affecting commerce” would require that one be involved in such a transaction.

Defining that even further, we have “interstate or foreign commerce” specifically excluding “intrastate” commerce, to wit:

“but such term does not include commerce between places within the same State but through any place outside of that State”

So, if Massey had purchased (commerce) a firearm within the state, it would take a real stretch to include “interstate”. However, Massey never purchased (commerce) any firearm, he merely possessed a firearm. Even if Massey had received it as a gift, it is inconceivable that this could create the necessary nexus to interstate commerce that the statute addresses. However, the government cannot even prove that he owns a firearm, and that is the burden that is placed upon them, by Hanen’s Opinion.

Now, that is twice removed from the apparent extent of the charges brought under 18 USC §922(g)(1). No interstate, and, no commerce.

Since the Fifth Circuit has ruled on the Tenth Amendment, and it is no longer a legal defense for Massey, it does not preclude the state from passing laws that are consistent with the Tenth Amendment, which, obviously, they have done.

So, let’s refer to this as the Ninth Amendment argument. The federal government has raised no objection to the state laws referred to above, so they must be constitutional. The Ninth Amendment reads:

“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”

The question is whether Massey has the right, under the Ninth Amendment, to possess a firearm, if he is totally in compliance with state law, and has not been involved in interstate commerce.

Terrorism? or, An Act of War?

The Oklahoma City Bombing

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 11, 1995 (republished August 4, 2015)

[Note: This article was written over twenty years ago. It is republished with minor revisions. You can probably, with your knowledge of recent events, supplement what has been presented.]

Dresden, Germany, February 1945 — A series of allied bombing raids resulted in virtual firestorms, nearly destroying this city, which dated from the early 13th century, along with many of its centuries old architectural landmarks. Over 135,000 people, the vast majority being women and children, died during these raids.

Japan, August 1945 — Hiroshima, Japan, three-fifths of the city destroyed, along with 75,000 people, mostly women and children. Just a few days later, another atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, destroying half the city and killing another 75,000 people, again, mostly women and children. These three events killed 285,000 people, yet they were acts of war, and were intended to end World War II.

During the “Vietnam War,” Haiphong, the major North Vietnamese city, was bombed over and over, and in 1972 the harbor was mined. Much of the city was destroyed and tens of thousands lost their lives. There was, however, no “declaration of war” to justify these acts, yet we perceive them to be Acts of War.

April 15, 1986, in a strategic operation, naval air forces attacked military targets in Tripoli, Libya. One of those targets was the home of Muammar Qaddafi. Hundreds were killed, yet no “declaration of war” had existed between the United States and Libya.

December 20, 1989, United States forces, under the operational name “Just Cause”, invaded Panama with the purported purpose of arresting Manuel Noriega on drug trafficking and money laundering charges. Hundreds died, and significant damage to the capital of Panama resulted. After trial, in December 1992, the federal judge from Miami ruled that Noriega was a “prisoner of war.”

On January 15, 1991, unified forces from 31 nations began a new form of warfare (without declaration) against Iraq. For five weeks smart missiles and smart bombs were directed against, the capital, Baghdad. Smart bombs were able to enter ventilation stacks of bomb shelters, killing women and children without destroying the shelter. Cruise missiles traveled hundreds of miles to explode close to their targets, killing tens of thousands of civilians in this new game of attrition. Never, however, a treaty of peace, for there was never a “declaration of war.”

These acts are not considered to be acts of “terrorism”, for they occurred during the course of a war. It is quite clear that during a war, acts, which might otherwise be considered below the dignity of man, can occur and be accepted as a consequence of war. If there is a war and thousands die, those deaths are written off as a consequence of war. Even without the accepted, and constitutionally required, declaration of war, war can be waged against innocent civilians with no effort made for discrimination of targets.

Since the “Declaration of War” has, apparently, become an unnecessary act; perhaps we can find a way of determining when a war exists by other means. In the Academic American Encyclopedia, under “court”, we find that, “Courts fulfill three important functions: (1) they resolve disputes that, while often routine, are crucial to those involved; (2) they provide protection from illegal actions by government and individuals; and (3) occasionally, they resolve disputes of great political and social significance.” Clearly, then under a normal circumstance, “protection from illegal acts by government” should leave the government open to be punished by the court. One can reasonably conclude that a state of war exists when government commits illegal acts against a people, with impunity.

No judicial process will hold the victors to task. Justice must be set aside during time of war, which is clearly affirmed in the Constitution (Article I, Section 9, clause 2, dealing with Habeas Corpus, and, Article V, Bill of Rights, dealing with exemption from Grand Jury process). So, perhaps, a state of war (since declarations have become a thing of the past) can best be determined by the fact that no trials are held to determine justice, or injustice, for the deaths that are a consequence of hostile action. How else, in this modern age, can the determination be made that a war even existed?

This being the case, perhaps we should look around and see if there are other wars going on, perhaps at this very moment. Maybe we should start back in August 1992. Hostilities broke out and, in the first incident, two “men” were killed. Hostilities ceased for a few days, but, then, another act of senseless murder occurred when Vicki Weaver stood in her doorway and was killed by a single sniper’s bullet. Well, this was clearly not a war since a trial was held. Unfortunately, even though three people were killed, no one was found guilty. This, then, must be a war, because war crimes trials were held, but the heinous offender could not be identified.

Just a few months later, another war began. This war lasted 51 days and the subsequent war crimes trials were held almost a year later. We know that this was a war because nine people were found guilty of killing (or other related acts of complicity) four men who were dressed and equipped as soldiers.

We can determine which side each side was on in these last two incidents by looking at a couple of factors. First was the uniform. One side chose black military uniforms, complete with web gear, automatic rifles, tanks, helicopters, grenades and other modern implements of war. The other side wore normal clothes — jeans, dresses, sneakers, etc., and used simple, legal weapons. They also sought refuge in their home and place of worship. The final indicator is that they fired only in self-defense. And, it must be war, since even the commanding general at the Justice Department in Washington, D.C. never described the acts of the enemy as terrorism.

On April 22, 1993, I left Waco, after 47 days, to return to Florida. I remember that I was somewhat dumbfounded by the events of April 19, and until I returned to Waco, in mid May, had not been able to sort out certain thoughts. When I returned to Waco, and finally stood on the concrete that was once the floor of the Mt. Carmel church, I looked around and saw partially burned remnants of utensils, clothes, books, letters, and toys, indicative of the lives once lived, and since lost, here. I recalled similar situations in Vietnam, and realized that a state of war existed here, in the United States of America. I realized that I was at war with the United States Government, but, that the war that I was in was still a “cold war”. Not so for those who died in those ashes, but for many, a state of war had begun.

After the Oklahoma City Bombing, we heard the battle cry come up from the side wearing black uniforms, “Terrorism,” they yell, over and over again. “Terrorism, it’s unfair, and they killed women and children. Terrorism, there is no other word for it.”

Many leaders who were on the side of the patriots also take up the battle cry. Many, who just a few years before, cried out that the surprise attacks by the Black uniformed soldiers were acts of war, now cry terrorism along with their enemies of the recent past. “Condemn them,” they yell. “Hang them after a quick and speedy trial. They are not warriors; they are cowards. Hang them, be done with them”. The cry came out from all those leaders who, so recently professed, to be on the side of the patriots.

Meanwhile, many who, just a few years before, had taken the battle cry of “Do whatever is necessary to end this mess,” are now questioning the fairness of the actions of the black uniforms, and beginning to understand why the poorly equipped soldiers of the other side have resorted to an act that cost 167 lives.

Perhaps it might be best to dispel the association of “baby killer” with the act that occurred in Oklahoma City. Since the sixties, the construction of federal buildings has been an “anti-terrorist” design. Since the bombing of Flight 103 (December 1988), we have been advised that federal buildings are potential targets of such bombings. As we learned from Waco, keeping your children in a location that has danger associated with it leaves the responsibility on the parent, not the aggressor. In fact, I never knew that there were day care centers in federal buildings. I supposed, prior to April 19, that the government had enough concern for children to move day care centers to a locations away from what it knew to be potential targets.

The determination of what constitutes an act of terrorism has to be defined by each of us, individually. It cannot be left to a government which controls the weapons of war, the streets, the language, and the press, to make that determination for us. If we allow this to happen, the stigma that will be placed on any act, whether it be the self-defensive actions against four BATF agents killed while assaulting a church in Texas, or a U. S. Marshall who has just killed a dog and a fourteen year old boy (Sammy Weaver), or bombing a federal building where people who chose to be employees of a government run amuck. We must resist succumbing to the need for approval by such controlling entities.

This leaves us, then, with the question:

Was this an Act of Terrorism? or, an Act of War?

Timothy McVeigh v. Lon Horiuchi

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
July 30, 2015

From time to time, on Internet radio shows or various discussions, I am accused of supporting Timothy McVeigh. This accusation has been leveled more frequently, of late, including from an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA), in opposition to a series of articles I have been writing.

This recent case, consistent with some of the previous accusations, are responses born of the inability of the other side to offer any viable refutation to arguments I have set forth. This is most commonly known as argumentum ad hominem. It is more accurately and understandably described as, ‘if you can’t counter the argument attack the messenger’.

