Camp Lone Star – Act III – A Kangaroo Court
Scene 2 – Presumption of Guilt

Massey’s own little Dungeon

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
June 25, 2015

We will begin with three definitions. The first is an amendment to the Constitution, that being limitations imposed upon the federal government and for the securing of our rights, as understood by the Framers of the Constitution, and, which are our birthright.

The second, the legal definition of one of the terms of that amendment, included to clarify that term.

The third, the description of what is known as a Kangaroo Court. As you read the following, you will see that all three of the definitions provided for such a Court are applicable in the case against K.C. Massey.

8th Amendment
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Bail [Black’s Law Dictionary – 5th Edition]
The Surety or sureties who procure the release of a person under arrest, by becoming responsible for his appearance at the time and place designated.

Kangaroo Court
1: a mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded or perverted
2: a court characterized by irresponsible, unauthorized, or irregular status or procedures
3: judgment or punishment given outside of legal procedure
(Merriam Webster)

In a previous article, Cruel and Unusual Punishments – Before Conviction, the conditions of release according to the Appearance Bond, were discussed. There were a number of conditions set, though the first three predicate the whole of the “Bond” that he was subject to. Those three were:

To appear for court proceedings

If convicted, to surrender to serve a sentence that the court may impose

To comply with all conditions set forth in the Order Setting Conditions of Release.

Now, based upon the definition of “bail” and the prohibition against “excessive bail”, when we look at the conditions, is it possible that the third condition, “to comply…”, might be deemed “excessive”, in that it goes beyond a requirement to appear, as per the definition, and the intent of the Bill of Rights?

Now, heed what we are discussing, for every patriot knows that he stands for the Constitution, and in so doing may be placing himself in a situation where he might find that he is charged and arrested for some made up crime.

However, since the government holds the guns, if Massey wanted to stay out of jail, pending trial, which he was more than willing to stand for, he would have to agree to the conditions.

The day that Massey was arrested, they did a UA (Urine Analysis) and find THC (from marijuana) in his test. So, they filled out the conditions as they would for someone charged with selling drugs, requiring random UA testing. Well, THC stays in your system for weeks, or longer. So, a scheduled test would have been sufficient to determine if he had not broken the law by using marijuana, since there is no federal law against use of marijuana. The random aspect of testing was detrimental to another condition, that he be gainfully employed, since he could be called from work to report for the UA, at any time, disrupting his reliability at work.

Massey agreed to the terms on November 3, 2014. He first refused the UA test in May 2015. He had gone over six months with absolute compliance with the conditions, even though he knew that they were unconstitutional. However, since half a year does not cut it for a speedy trial, and the confinement to home, not even allowed to maintain his property away from the immediate vicinity of the house, without prior permission from the Probation Officer (he is not on probation, he only, constitutionally, has to appear in court), and finding that when he was supposed to drive the ninety miles to Dallas for the UA, broke down, and refused the UA. Since he had taken that step, he continued to refuse subsequent calls for a UA.

That is until his next court appearance. Knowing that he would probably not pass the UA that he knew they would require when he arrived for the June 2 hearing, but he went to court, as required by the Constitution and the Conditions.

Now, the punishment that he received, prior to that June 10 hearing was bad enough. He was not a free, innocent man, until proven guilty. He was subject to conditions that were slightly less than if he had been in jail. He had such a limited amount of freedom that it could, nowise, be considered such.

Since he failed the UA on the 10th, he was sent to jail in the custody of the Brownsville Sheriff, though the contract with the federal government put him under the authority of the U. S. Marshall Service. The Marshall Service decided the Massey should be in Maximum Security. They have also imposed other conditions and restrictions that, along with general jail procedures, have imposed the following on Massey:

