Posts tagged ‘Massey’

Camp Lone Star – More like Wonderland

Camp Lone Star – More like Wonderland

Alice in Wonderland

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
March 21, 2015

 

In Camp Lone Star – “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree” and Camp Lone Star – “a Fundamental Right”, I discussed the motions filed by K. C. Massey’s attorney, Louis Sorola, the former being a motion to suppress evidence and the latter a motion to dismiss the charges. The government, surprisingly, managed to respond to those motions within the statutory time (20 days), when they filed the

GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND
MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMNT
[sic]

That is not an error on my part. The word “Indictment” is spelled, on the title of the document, as “Indictmnt”. Pretty good start for someone who receives over $100,000 per year plus amazing benefits from your hard earned money. You would think that they have spell-check on their computers, and that they would, to avoid error, have someone proofread what they write. But, heck, I guess that any form of diligence, whether as to grammar or truth, is not within their scope of responsibility.

Back on October 20, 2014, agents of the FBI and the BATF went to a home in Quinlan, Texas, to search for weapons (See Camp Lone Star – The Arrest of K. C. Massey). Any authority to search this house would be based upon the assumption that it was where Massey lived — his residence. Based upon the “Conditions of Release” (See Camp Lone Star – Cruel and Unusual Punishments – Before Conviction), they also presumed that Massey lived in the Quinlan house as that is where his “Home Detention” requires him to be. The Response does point out that Massey “left his home and traveled to Cameron County, Texas during the summer of 2014“, confirming that Quinlan was his home, but that he had moved for an extended period of time, over the summer.

Subsequently, they had a search warrant issued to search the premises at the Value Inn motel in Brownsville, and at the time of the search, arrested Massey. So, it appears that they then presumed that he lived at the Value Inn. The question, however, is where did Massey live, during that summer. Well, he lived on the “Rusty” Monsees property, at Camp Lone Star, with the consent of the owner. The purpose was to protect the property and to assist Border Patrol in discouraging entry into the United States, or, if they did enter Monsees’ land, to turn them over to BPS. The room at Value Inn was arranged to provide a place to clean up, due to the limited facilities at Camp Lone Star, and allow others, as well as Massey, to get a good night’s sleep on a soft bed, from time to time. So, his primary residence was actually Camp Lone Star. This can be equated with a businessman who has a home in New Jersey and works in New York. He may have a room in New York that he uses five days a week, and then stays at his home on the weekends. Are they not both his residence? Or, is there a law that prohibits only the wealthy (the Clintons come to mind) to have more than one residence?

Let’s add another factor before we proceed. A Mr. Aguilar, curator of the Sabal Palms wildlife sanctuary, granted permission to include the sanctuary in the area to be protected from illegal entry by illegal immigrants (See Massey’s account of incident). This would put that sanctuary, along with the Monsees property, under Massey’s “control”, at least with regard to deterring entry on the property of trespassers.

Now, you may be wondering why I brought that up. Well, I brought that up because I am wondering why the government, in their Response, chose to bring up a law that was not within their jurisdiction. On pages 4-5 of the Response, they cite Texas Penal Code Sections 46.02 and 46.04. It seems that they want to use Texas law to justify their action under federal law, but Massey is not charged with violating Texas law.

Texas Penal Code Section 46.02 Unlawfully Carrying Weapons
(a) A person commits an offense if the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly carries on or about his person a handgun, illegal knife, or club if the person is not:
(1) On the person’s own premises or premises under the person’s control

Texas Penal Code Section 46.04 Unlawful Possession of Firearm
(a) A person who has been convicted of a felony commits an offense if he possess a firearm:
(1) After conviction and before the fifth anniversary of the persons release from confinement following conviction of the felony or the person’s release from supervision under community supervision, parole, or mandatory supervision, whichever date is later; or
(2) After the period described by Subdivision (1), at any location other than the premises at which the person lives.

The justification is based upon the fact that a Cameron County Sheriff’s Deputy was on the scene shortly after the shooting incident, however, the Sheriff didn’t charge Massey with a violation of Texas law, so that whole subject is moot.

The shooting incident warrants our attention. The only shooting done that day was by BPS officer Gonzales who shot at John Foerster. From the Response, “Senior Border Patrol agent [sic] Danny Cantu was nearby, heard the shots, and secured the scene for investigation“… “Cantu told Massey all members of his group must remain until shooting is investigated” (page 2). So, if you have an armed officer telling you that you “must remain”, the question arises, were you detained? Or, were you free to go?

I asked Massey whether he was free to go and he explained that within the first few minutes of the “investigation”, he asked, since he and the third member of the party, could leave, they were told “no”. He explained that he asked, a number of times, that he asked in one form or another whether they could leave, and were consistently told that they could not leave.

At page 3 of the Response, “It was reasonable for BPA Cantu to disarm Massey and tell him he could not leave the area where the shooting occurred.” Well, this might be “reasonable” if Massey were a witness to the shooting, however, he did nothing more than hear the shots fired. So, he couldn’t be “detained” as a witness, as he witnessed nothing. The only two people that witnessed anything were Foerster and Gonzales. If you heard shots from a bank robbery, two blocks away, would they; could they detain you as a witness or participant?

On page 4 of the Response, “Police are allowed to stop and briefly detain persons for investigative purposes if the police have a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot” (pages 3-4). Where does the reasonable suspicion come in when Foerster never fired a shot and Massey and the third party did nothing more than hear the gunshots? What “criminal activity [might] be afoot”? Perhaps the BPS officer, Gonzales, fired his gun outside of the BPS policy for use of firearms, but is there any other possible “crime afoot” that would justify such action? So, it would appear that their argument would only apply to Gonzales, not anyone else — Sort of government doublethink or some other screwy effort at justification of something that is unjustifiable.

Also on page 4, we find, “If an officer develops—–and is able to articulate—–reasonable grounds to believe that a suspect is armed and presently dangerous to the officer, third parties, or himself, the officer may take swift measures to discover the true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized.” So, did Gonzales or Cantu have any reason to make any person other than Gonzales a “suspect”? Was there anything in the cooperation of the three that lead them to believe that any of the three were “presently dangerous to the officer, third parties, or himself”? And, if those conditions were met, to “take swift measures to discover the true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized”, would be what was required. However, by the times provided, and the absence of any apparent threat, we find that they were detained from 3:45 to 7:00. However, that final item not being, in the least, justified, how can anyone perceive 3 hours and 15 minutes in which you are not allowed to leave, anything other than being detained, without Miranda warning?

We cannot stop here, however. The guns were taken from the Massey side, I suppose as “evidence” of some sort, however, the pistol that did the shooting was not taken, as evidence, nor even inventoried or audited. It seems that five shots were heard but that only four shell casing were found. Hence, the Response, as previous documents provide, the uncertain “four or five shots”. What kind of incompetence on the part of government is this? They don’t know how many bullets were loaded in the pistol, or they never did any investigation of the shooting weapon. However, they saw fit to seize weapons that were not involved in the incident.

From page 3 of the Response, we find some very cheap rationalization with, “Massy [sic] was not provided Miranda warnings during the investigation“, and “Massey was never handcuffed…” Golly, gee, he was detained, but since he wasn’t handcuffed, he doesn’t qualify for a Miranda warning, only they use what he said, and what he may have possessed, against him. This, because he “cooperated in surrendering his weapons and providing statements.” Darn, isn’t that the whole idea behind the Miranda warning? They didn’t Mariandize him, they didn’t let him leave, they were armed, and they asked him questions and then took the firearms. Actually, the government said, “surrendered”. Surrendering is capitulating — giving into force or threat of force. However, the government argues that the “evidence” that lead to a subsequent Indictment was obtained, was given freely — perhaps Massey wanted to be charged with a crime. We will just discount the facts and draw some conclusions about around that “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree”.

Has the federal government run amuck? Do they lie to rationalize achieving their objective — by whatever means necessary? Is their sole objective to prove that the government can do no wrong? I leave the conclusion to the reader.

Camp Lone Star – “a Fundamental Right”

Camp Lone Star – “a Fundamental Right”

second-amendment-rifle

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
February 21, 2015

 

It is normal, in any criminal proceeding, for the Defense Attorney to file a Motion to Dismiss. Most often, these are simple appeals about nothing of significance, though they do add chargeable hours.

In K. C. Massey’s case, however, we find a “Motion to Dismiss Indictment“, with merit. Perhaps not in a legal sense, but in a truly lawful sense – The difference that is anything can be enacted (legal), though unless it is firmly based upon the powers and authorities granted in the Constitution, it may be unlawful.

Constitutionality

Massey’s attorney, Louis S. Sorola, begins by explaining the Texas law (Texas Penal Code, §46.04) which allows Massey to possess a firearm, for his own protection. This and other aspects that will be addressed here are dealt with in detail at Liberty or Laws? “Felon in Possession of a Firearm” is Not Legal or Lawful.