First, understand what I have said –that has been converted to a simple and blanket “support for Timothy McVeigh”. I have always said that I am supportive of McVeigh’s motivation for bombing the Murrah Building. After all, for the two years since Waco, as I traveled the country, I heard many patriots say that we should bomb a government building. I still stand behind that, though I always qualify that support, explaining that if it were my job to do, I would have done it differently. I would have bombed the building at night. However, McVeigh had to make the call, as it was his mission. And, though little known, he did explain why he bombed it in the daytime. He offers his explanation in an article he wrote, “An Essay on Hypocrisy, by Tim McVeigh“, and goes into more detail in “Why I bombed the Murrah Federal Building“.

I have also written my assessment of McVeigh and the bombing in “The Passing of the Torch“.

This most recent accusation, from an AUSA, someone who is “supporting” the FBI in the case he is prosecuting, brings to mind a consideration of who he “supports”.

There was an FBI sniper present at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, in support of the government’s effort to put down a man, Randy Weaver, who had refused to turn informant for the government. This sniper, Lon Horiuchi, from just a few hundred feet away, managed to miss his claimed target and hit a mother, Vicki Weaver, holding her infant child in her arms, and killing her instantly. The Rules of Engagement, later determined to be unlawful, provided that snipers could shoot any male holding a firearm. Vicki was, without any doubt, not of the male sex — a fact easily determined through the sniper rifle scope.

RUBY RIDGE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, August 22, 1992
1) If any adult male is observed with a weapon prior to the announcement [of surrender], deadly force can and should be employed, if the shot can be taken without endangering any children.

Now, after the first murder by Horiuchi, the FBI continued to keep him on staff, an obvious act of support, and brought him to a scene where his skills could, again, be put to effective but illegal use. It was just a few months later that Sniper Horiuchi went to Waco, Texas, and participated in the killing of over 80 men, woman, and children, including one “coffin birth” and one unborn child.

Some were shot to death by sniper fire and others burned to death by fire started by the FBI or other government agents. (Note: Ron Cole and I found three sandbagged sniper positions, in May 1993.) However, he is assured a pension from his employment for the government, both military and FBI.

I am sure that the AUSA would support Lon Horiuchi, either tacitly, or openly, if asked to do so.

So, if I am to take sides in what is surely inevitable in this country, then I will be required to support either Lon Horiuchi, or, Timothy McVeigh. In weighing the intent behind the actions of both Horiuchi and McVeigh, I find that McVeigh did not specifically target children, while Horiuchi acted with depraved indifference to the presence of children, in both instances.

It is possible that the AUSA would never openly support Lon Horiuchi, though he will surely never damn him. The fact that Horiuchi is now comfortably retired lends credence to the supposition that both government agencies and personnel continue to overtly support Horiuchi.

I would like to extend my thanks to the AUSA for bring this subject to my attention. Absent his criticism, I might never have broached the subject.

Montana Malfeasance
Jesse Newsom and Writs of Assistance

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
July 22, 2015

There is little doubt that the government knew that Jesse Newsom was on the road when they chose to serve a search warrant, not on him but on the premise and a vehicle. This will be explained in a subsequent article dealing with his arrest.

Shawn Hill, Special (I always get a kick out of the adjective, as applied to FBI) Agent, out of the Kalispell FBI office, served the warrant on July 10, 2015. The Warrant, signed by Magistrate Judge John T. Johnston, United States District Court, District of Montana, is, as is common with federal warrants, incomplete. There are four check boxes on the form, none of which are checked. Rather, it leaves the discretion to the server of the warrant, much like the Writs of Assistance that James Otis spoke against, about 250 years ago, when the Writs were blanket authority to search wherever they wanted to, for whatever they wanted, and carried no requirement of specificity with regard to what they were looking for. The only difference between then and now is that, now, a judge has to sign the warrant, but that appears to be a “done deal” when the FBI requests a warrant.

The Warrant did have an “Attachment B”, but “Attachment A” was conspicuously missing. Presumably, Attachment A would have been the constitutionally required “Oath or affirmation” providing the “probable cause” deemed necessary to justify the issuance of the Warrant. The Amendment also states, “particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” This Amendment, in response to what the Writs of Assistance were, includes this provision to insure that the warrant is issued to seize only what is known to exist, hence the inclusion of “particularly describing” both place and objects to be seized.

The definition of “particularly” that the Framers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights would recognize can be found in Webster’s 1828 Dictionary. Here is what we find, “particularly – adv. Distinctly; singly.” So, now we can compare what was intended, at least as should be interpreted by both the People and the government, as to the wording in the warrant’s “Attachment B”. We’ll deal with just a couple of the items described to be seized, though you can review the wording of the Attachment and see that there are others that so general as to fall well outside the obvious intent of the Fourth Amendment. (image of Attachment B; text of Attachment B)

The first listed item is:

1. Any and all firearms, destructive device, or ammunition as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a), or any photographs of firearms or ammunition or of persons in possession of firearms or ammunition.

Now, the Constitution recognizes our right “to be confronted with the witnesses against[us]” (Sixth Amendment). What if that “witness” is our own camera, or pictures from friends? Is that a violation of the Fifth Amendment prohibition, “nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law“. And, what of the property that is not criminal in its nature; proof of a crime; or the proceeds of criminal activity? It is taken, as we will see, with a preposterous disregard for personal property rights — that which is supposed to be protected by the Constitution, and not to be taken just because they want to, well, fish.

Fish. Well, why would we use that word? Simply, the other item on the property to be seized raises no possible doubt that the government is “fishing”, an absolute contradiction to the intent of the Framers. From “Attachment B”:

9. Evidence of occupancy, control, or ownership of the property to be searched, including but not limited to, received mail, outgoing mail with a return address, concealed mail, deeds, leases, rental agreements, photographs, personal ledgers, utility and telephone bills, and statements, and identification documents.

I have emphasized some of the items, but to all of them, what possible motive could there be to seize any of the listed items? Are they checking to see if he has permission to live where he lives? Are the concerned that he might not be paying his bills? Why would they want to know who he corresponds with? Federal law prohibits the government from opening mail. Is there a loophole that states that mail is sacred while in the hands of government, but is no longer sacred after it is received, or before it is sent? I can’t find one.

So, now, we can look at what was actually seized and inventoried, during the search.

• item 5 – No trespassing sign
• item 6 – Belt buckle
• item 8 – Black binder [presumably with un-“described papers “contained in the binder]
• item 10 – Camo shirt
• item 11 – Camo hat
• item 13 – Northwestern Energy Bill [concerned about his power usage?]
• item 14 – Camo hat
• item 15 – Camo pants, shirt and belt
• item 16 – Camo Backpack
• item 22 – Rental agreement [are they making sure that he pays his rent?]
• item 23 – Conviction from Washington State
• item 24 – Camo patch
• item 25 – Boots
• item 29 – Camo Clothing
• item 30 – Camo Coat
• item 39 – Catalogs
• item 41 – Camo clothing w/ Newsome [sic] name
• item 49 – Misc. targets
• item 52 – Identification cards and Militia Emblem
• item 56 – 2 empty shotgun shells

Though the other items are related to firearms, ammunition, etc., we have to wonder what those listed, above, have to do with anything that would be evidence of a crime. Power bill and rental agreement, are, perhaps, the most far-fetched. Clothing, boots, binder of paperwork — what role can these play?

According to federal statutes, specifically, 10 U.S. Code §311, Jesse is a member of the United States Militia, by law. And, the statute, though it excludes certain people, does not exclude those convicted of a felony (yes, Jesse has been convicted of a felony, but that will be covered in a subsequent article). So, why would they take clothing and other objects associated with militia? It is their law that binds him to that obligation as United States Militia.

We can only hope that Jesse has some civilian clothes, so that he doesn’t have to run around naked. And, we can contemplate, since many of these items cannot be associated with criminal activity, in any way, that he has been denied his property, “without due process of law“.

Now, I used the term “fishing”, earlier. So, let’s continue the journey into the fishing elements of this story. First, we will consider Mr. “A”. Mr. “A” was contacted by cell phone, while the agents were still at Jesse’s house. Mr. “A” was in town, Great Falls, when he received the call. He agreed to meet them at Jesse’s home. They waited until he arrived and then Special (there we go, again) Agent Mark D. Seyler, out of Helena FBI office, asked him questions, as Mr. “A” told me, they already had answers to. Did you know that Jesse was in a militia, and such. It appears that his “interview” was intended more as a threat, intimidation, or a warning.

From Jesse’s home, they went to the home of Mr. “B”. Here, it was a bit different, as they acknowledged that Mr. “B”‘s “name showed up on paperwork” that was taken during the search. Mr. B. did a good job of playing a government official with many, “I don’t recall”, or “I didn’t know that”. This, I suppose, is the first confirmed catch from the government’s “fishing expedition”. We can little doubt that there are many more names that will come under their scrutiny — to see how many more they can catch.

However, at one point, the agent stated that “about 10% of militia participants might be prone to violence”. They led Mr. “B” to the understanding that they didn’t consider him in that 10% (ha, ha, ha), and it appears that they were, again, attempting to intimidate or discourage Mr. “B”.