• His cell (sketch, above) is about 7′ by 10 feet, and includes bed, toilet, shower and table.
• He has only had only two 1-hour recreation periods since he has been in jail (three weeks).
• When he leaves the cell, for any reason, he first puts his hands through the food port and they are handcuffed. Then he is allowed out and told to face the wall while shackles are placed on his ankles and a chain around his waist. Then, he is handcuffed to the waist chain — yes, two bracelets on each hand.
• When he is out of his cell, he is always escorted by three guards, and the hallways are cleared before he can enter a hallway. One of the guards is constantly videotaping the procession.
• There is one window, in the cell door. That is where food is fed to the “animals”. It has a magnetic cover and is only open, with few exceptions, when they want to talk with him, pass food, or deliver the telephone to him so that he can make phone calls.
• Some guards will leave the door window cover off, at night, when the lights are dimmed, so they can do bed checks, about hourly. Other guards prefer to open the window, bang on the door, and make a lot of noise, then shine a flashlight in to see if he is there, and probably to make sure he is awake, every hour, during their shift.
• His cell walls are painted white, and the only constant sound is the whistling of the air-conditioning blowing into the call, keeping the temperature in the sixties. He only has one blanket.

As far as personal attention to his needs, he has gotten the many food gifts that were sent to him. He has had health problems. At one doctor call, he was found to have blood and high protein levels in his urine. For this, the doctor prescribed antibiotics. He tried them for three days and his stomach reacted, giving him pain, so he stopped taking the antibiotics. They have reported him for refusing to take his medicine, though they have not reported why he has refused it.

• He has a preexisting water on the knee problem that he has always treated with exercise, which provides relief.
• He has a pre-existing case of shingles, for which they have given him Triamcinolone, and he has had some relief.
• They had given him one Ibuprofen per day, taken in the presence of the guards, though he has had to quit taking them as it exacerbated the kidney problem.
• He has pain in his kidney, and, hopefully, will receive some treatment for that when he sees the doctor, again. He had been dealing with the kidney problem with exercise, to the point of perspiration to remove toxins, and cranberry juice. However, it is difficult to perspire in such a confined space with temperatures in to sixties.

If Massey is convicted, he will no longer be under the authority of the U. S. Marshall Service, but will be under Bureau of Prisons. At that point, being convicted, his living conditions will be far better than what he is currently enduring, and he will have regular exercise and will be able to seek necessary medical attention, without the constraints that are currently imposed upon him.

It appears that, perhaps, the government has taken the 8th Amendment literally, as it implies that once you are convicted, you can not be subjected to “cruel and unusual punishment”. It fails to prohibit cruel and unusual punishment prior to conviction, and, clearly, that is what Massey has been subjected to since his first arrest.

As far as “excessive bail”, the Conditions of Release were for an unsecured bond of $30,000. Whether that might be considered excessive, or not, is subjective, but let’s assume that it is not for the sake of discussion. If we assume that to be the point that anything over it would be excessive, then the conditions would, without a doubt, qualify as EXCESSIVE, and they go well beyond the simple historical concept of assuring that one be present in court, when required to.

As far as the Kangaroo Court, there is no doubt that “the principles of law and justice are disregarded or perverted“, and that this is “characterized by irresponsible, unauthorized, or irregular status or procedures“, and, finally, that “punishment [is] given outside of legal procedure“.

Quite simply put, some of the conditions that have been imposed upon Massey are outside of the constitutional framework created by the Founders, and some equate more toward medieval dungeon techniques resorted to by kings, tyrants, dictators, and other despots.

If we consider that if he is convicted of a crime, his conditions will improve, considerably, then we must also conclude that the justice system is based more upon punishment for Presumption of Guilt than upon any sense of justice.

Greenmail
Income Tax, Flat Tax, or, No Tax?

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
June 22, 2015

For those who believe that the federal government should tax us, either by income tax or a fair tax, or any other direct means of taxation, must understand that doing so only creates socialism among the states (taking from one to give to another), as the following table shows (A more complete table can also be found at Tax Foundation Special Report No. 158, “Federal Tax Burdens and Spending by State).

The table is from 2005 (I haven’t found a newer one, yet), so I would suppose that the only changes, absent minor redistributions of moneys, would be that the numbers have gone up, proportionately, in the last 6 years.

Note that $2,084,247,000,000 was taken in through taxes and that $2,210,184,000,000 was sent back to the states. This results in nearly $126 billion that was added back to the states’ side (to the benefit of the state). This additional money is likely a debt passed on to our posterity. And, this does not account for the many trillions spent by the federal government, each year, to support wars, foreign aid, and the expense of operating the government and its administrative agencies.