He supports this by reference to, “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”, in reference to the 2008 Supreme Court ruling in “District of Columbia v. Heller” (554 US 570), where the Court held that the Second Amendment gives individuals the right to keep firearms at their homes for their self-protection. This decision is consistent with the Texas law that allows such possession five years after completion of a sentence as a result of a felony. However, the federal statute that Massey is charged with presumes a lifetime prohibition, if incorrectly interpreted (see Commerce Clause, below).

He further argues that the term “people”, as used in the Second Amendment is also used in the 1st, 4th, and 9th Amendments, and in none of those is there an exception that would allow rights to be taken away. The only notable legal exception is in the Supreme Court decision found in “Sampson v. California” (547 US 843), which allows a different criteria if one is a prisoner or a parolee. It does not extend beyond that period of time when the person is in custody, or is under conditions of parole, in which he can be searched outside of constitutional constraints.

Commerce Clause

The question as to what extent the Commerce Clause (Article I, §8, cl. 3, Constitution) grants authority to the federal government is raised. Heller addressed the Second Amendment, but did not address the Commerce Clause, however another decision, “United Sates v. Lopez” (514 US 549) addressed the Commerce Clause, but did not address the Second Amendment. In Lopez, the extent of the Commerce Clause did not grant blanket jurisdiction, which resulted in the overturning of the federal Gun-Free School Zone law. If the ruling in Lopez was applied to Massey’s case, it would necessarily require a “substantial effect on Interstate Commerce.

As Sorola argues, “[t]he interstate commerce began and ended with the Federal Firearm License dealers involved. After the importation into Texas the guns are under Texas jurisdiction. Thus the laws of Texas apply, not the federal government.”

Equal Protection Clause

What is meant by Equal Protection was best defined by the Supreme Court in their ruling in “Yick Wo v. Hopkins” (118 US 356 – 1886):

[E]qual protection and security should be given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and civil rights;… that no impediment should be interposed to the pursuits of any one, except as applied to the same pursuits by others under like circumstances; that no greater burdens should be laid upon one than are laid upon others in the same calling and condition; and that, in the administration of criminal justice, no different or higher punishment should be imposed upon one than such as is prescribed to all for like offenses.

Now, it must be understood that the Equal Protection requirement is federal, not to be confused with state laws. Otherwise, all state laws would be equal, but, they are not — they are enacted in accordance with the State’s constitution. (See Which Constitution Am I Protected By?) Where it does apply is in the application of federal laws, as described in Yick Wo.

If different states have different laws as to what a felony is and how much time is served, is it equal protection if one state might consider it third degree and have a light sentence while another state might hold a higher penalty and mandatory 1 year (federal criteria) in prison? The federal government has not even attempted to establish a uniform criteria for the applicability of 18 USC §922(g)(1) – the charge against Massey). This lends support to the Commerce Clause limitation, above, where the law would only apply to Interstate Commerce, not to the right of the people, in general.

In a Circuit Court decision, the court decided that, in enacting the statute, “Congress superimposed a patchwork of state law over a broad piece of federal legislation in a manner bound to produce anomalous results.” (McGrath v. United States, 60 F.3d 1005)

Perhaps what is most important about this Motion to Dismiss is the fact that it is, without a doubt, a challenge to federal jurisdiction, a preservation of State’s Rights, and the rights of the People.

Camp Lone Star – “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree”

Camp Lone Star – “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree”

Bill of Rights

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
February 19, 2015

 

We are all familiar, at least to some degree, with the concept of chain of evidence, Miranda rights, and the 4th and 5th Amendments to the Constitution.

Evidence has to be acquired by legal means. A warrant is required, except under certain circumstances, to seize evidence. So, what happens if there is an incident, whether accidental, or, perhaps, even set up, to create a situation where, by stealthy means, “evidence” is secured without a warrant, or a crime (certain circumstances) in which the evidence can be rightfully secured?

On August 29, 2014, a Border Patrol Agent, claiming that a weapon had been pointed at him, fired five shots, from about 30 feet distant from John Foerster. Surprisingly, he missed hitting Foerster, indicating both poor marksmanship, and suggesting that the agent committed a crime, in violation of BPS policy.

Foerster, Massey, and the third member of their group, Varner, had their five firearms taken from their 4-wheel “mule”, without a warrant – a violation of the 4th Amendment. Then, without being read their Miranda rights, questioned by BPS, a local Sheriff’s deputy, and an FBI agent.

From the Affidavit for a Search Warrant, item 5.

  1. During a post-shooting investigation, two of these armed individuals were identified as Kevin Lyndel MASSEY (aka KC Massey) and John Frederick FOERSTER, and both admitted to interviewing officers of the Cameron County Sheriffs Office (CCSO) and Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) to possessing some of the firearms seized.

From the Affidavit for a Criminal Complaint (arrest warrant):

  1. FBI Special Agent Caryn Chasteen and Cameron County Sheriffs Office Investigator Padilla interviewed FOERSTER. During the interview FOERSTER admitted to possessing the ZASTAVA, Model: PAP M92PV, 7.62 x 39mm pistol, SN: MP2PV005143; adding that he did not own this firearm but borrowed it from Kevin MASSEY.
  2. During the interview of MASSEY, by FBI Special Agent David Cordoba and HSI Special Agent Jeremy Bergeaux, MASSEY admitted to both the ownership of the ZASTAVA, Model: PAP M92PV, 7.62 x 39mm pistol, SN: MP2PV005143, and to lending this firearm to FOERSTER.

Now, in reviewing those documents, we find no claim that there was a search warrant to allow them to seize the firearms, or that Miranda rights were read to them before taking testimony.

Because of the illegal seizure of the weapons, and the illegally obtained statements by Massey, Foerster, and Varner, the subsequent Search Warrant and Criminal Complaint (arrest warrant) were secured. If the rights of Americans are as intended by the Founders, then the invalidity of the actions of August 29 leave no lawful justification (excuse) to obtain the subsequent warrants.

If we are a nation of laws, and the “supreme Law of the Land” is the Constitution, then by what right does the federal government pretend that they can walk over the Bill of Rights, imposing hardship and expense on K. C. Massey?

Massey’s attorney, Louis S. Sorola, has the same question, so he has filed a Motion to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence and Illegally Obtained Statements. As he points out in the Motion,

The August 29, 2014 search and seizure was illegal and the evidence and statements should be suppressed along with any subsequent statements and evidence seized on October 20, 2014 as they are fruit of the poisonous tree.

The Honorable Andrew S. Hanen, United States District Court, Southern District of Texas, Brownsville Division will hear this Motion. Judge Hanen recently ruled against the Obama Amnesty Plan, indicating a respect for both the Constitution and the fact that only Congress may legislate.

Camp Lone Star – Arbitrary & Capricious Justice?

Camp Lone Star – Arbitrary & Capricious Justice?

Nocheating

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
November 24, 2014

 

“Arbitrary and Capricious” is a rather interesting phrase. Most people have never heard of it, so perhaps, it is time to understand what it is and what the legal significance is.

Let’s start with some definitions, from the respective sources:

Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition:

Arbitrary. Means in an “arbitrary” manner, as fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure. Without adequate determining principle; not founded in the nature of things; nonrational; not done or acting according to reason or judgment; depending on the will alone; absolutely in power; capriciously; tyrannical; despotic; Without fair, solid, and substantial cause; that is, without cause based upon the law; Not governed by any fixed rules or standard. Ordinarily, “arbitrary” is synonymous with bad faith or failure to exercise honest judgment and an arbitrary act would be one performed without adequate determination of principle and one not founded in nature of things.

Arbitrary and capricious. Characterization of a decision or action taken by an administrative agency or inferior court meaning willful and unreasonable action without consideration or in disregard of facts or without determining principle.

Caprice (root of capricious). Whim, arbitrary, seemingly unfounded motivation. Disposition to change one’s mind impulsively.

Webster’s 1828 Dictionary:

ARBITRARY, a. Depending on will or discretion ; not governed by any fixed rules; as, an arbitrary decision; an arbitrary punishment.

-Arbitrary power is most easily established on the ruins of liberty abused to licentiousness.

Washington.

CAPRICIOUS, a. Freakish; whimsical; apt to change opinions suddenly, or to start from ones purpose; unsteady; changeable; fickle; fanciful; subject to change or irregularity; as a man of a capricious temper.

Many state and federal statutes make arbitrary and capricious actions “null and void”, since the concept of such application of law is far beyond any concept of “equal justice under the law”.

Now you probably have a picture of just what “arbitrary and capricious” means, so let’s take an objective view of many of the circumstances surrounding the incident, arrest, and accusations, against K. C. Massey. See if you can recognize where arbitrary and capricious come into play.

We’ll start with the shooting incident on August 29, 2014, when Border Patrol Agent Hernandez fired 5 shots, from 30 feet away, missing his target. The target was John Foerster. He was holding a firearm, which he placed on the ground, after the shots were fired. No testimony even suggests that he pointed the rifle at the agent, but, more on that, later. Now, agents are not to shoot at illegal aliens, unless fired upon. So, I suppose that this shooting is noteworthy in that he didn’t fire on an illegal alien.