From what I have seen in the past, taking paperwork to expand their understanding of the militia networking is a new tactic, and though their pursuit has nothing to do with criminal activity. It is intelligence gathering, by unlawful use of search warrants and intimidation.

Camp Lone Star – Act III – A Kangaroo Court
Scene 2 – Presumption of Guilt

Massey’s own little Dungeon

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
June 25, 2015

We will begin with three definitions. The first is an amendment to the Constitution, that being limitations imposed upon the federal government and for the securing of our rights, as understood by the Framers of the Constitution, and, which are our birthright.

The second, the legal definition of one of the terms of that amendment, included to clarify that term.

The third, the description of what is known as a Kangaroo Court. As you read the following, you will see that all three of the definitions provided for such a Court are applicable in the case against K.C. Massey.

8th Amendment
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Bail [Black’s Law Dictionary – 5th Edition]
The Surety or sureties who procure the release of a person under arrest, by becoming responsible for his appearance at the time and place designated.

Kangaroo Court
1: a mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded or perverted
2: a court characterized by irresponsible, unauthorized, or irregular status or procedures
3: judgment or punishment given outside of legal procedure
(Merriam Webster)

In a previous article, Cruel and Unusual Punishments – Before Conviction, the conditions of release according to the Appearance Bond, were discussed. There were a number of conditions set, though the first three predicate the whole of the “Bond” that he was subject to. Those three were:

To appear for court proceedings

If convicted, to surrender to serve a sentence that the court may impose

To comply with all conditions set forth in the Order Setting Conditions of Release.

Now, based upon the definition of “bail” and the prohibition against “excessive bail”, when we look at the conditions, is it possible that the third condition, “to comply…”, might be deemed “excessive”, in that it goes beyond a requirement to appear, as per the definition, and the intent of the Bill of Rights?

Now, heed what we are discussing, for every patriot knows that he stands for the Constitution, and in so doing may be placing himself in a situation where he might find that he is charged and arrested for some made up crime.

However, since the government holds the guns, if Massey wanted to stay out of jail, pending trial, which he was more than willing to stand for, he would have to agree to the conditions.

The day that Massey was arrested, they did a UA (Urine Analysis) and find THC (from marijuana) in his test. So, they filled out the conditions as they would for someone charged with selling drugs, requiring random UA testing. Well, THC stays in your system for weeks, or longer. So, a scheduled test would have been sufficient to determine if he had not broken the law by using marijuana, since there is no federal law against use of marijuana. The random aspect of testing was detrimental to another condition, that he be gainfully employed, since he could be called from work to report for the UA, at any time, disrupting his reliability at work.

Massey agreed to the terms on November 3, 2014. He first refused the UA test in May 2015. He had gone over six months with absolute compliance with the conditions, even though he knew that they were unconstitutional. However, since half a year does not cut it for a speedy trial, and the confinement to home, not even allowed to maintain his property away from the immediate vicinity of the house, without prior permission from the Probation Officer (he is not on probation, he only, constitutionally, has to appear in court), and finding that when he was supposed to drive the ninety miles to Dallas for the UA, broke down, and refused the UA. Since he had taken that step, he continued to refuse subsequent calls for a UA.

That is until his next court appearance. Knowing that he would probably not pass the UA that he knew they would require when he arrived for the June 2 hearing, but he went to court, as required by the Constitution and the Conditions.

Now, the punishment that he received, prior to that June 10 hearing was bad enough. He was not a free, innocent man, until proven guilty. He was subject to conditions that were slightly less than if he had been in jail. He had such a limited amount of freedom that it could, nowise, be considered such.

Since he failed the UA on the 10th, he was sent to jail in the custody of the Brownsville Sheriff, though the contract with the federal government put him under the authority of the U. S. Marshall Service. The Marshall Service decided the Massey should be in Maximum Security. They have also imposed other conditions and restrictions that, along with general jail procedures, have imposed the following on Massey:

• His cell (sketch, above) is about 7′ by 10 feet, and includes bed, toilet, shower and table.
• He has only had only two 1-hour recreation periods since he has been in jail (three weeks).
• When he leaves the cell, for any reason, he first puts his hands through the food port and they are handcuffed. Then he is allowed out and told to face the wall while shackles are placed on his ankles and a chain around his waist. Then, he is handcuffed to the waist chain — yes, two bracelets on each hand.
• When he is out of his cell, he is always escorted by three guards, and the hallways are cleared before he can enter a hallway. One of the guards is constantly videotaping the procession.
• There is one window, in the cell door. That is where food is fed to the “animals”. It has a magnetic cover and is only open, with few exceptions, when they want to talk with him, pass food, or deliver the telephone to him so that he can make phone calls.
• Some guards will leave the door window cover off, at night, when the lights are dimmed, so they can do bed checks, about hourly. Other guards prefer to open the window, bang on the door, and make a lot of noise, then shine a flashlight in to see if he is there, and probably to make sure he is awake, every hour, during their shift.
• His cell walls are painted white, and the only constant sound is the whistling of the air-conditioning blowing into the call, keeping the temperature in the sixties. He only has one blanket.

As far as personal attention to his needs, he has gotten the many food gifts that were sent to him. He has had health problems. At one doctor call, he was found to have blood and high protein levels in his urine. For this, the doctor prescribed antibiotics. He tried them for three days and his stomach reacted, giving him pain, so he stopped taking the antibiotics. They have reported him for refusing to take his medicine, though they have not reported why he has refused it.

• He has a preexisting water on the knee problem that he has always treated with exercise, which provides relief.
• He has a pre-existing case of shingles, for which they have given him Triamcinolone, and he has had some relief.
• They had given him one Ibuprofen per day, taken in the presence of the guards, though he has had to quit taking them as it exacerbated the kidney problem.
• He has pain in his kidney, and, hopefully, will receive some treatment for that when he sees the doctor, again. He had been dealing with the kidney problem with exercise, to the point of perspiration to remove toxins, and cranberry juice. However, it is difficult to perspire in such a confined space with temperatures in to sixties.

If Massey is convicted, he will no longer be under the authority of the U. S. Marshall Service, but will be under Bureau of Prisons. At that point, being convicted, his living conditions will be far better than what he is currently enduring, and he will have regular exercise and will be able to seek necessary medical attention, without the constraints that are currently imposed upon him.

It appears that, perhaps, the government has taken the 8th Amendment literally, as it implies that once you are convicted, you can not be subjected to “cruel and unusual punishment”. It fails to prohibit cruel and unusual punishment prior to conviction, and, clearly, that is what Massey has been subjected to since his first arrest.

As far as “excessive bail”, the Conditions of Release were for an unsecured bond of $30,000. Whether that might be considered excessive, or not, is subjective, but let’s assume that it is not for the sake of discussion. If we assume that to be the point that anything over it would be excessive, then the conditions would, without a doubt, qualify as EXCESSIVE, and they go well beyond the simple historical concept of assuring that one be present in court, when required to.

As far as the Kangaroo Court, there is no doubt that “the principles of law and justice are disregarded or perverted“, and that this is “characterized by irresponsible, unauthorized, or irregular status or procedures“, and, finally, that “punishment [is] given outside of legal procedure“.

Quite simply put, some of the conditions that have been imposed upon Massey are outside of the constitutional framework created by the Founders, and some equate more toward medieval dungeon techniques resorted to by kings, tyrants, dictators, and other despots.

If we consider that if he is convicted of a crime, his conditions will improve, considerably, then we must also conclude that the justice system is based more upon punishment for Presumption of Guilt than upon any sense of justice.

Camp Lone Star – Act III – A Kangaroo Court
Scene 1 – How Case Law Subverts the Constitution

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
June 8, 2015

Kangaroo Court
1: a mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded or perverted
2: a court characterized by irresponsible, unauthorized, or irregular status or procedures
3: judgment or punishment given outside of legal procedure
(Merriam Webster)

In a recent article, “Government Enforces Their Laws – Who Shall Enforce the Constitution?“, I raise a question that is now worthy of our consideration. If we want our birthright of Constitutional Government, as envisioned by the Founders, we cannot rely upon government for interpretation those laws passed which are applied contrary to the Constitution.

To quote Teddy Roosevelt, with regard to the “case law method”, “some of the teaching of the law books and of the classroom seemed to me to be against justice… we are concerned with [the] question of what law is, not what it ought to be.”

In my Constitution, government was granted powers and authorities, and had limitations imposed upon it. Here, we will deal with some authorities granted and some limitations imposed. And, we, as Americans concerned about our country and our posterity find that we are in a situation similar to that which the Founders recognized, 240 years ago. And, we, like they, must weigh, very carefully, the extent of encroachments into our rights and our lives, as they did, then.

On April 17, 2015, the final pre-trial motions were submitted to the Court. The Court has taken 7 weeks to prepare a Memorandum Opinion and Order, to address the argument presented to the Court by Massey’s attorney.

Rather than outright denying the motions, the extended interval tended to support the probability of a well-crafted reply, granting the motions and dismissing charges against Massey. I don’t doubt that, somewhere, that well crafted order still exists, though it has been replaced by a rather poorly crafted order, which will be the subject of this article, and was substituted solely because Massey created a situation in which the Judge, for reasons that many will not understand, chose not to pursue justice in that it would reflect on him as supporting someone who could not keep his promise — his agreement with the Court.