So, if the money never went to the federal government (income taxes), then the states would have had less revenue, even if they retained that which would have gone to the federal government for redistribution back to the states.

Now, there is also a loss in the administration of the distribution of the money. First, it is collected (IRS); then it has to go to the various agencies (accounting) for distribution back to the states (with all of the strings attached); then the state has to distribute the funds according to those strings, which, surely, requires a significant staff to assure that no money goes where the federal government does not want it to go, and vice-versa.

How much less would it cost if the states collected that money (and, being closer to home, might be more cautious in their raising taxes and spending recklessly, or to comply with federally mandated programs), and determined where it was to go, without federal intervention?

Now, if this does not convince you that a federal direct tax is unnecessary, and that it is used to manipulate social change and to bring the states into subjugation, then I would appreciate your explanation as to why it does not.

You should also note that Washington, D.C. gets back nearly six times, per capita, what it contributes, which amounts to over $65,000 per resident of that “model” city.

You can understand that rather than calling this blackmail, it is more appropriately defined as “Greenmail”.

* During fiscal years in which the federal government runs deficits some spending is financed through borrowing. This creates implicit tax liabilities for states that must be repaid eventually. To incorporate these implicit tax liabilities into the analysis, the following adjustment was made to state tax burdens: First, the total federal tax burden is increased by the size of the federal deficit. Next, this total burden is allocated among states based on each state’s proportion of the actual federal tax burden. Finally, adjusted spending-per-dollar-of-tax ratios are calculated by dividing actual expenditures by the adjusted tax figure, effectively making figures deficit neutral.

Source: Tax Foundation Special Report No. 158, “Federal Tax Burdens and Spending by State,” and U.S. Census Bureau’s Consolidated Federal Funds Report for 2005.

“No bended knee for me”
Who Does the Patriot Fight For?

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
June 15, 2015

Almost every patriot I have met, when asked, “What are you willing to fight for?”, will answer, my family – my children and grandchildren. The Founders chose the word “Posterity” to explain their objective in both fighting and establishing a new government comprised of member States. What they did, they did for us, their posterity.

So, what happened when that government established upon those principles, as well as others, becomes the enemy of that very protection that they were, and we are, willing to fight for?

In 1997, Jennifer McVeigh was threatened with a charge of treason and the possibility of the death penalty (McVeigh’s Sister Tells Why She Aided U.S. Case Against Him) if she refused to testify against her brother. As tough at is it was, she opted to testify against her sibling.

Robert Beecher recently faced a similar situation. His daughter, Jessica, had owned two .22 caliber rifles that were found on the property that Beecher lived on, and one of which was included in the Indictment. She had also bought her father a .30-30 rifle for his birthday. This, too, was included in the Indictment and a picture of Robert holding the 30-30, pasted in Facebook, was instrumental in the government filing a Criminal Complaint, and securing search and arrest warrants for the property and Beecher.

During the initial interrogation of Beecher, FBI Special Agent Slater, having already ascertained that Jessica had purchased the firearms, suggested, “Maybe we should arrest her, instead”. Though the applicability of federal law is, and ought to be, questioned, 18 U. S. Code §922 (d)(1) does make it criminal to transfer a weapon to a know felon, regardless of state law (See “Felon in Possession of a Firearm” is Not Legal or Lawful).

With the possibility of Jessica serving ten years in prison for giving a birthday present, Robert had the unfortunate necessity of making one of the most difficult decisions of his life. It was whether he, or Jessica, or both, would spend ten years in prison.

The only decision that could be more severe than what Robert faced would be whether he would give his life for her. Now the latter decision, I think we all would agree, has only one proper answer. So, we must consider that the former also has only one answer.

Some questions arise as to whether the threat to go after Jessica would be carried out. Would it have gotten Robert off on his charges? Would the government even stoop so low as to make such a threat — to coerce someone into pleading guilty to what should not even be a crime, unless there was criminal intent in the activity?

We have been taught that we are a nation of laws, not a nation of men. So, just what laws are we a nation of?