After the shooting, Foerster, “Wolf” and Massey were asked to turn their weapons over to BPS, since BPS seemed to think that some “illegals” might sneak up to Massey’s Kawasaki mule, grab the weapons, and then start shooting at the BPS. Makes sense, since we have learned, so often, that “officer safety” is paramount to the safety of unarmed citizens.

So, the weapons that were not fired were turned over to BPS rather than contest the matter with the armed agents, one of whom had just fired at one of the citizens. And, there is little doubt that this incident should be classified as an “officer involved shooting”, since it was only an officer who shot anything. So, we have an officer involved shooting. First thing is to secure the officer’s firearm for the requisite “firearm audit”, which would include ballistics, ammunition count, etc. Instead, BPS Captain Cantu traded weapons with Hernandez, and then placed the shooting weapon in his own holster. Nobody read “Miranda Rights” to the citizens, but the firearms were taken then given to Cameron County Sheriff Investigator Sergio Padilla. Still no receipt for the property taken, no Miranda, and no indication that there would be the requisite “firearm audit”. So, when armed, uniformed officers take your firearms, and they don’t provide a receipt, is that armed robbery — the act of highwaymen? (See Massey’s account of incident)

But, still no indication in the filed reports that any scrutiny, except a verbal report, was made regarding the only person that fired a weapon, that day.

Now, we jump to the criminal complaints that lead to an Arrest Warrant.

The Criminal Complaint is supposed to be an affidavit. Let’s look at what an affidavit is, and what standard we would be held to if we were to file an affidavit:

Affidavit. A written or printed declaration or statement of facts, made voluntarily, and confirmed by the oath or affirmation of the party making it, taken before a person having authority to administer such oath or affirmation.

First, it is a statement of fact. So, is it a statement of fact if someone tells me that something happened, or, is it merely a fact that someone told me what happened? I can attest to the fact that someone told me what happened, but, I cannot attest to what happened, since I don’t know that I was told was something factual. If someone told me that something happened, it is hearsay, not fact, at least to the extent of my knowledge. It is to be confirmed by oath or affirmation, and must be acknowledged by a person having the authority to administer such oath or affirmation”.

Now, this might be insignificant (arbitrarily not applied), if it were not for the fact that the Constitution, in the Fourth Amendment, states:

  • The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Because the Crown had used “Writs of Assistance“, there was cause for the Framers to incorporate such protection against an overreaching government. Should not the government be bound by the document (Constitution) that created it? Or, let me use the words of a friend when discussing overreaching government authority. He said, “There is no effective bar by an individual to any action taken by the Federal government. Federal judges will NOT help dismember the system that created them.” He was a former AUSA (Assistant United States Attorney).

So, the Criminal Complaint begins with “I, Special Agent Anthony M. Rotunno, affiant, do hereby depose and state the following”. He does not state that he has knowledge, or, that what he is presenting is factual. He does not state that he has personal knowledge of what he has said, nor does he “certify” that what he has said is true, though U. S. Magistrate Judge Morgan, does state that it was sworn to him. So, the only element required in an affidavit that meets the standard was made by the judge, not by the affiant.

So, let’s see what he says, that is supposed to be certified as true and correct (from the Criminal Complaint):

  1. On August 29, 2014, United States Border Patrol Agents from the Fort Brown Border Patrol Station, while in performance of their official duties, encountered an armed individual, identified as John Frederick FOERSTER, in the brush. During this encounter, FOERSTER turned and pointed a firearm at a USBP Agent, who intern fired several shots at FOERSTER. FOERSTER is a member of “Rusty’s Rangers,” an armed citizen militia group patrolling the border of the United States and Mexico.

This is the only source on file that says that Foerster pointed a firearm at the agent. He lets his “device” override our language when he says “intern” instead of “in turn” or “in return”. Kind of makes you wonder how much effort he put into making this a truthful statement. He also, decides, in this “sworn statement”, that Rusty’s Rangers” is a “militia group”. Is that personal knowledge or an effort at demonization? That can be nothing more than an opinion, which should never be presented as fact, and there is nothing that Camp Lone Star or Rusty’s Rangers has ever presented that indicated that they were “militia”.

In the third item, he states that Massey and Varner “were armed as well”. He was not present, so, he can have no personal knowledge of that fact.

  1. While conducting the post-shooting investigation, five firearms were taken into custody by Cameron County Sheriff Investigator Sergio Padilla. The firearms are described as…

The five firearms were all personal weapons and did not include the one that Hernandez had. Is that a presumption that a BPS agent cannot commit a crime worth investigating?

  1. On October 16, 2014, your affiant spoke with Supervisory Border Patrol Agent Danny Cantu. SBPA Cantu was in the area of the shooting when the shots were fired and responded immediately to the scene. SBPA Cantu stated that he in-fact recovered the ZASTAVA, Model: PAP M92PV, 7.62 x 39mm pistol, SN: MP2PV005143 from FOERSTER and that he escorted MASSEY, FORESTER and Varner to the staging area for interviews; witnessing MASSEY carrying a holstered Springfield, Model: XDS, .45 caliber pistol, SN: XS664509 and the Centurion, Model: 39 Sporter, 7.62 x 39mm rifle, SN: 39NCO2585, which was slung around MASSEY’s neck.

Hearsay! This does not meet the standard that the Framers set out for government to abide by. This is an arbitrary and capricious acceptance of a piece of worthless paper as evidence with which to issue and arrest warrant for the arrest of Massey.

The Criminal Complaint is available, with all of the statements made by Rotunno. Why don’t you play “hidden picture” with it and find what he has “hidden” that is not personal knowledge and/or based upon hearsay.

Because of the arrest of Massey, the government was able to secure a “Search Warrant“. It differs slightly in form, though the absence of valid content is apparent. The Search Warrant affidavit is, at least, titled, “Affidavit for Search Warrant”, so the claim is made, though the document will still fall well short of what is required by the Constitution. First, he gives his credential as an expert because he went to many government school training classes (I hope these schools are better than the government public schools, or they are equally worthless).

Then, as he gets past his superior intellect, he says:

This affidavit is based on information received from law enforcement officers, law enforcement databases, as well as my own investigation. This affidavit seeking the issuance of a search warrant based on the following…

Then, he reiterates, sometimes reworded, most of the same content that was included in the Complain/Arrest Warrant. He fails to note that the camp, Camp Lone Star, is located on private property, with the consent of the owner, rather, he leaves it hanging:

E.  USBP Agents have had numerous encounters with members of “Rusty’s Rangers/Regulators”, as this group has set up a “camp” (referred to as Camp Lone Star) near the Rio Grande River in Brownsville, Cameron County, Texas. This “camp” appears to be their staging area for their patrols.

He also fails to point out that many of the “encounters” (rather suggestive) were favorable and cooperative, as they were the day of the shooting incident.

Then, in an effort to fortify his position, he says:

F.  During these encounters, on more than one occasion, USBP Agents have seen MASSEY carrying what appears to be a holstered firearm on his hip and a rifle slung around his neck. These encounters are videotaped by MASSEY, usually via a body mounted or vehicle mounted camera; and then posted to MASSEY’s Facebook page. Affiant has viewed MASSEY’s Facebook; viewing the posted videos that depict MASSEY on patrol with other individuals who armed with long guns. MASSEY’s Facebook page also depicts numerous still photos of MASSEY and others armed with firearms. Friday, October 17 of 2014, was the last time USBP Agents saw MASSEY carrying a firearm; more specifically what they referred to as “automatic firearms”.

Darn, he turned semi-automatic weapons into “automatic firearms”, and this guy works for BATF. Note that they arrested Massey with a firearm, so they need not revisit, and enhance, the Camp Lone Star aspect, but, then, they had to get the demonization in to make sure that the Grand Jury would have an earful as to how bad a dude K. C. Massey really is. That makes it easier to get the Grand Jury Indictment.

Now, we get to the arrest, where, miraculously, nobody was injured:

I.  As part of this investigation, it was discovered that MASSEY had been staying at the “Value Place”, an extended stay type hotel located at 995 Media Luna Road, Brownsville, TX, and to driving a white in color 2006 Ford F-150, TX LP [blocked out] (registered to Kevin MASSEY, at [blocked out] with various decals and stickers on the back of the truck. This same vehicle is used by MASSEY to drive to and from the Value Place to “Camp Lone Star” as witnessed by FBI Special Agent Joe Schneider.

First point of interest is that they “discovered” that Massey had been staying at the “Value Place”. This might have been the role that Foerster played, but then we have FBI Special Agent Joe Schneider witnessing Massey driving from Value Place to Camp Lone Star.

Now, I like this next part:

J.  At approximately 9:30 AM, ATF SA’s, with the assistance of FBI, USBP and CCSO agents and officers, established surveillance at the Value Place and located MASSEY’s vehicle parked in the front. Surveillance on this vehicle was maintained until MASSEY was arrested leaving the Value Place at approximately 1:00 PM, as he was walking toward his vehicle while talking to someone using a white in color iPhone 5. The iPhone 5 is a smartphone which is capable of taking still photos and uploading photos to Facebook via the internet, which affiant has performed on numerous occasions with his own iPhone.