Honor, one’s word being good, is an important part of life. Massey, regardless of why, gave his word that he would not partake of any illegal substances — as a condition of his “home detention” (See Cruel and Unusual Punishments – Before Conviction) — rather than remaining in jail awaiting trial.

The dilemma this created for Judge Hanen is that he would be challenging the status quo by granting the motion, undermining the very strength of the federal “Felon in Possession” law, and putting it back in proper perspective with those limitations imposed by the Constitution. This would leave those in government who support the improper interpretation in a position to accuse Hanen of siding with a man lacking honor and unable to abide by an agreement that he willingly made as a condition of his pre-trial release.

We must put ourselves in a position to understand that this apparently minor infraction would probably have similar consequences, or at least should have them, within our own community. Suppose you supported someone whom you had faith in to a position of chairman, or some other leadership role, within your organization. Suppose, then, he gave his word to abide by a promise that he had made, and then broke that promise. Would you continue to support him in the office that he held? This is what the politicians do, and this is an intolerable situation — it cannot be supported, if we stand behind our belief that honor and trust are necessary elements of leadership.

This is similar to the situation in which Judge Hanen finds himself. If he was willing to challenge the system and return to a proper interpretation of the law, it could be career ending decision, and could subject him to ridicule by others in government, including some of his peers on the federal benches. For him to take upon himself that responsibility, he would have to know that the person he was supporting by his actions was one as honorable as the Judge would be, in standing for justice. This is typical “office politics” and is true in business and the patriot community, as well. Violate the trust and you lose support.

So, let’s look at the “Memorandum Opinion and Order” that denied the Motions to Dismiss the Indictment (there were two of them: Motion to Dismiss Indictment, and First Supplement to Opposed Motion to Dismiss Indictment).

The Order begins with a misrepresentation that sets an erroneous foundation for what follows in the three “arguments” that the court offers, when it says:

As detailed below, Massey’s Motion to Dismiss focuses on the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 922(g), which makes it a crime for a person who has previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year “to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment.

First, he implies that the entire question rests on “the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 922(g)“. Though challenges to constitutionality were made, there was an even stronger argument made with regard to the grammatical context of the statute, which, if correct, would allow other aspects of the law to fit, neatly, into earlier Congressional interpretations of the extent of the “commerce clause”. This will be addressed in the third point.

1. Second Amendment Argument:

Massey’s argument relies heavily on District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), which upheld the right of people to have firearms for their personal protection. He argues that, among others, you do not lose your right to freedom of speech for being a convicted felon, so you cannot lose, forever, your right to keep and bear arms. Perhaps, unfortunately, the argument did not bring up the fact that 10 U.S.C. § 311 does exclude some from being members of the militia, though “felons” are not among those exclusions, which is a direct contradiction of the felon in possession statute, as applied.

The Court then argues that Heller did not address the felon aspect, He does point out that the court has set up the “scrutiny” to be applied in weighing whether a statute unfairly limits the “not infringe” (my words) provision of the Second Amendment, but rather than compare it to real world, he simply builds upon case law, redefining the Constitution, one case at a time.

In the dismissing nature of the current judicial system, he says:

The Second Amendment, at its core, protects “law-abiding” citizens. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. It is clear that convicted felons are not such citizens and thus fall outside of the Second Amendment’s protection. Accordingly, the Court need not consider the second inquiry because Section 922(g)(1) does not burden conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment.

So, unlike Texas, that being the location of the private property in which the alleged crime (possession) was committed, he determines that the rehabilitation program, under the various penal systems, cannot achieve its stated goal of rehabilitation, during the course of one’s life. In direct contravention of that “philosophy”, we have the opportunity to look at Massey’s life, since that rehabilitation, in “Who is K. C. Massey?“. What he does not address is the question of jurisdiction. If the “crime” was committed on private property (affirmed, in the next argument), is it constitutional to supersede Texas law absent an act that was committed on public lands? This doesn’t address an even more serious breach of jurisdictional limitations, which is quiet apparent in Massey’s case, as Massey was absolutely sure that they were on private land, with permission of the owner, to protect the owner’s property.

2. Equal Protection Clause Argument:

This argument, in the Order, addresses only that challenge brought up in the first of Massey’s Motions. It is, perhaps, inserted here to avoid addressing the ramifications of the subsequent challenge to “equal protection” brought up in the second Motion — a legal sleight of hand.

Hanen, in citing a previous decision, says, “a law is subject to strict scrutiny review in the face of an equal protection challenge only if (1) there is a fundamental right affected or (2) the law targets a suspect class. He continues, “does not impermissibly impinge upon a right protected by the Second Amendment because it regulates conduct that falls outside the scope of the Amendment’s guarantee.”

So, let’s look, first, at (1), where the law in question, “felon in possession, affects the Second Amendment. As mentioned above, 10 U.S.C. § 311 is the codification of the Second Amendment. That statute has a solidly placed foundation in the Constitution, as it clearly defines what at least the one provision of the Second is the militia. It makes exception for some, as far as being, without question, in the militia, though “felons”, or any descriptor that would imply such, is not exclude from the mandatory inclusion in the militia.

Now, let’s look at (2), whether it targets a “suspect class”. Here, we enter more into the First Supplement (the second motion to dismiss the indictment), though Hanen refused to address that part of that motion. If it refused people in one state, merely because they lived in that state, and approved those in another state, simply because they lived in that state, would they not be creating a “suspect class” of those who lived in one of the “refused” states? Quite simply, living in one state makes you a “suspect”, while living in another allows you all of the privileges of firearms possession and ownership. So, if we consider the asserted Second Amendment right, including the codification, and compare that to the “commerce clause”, what do we come up with?

Back in 1934, the Congress enacted the first firearms control act. The concern was expressed in the record (Congressional Record, reference: keep and bear arms, pg 42 “}, which says:

Mr. FREDERICK. That takes me into the purposes of this bill. This bill, as I see it, is intended to be a bill for the suppression of crime and is proposed to the United States Congress which ordinarily has no power in such matters, under the guise of a revenue raising bill.

So, we have, “which ordinarily has no power in such matters, under the guise of a revenue bill”. Now, they were using the commerce clause, as that original acts required that interstate commerce be involved. However, since they had no power to “suppress crime”, they used their power to tax (“revenue raising bill”), to both fund and track firearms. That was the only way that they could mount a challenge to the Second Amendment — by taxing, not by criminal charges, unless the tax was ignored. That was what the Constitution, even loosely construed in the act, allowed. There are no amendments that would extend that authority beyond what existed in 1934 — except the machinations of “case law”, which disregards the Constitution if one can manipulate the words of a previous decision to extend government authority where it had no constitutional authority to go. This is precisely why I suggest that we, the People, need to interpret Our Constitution, as the government is intent upon subverting it.

3. Commerce Clause Challenge:

Now, let’s look at the statute, in detail:

18 USC 922

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person –

(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

There are two key elements that we need to consider. First, “possess in or affecting commerce“. “In” is easily understood. That would clearly be in the act of shipping or transporting. “Affecting”, while that would mean that the possession affected, had an effect on, the transporting.

Here, the Judge cites United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1996), which says that the “in or affecting commerce’ element can be satisfied if the firearm possessed by a convicted felon had previously traveled in interstate commerce.” Damn, I need to return to school and take English Grammar all over, again. I cannot draw the same conclusion that the Court did in Rawls, though apparently, Judge Hanen apparently, can make that broad leap — away from the Constitution and into the lap of a government that wants to have absolute control over every aspect of our lives (Hint: That was once known as slavery). So, in a sense, the wording from Rawls rewrites the wording of the statute (922 (g)(1)) into something that is not written as law, rather, is interpreted into something that is not written in law, thereby making it law because the judges of the Fifth Circuit wanted it to be; not what it was intended to be when passed into law (or regulation). It is bad enough when the Congress can go from taxing to criminalization, however, when they allow the Courts to go even further and make something that does not exist, and then they can be described as nothing less than a Kangaroo Court.

But, wait, we’re not done, yet. That second part of the statute states, “to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate… commerce“, was discussed in A Favorable Ruling?. This, too, stretches our comprehension of the English Language. Here is how it is presented in Massey’s motion:

The word “has”, as opposed to the word “had” was used in the statute. “Has” is the third person singular, present indicative, verb meaning active in the action just completed, where “had” is past tense and participle of the verb have, meaning in a previous situation. So, if one were the direct recipient, then the word “has” would be appropriate. However, if it were expansive, intended to include any firearm shipped in interstate commerce, then “had” would be the proper verb. The use of “had” would have meant to include any and all that “had” been so transported any time prior.

That cannot be too difficult to understand, unless they teach a different grammar in law school, or have judicial indoctrination classes that they have not told us about. It has to do with tense. So, who is to interpret the laws? Will it be the government? Or, will it be we, the People, who have a vested interest in the laws of this nation, and, more importantly, in the Constitution that created that government that is now ignoring that document to increase their power over our very lives?