In 1982, the Justice Department tried to determine how many federal criminal laws there were. Their answer was that there were over 3,000 criminal laws (however, many of those laws have multiple conditions that may be met, increasing the actual crimes to considerably more) contained within the 23,000 (currently 27,000) pages of U. S. Code.

When there are that many laws, we are not a nation of law; rather, we are a nation subject to the will of the men that administer those laws.

This brings to mind a quote from James Madison in Federalist #63:

It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is today, can guess what it will be tomorrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?

In Robert’s first letter to me, he said, “No bended knee for me”. Against what Robert was faced with, he stood firm to the principles that guide true patriots. He refused to bend a knee, though the force was overwhelming, and he had no choice but to succumb to that force. He was willing to sacrifice a portion of his life — for his Posterity.

His plea agreement, which he entered into to protect his family, especially his daughter, Jessica, committed him to 10 years in prison and 5 years supervised release. The government has promised (if any weight can be attributed to a government promise) to file for a sentence reduction within 360 days. Only time will tell if, and what, that will be.

In the meantime, we must all understand that those who speak out will find that the government will pull out all of the stops to put us in prison, if they can find just one violation of those 3,000 laws. This will continue to be true UNTIL such time as we find the need to replace the government that has deviated so far from what the Founders intended.

Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus
Scene 4 – Government Fears Habeas Corpus

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 27, 2015

Setting the Stage: Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum (the sacred writ) has not been addressed at the Supreme Court since 1890. A recent effort resulted in the Supreme Court simply refusing to rule on a Petition for Habeas Corpus, even after all of the lower courts refused to even acknowledge that right. Now, in the current story, the Court has paid “token” acknowledgment of the right, while endeavoring to quash it — rather than pursuing Justice, as is its constitutional responsibility. Instead, as you will see, the Federal District Court in Montana is there to make sure that the government has no chance of losing a case.

The Government is Afraid of Habeas Corpus

William Krisstofer Wolf (that’s is how the government refers to a friend that we know simply as “Wolf”) and I have known each other for over a year. We have never met, but we have shared many hours of phone conversation, email correspondence, and I can’t count the number of times I was a guest on his radio show on “The Montana Republic”.

Among the subjects discussed in those appearances were “The Plan for Restoration of Constitutional Government“, “Declaration of Dissolution of Government”, “Targeting“, “Committees of Safety“, and “Habeas Corpus – The Guardian of Liberty“. The last, regarding the “Sacred Writ”, Habeas Corpus, was also the subject of some of our private conversations. Wolf fully understands what I had learned, over the past three years, though we had never anticipated having to call upon the sacred writ on his behalf — until he was arrested on March 25, 2015.

Based upon our previous conversations on the subject, I prepared a simple demand for Habeas Corpus (3 pages) and a Power of Attorney authorizing me to speak o his behalf regarding Habeas Corpus. These were Priority mailed to him on March 27, and he executed and attempted to have them delivered to the Court. After numerous attempts to have the guards take and deliver the documents to the Court, and the Court refusing to recognize the prepared Habeas Corpus, Wolf resorted to a one page, handwritten, Habeas Corpus (Court Doc. 1), dated April 1, to wit:

United States of America
v.                                             15-                  -BIL-CSO
William Krisstofer Wolf

In the Honorable Court of:
UNITED STATES Magistrate Judge Carol S. Ostby
On April 1, 2015, I, William Krisstofer Wolf, by the only means available. in Yellowstone Corrections Facility interoffice mail, SERVE on the court a DEMAND FOR HABEAS CORPUS.
In as such, I, William Krisstofer Wolf hereby request to be put on the Docket to Schedule a hearing date on the DEMAND FOR HABEAS CORPUS. This docket request for a scheduling here is needed to allow my Attorney in Fact, who has a Power of Attorney – Specific, time to travel to this Honorable Court to speak on my behalf, by authority of the case of Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 US 146.

Done on this Day, April 1, 2015
/s/William Krisstofer Wolf
Defendant

This was sufficient for the Court to finally take notice of Wolf’s right to challenge both unconstitutional laws and absence of jurisdiction. On April 15, the Court “Received” the document. The Court stated that they would not let the Habeas Corpus hold the Court hostage, so they opened a civil case, on April 16, and filed the handwritten Habeas Corpus and then filed an ORDER (Court Doc. 2), immediately thereafter.

