Camp Lone Star – Act Two: The Contradictions Scene 3: To Be, or Not to Be – Forthright

Camp Lone Star – Act Two: The Contradictions
Scene 3: To Be, or Not to Be – Forthright

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Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
April 14, 2015

In Act One: The Government Charade, Judge Hanen graciously gave Prosecuting Attorney Hagen, the opportunity to respond to the Motions to Suppress and Dismiss, in greater detail, since he had failed to address some of the points presented in Mr. Sorola’s motions. The deadline for the response was April 10. So, we anxiously awaited that filing to see if Hagen could dig out of the hole he had created for himself, with his prosecution (persecution?) of K. C. Massey.

Well, I received a copy of Government’s Supplementary Response To Motion Suppress And Motion To Dismiss Indictment, on Friday, April 10. Now, it is typical of the “case law” method, which, well, let’s use the description of Teddy Roosevelt’s thoughts on this method, from the book “Bully Pulpit”, by Doris Kearns Goodwin. Case law method was developed at Harvard in 1872. Though the pleasure he took in his studies is amply expressed in his journal, he was troubled that ‘some of the teaching of the law books and of the classroom seemed to me to be against justice.’ He noted critically that ‘we are concerned with [the] question of what law is, not what it ought to be.'” So, like Teddy, we are stuck with what law is, not what it ought to be.”

Hagen’s Response addresses a number of higher court opinions, both Supreme and appellate, though we will only be looking at those opinions of the Supreme Court. So, let’s look at just how Mr. Hagen attempts to extricate himself from that hole. At this time, we will only address the Response to the Motion to Suppress.

First, he addresses the Motion to Suppress Evidence. In so doing, he lists the following:

(i) Defendant was observed carrying a rifle and that observation was made prior to any alleged search or stop;
(ii) Defendant was asked for his identification by law enforcement in the course of investigating a shooting involving a federal agent;
(iii) Defendant was detained after the shooting occurred as potential witnesses;
(iv) Defendant’s firearms were seized to protect both law enforcement and civilian witnesses; and,
(v) Defendant’s possession of two firearms was in violation of both state and federal law.

Regarding (i), this was discussed in the previous article. If the act was criminal, why did the government not arrest Massey when the observation was made? The answers rests on identification of Massey and determination of his status, none of which would have occurred had the “stop” or “detention” not occurred. Should we “cooperate” with law enforcement if going about our daily lives might result in subjecting ourselves to directed persecution? In this case, the shooter, in violation of both law and policy, and, the subject of the “investigation”, goes free, while the non-witness is subsequently arrested. One has to wonder if this whole thing was a set up to “get Massey”.

Regarding (ii) & (iii), that, too, was addressed in the previous post. Someone who, like the “investigator”, Cantu, had no more information than Cantu had, until Cantu received a radio message and passed that same information on to Massey, does not really qualify as a witness to anything. This leaves the question of “stop” or “detention” open, and that will be discussed shortly.

Regarding (iv), Foerster, Massey, and Varner, all retained their weapons, posing no threat, as testified to by Cantu. Subsequently, the decision was made, by persons unknown, that the weapons should be “secured”. “Seized”, as described in the Response, has no relationship to the testimony.

Regarding (v), here comes a problem, with Hagen’s comprehension skills. He quotes Texas Penal Code, as follows:

Texas Penal Code § 46.04 Unlawful Possession of Firearm

(a) A person who has been convicted of a felony commits an offense if he possess a firearm:

(1) After conviction and before the fifth anniversary of the persons release from confinement following conviction of the felony or the person’s release from supervision under community supervision, parole, or mandatory supervision, whichever date is later; or

(2) After the period described by Subdivision (1), at any location other than the premises at which the person lives.

So, it says, in the singular, that he is in violation “if he possess a firearm”, before the fifth anniversary. Are we to assume that if he possesses more than one firearm, he is exempt from violation? It says nothing about any limitation after the fifth anniversary. Except, perhaps, in some secret version of Texas law that Hagen has hidden in his drawers.