The Order says, “The Indictment, in all four counts, charges that Massey “did knowingly possess in and affecting interstate commerce a firearm . . . said firearm having been shipped in interstate commerce.” Now, the wording of the statute has been conveniently rearranged as it was presented to the Grand Jury that issued the Indictment. If that Grand Jury accepts that the wording of a law (statute) is what they are told, and probably in writing, how are they to know that it differs from the law that they are asked to weigh against Massey’s actions? If they did choose to question the wording, I’m sure that the US Attorney would explain to them that he, being a lawyer, has said that “this is what the law is, and, if Massey is in violation of this law, as I present it to you, you must come back with an Indictment”.

Let’s compare the wording from the Indictment

… did knowingly possess in and affecting interstate commerce a firearm . . . said firearm having been shipped in interstate commerce.

And the statute:

… to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

Darn look at that. They have introduced another verb, “having”.

“Had” and “having” are both past tense, as described in the First Supplement. However, “has”, is present tense (present indicative). So, the statute says “has”, while the proper verb should have been “had”, if what the government claims was intended was really intended when the statute was written. However, the Grand Jury was led to believe the even more broadly expressed “having”, which is very inclusive.

Has – present 3d singular of have
Had – past and past participle of have
Having – To be in possession of already

So, do we allow the government to redefine words so that they can imprison those that they want to punish? Or, do we decide that you don’t have to be a lawyer, or a judge, to understand the Constitution and the statutes alleged to be written in “Pursuance” to the Constitution?

Here is what James Madison said regarding laws:

It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is today, can guess what it will be tomorrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?

They will be “incoherent” if the Courts use a different language than the People. We cannot know what the law is, today, if that law is not based upon the language that we understand. The law is little known and less fixed when previous decisions of the courts have redefined the words, moving slowly but steadily away from the Constitution, for it is unfixed with subsequent decisions, and little known unless we make a daily habit of reading what the courts have done to both our language and the Constitution.

There is even more that troubles the patriot’s heart, and you will find those points highlighted in the linked Order. Suffice to say that if we fit the analogy of frogs in the water approaching its boiling point, we have, so far complained of the rising temperature, have failed to get out of the water.

Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus
Scene 4 – Government Fears Habeas Corpus

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 27, 2015

Setting the Stage: Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum (the sacred writ) has not been addressed at the Supreme Court since 1890. A recent effort resulted in the Supreme Court simply refusing to rule on a Petition for Habeas Corpus, even after all of the lower courts refused to even acknowledge that right. Now, in the current story, the Court has paid “token” acknowledgment of the right, while endeavoring to quash it — rather than pursuing Justice, as is its constitutional responsibility. Instead, as you will see, the Federal District Court in Montana is there to make sure that the government has no chance of losing a case.

The Government is Afraid of Habeas Corpus

William Krisstofer Wolf (that’s is how the government refers to a friend that we know simply as “Wolf”) and I have known each other for over a year. We have never met, but we have shared many hours of phone conversation, email correspondence, and I can’t count the number of times I was a guest on his radio show on “The Montana Republic”.

Among the subjects discussed in those appearances were “The Plan for Restoration of Constitutional Government“, “Declaration of Dissolution of Government”, “Targeting“, “Committees of Safety“, and “Habeas Corpus – The Guardian of Liberty“. The last, regarding the “Sacred Writ”, Habeas Corpus, was also the subject of some of our private conversations. Wolf fully understands what I had learned, over the past three years, though we had never anticipated having to call upon the sacred writ on his behalf — until he was arrested on March 25, 2015.

Based upon our previous conversations on the subject, I prepared a simple demand for Habeas Corpus (3 pages) and a Power of Attorney authorizing me to speak o his behalf regarding Habeas Corpus. These were Priority mailed to him on March 27, and he executed and attempted to have them delivered to the Court. After numerous attempts to have the guards take and deliver the documents to the Court, and the Court refusing to recognize the prepared Habeas Corpus, Wolf resorted to a one page, handwritten, Habeas Corpus (Court Doc. 1), dated April 1, to wit:

United States of America
v.                                             15-                  -BIL-CSO
William Krisstofer Wolf

In the Honorable Court of:
UNITED STATES Magistrate Judge Carol S. Ostby
On April 1, 2015, I, William Krisstofer Wolf, by the only means available. in Yellowstone Corrections Facility interoffice mail, SERVE on the court a DEMAND FOR HABEAS CORPUS.
In as such, I, William Krisstofer Wolf hereby request to be put on the Docket to Schedule a hearing date on the DEMAND FOR HABEAS CORPUS. This docket request for a scheduling here is needed to allow my Attorney in Fact, who has a Power of Attorney – Specific, time to travel to this Honorable Court to speak on my behalf, by authority of the case of Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 US 146.

Done on this Day, April 1, 2015
/s/William Krisstofer Wolf
Defendant

This was sufficient for the Court to finally take notice of Wolf’s right to challenge both unconstitutional laws and absence of jurisdiction. On April 15, the Court “Received” the document. The Court stated that they would not let the Habeas Corpus hold the Court hostage, so they opened a civil case, on April 16, and filed the handwritten Habeas Corpus and then filed an ORDER (Court Doc. 2), immediately thereafter.

The Court’s Efforts to Quash Habeas Corpus

Here are some of the “claims” made in the ORDER (Court Doc. 2):

1. [T]he document does not specify the number of the criminal case or indicate in any other way that it is meant to be filed in the criminal case.
2. [T]he document states that Wolf is acting “by the only means available”; yet counsel was appointed for Wolf in the criminal case on March 26, 2015.
3. Wolf did not pay the filing fee of $5.00 or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
4. “In all courts of the United States, the parties may plead and conduct their own causes personally or by counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (emphasis added); see also Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). [She concludes this claim with the statement] “Wolf may litigate this matter pro se, or he may appear through duly qualified and admitted counsel without an attorney-in-fact.
5. [T]he “‘demand for habeas corpus’ does not set forth any allegations of fact”. “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Wolf cannot mount such an attack until he alleges facts he believes demonstrate that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2242. If Wolf intends to proceed, he must submit an amended petition alleging such facts and explaining why his custody violates the law.
6. If Wolf intended to seek a detention hearing in the criminal case that is pending against him, he should discuss this with his attorney, who can file a motion for a detention hearing under the criminal case number, CR 15-20-MJ-BLG-CSO. If Wolf wishes to file the motion on his own, the Court will then need to consider the motion and decide whether to entertain the motion from Wolf personally, notwithstanding his representation by counsel. But the rule that an attorney-in-fact may not act for Wolf in court applies in all federal cases, civil or criminal. Kelley, 539 F.2d at 1201-03. Moreover, in the criminal case, Wolf’s attorney-in-fact can play no role at all. Wolf is the person charged.

Response to The Court’s Efforts to Quash Habeas Corpus

So, let’s look at what the correct response is to the above claims:

As far as Claim #1, Wolf had no access to documents, and by this time, he was “blocked” from calling some of his friends on the phone. At the time that he wrote the handwritten, which was long after the typed 3 page version (Court Doc. 3), he had only the “Criminal Complaint“, and from that, was only able to extract “15-     -BIL-CSO”, which he properly quoted in the handwritten document, and it was styled as all subsequent filings, “United States of America v. William Krisstofer Wolf”, just as the Court did. So, that doesn’t take rocket science, heck, even the Post Office could have figured that out.

To Claim #2, that he is acting “by the only means available”, raises an interesting question. Wolf stated to the Judge, at his next appearance, that he does not recognize the jurisdiction of the Court and he had no intention of entering a plea. So, if he were to go through the court appointed attorney, an officer of that court, would he not be submitting to the jurisdiction that that Court? There is little doubt, as you will see, that the Court will resort to obfuscation and chicanery in an effort to undermine his right to challenge that persecution that is currently being conducted against him.

Claim #3 says that he “did not pay the filing fee of $5.00”. I can find no reference to the filing fee in the “UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA – Local Rules of Procedure“. However, with regard to:

Rule 3.1 Filing a New Case.

(a) Required Items. The following items are required to file a new case:

(1) a complaint, petition, or other originating document;

(2) unless the originating document is a petition for writ of habeas corpus, payment of the full amount of the filing fee or a motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); and

(3) a civil cover sheet, unless the plaintiff or petitioner is proceeding pro se.

So, the originating document (1)was provided, though they refused the first and opened the case based upon the handwritten document. As to the fee, there is an exception for Habeas Corpus (2), and otherwise, only the full amount can be accepted. It does not address any partial, or alternate fee, such as $5.00, it simply exempts Habeas Corpus from fees. As it exempts the requirement for a cover sheet (3), if he is proceeding pro se (presumably, that would also apply to someone proceeding “pro per”. So, why the effort to extort (yes, that is the legal term) $5.00 from Wolf? Or, is it an effort to simply place obstructions in the way, to discourage his attempt to seek his right to challenge the Court?

Now, with Claim #4, we enter into a rather interesting aspect, which deals directly with our rights and efforts to force us into submission to the dictates of the government. This will be similar to those in #5 and #6, though we will consider them separately. The claim cites both 28 U.S.C. § 1654 and the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). Consequently, “[a]ny individual acting without an attorney must appear personally and may not delegate that duty to any other person who is not a member of the bar of this Court.” D. Mont. L.R. 83.8(a) [Local Rules of Procedure]; see also United States v. Kelley, 539 F.2d 1199, 1201-03 (9th Cir. 1976).