The Court’s Efforts to Quash Habeas Corpus

Here are some of the “claims” made in the ORDER (Court Doc. 2):

1. [T]he document does not specify the number of the criminal case or indicate in any other way that it is meant to be filed in the criminal case.
2. [T]he document states that Wolf is acting “by the only means available”; yet counsel was appointed for Wolf in the criminal case on March 26, 2015.
3. Wolf did not pay the filing fee of $5.00 or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
4. “In all courts of the United States, the parties may plead and conduct their own causes personally or by counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (emphasis added); see also Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). [She concludes this claim with the statement] “Wolf may litigate this matter pro se, or he may appear through duly qualified and admitted counsel without an attorney-in-fact.
5. [T]he “‘demand for habeas corpus’ does not set forth any allegations of fact”. “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Wolf cannot mount such an attack until he alleges facts he believes demonstrate that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2242. If Wolf intends to proceed, he must submit an amended petition alleging such facts and explaining why his custody violates the law.
6. If Wolf intended to seek a detention hearing in the criminal case that is pending against him, he should discuss this with his attorney, who can file a motion for a detention hearing under the criminal case number, CR 15-20-MJ-BLG-CSO. If Wolf wishes to file the motion on his own, the Court will then need to consider the motion and decide whether to entertain the motion from Wolf personally, notwithstanding his representation by counsel. But the rule that an attorney-in-fact may not act for Wolf in court applies in all federal cases, civil or criminal. Kelley, 539 F.2d at 1201-03. Moreover, in the criminal case, Wolf’s attorney-in-fact can play no role at all. Wolf is the person charged.

Response to The Court’s Efforts to Quash Habeas Corpus

So, let’s look at what the correct response is to the above claims:

As far as Claim #1, Wolf had no access to documents, and by this time, he was “blocked” from calling some of his friends on the phone. At the time that he wrote the handwritten, which was long after the typed 3 page version (Court Doc. 3), he had only the “Criminal Complaint“, and from that, was only able to extract “15-     -BIL-CSO”, which he properly quoted in the handwritten document, and it was styled as all subsequent filings, “United States of America v. William Krisstofer Wolf”, just as the Court did. So, that doesn’t take rocket science, heck, even the Post Office could have figured that out.

To Claim #2, that he is acting “by the only means available”, raises an interesting question. Wolf stated to the Judge, at his next appearance, that he does not recognize the jurisdiction of the Court and he had no intention of entering a plea. So, if he were to go through the court appointed attorney, an officer of that court, would he not be submitting to the jurisdiction that that Court? There is little doubt, as you will see, that the Court will resort to obfuscation and chicanery in an effort to undermine his right to challenge that persecution that is currently being conducted against him.

Claim #3 says that he “did not pay the filing fee of $5.00”. I can find no reference to the filing fee in the “UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA – Local Rules of Procedure“. However, with regard to:

Rule 3.1 Filing a New Case.

(a) Required Items. The following items are required to file a new case:

(1) a complaint, petition, or other originating document;

(2) unless the originating document is a petition for writ of habeas corpus, payment of the full amount of the filing fee or a motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); and

(3) a civil cover sheet, unless the plaintiff or petitioner is proceeding pro se.

So, the originating document (1)was provided, though they refused the first and opened the case based upon the handwritten document. As to the fee, there is an exception for Habeas Corpus (2), and otherwise, only the full amount can be accepted. It does not address any partial, or alternate fee, such as $5.00, it simply exempts Habeas Corpus from fees. As it exempts the requirement for a cover sheet (3), if he is proceeding pro se (presumably, that would also apply to someone proceeding “pro per”. So, why the effort to extort (yes, that is the legal term) $5.00 from Wolf? Or, is it an effort to simply place obstructions in the way, to discourage his attempt to seek his right to challenge the Court?