So, they were there at 9:30 AM, waiting to arrest Massey. They arrested Massey at about 1:00 PM. According to Massey, there were between 20 and 30 armed agents that made the arrest, with guns drawn. They had waited three and a half hours to make the arrest. So, if we use even twenty agents, we can calculate that it took about 70 man-hours (nearly two workweeks) of time to make a simple arrest — and BPS has a shortage of people to conduct their job. It is that shortage of BPS agents that led to the establishment of Camp Lone Star and Massey’s involvement on the border — to ease the burden on BPS.

It is also interesting to note that Rotunno has sufficient skill to take “still photos and uploading photos to Facebook via the internet, which affiant has performed on numerous occasions with his own iPhone.” I wonder if that was part of the government training circular, or if his children taught him how to do this.

Let’s get some more hearsay, just to understand the deficiency of what was intended by the Framers to be legal sufficiency:

K.  After MASSEY was detained, ATF SA A. Rivas informed MASSEY that he was being arrested based on an arrest warrant, and asked MASSEY if he had any firearms or anything else on him that the agents needed to know about. MASSEY immediately informed SA Rivas that he had a firearm “in his pocket”. SA Rivas then pulled a loaded Springfield Armory USA pistol, model XD5, caliber .45, SN XS613495 out of MASSEY’s right side, front pocket. The firearm and the white iPhone 5 were seized by ATF.

So, BATF SA Rivas retrieved Massey’s firearm, but we have Rotunno making the statement. It might be proper if he had said, “I observed SA Rivas ask Massey if he had a firearm, and then observed Rivas securing that firearm.” However, we are, once again, simply left guessing as to what might really have happened. In addition, we must wonder how dangerous an iPhone 5 is in the hands of a notorious criminal, or even in Massey’s hands.

Then we get to where there should be a statement that meets the standard for an affidavit, though look as we might, we simply find:

Based on the above facts, it is respectfully requested that a search warrant be issued for the items listed in Attachment A, specifically looking for items listed in Attachment B.

So, he says that what he has said is fact, though he has no proof that it is fact. Very little in the entire affidavit suggests that it was personal knowledge, and some of it, obviously, is not. So, where is the chain of sworn statements as to facts that you or I would be held to?

And, while we are discussing “chains”, what about the “chain of evidence”? From the O. J. Simpson trial through other high profile trials, we find the necessity of the court to require a chain of evidence. If that chain becomes broken, then the evidence, itself, is brought into question. Where are the receipts for transfer of the evidence to BPS, CCSO, and then to BATF? Was it a “magical” transition of possession? I cannot find “magical” in the Constitution, or even the U. S. Code. Or, is it simply, if you have enough money, Justice might just work for you? Perhaps we can begin to understand why the statutes of Justice have a balance beam to measure the gold, and a blindfold, as if justice is based simply upon the values that the court, and players on the government side, place on it.

If we are to assume that such sloppy work can be considered within the intent of the Framers, then we are also bound to assume the guilt of a party by as equally sloppy practices within the halls of justice.

Perhaps it is time for us to read the words, and rely upon ourselves to interpret them, as we believe the Framers intended. So far, we have left it up to the government to decide what the words mean, and we have been sorely abused for our failure to insure that government abides by the document that created it (the government), and brought it into existence.

Are the people to serve the Government, or, is the government to serve the People?

 

Related articles:

Camp Lone Star – The Arrest of K. C. Massey

Camp Lone Star – Update #1 on K. C. Massey

Camp Lone Star – Massey & The Clash of Laws

Camp Lone Star – Search Warrant or Fishing license?

Camp Lone Star – Cruel and Unusual Punishments – Before Conviction

Liberty or Laws? “Felon in Possession of a Firearm” is Not Legal or Lawful

Camp Lone Star – Cruel and Unusual Punishments – Before Conviction

Camp Lone Star – Cruel and Unusual Punishments – Before Conviction

Massey ankle braclet KC’s personal ankle bracelet

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
November 14, 2014

 

On Monday, November 10, 2014, K. C. Massey was released from the “Correctional Institution Willacy County”, “a contracted correctional institution, operated by a private corporation”, after 14 days of incarceration.

Massey’s bail had been set at $30,000, and his wife had raised the $3,000.00 necessary for the bond (not to be returned) through a bail bond agency. Fortunately, Ronald G. Morgan, U. S. Magistrate Judge, Southern District of Texas (Brownsville), saw that Massey had led an exemplary life, with contributions to community and even law enforcement, saw fit to release him on an “unsecured bond of $30,000”, which means that the bondsman will not make his $3,000 and that the Massey’s will not have to pay that penalty for him to remain on the streets until trial. However, the freedom that you and I enjoy is not to be his to enjoy.

Though Magistrate Morgan chose not to impose the secured bond, the conditions of Massey’s release are far from being able to live his life in a normal manner. Instead, they have placed conditions, which would be considered by most, to be just a prison door away from incarceration.

The Grand Jury indicted Massey on four counts (subject of a future article), so he is, in accordance with the Constitution, accused, based upon “probable cause”, possibly guilty of the crimes alleged. The final determination as to innocence or guilt is, however, subject only to the determination of a jury of his peers. It is not the determination of the U. S. Attorney who is prosecuting the case, or the Magistrate. Therefore, he is “innocent until proven guilty”. This is, or was, the unequivocal foundation for the judicial system that our nation once so proudly hailed.

The release from detention was based upon a document styled “Appearance Bond” (includes all documents discussed herein). That would imply that it was to assure his appearance in court, when called to do so. This would be consistent with the concept of “innocent until proven guilty”, and would allow him to continue his life, as he had before, without impediment by conditions that take away his freedom. Appearance for that determination of innocence or guilt, not for punishment prior to conviction.

So, let’s look at what has been imposed on Massey that most of us would consider “cruel and unusual punishments” (Eighth Amendment).

The “Appearance Bond, on its first page, says:

“This appearance bond may be forfeited if the defendant does not comply with the above agreement. The court may immediately order the amount of the bond surrendered to the United States, including the security for the bond, if the defendant does not comply with the agreement. At the request of the United States, the court may order a judgment of forfeiture against the defendant and each surety for the entire amount of the bond, including interest and costs.”

So, let’s look closely at what is above that written statement of forfeiture. The only items checked, or otherwise indicated, are:

(X) to appear for court proceedings;

(X) if convicted, to surrender to serve a sentence that the court may impose; or

(X) to comply with all conditions set forth in the Order Setting Conditions of Release.

(√) (2) This is an unsecured bond of $30,000.00

That, in itself, is sufficient to assure his appearance. If he fails to appear are otherwise comply with the three conditions, that is it, the court will take the $30,000.

So, now we will look at what is below the statement quoted above. First is a statement regarding the property used to secure the bond. Then, it has an:

Acceptance. I, the defendant — and each surety — have read this appearance bond and have either read all the conditions of release set by the court or had them explained to me. I agree to this Appearance Bond.

Interesting that the previously set condition on the first page, then the append those conditions to include “conditions of release” on the second (final) page of the “Appearance Bond”. And, now we will look at those conditions of release that have nothing, at all, to do with Massey’s agreement to appear in court, etc.

The “Order Setting Conditions of Release”, being a part of the “requirement” that goes beyond simply assuring appearance, begins to eat away at Massey’s freedoms, which we, not the court, must determine if they are consistent with the intent of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

The pertinent parts of the Conditions (indented) and my comments thereto:

(1) The defendant must not violate federal, state, or local law while on release.

(2) The defendant must cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample if it is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 14135a.

(3) The defendant must advise the court or the pretrial services office or supervising officer in writing before making any change of residence or telephone number.

(4) The defendant must appear in court as required and, if convicted, must surrender as directed to serve a sentence that the court may impose.

Nothing wrong with these, because they have to stay in touch with you, and you shouldn’t go committing crimes, even if you don’t know that they are crimes (Camp Lone Star – Massey & The Clash of Laws) — EXCEPT — they want DNA samples, even if you are arrested or facing charges (42 U.S.C. § 14135). Neither of these are convictions, so what gives? They want a database, so all they have to do is charge you with a crime, get the DNA sample, and then let you go. Neat trick! At the same time, people are fighting, and winning, cases against unjustified collection of DNA samples.

Next, we will go to the “Additional Conditions of Release” (included in the linked “Appearance Bond”). This will include all of the applicable ones, but there are some that stand out and might be considered “cruel and unusual”, at least in the original concept of the phrase. So, as we go through them put, yourself in the mindset of those who committed those sacred words to the Constitution, and consider, also, the concerns that led to the Declaration of Independence. The indented portions are from the document, my comments after those that warrant such comment. Bolded portions are typed into a standard form.

(x) (7) The defendant must (checked items only):

(x) (a) submit to supervision by and report for supervision to the U.S. Pretrial Services Agency telephone number 956-548-2667 , no later than [date left blank]

(x) (b) continue or actively seek employment and provide proof to Pretrial Services.