Now, if Hagen is suggesting that Massey was not at “the premises at which the person lives”, the government also already stated that Massey had been at Camp Lone Star for four months. So, can there be any doubt as to where he lived at the time of this incident? The purpose of this provision is, without doubt, to provide the means for protecting the “premise”. Does that preclude someone from going on to his neighbor’s property, with that neighbor’s permission, to provide for that protection?

However, we can put that all aside, as Massey is not charged with violation of state law, Hagen has charged him with violation of federal law. The Sheriff’s Office has not chosen to file charges against Massey in their jurisdiction, so that makes Hagen’s argument somewhere on the other side of moot.

So, let’s look at the Supreme Court decisions that Hagen has cited to defend his position. First is Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court Nevada 542 US 177. He argues that A police officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment.

So, let’s see what Hiibel says:

At 177, setting the background of the case, it says, Petitioner Hiibel was arrested and convicted in a Nevada court for refusing to identify himself to a police officer during an investigative stop involving a reported assault. Nevada’s “stop and identify” statute requires a person detained by an officer under suspicious circumstances to identify himself.”

At 184, we find Here there is no question that the initial stop was based on reasonable suspicion, satisfying the Fourth Amendment requirements noted in Brown.

Then finally, at 185, the pages cited by Hagen, we find, “Asking questions is an essential part of police investigations. In the ordinary course a police officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment. [I]nterrogation relating to one’s identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.” the Court has recognized that a law enforcement officer’s reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate further.

So, just what were the “suspicious circumstances”, or “reasonable suspicion”, that existed on August 29, 2014, on the Sabal Palms property? Perhaps Hagen should be instructing BPS, FBI, and others, as to what is required to “investigate” and require that one identify himself, absent the criteria established by the Supreme Court. I suppose that we could also ask Mr. Hagen what the difference is between and “interview”, as described in testimony, and, “interrogation”, as cited in this case.

Then, he cites INS v. Delgado 466 US 210. He does not, however, provide any quotation from that case, so I suppose that quantity rather than quality might be his motivation, here. So, to put a context on the current situation, I will provide the quotations. This case refers to whether INS could profile by asking questions of employees being suspected of being illegal aliens. So, here is what the cited page, 216, tells us:

In contrast, a much different situation prevailed in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), when two policemen physically detained the defendant to determine his identity, after the defendant refused the officers’ request to identify himself. The Court held that absent some reasonable suspicion of misconduct, the detention of the defendant to determine his identity violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure.

Unless the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded, one cannot say that the questioning resulted in a detention under the Fourth Amendment.

So, the Court has given us a situation, and then concludes, “Unless… a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded”, then the questioning was not a detention. However, Hagen as argued that this was a “stop” (Terry Stop), not a detention, and there is no doubt that when Massey “cooperated” in providing his identification, he had already been told that there was an investigation and that he could not leave.

Next, he cites United States v. Sharpe 470 US 675. At least he provides a context, and page (685), though, again, no quotation. So, we will begin at 684:

In that case, law enforcement agents stopped the defendant after his arrival in an airport and seized his luggage for 90 minutes to take it to a narcotics detection dog for a “sniff test.” We decided that an investigative seizure of personal property could be justified under the Terry doctrine, but that “[t]he length of the detention of respondent’s luggage alone precludes the conclusion that the seizure was reasonable in the absence of probable cause.”

And, at the cited page 685:

While it is clear that “the brevity of the invasion of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion,” we have emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes.

So, in the first instance, a stop of 90 minutes was unreasonable, absent “probable cause”. And, in the second, there was an “invasion of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests”, rests upon “reasonable suspicion”. They speak of “seizure”. That is what the Prosecution has claimed, and maintained by continue to retain, all of the firearms, except Varner’s. But, they were not “seized”, according to testimony. They were “secured” for Officer Safety.