Now, with Claim #4, we enter into a rather interesting aspect, which deals directly with our rights and efforts to force us into submission to the dictates of the government. This will be similar to those in #5 and #6, though we will consider them separately. The claim cites both 28 U.S.C. § 1654 and the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). Consequently, “[a]ny individual acting without an attorney must appear personally and may not delegate that duty to any other person who is not a member of the bar of this Court.” D. Mont. L.R. 83.8(a) [Local Rules of Procedure]; see also United States v. Kelley, 539 F.2d 1199, 1201-03 (9th Cir. 1976).

28 U.S. Code § 1654 – Appearance personally or by counsel
In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.

As stated earlier, a writ “is a form of written command in the name of a court or other legal authority to act, or abstain from acting, in some way.” It requires no plea, nor is it a case; it is a request for the court to command an action, which, in the matter of Habeas Corpus, is to issue the writ to raise the questions posed by the person requesting the writ. From that point, it’s not a matter of innocence or guilt, it is to assure that there is proper legal authority regarding the action upon which it is based.

The next citation is the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35:

And be it further enacted, That in all courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by assistance of such counsel or attorneys at law as by the rules of the said courts respectively shall be permitted to manage and conduct causes therein… for crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United States, and all civil actions in which the United States shall be concerned… in the respective courts before which the suits or prosecutions shall be.

In the broadest construction, that “assistance of counsel”, which clearly is not an “attorney at law”, hence the “or”, nor the party, himself, hence the other “or”, which leaves the possibility that a party, a person, may, since he is also capable of taking all responsibility upon himself, assign another to speak on his behalf, as an “attorney in fact”.

The Court references D. Mont. L.R. 83.8(a):

83.8 Self-Represented Litigants.

(a) Any individual acting without an attorney must appear personally and may not delegate that duty to any other person who is not a member of the bar of this Court. A selfrepresented person is bound by the Federal Rules and all applicable local rules. Sanctions, including but not limited to entry of default judgment or dismissal with prejudice, may be imposed for failure to comply with local rules.

This Rule applies to “litigants. This will be addressed along with the cited Kelley case.

Regarding United States v. Kelley, as we look at that case, we might wonder just what the Court was thinking, or was it stabbing blindly, in the dark, to endeavor to equate Kelley with the current matter, the writ. Kelley was being prosecuted. He was not seeking to question the constitutionality of the law, nor the jurisdiction. First, “he argues that he had a right to be represented by a non-lawyer.” Then, “Kelley sought to have his trusted friend Hurd, who was well-versed on Kelley’s monetary theory, serve as trial counsel. Hurd is a roofer and not a licensed attorney. The district court denied the request and prohibited Hurd from sitting at the counsel table or consulting with Kelley during the course of the trial.”

It is well known that if you don’t assert a right, the Court will not grant you that right. Kelley wanted Hurd to sit with him and counsel him. Kelley did not provide a “power of attorney”, according to the decision, he just wanted Hurd to sit and advise him. It doesn’t begin to approach the question at hand. This case is not on point, since it is silent on the point that the Court is trying to make about power of attorney and attorney in fact, and whether this is applicable to a writ, instead of litigation.

Finally, she says that he “may litigate this matter pro se, or he may appear through duly qualified and admitted counsel without an attorney-in-fact.” “Litigate means, “To dispute or contend in form of law; to settle a dispute or seek relief in a court of law; to carry on a suit… a judicial contest.” This is not a dispute, it is simply seeking an answer to a challenge to jurisdiction and constitutionality. As stated before, it is “a form of written command in the name of a court… to act, or abstain from acting, in some way.” It is not an adversarial proceeding.

Wolf had provided a “Power of Attorney”, making Gary Hunt his “Attorney in Fact”, and that was submitted to the Court and filed in the case. Therefore, it is before the Court. The Court, however, challenges Wolf’s right to have someone other than the court appointed attorney, or another “attorney at law”, speak for him on this matter that is not a suit, and, is not a prosecution, it is a “writ of right”, asking the Court to rule on the question presented — that being whether the laws upon which the charges are based, are, in fact, constitutional as applied to Wolf, and whether he falls under the jurisdiction of the authority behind those laws, and the Court, itself (or should I say, “herself”?).