28 U.S. Code § 1654 – Appearance personally or by counsel
In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.

As stated earlier, a writ “is a form of written command in the name of a court or other legal authority to act, or abstain from acting, in some way.” It requires no plea, nor is it a case; it is a request for the court to command an action, which, in the matter of Habeas Corpus, is to issue the writ to raise the questions posed by the person requesting the writ. From that point, it’s not a matter of innocence or guilt, it is to assure that there is proper legal authority regarding the action upon which it is based.

The next citation is the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35:

And be it further enacted, That in all courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by assistance of such counsel or attorneys at law as by the rules of the said courts respectively shall be permitted to manage and conduct causes therein… for crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United States, and all civil actions in which the United States shall be concerned… in the respective courts before which the suits or prosecutions shall be.

In the broadest construction, that “assistance of counsel”, which clearly is not an “attorney at law”, hence the “or”, nor the party, himself, hence the other “or”, which leaves the possibility that a party, a person, may, since he is also capable of taking all responsibility upon himself, assign another to speak on his behalf, as an “attorney in fact”.

The Court references D. Mont. L.R. 83.8(a):

83.8 Self-Represented Litigants.

(a) Any individual acting without an attorney must appear personally and may not delegate that duty to any other person who is not a member of the bar of this Court. A selfrepresented person is bound by the Federal Rules and all applicable local rules. Sanctions, including but not limited to entry of default judgment or dismissal with prejudice, may be imposed for failure to comply with local rules.

This Rule applies to “litigants. This will be addressed along with the cited Kelley case.

Regarding United States v. Kelley, as we look at that case, we might wonder just what the Court was thinking, or was it stabbing blindly, in the dark, to endeavor to equate Kelley with the current matter, the writ. Kelley was being prosecuted. He was not seeking to question the constitutionality of the law, nor the jurisdiction. First, “he argues that he had a right to be represented by a non-lawyer.” Then, “Kelley sought to have his trusted friend Hurd, who was well-versed on Kelley’s monetary theory, serve as trial counsel. Hurd is a roofer and not a licensed attorney. The district court denied the request and prohibited Hurd from sitting at the counsel table or consulting with Kelley during the course of the trial.”

It is well known that if you don’t assert a right, the Court will not grant you that right. Kelley wanted Hurd to sit with him and counsel him. Kelley did not provide a “power of attorney”, according to the decision, he just wanted Hurd to sit and advise him. It doesn’t begin to approach the question at hand. This case is not on point, since it is silent on the point that the Court is trying to make about power of attorney and attorney in fact, and whether this is applicable to a writ, instead of litigation.

Finally, she says that he “may litigate this matter pro se, or he may appear through duly qualified and admitted counsel without an attorney-in-fact.” “Litigate means, “To dispute or contend in form of law; to settle a dispute or seek relief in a court of law; to carry on a suit… a judicial contest.” This is not a dispute, it is simply seeking an answer to a challenge to jurisdiction and constitutionality. As stated before, it is “a form of written command in the name of a court… to act, or abstain from acting, in some way.” It is not an adversarial proceeding.

Wolf had provided a “Power of Attorney”, making Gary Hunt his “Attorney in Fact”, and that was submitted to the Court and filed in the case. Therefore, it is before the Court. The Court, however, challenges Wolf’s right to have someone other than the court appointed attorney, or another “attorney at law”, speak for him on this matter that is not a suit, and, is not a prosecution, it is a “writ of right”, asking the Court to rule on the question presented — that being whether the laws upon which the charges are based, are, in fact, constitutional as applied to Wolf, and whether he falls under the jurisdiction of the authority behind those laws, and the Court, itself (or should I say, “herself”?).

So, let’s see what both “power of attorney” and “attorney in fact” mean (Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition):

Power of attorney: An instrument authorizing another to act as one’s agent or attorney. The agent is attorney in fact and his power is revoked on the death of the principal by operation of law. Such power may be either general or special. [no citations given]

Attorney in fact: An attorney authorized to act in his place and stead, either for some particular purpose, as to do a particular act, or for the transaction of business in general, not of legal character. This authority is conferred by an instrument in writing, called a “letter of attorney,” or more commonly a “power of attorney”. [no citations given]

Now, so as not to be misunderstood, that phrase, “not of a legal character” applies only to the “general business”, which is separated from the “particular act” by the “or”.

So, what the Court has said is, well, not on point to the entire matter before it.

So, let’s move on to Claim #5:

Though she does cite, correctly, from the case, when she says, “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody”, she has the subject of custody out of context to what is applicable in Wolf’s case. Wolf has not been convicted. He is challenging his detention based upon absence of jurisdiction as well as absence of constitutional authority of the charges against him. In Preiser, Rodriguez had been convicted and had already served some time in prison. He had sought relief from the length of his sentence, well, in the words of the decision:

Respondents were state prisoners who had elected to participate in New York’s conditional-release program, by which a prisoner serving an indeterminate sentence may earn up to 10 days per month good-behavior-time credits toward reduction of his maximum sentence… Held: When a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his physical imprisonment and by way of relief seeks a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

This decision, Preiser, as stated in the decision, is an action under 28 U.S, Code §2254:

(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 US Code § 2251: Stay of State court proceedings, begins the subject of dealing with state prisoners challenging through the federal court system. Wolf’ case is purely federal, so we need not concern ourselves, though the court has, with this,. Even if we did, we are really discussing what it says in §2241 (b), below, so I have no idea what her majesty was thinking; she should no that this is a federal matter — I think.

Though the ORDER does not cite §2254, as the case does, it does, properly, cite §§2241-2242, below. However, this citation is really apples and oranges, as the Preiser decision has no bearing on the subject of this current matter. §2254 has no relevance, at all, to the Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum Wolf is seeking, and that the Court is required to respond (answer) to.

So, let’s look at the pertinent parts of 28 U. S. Code §§2241-2242:

28 U.S.C. § 2241 : US Code – Section 2241: Power to grant writ

(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had.

(b) The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit judge may decline to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer the application for hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it.

(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless –

(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or

(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United States; or

(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States; or

28 U.S.C. § 2242 : US Code – Section 2242: Application

Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf. It shall allege the facts concerning the applicant’s commitment or detention, the name of the person who has custody over him and by virtue of what claim or authority, if known. It may be amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions. If addressed to the Supreme Court, a justice thereof or a circuit judge it shall state the reasons for not making application to the district court of the district in which the applicant is held.

So, the District Court is the proper place in which to initiate a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum. Now, under subparagraph (c), we find two applicable qualifiers for who may Petition for such writ. The ORDER cites subparagraph (3), though seems to skip right over subparagraph (1). However, until the person detaining Wolf has answered the writ, that determination cannot be made. Though that last sentence may seem confusing, we will shed some light on it as we venture into the next relevant section, that the Court seemed to have completely, or conveniently, overlooked.

28 U.S.C. § 2243 : US Code – Section 2243: Issuance of writ; return; hearing; decision

A court, justice or judge entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.

The respondent is, of course, the person who has detained Wolf, or that Wolf is detained under the authority thereof. So, unless the Court can show that the applicant (“attorney in fact”, or, “next friend”) is not entitled thereto, which it has, perhaps, insufficiently, attempted to do, must either grant or require the respondent to “show cause”. By the way, “forthwith” is without delay, immediately, etc., It does not provide for excuses, only action.

The writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained. It shall be returned within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.

Now, the civil case was opened on April 15, fully two weeks after the Habeas Corpus was submitted, “by the only means available”, and the Court has still not, over a month later, even begun the process that §2243 requires. So, from the “forthwith”, being the starting of the clock required for what Madison, the father of the Constitution, described as “in the most expeditious and ample manner“, the respondent then has three days to return, which is “to show cause”. Remember, the Fourth Amendment states that you have the right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation”.

Further, the Court states, “Wolf cannot mount such an attack until he alleges facts he believes demonstrate that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”. But, wait just a minute. The Amendment says that the government has to show “nature” and “cause”, not the accused. This is supported by the wording in §2243, that the “order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained.” It sort of makes you wonder if law school has any courses on English comprehension.

Continuing with §2243:

The person to whom the writ or order is directed shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention. When the writ or order is returned a day shall be set for hearing, not more than five days after the return unless for good cause additional time is allowed.

There it is, again. The person making the return, that would be the person detaining, not the person detained, “shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention.” How could that have possible been overlooked by a District Judge, in whose hands lie the lives and futures of those who are required to stand before her for judgment? And, when is that damned hearing going to be held? Wolf sits in detention, denied his liberty, while the judge fritters away that very object that brought the colonies to rebel against England, and part ways with a corrupted judicial system.

The remainder of §2243:

Unless the application for the writ and the return present only issues of law the person to whom the writ is directed shall be required to produce at the hearing the body of the person detained. The applicant or the person detained may, under oath, deny any of the facts set forth in the return or allege any other material facts.

The return and all suggestions made against it may be amended, by leave of court, before or after being filed.