(x) (e) not obtain a passport or other international travel document.

(x) (f) abide by the following restrictions on personal association, residence, or travel: Travel is restricted to the Northern District of Texas with permission to travel to Brownsville, Texas for court appearances and attorney visits only. No travel into Mexico.

“(f)” imposes travel restrictions within the Northern District of Texas. It also includes permission to travel to Brownsville, this being to attend court, as required. The implication, then, is that he is free to travel within the prescribed area. We will address this, later on, in this section, and once, more, later on.

(x) (g) avoid all contact, directly or indirectly, with any person who is or may be a victim or witness in the investigation or prosecution, including: co-defendants and any member of “Rusty’s Rangers”, an armed citizen militia group.

“(k)” imposes a restriction on the right to speech, the right to peaceably assemble, and, perhaps the right to petition government (First Amendment). It also sets the prima facie representation of Rusty’s Rangers, a private group of concerned citizens, well within the laws of Texas, as “an armed citizen militia group”, regardless of the fact that both state and federal constitutions provide for who is militia, under their respective constitutions and statutes (See Liberty or Laws? Government Enforces Their Laws – Who Shall Enforce the Constitution?).

(x) (k) not possess a firearm, destructive device, or other weapon; remove all weapons/firearms from residence prior to release and provide proof to Pretrial Services.

(x) (1) not use alcohol (x) at all ( ) excessively.

If alcohol was not a part of the alleged crime, why would they deny that freedom — to imbibe? And, they didn’t even give him the benefit of the qualifier “excessively”.

(x) (m) not use or unlawfully possess a narcotic drug or other controlled substances defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802, unless prescribed by a licensed medical practitioner.

They had already said that the “defendant must not violate federal, state, or local law while on release”, so, well, perhaps the one hand has no idea what the other hand is doing, or, there is an extreme deficiency in the intelligence of those who write these documents. It will also seem to suggest their inability to comprehend the Constitution.

(x) (p) participate in one of the following location restriction programs and comply with its requirements as directed.

(x) (ii) Home Detention. You are restricted to your residence at all times except for employment; education; religious services; medical, substance abuse, or mental health treatment; attorney visits; court appearances; court-ordered obligations; or other activities approved in advance by the pretrial services office or supervising officer;

Back to the use of grammar in documents. The wording and punctuation here suggests that prior approval only applies to “other activities”. Suggesting that the intent was a degree of freedom, however, Massey has been instructed that if he leaves the house, not the yard, that it will set off an alarm and he would be in violation, as you will see, later.

(x) (q) submit to location monitoring as directed by the pretrial services office or supervising officer and comply with all of the program requirements and instructions provided.

(x) You must pay all or part of the cost of the program based on your ability to pay as determined by the pretrial services office or supervising officer.

So, the federal government, with all of the money that they waste, decides that someone under these constraints must also pay for what constitutes his imprisonment.

(x) (r) report as soon as possible, to the pretrial services office or supervising officer, every contact with law enforcement personnel, including arrests, questioning, or traffic stops.

The final page of this document explains the penalties for violation of the conditions given.

First, he has to contact the United States Pretrial Service Officer, Eric Zarate, in Dallas. Then, he has to submit to random “visits” to his home to assure that there are “No Firearms, Destructive Devices, or Dangerous Weapons” in the home. Darn, he has to agree to suspend the requirement for a warrant to search his home. Scratch the Fourth Amendment, but then we have already addressed that in “Camp Lone Star – Search Warrant or Fishing license?“. This simply broadens the government’s ability to remove rights that were protected by the Constitution, and supported, as explained in the linked article, by the fact that when Massey’s wife said, “no, you can’t search without a warrant”, they had no way to look inside of the Massey home.

Then, it states that Massey is to give “FIVE days notice… for approval of travel outside the restricted area.” Now, this implies that he is free to roam in the “Northern District of Texas”, but we will soon see that additional document will erode, further, the rights that were supposed to be protected, absent a conviction. A map of the “Northern District of Texas” is included in the documentation provided to Massey.

The final document dealing with Massey’s release is the “Home Confinement Program Participant Agreement”. (Indent is from the pertinent parts, comments are mine):

1.  I, [K. Massey], have been Placed in the Home Confinement Program. I agree to comply with all program rules set forth in this agreement and the instructions of my probation or pretrial services Failure to comply with this agreement or the instructions of my officer will be considered a violation of my supervision and may result in an adverse action. I agree to call my officer immediately if I have any questions about these rules or if I experience any problems with the monitoring equipment.

3. I will remain at my approved residence at all times, except for activities approved in advance by my probation or pretrial services officer. Regularly occurring activities will be provided for in a written weekly schedule which will remain in effect until modified by my officer. I must obtain my officer’s advance permission for any absences away from home that are not included in my written schedule.

Does this remind you of being “grounded”, when you were a kid? Except that violation could land Massey in prison.

  1. I understand that my officer will use telephone calls and personal visits to monitor my compliance. When I am at home, I agree to promptly answer my telephone or door. If I fail to answer my telephone or door when I should be at home, my officer will conclude that I am absent and in violation of my home confinement restrictions.

So, guilt (conclude) without trial. It wouldn’t take much for a pissed off officer to “violate” him and send him back to prison.

  1. I understand that my officer must be able to locate me at all times when I am away from home. If I do not have a job with a fixed location, my officer must be able to locate me by calling my employer. I also understand that jobs that do not meet these requirements are not permitted while I am in the Home Confinement Program. I understand that all job changes require advance approval from my officer.
  2. I will not deviate from my approved schedule except in an emergency. I first will try to get the permission of my officer. If this is not possible, I will call my officer as soon as I am able to do so. If I call during non-business hours, I will leave a message, including my name, the date, the time, a brief description of the emergency, and my location or destination. I agree to provide proof of the emergency as requested by my officer.

ELECTRONIC MONITORING

  1. While in the Home Confinement Program, I agree to wear a non-removable transmitter that my officer will attach either to my wrist or ankle.

These transmitter cuffs were, at once only used for those convicted of crimes. I guess the manufacturer of them has convinced the government to buy more. Not much different than the ankle shackles of the past, except you only need one ankle, not two.

10. I understand that I will be held responsible for damage, other than normal wear, to the assigned equipment. I also understand that if I do not return the equipment, or do not return it in good condition, I may be charged for replacement or the repair of the equipment, and I agree to pay these costs.

13. I agree not to move, disconnect or tamper with the monitoring unit or place any objects on top of it.

14. I agree not to remove or tamper with the transmitter device except in a life-threatening emergency or with the prior permission of my officer.

15. I agree to allow authorized personnel to inspect and maintain the transmitter device and monitoring unit.

16. I agree to notify my officer immediately, or as directed, if I: a) lose electrical power at my residence for more than 24 continuous hours, b) remove the transmitter device from my wrist or ankle because of an emergency, or c) experience any problems with the monitoring equipment. During non-business hours, I agree to call my officer and leave a message that includes my name, the date, the time, and the nature of my problem. If there is a power problem, I agree that I will call and leave another message when the power is restored. I also agree to notify my officer of any problems with my telephone service as soon as I am able to do so.

If the monitor goes out in the middle of the night, and you don’t realize it because you are sleeping, you are in violation. If it comes on while you are still sleeping, well, another violation.

17. I understand and agree that all telephone calls from the monitoring center to my residence will be recorded by the monitoring center. I will follow all directives from monitoring personnel when they call.

So, you can see how they began with a fairly innocuous agreement, simply a return for trial, etc., and you are free to go. Next, they step it up a notch, increasing restrictions and limiting travel to the “Northern District of Texas”. Then, they remove nearly a third of Texas and reduce the “free to roam” space to the size of the house. The first, the Appearance Bond”, seems to satisfy a reasonable approach to assuring that an honest man will appear when required, even to the point of turning himself in to serve time. And, since the Court determined that it was an unsecured bond, there can be little doubt that the character of K. C. Massey warranted such a status. Then, piecemeal, they begin to inflict what could be considered no less than unusual punishment by hanging the threat of returning to prison for as little as failing to make a phone call, under the conditions described. This is a practice that used to be reserved for convicted criminals, either on parole or probation. That which might be considered leniency to the convict can be considered nothing less than punishment to a man who is simply charged with a crime and still assumed innocent. That would meet the standard of cruel as well as unusual.

This is also an education for those who might face charges, even if they have done nothing in violation of state laws, of what to expect if the government decides to charge you with a crime.

This, once again, leads us to question:

Do the people are to serve the Government, or, Does the government to serve the People?

 

Related articles:

Camp Lone Star – The Arrest of K. C. Massey

Camp Lone Star – Update #1 on K. C. Massey

Camp Lone Star – Massey & The Clash of Laws

Camp Lone Star – Search Warrant or Fishing license?

Camp Lone Star – Arbitrary & Capricious Justice?

Liberty or Laws? “Felon in Possession of a Firearm” is Not Legal or Lawful

Camp Lone Star – Search Warrant or Fishing license?

Camp Lone Star – The Search Warrant or Fishing License?