So, let’s see what both “power of attorney” and “attorney in fact” mean (Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition):

Power of attorney: An instrument authorizing another to act as one’s agent or attorney. The agent is attorney in fact and his power is revoked on the death of the principal by operation of law. Such power may be either general or special. [no citations given]

Attorney in fact: An attorney authorized to act in his place and stead, either for some particular purpose, as to do a particular act, or for the transaction of business in general, not of legal character. This authority is conferred by an instrument in writing, called a “letter of attorney,” or more commonly a “power of attorney”. [no citations given]

Now, so as not to be misunderstood, that phrase, “not of a legal character” applies only to the “general business”, which is separated from the “particular act” by the “or”.

So, what the Court has said is, well, not on point to the entire matter before it.

So, let’s move on to Claim #5:

Though she does cite, correctly, from the case, when she says, “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody”, she has the subject of custody out of context to what is applicable in Wolf’s case. Wolf has not been convicted. He is challenging his detention based upon absence of jurisdiction as well as absence of constitutional authority of the charges against him. In Preiser, Rodriguez had been convicted and had already served some time in prison. He had sought relief from the length of his sentence, well, in the words of the decision:

Respondents were state prisoners who had elected to participate in New York’s conditional-release program, by which a prisoner serving an indeterminate sentence may earn up to 10 days per month good-behavior-time credits toward reduction of his maximum sentence… Held: When a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his physical imprisonment and by way of relief seeks a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

This decision, Preiser, as stated in the decision, is an action under 28 U.S, Code §2254:

(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 US Code § 2251: Stay of State court proceedings, begins the subject of dealing with state prisoners challenging through the federal court system. Wolf’ case is purely federal, so we need not concern ourselves, though the court has, with this,. Even if we did, we are really discussing what it says in §2241 (b), below, so I have no idea what her majesty was thinking; she should no that this is a federal matter — I think.

Though the ORDER does not cite §2254, as the case does, it does, properly, cite §§2241-2242, below. However, this citation is really apples and oranges, as the Preiser decision has no bearing on the subject of this current matter. §2254 has no relevance, at all, to the Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum Wolf is seeking, and that the Court is required to respond (answer) to.

So, let’s look at the pertinent parts of 28 U. S. Code §§2241-2242:

28 U.S.C. § 2241 : US Code – Section 2241: Power to grant writ

(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had.

(b) The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit judge may decline to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer the application for hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it.

(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless –

(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or

(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United States; or

(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States; or

28 U.S.C. § 2242 : US Code – Section 2242: Application

Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf. It shall allege the facts concerning the applicant’s commitment or detention, the name of the person who has custody over him and by virtue of what claim or authority, if known. It may be amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions. If addressed to the Supreme Court, a justice thereof or a circuit judge it shall state the reasons for not making application to the district court of the district in which the applicant is held.

So, the District Court is the proper place in which to initiate a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum. Now, under subparagraph (c), we find two applicable qualifiers for who may Petition for such writ. The ORDER cites subparagraph (3), though seems to skip right over subparagraph (1). However, until the person detaining Wolf has answered the writ, that determination cannot be made. Though that last sentence may seem confusing, we will shed some light on it as we venture into the next relevant section, that the Court seemed to have completely, or conveniently, overlooked.

28 U.S.C. § 2243 : US Code – Section 2243: Issuance of writ; return; hearing; decision

A court, justice or judge entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.

The respondent is, of course, the person who has detained Wolf, or that Wolf is detained under the authority thereof. So, unless the Court can show that the applicant (“attorney in fact”, or, “next friend”) is not entitled thereto, which it has, perhaps, insufficiently, attempted to do, must either grant or require the respondent to “show cause”. By the way, “forthwith” is without delay, immediately, etc., It does not provide for excuses, only action.

The writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained. It shall be returned within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.

Now, the civil case was opened on April 15, fully two weeks after the Habeas Corpus was submitted, “by the only means available”, and the Court has still not, over a month later, even begun the process that §2243 requires. So, from the “forthwith”, being the starting of the clock required for what Madison, the father of the Constitution, described as “in the most expeditious and ample manner“, the respondent then has three days to return, which is “to show cause”. Remember, the Fourth Amendment states that you have the right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation”.