The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.

Now, that last line says it all, that “The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.”

As to Claim #6, Wolf does not seek a detention hearing, as to do so would admit to jurisdiction. The other points in this Claim have already been addressed.

Stay tuned for Act I, Scene 5.

Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus
Scene 3 – Guardian of Personal Liberty

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 26, 2015

Setting the Stage: Joseph Story called Habeas Corpus “the great bulwark of personal liberty.” He did so as he, as well as did other legal scholars and various Supreme Court decision, because the founders knew that overarching government might attempt to suppress the rights of the people that had been so recently won, at great cost to the people. The inclusion of the “sacred writ” in the Constitution was to assure that their posterity would always have a means of challenging the federal government, when it went beyond those limits set by the Constitution.

The Truth About Habeas Corpus, the “Sacred Writ”

Now, let’s visit the remedy the Founders provided us, in the Constitution. It is fair to say that the Constitution was written with an understanding of both human nature and the incessant obsession in some to seek power solely for the sake of wielding that power.

In Article I, which is the Legislative Branch, § 9, clause 2, it provides that:

The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.

A privilege is a right that can be suspended.

So, exactly what does it mean? Let’s see what some early judicial scholars had to say.

In 1768, William Blackstone, in his Commentaries, provides insight into the necessity and requirements associated with this Writ of Right.

But the great and efficacious writ in all manner of illegal confinement, is that of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum; directed to the person detaining another, and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner with the day and cause of his caption and detention…

[I]f a probable ground be shewn, that the party is imprisoned without just cause, and therefore hath a right to be delivered, the writ of habeas corpus is then a writ of right, which “may not be denied, but ought to be granted to every man that is committed, or detained in prison, or otherwise restrained, though it be by the command of the king, the privy council, or any other.”

In a former part of these commentaries we expatiated at large on the personal liberty of the subject. It was shewn to be a natural inherent right, which could not be surrendered or forfeited unless by the commission of some great and atrocious crime, nor ought to be abridged in any case without the special permission of law.

A remedy the more necessary, because the oppression does not always arise from the ill-nature, but sometimes from the mere inattention of government.

From the Constitutional Convention, we have Madison’s Records of the Federal Convention.

“The privileges and benefits of the writ of habeas corpus shall be enjoyed in this government in the most expeditious and ample manner: and shall not be suspended by the Legislature, except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a limited time, not exceeding [blank] months.”

“Expeditious and ample” are easily understood, and, clearly, the intention of the inclusion of the “Sacred Writ” within the protection of the Constitution. Being the only “right” defined as a “privilege”, we need simply understand that it is the only enumerated right that is subject to legislative suspension, though only legislative.

William Rawle, in “A View of the Constitution of the United States” (1829), provides us insight into the perception of the Writ just forty years after the Ratification of the Constitution, and, clearly, as it was envisioned at the time.

Reasons will be given hereafter for considering many of the restrictions, contained in the amendments to the Constitution, as extending to the states as well as to the United States, but the nature of the writ of habeas corpus seems peculiarly to call for this construction. It is the great remedy of the citizen or subject against arbitrary or illegal imprisonment; it is the mode by which the judicial power speedily and effectually protects the personal liberty of every individual, and repels the injustice of unconstitutional laws or despotic governors. After erecting the distinct government which we are considering, and after declaring what should constitute the supreme law in every state in the Union, fearful minds might entertain jealousies of this great and all-controlling power, if some protection against its energies when misdirected, was not provided by itself.

If this provision had been omitted, the existing powers under the state governments, none of whom are without it, might be questioned, and a person imprisoned on a mandate of the president or other officer, under colour of lawful authority derived from the United States, might be denied relief.

The Honorable Justice Joseph Story, in “Commentaries on the Constitution“, will provide even more insight.

1333. In order to understand the meaning of the terms here used, it will be necessary to have recourse to the common law; for in no other way can we arrive at the true definition of the writ of habeas corpus. At the common law there are various writs, called writs of habeas corpus. But the particular one here spoken of is that great and celebrated writ, used in all cases of illegal confinement, known by the name of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, directed to the person detaining another, and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner, with the day and cause of his caption and detention… It is, therefore, justly esteemed the great bulwark of personal liberty; since it is the appropriate remedy to ascertain, whether any person is rightfully in confinement or not, and the cause of his confinement; and if no sufficient ground of detention appears, the party is entitled to his immediate discharge. This writ is most beneficially construed; and is applied to every case of illegal restraint, whatever it may be; for every restraint upon a man’s liberty is, in the eye of the law, an imprisonment, wherever may be the place, or whatever may be the manner, in which the restraint is effected.

Finally, we will visit Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856):

HABEAS CORPUS, remedies A writ of habeas corpus is an order in writing, signed by the judge who grants the same, and sealed with the seal of the court of which he is a judge, issued in the name of the sovereign power where it is granted, by such a court or a judge thereof, having lawful authority to issue the same, directed to any one having a person in his custody or under his restraint, commanding him to produce, such person at a certain time and place, and to state the reasons why he is held in custody, or under restraint.

7.  The Constitution of the United State Article 1, s. 9, n. 2, provides, that ” the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it and the same principle is contained in many of the state constitutions. In order still more to secure the citizen the benefit of this great writ, a heavy penalty is inflicted upon the judges who are bound to grant it, in case of refusal.

It is pro8.  per to consider, 1. When it is to be granted. 2. How it is to be served. 3. What return is to be made to it. 4. The bearing. 5. The effect of the judgment upon it.

9. – 1. The writ is to be granted whenever a person is in actual confinement, committed or detained as aforesaid, either for a criminal charge, or, …under any color or pretence whatsoever…

10. – 2. The writ may be served by any free person, by leaving it with the person to whom it is directed, or left at the gaol or prison with any of the under officers, under keepers, or deputy of the said officers or keepers...

16.  The habeas corpus can be suspended only by authority of the legislature. The constitution of the United States provides, that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of invasion and rebellion, the public safety may require it. Whether this writ ought to be suspended depends on political considerations, of which the legislature, is to decide…

It is apparent that the inclusion of Article I, Section 3, clause 3, was included in the Constitution as a bar against overarching government, unconstitutional laws, and jurisdiction beyond that authorized by the Constitution.

Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus
Scene 2 – Who is in Charge Now?

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 23, 2015

Setting the Stage: Ten years after the Ashwander Decision, an Act of Congress established a far more authoritative agency structure, creating a Fourth Branch of Government. Though intended to affect less than 1% of the population, or so they said, it now affects nearly every one of us.

bu·reauc·ra·cy. noun

A system of government in which most of the important decisions are made by state officials rather than by elected representatives.

Administrative Agencies Rule Our Lives

The “Administrative Procedures Act of 1946” was submitted by Representative Pat McCarran, Democrat, Nevada, who gave us some insight into its purpose, when, in the Congressional Record, he said:

“We have set up a fourth order in the tripartite plan of government which was initiated by the founding fathers of our democracy. They set up the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches; but since that time we have set up fourth dimension, if I may so term it, which is now popularly known as administrative in nature. So we have the legislative, the executive, the judicial, and the administrative.”

What? A fourth branch of government? My Constitution only has three. Wouldn’t an Amendment be required to create a fourth branch?

He then goes on to say:

“[This bill], the purpose of which is to improve the administration of justice by prescribing fair administrative procedure, is a bill of rights for the hundreds of thousands of Americans whose affairs are controlled or regulated in one way or another by agencies of the Federal government. It is designed to provide guarantees of due process in administrative procedure.

So, he says that there are hundreds of thousands of people “whose affairs are controlled or regulated in one way or another by agencies of the Federal government.” The population of the United States, in 1946, was 150 million people. So, the “hundreds of thousands”, he didn’t say anything about a million, would constitute well less than one percent of the population.

There is an old saying that if you give an inch, they will take a mile. This appears to be an understatement when you consider that the less than 1% has expanded, in these past 69 years, to incorporate probably 99.9% of the people in this country.

This is, most certainly, NOT the limited government that was given to us by the Founding Fathers. Though we find that their foresight provided a means by which we could challenge that expansion (let’s be honest, usurpation) of authority in the limitations imposed upon that government. However, before we do, we need to look at what those men of integrity also told us of the consequences of such usurpations.

The Founders on Constitutional Limitations

Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No 78, made clear the judiciary, especially the Supreme Court (which is the only court proposed at the date of his writing) was “the citadel of the public justice and the public security“, and, that “No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid“.

Further, Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137), says that “an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void“.

Prior to the ratification of the federal Constitution, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in 1787, first nullified an enacted statutes that was contrary to the North Carolina Constitution, in Bayard v Singleton (1 N.C. 42). They said that “if they could [enact legislation contrary to the constitution], they would at the same instant of time destroy their own existence as a legislature and dissolve the government thereby established“.

The next Scene will explain what the Founders did to protect us from such encroachments by the government that we created.

Shortly after I posted Camp Lone Star – More like Wonderland, K. C. Massey provided me with his analysis of the Response by the government to his motions for suppressing evidence and dismissal. I have made minor edits for clarification. Otherwise, these are Massey’s own evaluation of the Response.