 

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
November 10, 2014

 

After the incident of August 29, 2014, in which BPS Agent Hernandez, who is bound by policy forbidding the firing of weapons upon illegal aliens, though apparently no such policy exists regarding American citizens, fired five shots from 30 feet away, failing to hit John Foerster (Jesus), a total of five weapons were “taken into custody” by the BPS and Sheriff’s Deputy. (See Massey’s account of incident). There is nothing to suggest that the perpetrator of that incident, Hernandez, had his weapon confiscated. These weapons were the basis for a “Criminal Complaint” issued on October 20, 2014, and lead to the arrest of K. C. (Kevin) Massey on Monday, October 20, and John Foerster, on Tuesday October 21 (See Camp Lone Star – Update #1 on K. C. Massey).

We are going to look at the Search Warrant and related documents to better understand both the divisiveness of government, and the deviation from the intent of the Constitution –regardless of how the courts may have ruled on the matter, after all, how can we be bound by laws if the government is not bound by the Constitution?

On October 20th, the same day as the Criminal Complaint, the “Application for a Search Warrant” (included in linked PDF) is supported by an “Affidavit for Search Warrant”, and though it doesn’t have the legally required concluding statement:

Further affiant saith not.
I swear or affirm that the above and foregoing representations are true and correct to the best of my information, knowledge, and belief.

or, variations thereof, it does comport the air of authority, as it is signed by “Anthony M. Rotunno, Special Agent, ATF”. However, should we expect the government to abide by the rules of legal sufficiency? Or, is that simply for “us peons”? After all, the government speaks only truth, and need not swear or affirm, simply, state. The Constitution does require that an affidavit be “supported by Oath or affirmation” (see 4th Amendment, below).

So, the Criminal Complaint was based upon what is referred to as “Felony Possession of a Firearm”. In fact, the Affidavit cites 18 U. S. Code, § 922 (g)(1), with the pertinent phrase being, “to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce”. Though I have written on the subject of 10 USC 922 (g)(1), before (“No bended knee for me” – the Charge against Robert Beecher & Liberty or Laws? Government Enforces Their Laws – Who Shall Enforce the Constitution?), I need to add another question regarding the applicability solely to the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. It has to do with the word “has”, as opposed to the word “had”. “Has” is 3rd person present, meaning active in the action just completed, where “had” is past tense, meaning in a previous situation. So, if one were the direct recipient, then this would be appropriate. However, if it were expansive — intended to include any firearm shipped in interstate commerce, then had would be the proper verb — to include any and all that had been so transported. I am sure that those who write such laws, or rules, have a grasp on the language and the meaning of words than those idiots who cannot even ascribe an affidavit properly.

That aside, Rotunno goes on with his explanation of his background, including with BPS from 2002 to 2008, then with ATF, since that time. Of course, the background also included special classes that he is familiar with, including the one mentioned above, though English grammar is not listed.

He then goes on to explain what the ATF National Academy teaches about what is reasonable to believe about what firearms owners “normally” do. For example, these rarely known facts, known only to the select few who have attended the appropriate indoctrination classes, are as follows:

  1. That the ATF National Academy teaches that most Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have held that it is reasonable to believe that persons normally store their firearms in their homes;
  2. That persons who possess firearms usually possess other items related to firearms, such as: gun cases, ammunition, ammunition magazines, holsters, spare parts, cleaning equipment, photographs of firearms and receipts for the purchase of these items;
  3. That it is common for individuals who possess firearms and ammunition after being convicted of a felony, to secrete such firearms and ammunition in secure locations within their residence, motor vehicles and other real property over which they have dominion and control;
  4. That documents which indicate their occupancy and/or ownership such as personal mail, checkbooks, identification, notes, correspondence, utility bills, rent receipts, payment receipts, financial documents, keys, photographs, leases, mortgage bills, vehicle registration information, ownership warranties, receipts for vehicle parts and repairs, telephone answering machine introductions; cell phone cameras or other electronic recording devices which may contain electronic data of evidentiary value; and
  5. That those persons often take and store photographs of themselves with their firearms, of firearms they own or possess, and usually take or store these photographs using their personal telephones or the “memory” cards of their telephones.

If Rotunno is such an expert, he should be familiar with something known as “Tannerite”. Tannerite is sold as a two-part compound, with the parts separated. It is legal to sell and possess. Its nature changes when the primary part, ammonium nitrate (an oxidizer) and aluminum powder (a fuel), are mixed. At that point, when mixed, laws apply only to the transporting and/or shipping of the then Tannerite. So, in an effort to prepare for the demonization of Massey, when this matter goes to the Grand Jury for an Indictment, they will tell the Grand Jury that he possessed ammonium nitrate and fuel, the same substances that Timothy McVeigh used to blow up the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City. This will be presented before any evidence of firearms so that the jury members will perceive Massey as a terrorist, as most people see McVeigh. At that point, the jury will follow the lead of the U. S. Attorney and not question other possible elements of the case. They will do what they have to do in order to indict Massey, and then the ordeal and expense of trial well begin to drain away Massey’s energy and resources, and the government a success, without even a conviction, in removing a committed patriot from our ranks.

Perhaps we need to look at this realistically. The Constitution provides, in the Fourth Amendment, that:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Therefore, we have another misunderstanding between the intent of the Constitution and the application by government. Why did the Founders insert the adverb “particularly”? Why didn’t they just leave it out? Well, then it would have read, “and describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Is that what they meant?

But, wait a minute! They already have in their custody the five firearms listed in the Criminal Complaint and the two subsequently identified in the Affidavit for Search Warrant. So, keep that in mind as you read Page 3 of the Search Warrant (linked above).

On that page, you will see a list that is, at best, obscene, at least with regard to finding evidence that Massey had committed the alleged crime. You will note that the Warrant also says that they confiscated one firearm on Massey at the time of arrest, and that they knew that there was another firearm in the motel room. That is seven firearms, and they need to “confiscate” records, items, nearly everything but the toilet paper, to find “evidence of a crime”? Hell, if it really is a crime, then they had him, “dead to rights”, with seven firearms.

Can we attribute any other “justification” for this extensive and intrusive search other than “fishing” — to gather intelligence and profile others who have associated with Massey? Perhaps looking for evidence of another crime. Perhaps looking for picture so naked women, so that they can do something “productive”, during their long periods of surveillance.

Another thought that occurs is timing. If the original arrest was scheduled for 9:30 AM, though wasn’t conducted until Massey left the room, at 1:00 PM., one must wonder how the Affidavit, with all of the detail, could have been prepared, then the Assistance US Attorney found, to approve it, and, finally, a judge found who would sign it, within normal working hours, to be served the same day.

A final comment on the Search Warrant is the admission by the government that Massey showed the understanding that saying anything can only lead to disaster. By standing firm in not talking, he deserves the praise for the fortitude that held him to that conviction. Had he not, it is quite possible that he would have divulged information that might be detrimental to others. The quote, from the Warrant:

At the FBI office, your affiant (Rotunno) and FBI J. Schneider attempted to interview MASSEY. However, MASSEY invoked his right to an attorney.

What is clear is that the government’s regard for obedience to the intent of the Constitution is, without question, absent from everything done in this current exercise of despotic government. The primary evidence (5 firearms) was obtained without a warrant. Is it “forbidden fruit”, as it was obtained when government officers committed a crime by firing on John Foerster, and therefore within the limitations imposed by the 4th Amendment? Can that “evidence” then be used to secure an unsworn Search Warrant, so that, perhaps, they can make an arrest and find some evidence that is not as questionable? Would that evidence also be questionable, if obtained by improper (unconstitutional) methods? Come to think of it, the Search Warrant (page 6, item “H”) says that they had an arrest warrant, though Massey has never been provided a copy of the alleged Arrest Warrant.

So, we return to that necessary question, Are the people are here to serve the Government, or, is the government here to serve the People?

 

Related articles:

Camp Lone Star – The Arrest of K. C. Massey

Camp Lone Star – Update #1 on K. C. Massey

Camp Lone Star – Massey & The Clash of Laws

Camp Lone Star – Cruel and Unusual Punishments – Before Conviction

Camp Lone Star – Arbitrary & Capricious Justice?

Liberty or Laws? “Felon in Possession of a Firearm” is Not Legal or Lawful

Liberty or Laws? Government Enforces Their Laws – Who Shall Enforce the Constitution?

Liberty or Laws?
Government Enforces Their Laws – Who Shall Enforce the Constitution?

gov const balance

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
November 3, 2014

 

“Felony Possession of a Firearm” is the feds’ way of charging someone who is a convicted felon and possesses a firearm, which is found in 18 USC 922, at (g)(1). In two previous articles, we touched upon various aspects of that law. In “No bended knee for me” – the Charge against Robert Beecher, we addressed the interstate commerce aspect of that law. It explained that the law can only be properly applied if a person is directly involved in interstate or foreign commerce of a firearm, as any other interpretation would result in unequal justice under the law, whereby a citizen of one state might be able to have both firearms and ammunition, in another state, one might be able to only have ammunition or a firearm, and in the remainder of the states, one could possess neither firearm or ammunition.