Okay, just one more. This is United States v. Leon 468 US 897. Though no quotations are given, he points out that Rotunno, the agent who swore to the accuracy of the information used to secure the various Warrants and Criminal Complaint, was present neither at the shooting incident investigation on August 29, nor at the arrest on October 20, 2014. Quite simply, Rotunno “fabricated” (that is a polite form of lying) an important element of what happened on August 29, which implied that Foerster, and Foerster, alone, might have committed a criminal act by “pointing: his firearm at Gonzales. Massey and Varner were innocent parties to the entire episode. So, Hagen’s assertion might apply to Foerster, but the great leap to envelope Massey in his web is without any lawful or legal merit.

That doesn’t however, remove us from consideration of what the court said in U. S, v Leon.

In this case, a warrant was issued based upon observations during a drug trafficking investigation, by law enforcement officers. There was nothing illegal about the observations, nor were there misrepresentations, or outright lies, in the affidavit that resulted in the warrant.

The court held that Application of the exclusionary rule should continue where a Fourth Amendment violation has been substantial and deliberate, but the balancing approach that has evolved in determining whether the rule should be applied in a variety of contexts – including criminal trials – suggests that the rule should be modified to permit the introduction of evidence obtained by officers reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate.”

Further, that “the courts must also insist that the magistrate purport to perform his neutral and detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police… However the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.”

And, that “A police officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable. Suppression remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth, or if the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his detached and neutral judicial role.”

So, though even Foerster may find relief by this decision, Massey was nothing more than a bystander in the events of August 29, and nothing conjured by Hagen can change that relationship. There was never the requisite probable cause, suspicion, or any other factor, that would ensnare Massey in this web. It is only Hagen’s desire to please those “up the river” that forces him to persist in the persecution of K. C. Massey.

Now, I realize that what was just stated might be considered by some to be overstepping the bounds of propriety. However, we must not detach ourselves from the reality that we are constantly presented with the excuse that, “there are only a few bad cops”. We have learned, over time that “few” is a gross misrepresentation of reality.

Let us simply refresh our minds with a recent event wherein an innocent man spent thirty years on Death Row. He was released when his innocence was final acknowledged. His innocence was known by the Prosecutor, from the very beginning. That Prosecutor, Marty Stroud, has repented. Marty Stroud is demonstrative of the subject of the book, “Three Felonies a Day”, by Harvey A. Silverglate, in which the objective is to obtain a conviction, regardless of guilt, and to distort the wording of the law to achieve that end.


  1. Kyle says:

    Your observation that “the King can do no wrong” seem very apropos to the political persecution of Kevin Massey. As Justice Brandeis wrote in his dissenting opinion during the 1928 Olmstead case, “To declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal – would bring terrible retribution.” And the government has done exactly that, as mentioned during the 1976 Church Committee’s hearings summary, “Government officials…have advocated and defended their right to break the law.” What we have here is a political situation whereby the government exists in a completely different moral sphere from the citizenry; what is illegal for you and I to do is permissible for them to skate by on, with no adverse consequences to them whatsoever.

    I think another lesson that Massey’s case tells us is that a likely consequence of working “with” USBP is that they will betray the patriots. As mentioned in a previous installment of your Liberty or Laws? series (, I think Massey should be a cautionary tale for anyone who thinks it’s a mighty fine activity to work hand-in-hand with Border Patrol, doing anything at all. I think this two part interview of Massey describing his case nicely lays it all out: &

  2. […] the form of a security team or a private defense agency. The reason why American patriots like Kevin Massey andWilliam Wolf got persecuted by the federal government the way that they did is because they both […]

  3. […] Camp Lone Star – Act Two: The Contradictions Scene 3: To Be, or Not to Be – Forthright […]

  4. […] Some previous articles that discuss the “case law method”:Camp Lone Star – Act Two: The Contradictions Scene 3:  To Be, or Not to Be – Forthright, Camp Lone Star – Act II – A Kangaroo Court – Scene 1 – How Case Law […]

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