In all fairness, if anybody from the government side wants to rebut, or refute, either Massey’s or my post, I will be happy to accommodate them.

Massey says:

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

BP agent, Marcos Gonzales, was pursuing a group of illegal aliens when he encountered an armed Foerster in heavy brush. BP agent Gonzales perceived Foerster as an armed and immediate threat when Forester pointed the weapon he was carrying at Gonzales who was emerging from the brush. Gonzales fired four or five shots which did not strike Foerster. Foerster was armed with 7.62X39mm pistol which contained a vertical fore grip and was slung around his neck. The shots were fired at approximately 3:45 P.M.

This is UNTRUE. We had been to only 3 crossing sites when we encountered the dismounted BP approximating the time to be no later than 3:00p approx 15 minutes into the assistance of the BP the shots rang out. Making the shooting closer to 3:15. The firearms audit investigation did not determine whether it was 4 or 5 shots. The original reports as issued by Border Patrol information officer Zamora to the press August 29th NEVER stated Foerster “Pointed” his weapon at the Agent, only he turned with it in his hands. How do you “Sling” a pistol around your neck? What is the point of mentioning what Foerster did or possessed have to do with me who was not at the scene? I also posted my account of the incident at https://www.facebook.com/kevin.kc.massey/posts/839070526105377 on Aug 30, 2014. That is my recount of the story, written just after it happened.

Senior Border Patrol agent Danny Cantu was nearby, heard the shots and secured the scene for investigation by Federal and/or State law enforcement. Cantu was not certain if the shooting was on State or Federal land and contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Cameron County Sheriff’s Office. Cantu requested Foerster to accompany him away from the river bank to an open area, “staging area”, approximately 100 yard away.

The staging area was over 200 yards away, and we were asked to move there due to illegals still in the area moving toward our position. He commanded myself and Varner to go to the staging area. Foerster rode on the mule to the interview site with us! We were told since it was private property the Sheriff had to be notified to investigate. Cantu KNEW we were on private property, they called the Game Warden to determine if we had trespassed on federal land prior to the shooting is what the Game Warden stated to me, which he was able to confirm we had not. They said the federal Agents had to investigate since it was a shooting by a federal agent. The picture, below, has the approximate locations of the shooting and interview area, on the right side.

Foerster was angry and wanted to fight BP agent Gonzales. Defendant, Massey, wanted to leave the area.

Foerster was angry because he was just shot AT by a BP Agent after we had been asked to assist the dismounted BP agent and the shooting was unprovoked. I NEVER asked to leave the area, that was the decision of Cantu!!! He said since there were still illegals in the area we needed to move locations. We stated we did not want to “press charges” for the shooting by BP, but BP said they had to conduct an investigation since a federal agent had discharged his firearm.

Cantu told Massey all members of his group must remain until shooting was investigated. Cantu requested that all members of Rusty’s Rangers disarm while the investigation was conducted.

This is another LIE Cantu NEVER requested we “disarm” We voluntarily decided to leave weapons on the mule after we moved to the staging area.

Massey turned over a handgun and rifle which was secured in a Border Patrol vehicle during the investigation. Foerster relinquished the pistol he was carrying and the third member of Rusty’s Rangers relinquished a pistol and a rifle. The weapons were all secured in a Border Patrol vehicle.

Cantu TOOK Foerster’s gun after Gonzalez shot at him which Foerster had laid on the ground. My and Varner’s weapons were left on the mule. It was articulated to us “For officer safety” and due to “Illegals in the area” BP wanted to remove our weapons from the mule along with my GoPro Camera and other personal equipment and “secure” them in the BP vehicle for our “safety”.

During the investigation criminal histories were requested that indicated that Massey and Forester had felony convictions. The pistol carried by Forester was believed to be a prohibited weapon due to the addition of the fore grip. CCSO officials decided to keep possession of the weapons pending further investigation.

The sheriff’s office DID NOT articulate any cause or reason for taking and keeping our arms, even after protest by myself and Varner. We were never given a receipt for the Arms or other equipment they took from the mule. The sheriff took possession of the Arms only 15 minutes or so before we were released from detention.

Massey and Forester were allowed to leave the scene and all officials departed by 7:00 PM.

Again another LIE, we were released from detention at approx 8:15 pm. We were detain nearly 5 hours and were not free to go.

Massey was not provided Miranda warnings during the investigation. Massey was never handcuffed and cooperated in surrendering his weapons and providing statements.

Only after BP and FBI, and HSI and CC Sheriff insisted we make statements even after we stated we (Varner and myself) were NOT witnesses to the shooting and had NO pertinent information. We gave statements under protest. We did not “surrender” the Arms, they insisted for officer safety that they be secured in the BP vehicle.

It was reasonable for BPA Cantu to disarm Massey and tell him he could not leave the area where the shooting occurred. Police are allowed to stop and briefly detain persons for…

“Briefly” is defined as 5 hours?

investigative purposes if the police have a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot.

We were never informed. “We”, Foerster, Varner or myself, were not under any investigation for ANY crimes. The only criminal activity was the unprovoked shooting at a civilian, that were there at the request and in assistance of the BP.

Texas Penal Code Section 46.02 Unlawfully Carrying Weapons (a) A person commits an offense if the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly carries on or about his person a handgun, illegal knife, or club if the person is not: (1) On the person’s own premises or premises under the person’s control  

The property was under our control by permission of the conservator for patrol and illegal immigrant deterrence and for cleaning, marking and clearing of illegal crossings. We had permission for 24 hour access to the property in which we routinely camped out on the border.

The CCSO was informed by Border Patrol agents about the shooting and the seizure of weapons. CCSO deputies made the decision to maintain custody of the weapons after it was revealed that Massey had provided Forester a weapon and that Massey and Forester both had criminal histories that included felony convictions.

We were told the weapons were being held for investigation pertaining to the BP shooting, not for any criminal causes relating to us. They confiscated Varner’s weapons and did not return his although he was NOT a felon. The above statement says the weapons were seized, yet earlier statement says they were voluntarily surrendered. Which is it? They had the Arms in the BP vehicle PRIOR to knowing any prior history of Foerster or me.

Statements obtained from Massey were not the product of custodial interrogation. Massey was never handcuffed, placed in a police vehicle or moved away from the staging area.

I was held under protest due to investigation of BP Gonzales illegal discharge of his firearm at Foerster for approx 5 hours. I was in custodial arrest/detention, I was not free to go despite several requests to leave due to my NON involvement and lack of knowledge in the shooting incident and me NOT witnessing anything since I was in a covered position on the river bank at the time of the shooting. Varner and I were over 75 yards away from the shooting through a lot of heavy brush.

Massey was interviewed by an FBI agent for approximately 35-40 minutes. Massy was not arrested and was allowed to leave the area as soon as questioning concluded.

I was questioned by Border Patrol, FBI and Homeland Security and the Sheriff’s office. Questioning lasted approx 30 minutes by each agency. We were not free to go until over an hour after the last “Interview” after approx 5 hours of forced detention.

The questioning took place on the side of a dirt road. Massey was cooperative during questioning and agreed to answer most of the questions asked of him. Massey did not want to provide his social security number and the FBI agent agreed he did not have to provide the number.

Massy and the FBI agent were cordial to one another with Massy indicating he appreciated the need to ask questions because he knew law enforcement officers.

What is the point of the above statement? Notice the misspellings? Why the reference to my social number? If they read the investigation report enough to see I didn’t give up my social security number, what couldn’t they determine the other facts of the case like the firearms audit of the BP agent to determine how many shots were fired?

Massey was not the focal point of the investigation;

Previously they said I was the focal point of an investigation of felon in possession of a firearm in violation of Texas law. Why were the federal agents detaining me for a possible state law violation?

agents were primarily concerned with circumstances surrounding the shooting between Forester and BPA Gonzales. Custody for Miranda purposes requires a greater restraint on freedom than seizure under the fourth amendment. United States v. Cavazos, 668 F.3d 190,193 (5th Cir. 2012). “A suspect is … ‘in custody’ for Miranda purposes when placed under formal arrest or when a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree which the law associates with formal arrest. United States v. Begivanga, 845 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir. 1988).

Again notice the inconsistency of their statement “agents were primarily concerned with Foerster” Yet they took the arms from myself and Varner who were not involved in the shooting in any way, as defined by Blacks Law 8th – Physical Custody; Custody of a person whose freedom is directly controlled or limited. Detention; The act or fact of holding a person in custody; Confinement or compulsory delay. Investigative detention; the holding of a suspect without a formal arrest during the investigation of the suspects participation in a crime. Detention of this kind is constitutional only if probable cause exists. Arrest; 2.The taking or keeping of a person in custody by legal authority. The term “formal arrest” is not defined.

In the instant case Massey was told, By BPA Cantu, to remain in the staging area while the shooting was investigated. Massey was allowed to leave after he was questioned. Massey was never in custody.

I was held against my will and under protest for approx 5 hours. I was not “allowed to leave after questioning” for almost an hour after the last of 4 interviews. I was in custody under arrest although not under restraints. I asked if we were free to go several times, prior to and after each interview. I was held in a “custodial arrest” and I was not free to leave. I was in custody (physical custody) as defined by Blacks Law.