In a subsequent article, Camp Lone Star – Massey & The Clash of Laws, we discussed the conflict between state and federal laws. The Constitution provides, in Article IV, § 4, that “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government”. Further, the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, to wit:

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

This provides that if a power is not delegated to the United States, the state may consider it reserved for their disposition, and, when that is not applied, then the people retain the power.

Now, supposing that is the case, could the federal government, absent such delegated power, pass a law, or promulgate a rule (See The Bundy Affair – The Revenge of the BLM), that was Constitutional, or is it without jurisdiction – unless supported by another power or authority granted to the federal government? The “Clash of Laws” article refers to a Supreme Court decision, United States v Lopez 514 US 549 (1995), which removes any doubt as to whether the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, “To regulate Commerce … among the several States” (Art. I, §8, clause 3) allows that regulation to extend to any use, once removed from interstate commerce. The Court ruled, “To uphold the Government’s contention… would require this Court to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional Commerce Clause authority to a general police power of the sort held only by the States”. The Court, in declining to decide in the government’s favor, ruled that the government was unable to extend its “Commerce Clause authority” to encroach upon the authority reserved to the States.

So, that is two strikes against the federal government, in their intent to broaden their authority where it was never granted by the Constitution. Is it possible that there might be a third strike that would, without question, prohibit the federal government from imposing any limitation of the right to possess a firearm, leaving that power solely to the state government to do as they wish?

The first eight Amendments are prohibitions – things that the federal government cannot violate. Let’s start with the Second Amendment:

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

Before we proceed, it might be worth understanding what the definition of the most significant word in that Amendment is. This definition is from Webster’s 1828 Dictionary — words as they were understood by the Founders.

infringe, v.t.
1. To break, as contracts; to violate, either positively by contravention, or negatively by non-fulfillment or neglect of performance. A prince or a private person infringes an agreement or covenant by neglecting to perform its conditions, as well as by doing what is stipulated not to be done.
2. To break; to violate; to transgress; to neglect to fulfill or obey; as, to infringe a law.

infringed, pp. Broken; violated; transgressed.

Well, that is pretty clear that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed” means that it is not within the granted powers and authorities granted to the federal government, for it to do “what is stipulated not to be done”.

That appears to be a good start, though we need to go a bit further to see if that infringement is contrary to a provision of U. S. Code that is very consistent with the Second Amendment, and in its provisions, does not exclude the right, under federal law, to possess a firearm — except, possibly, while directly involved in interstate or foreign commerce.

So, what about the militia? The government tells us how bad they are, but, what does United States Code (the Law of the Land, as per Art. VI, say about the militia? From 10 U.S.C. §311, et seq, pertinent parts:

   § 311 – Militia: composition and classes – tells us who is in the militia. “The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section 313 of title 32 [note: this has to do with ages of officers], under 45 years of age…” It goes on to explain both organized and unorganized militia. The next section tells us who is exempt from the militia, to wit:

   § 312 : US Code – Section 312: Militia duty: exemptions

(a) The following persons are exempt from militia duty:

(1) The Vice President.

(2) The judicial and executive officers of the United States, the several States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.

(3) Members of the armed forces, except members who are not on active duty.

(4) Customhouse clerks.

(5) Persons employed by the United States in the transmission of mail.

(6) Workmen employed in armories, arsenals, and naval shipyards of the United States.

(7) Pilots on navigable waters.

(8) Mariners in the sea service of a citizen of, or a merchant in, the United States.

    (b) A person who claims exemption because of religious belief is exempt from militia duty in a combatant capacity, if the conscientious holding of that belief is established under such regulations as the President may prescribe. However, such a person is not exempt from militia duty that the President determines to be noncombatant.

Nowhere in this law made in pursuance to the Constitution, specifically the Second Amendment, does it prohibit a convicted felon from being in the militia. In fact, it is mandatory, since he is not exempted, that he be within those defined as “unorganized”. So, ponder this; can someone be in the militia that is unable to possess a firearm? That would seem to be contrary to the Constitutional provision pertaining for the militia. only the most absurd reasoning could devise to argue against a person’s right to possess a firearm, with the exception of that portion that prohibits direct involvement in interstate or foreign commerce.

Article VI, clause 2 tells us “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereofshall be the supreme Law of the Land.” So, if a law is made in pursuance, as opposed to without such authority, it is Constitutional. Otherwise, it is not.

So, do we allow the judges, who are constantly subverting the Constitution by ruling contrary to its provisions, or adding their personal beliefs, as enforceable points of law, to continue to rule in such a manner? Or, do we, as Americans, have every right to read, interpret, so long as we don’t err in that interpretation, abide by, and enforce the law as was intended by the Founders? Moreover, does this right extend to the use of whatever force necessary to free those shackled by government efforts to quash the Constitution in such a manner as to grant them powers that are tyrannical?

 

Related articles:

Liberty or Laws? — Dealing with the Current Invasion

Liberty or Laws? — Militia in Defense of the State

Liberty or Laws? — Militia in Aid of Our Neighbor

Liberty or Laws? — Immigration or Invasion

Liberty or Laws? — Treason Against the State

Liberty or Laws? — Government and Patriots Aiding and Abetting Criminal Activity

Liberty or Laws? — … and jealously guard our Liberties

Liberty or Laws? – Appeasement

Liberty or Laws? “Felon in Possession of a Firearm” is Not Legal or Lawful

Camp Lone Star – Massey & The Clash of Laws

Camp Lone Star – Massey & The Clash of Laws

Clash of Laws

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
October 27, 2014

 

K. C. Massey was in the area when a shooting occurred that brought numbers of Border Protection Service (BPS) agents, and Cameron County Sheriff Investigator Sergio Padilla, to the scene. The BPS agents asked that the weapons of all three individuals be turned over to BPS for reasons of safety (Explained in Massey’s account of incident). They were then turned over to Padilla, though at no time was Massey read Miranda rights, nor was the transfer of the weapons voluntary. It was simply done because they were agents, with guns, and in the principle of “discretion being the better part of valor”, they relinquished the weapons.

Those weapons then became the object of a Criminal Complaint, charging Massey and John Foerster (See Camp Lone Star – Update #1 on K. C. Massey) with felony possession of a firearm, based on 18 U. S. Code § 922 (g)(1).

Federal Authority and limitations

The theory behind laws, and the application of law, including ambiguity of the word, intent of the law, and misapplication of those laws is addressed in “No bended knee for me” – the Charge against Robert Beecher (for those interested in that aspect of persecution), however, the purpose of this article is to discuss what might be termed “the clash of laws” between the United States and Texas, under a Republican Form of Government (Art. IV, § 4 of the Constitution, as a member state of the Union of these United States (yes, the plural is intended).

To understand this clash, we must first look at the powers granted to, and the limitations imposed upon, on the federal government, by the Constitution.

First, there is the inevitable, and truly sacred, Second Amendment.

“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”

Now, that reference to “free State” applies only to the states, not to the federal government, since the existence of a federal militia was never addressed in the Constitution, only the authority to call forth the militia. The first reference to what might be considered a federal militia occurred in 1916 with the enactment of law embodied in 10 U.S.C. § 311 (See A United States Militia). So, the Constitutional references to militia and bearing arms are contained in that Second Amendment and the following provisions in the Constitution”

Article I, § 8, clause 15: To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

Article I, § 8, clause 16: To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

So, Congress can call forth the Militia, which they could not “call” if they were already under federal authority, and next, they recognize that “Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States”. Leaving, of course, officers and training, to the “parent” of the militia, the States.

The only other provision is found in Article II, § 2, which reads,

“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States…”

This makes clear that the Militia belong to the States, not to the federal government, except when called into service. Now, the only mention of “arms” is associated with that militia in the Second Amendment, which links any firearms laws only to the authority to the states (we will go further on this subject, later). The only applicability to federal authority, or should we say, prohibition, is that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” It appears that it wasn’t until the 1930s when the government first crossed that line drawn by the Constitution, and has continued to expand overarching authority into those Constitutionally prohibited realms, since that time (See The Three Constitutions – Which One do You Defend).

There is one more concern regarding federal authority that must be addressed, before we get to the heart of the matter. That is the authority granted regarding Commerce, Article I, § 8, clause 3, says,

“The Congress shall have Power… To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”

It does not grant any power within the states, only “among the several States”. That is interstate, not intrastate, commerce.

Then, we have the only other “commerce” provision in Article I, § 9, clause 6:

No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.”

Now, you need to keep these points in mind as we continue down a path of discovery — to determine what We, not the government, see as the powers granted and limitations imposed.

Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon (Federal)

The only charge against Massey, according to the Criminal Complaint, is a violation of 18 USC §922(g)(1) (the full text of §922(g) at 18 USC 922). The pertinent part is as follows:

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person –

(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

So, let’s look at the obvious intent of the law. First, “It shall be unlawful“, well, no problem with that.

Next, if that person “has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” Let’s assume for the sake of discussion, that that criterion has been met — that Massey has such a criminal record. So, now we move on to the third portion of the Statute.

It is unlawful “to ship or transport in interstate… commerce“. Now, this next phrase is rather interesting. “Possess” means “To occupy in person; to have in one’s actual and physical control“. So this must mean that you have in your control the firearm when you affect the commerce. The possession must be done while participating in or affecting that commerce. Finally, “to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate commerce.” Well, that last one surely must be the direct recipient, the addressee – to “receive”, as opposed to “possess”. For if that were the case, it would read, “to possess any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate commerce.

So, let’s revisit what we said about Commerce. “No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue… one State over those of another.” However, if we consider the implications of the law, if you live in a state that manufactures a firearm, then you can posses it, as it has not been involved in interstate commerce. However, if you have ammunition that was manufactured in another state, then you are guilty because of the ammunition. If you live in a state that manufactures both weapons and ammunition, you can posses those “firearms” and ammunition. However, if you live in a state that manufactures one, the other, or neither, then you may have but one, or none. That seems to give Preference to one state over another.

Further, this absolutely defies the concept of equal justice; it would defy the concept of Article IV, § 2, which states, “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all of the Privileges and Immunities of the Citizens of the several States.” And, it would mean that if one moved to another state, with what was legal, from the federal standpoint, in the state from which he began, he would criminal in the other state.

 

Texas Possession Laws

So, let’s see what Texas has to say about a convicted felon possessing a firearm. The applicable law is found in Texas Penal Code, Section 46.04. The pertinent part is as follows:

(a) A person who has been convicted of a felony commits an offense if he possesses a firearm:

(1) after conviction and before the fifth anniversary of the person’s release from confinement following conviction of the felony or the person’s release from supervision under community supervision, parole, or mandatory supervision, whichever date is later; or

(2) after the period described by Subdivision (1), at any location other than.

(f) For the purposes of this section, an offense under the laws of this state, another state, or the United States…

So, if one is convicted of a qualifying felony, after he has served his time gone through post conviction service, the clock starts. After five years, he cannot possess weapons, except at “the premises at which the person lives.” Now, premises, in legal terminology, is the house, outbuildings and land. This is to afford protection — once the five years has expired. It does not say house, it includes his whole dominion. He can protect his property.

Now, a question arises as to if he relocates, and lives elsewhere. In Massey’s case, he has lived at Camp Lone Star for four months. The land is owned by “Rusty” Monsees, and the camp is located on his property, with his consent. That is where he lives, so the premises, though not owned by him, is the premises that are applicable in the statute. He encountered the BPS on those premises, so he had every legal right to possess the weapons, under state law.

When he was arrested, he was in a motel room, where he lived the night before he was arrested. This may be a gray area, though it seems that since he lived in that motel room, that night, and that the obvious purpose of the law is for personal protection, that he would still be legal, under state law. The alternative would have been to either secure his firearms in his truck, or to leave them unattended at Camp Lone Star. Though this may be debatable, if we look at intent, it is probable. If not, the only violation, under state law, might be him having his weapons in the motel room. However, he was not charged with that. The initial charge came when he surrendered his weapons, without Miranda, while still fully in compliance with Texas law. The Complaint was based upon his lawful (state law) possession. The Complaint led to the arrest, which might be the only exception to state law. However, the Complaint, itself, admits to “forbidden fruit”.

So, where do we go, next?

Collision of Laws

Recently, Washington state and Colorado enact laws legalizing marijuana. Shortly thereafter, the Department of Justice announced that they were going to suspend prosecution of federal marijuana laws in those two states. Shall we ponder their reasoning for making such a decision?

Let’s suppose that state law says you can posses marijuana, and federal law says that you cannot. To begin to understand this, and the subsequent discussion, perhaps we need to interrupt, for a minute, and understand what James Madison told us in Federalist Papers #62:

It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is today, can guess what it will be tomorrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?

So, law is “a rule of action”, or, perhaps, a prohibition. But, it is there to guide us in remaining within the boundaries of law, or suffering the consequences of deviation from the law.

So, if marijuana is legal in Colorado, and criminal by federal law, which “rule of action” are we bound by? Well, the government did not want to face the consequences of a legal challenge to their presumed superiority of their laws over the state’s laws. Let’s look at Article IV, § 4, of the Constitution:

“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”

So, we have the only “guarantee” in the Constitution, and that is that we have a “Republican Form of Government”. That guarantee is that so long as the state does not enact a law in violation of the Constitution, they have every right to enact any other law — such as the marijuana law. Gee, it also provides that the government “shall protect… them against Invasion”. Golly, gee, isn’t that what K. C. Massey and Camp Lone Star were doing, since the government was having so much trouble fulfilling this obligation?

However, the marijuana laws are the “Conflict of Laws”, and, perhaps, the felony possession laws are also a Conflict of Laws. After all, the same dilemma arises. Can K. C. Massey possess firearms, so long as he does so in compliance with Texas Law, under their Republican Form of Government? Or, is he bound by federal law that depends so much on the Commerce provisions of the Constitution?

Let’s look at what the United States Supreme Court said about the extent of authority granted by the commerce clause. The case is United States v Lopez 514 US 549 (1995).

The federal government had enacted the “Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990”, which forbids “any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows . . . is a school zone.” The District Court denied Lopez, as they claimed that the law was “a constitutional exercise of Congress’ power to regulate activities in and affecting commerce.”

That decision was appealed to the Appellate Court, who then reversed the lower court decisions, when Chief Justice Rehnquist said,

Held:

The Act exceeds Congress’ Commerce Clause authority. First, although this Court has upheld a wide variety of congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity that substantially affected interstate commerce, the possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, have such a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Section 922(q) is a criminal statute [as is the charge against Massey] that by its terms has nothing to do with “commerce” or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly those terms are defined… Second, 922(q) contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearms possession in question has the requisite… nexus with interstate commerce. Respondent was a local student at a local school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce. To uphold the Government’s contention that 922(q) is justified because firearms possession in a local school zone does indeed substantially affect interstate commerce would require this Court to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional Commerce Clause authority to a general police power of the sort held only by the States.

In a Certiorari to the Supreme Court, the case was heard. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. After a lengthy discussion, affirming most of what the Appellate Court had said in their decision, and extending even further into limitations of federal authority, the Decision concludes, “For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed.

So, the Supreme Court, back in 1995, imposed a limitation of authority on the federal government, regarding the utilization of the Commerce Clause beyond its Constitutional intent. And, the law that was overturned, 18 U. S. Code Section 922(q), a part of the same statute that is being used against Massey, requires that there be an economic nexus to commerce for a law to be valid.

The first portion of this article explains the wording of the law, (922 (g)(1), and how it is clearly tied to commerce. Whether it was rewritten after the Lopez decision, or not, it must have the nexus to commerce. If the ownership of the gun by Lopez does not have that nexus, how, possibly, can the ownership by Massey have what the other did not?

Commerce begins when somebody “ships” something in interstate commerce. It continues when someone “transports” something interstate commerce. It finally ends when someone “receives” something that has been sent and transported. At that point, the nexus to commerce ceases, and we are back to “Equal Protection under the Law”, where the state that you live in is the authority as to whether you can posses guns or ammunition.

The final point to be made on this subject is the fact that the state of Texas has three branches of government. They have, like every other state, a Legislative, and Executive, and a Judicial branch. The Judicial, of course, is to render justice. The Legislative, to enact laws, under its “Republican Form of Government”, and the Executive to sign such enactments into law, and enforce them.

If what the federal government implies to be true by their persecution of K. C. Massey is true, then there is no need for the three branches of the government of Texas to exist. On the other hand, the government of Texas should take a more aggressive role, as the Supreme Court did, in limiting the overbearing and abused authority of the federal law enforcement agencies.

Let me repeat two quotations from the above. First is by Chief Justice Rehnquist in the Lopez decision, the second, my observation, from over twenty years of reporting to the Patriot community, on the ramifications and consequences of the current round of persecutions by the federal government, contrary to the state’s constitutions and laws:

  • To uphold the Government’s contention that 922(q) is justified because firearms possession in a local school zone does indeed substantially affect interstate commerce would require this Court to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional Commerce Clause authority to a general police power of the sort held only by the States.
  • If what the federal government implies to be true by their persecution of K. C. Massey is true, then there is no need for the three branches of the government of Texas to exist.

Therefore, We must ask ourselves whether the people are here to serve the government, or, is the government here to serve the people? If the former, then we acquiesce to a condition of servitude. If the latter, then we must, in the Court of Public Opinion, rise above the government, and force them back to the limitations imposed on them by the Constitution, by whatever means necessary.

 

Related articles:

Camp Lone Star – The Arrest of K. C. Massey

Camp Lone Star – Update #1 on K. C. Massey

Camp Lone Star – Search Warrant or Fishing license?

Camp Lone Star – Cruel and Unusual Punishments – Before Conviction

Camp Lone Star – Arbitrary & Capricious Justice?

Liberty or Laws? “Felon in Possession of a Firearm” is Not Legal or Lawful