Further, the Court states, “Wolf cannot mount such an attack until he alleges facts he believes demonstrate that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”. But, wait just a minute. The Amendment says that the government has to show “nature” and “cause”, not the accused. This is supported by the wording in §2243, that the “order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained.” It sort of makes you wonder if law school has any courses on English comprehension.

Continuing with §2243:

The person to whom the writ or order is directed shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention. When the writ or order is returned a day shall be set for hearing, not more than five days after the return unless for good cause additional time is allowed.

There it is, again. The person making the return, that would be the person detaining, not the person detained, “shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention.” How could that have possible been overlooked by a District Judge, in whose hands lie the lives and futures of those who are required to stand before her for judgment? And, when is that damned hearing going to be held? Wolf sits in detention, denied his liberty, while the judge fritters away that very object that brought the colonies to rebel against England, and part ways with a corrupted judicial system.

The remainder of §2243:

Unless the application for the writ and the return present only issues of law the person to whom the writ is directed shall be required to produce at the hearing the body of the person detained. The applicant or the person detained may, under oath, deny any of the facts set forth in the return or allege any other material facts.

The return and all suggestions made against it may be amended, by leave of court, before or after being filed.

The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.

Now, that last line says it all, that “The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.”

As to Claim #6, Wolf does not seek a detention hearing, as to do so would admit to jurisdiction. The other points in this Claim have already been addressed.

Stay tuned for Act I, Scene 5.

Camp Lone Star — A Favorable Ruling?

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 26, 2015

On March 30, Massey attended a hearing with testimony that was discussed in Camp “Lone Star — The Setup – Get Massey“. At the end of that hearing, since the government had not responded directly to the existing “Motion to Dismiss”, Judge Hanen allowed the Prosecutor until April 10, and the Defense until April 17, to file supplemental motions.

Massey’s attorney, Louis Sorola, submitted a First Supplement to Opposed Motion to Dismiss Indictment. However, rather than just arguing “case law”, though some was included, he ventured into the realm of “substantive law”, arguing two points with regard to the Constitution, and not just previous decisions.

Massey wanted to challenge jurisdiction, though he was too late to do so, having pled “not guilty”. He also wanted to question the constitutionality of the charges against him, for a number of reasons — most significantly, those discussed in “Camp Lone Star – Massey & The Clash of Laws“. However, his former attorney, Ed Cyganiewicz, refused to take the battle to the courtroom, preferring to go along with the game of “let’s make a deal”. Fortunately, Massey’s insistence in fighting, rather than just giving in, caused Cyganiewicz to withdraw from the case.

Providence, then, provided his next attorney, Mr. Louis Sorola. Sorola listened to Massey, and Massey provided him a copy of an article, Liberty or Laws? “Felon in Possession of a Firearm” is Not Legal or Lawful“, which addressed, among other questions, what Massey refers to as the “has-had” argument and the “equal justice” argument.

Sorola, faithful to his client (unusual, nowadays), did research, found that the “has-had” argument had not been argued, and then prepared the “First Supplement…” (linked above), and served it on the Court and Judge Hagen within the time allowed.

Word came back that after receiving the “First Supplement…”, the courthouse was “abuzz”. Apparently, Hagen was taken aback, and had no idea just how to deal with this new stick in the federal spokes.

The Argument

Let’s first look at the wording of the “felon in possession” statute, 18 USC § 922 (g), that is pertinent to the argument.

“to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”

That is it. The question is what does “has” mean, as written in the statute.

Now, we will look at the “has-had” argument (paragraph #4), from the “First Supplement…”:

The word “has”, as opposed to the word “had” was used in the statute. “Has” is the third person singular, present indicative, verb meaning active in the action just completed, where “had” is past tense and participle of the verb have, meaning in a previous situation. So, if one were the direct recipient, then the word “has” would be appropriate. However, if it were expansive, intended to include any firearm shipped in interstate commerce, then “had” would be the proper verb. The use of “had” would have meant to include any and all that “had” been so transported any time prior

Keep that in mind as we visit the “equal justice” argument “(paragraphs #14, 15), again from the “First Supplement…”:

[I]f you live in a state that manufactures a firearm, then you can possess it, as it has not been involved in interstate commerce. However, if you have ammunition that was manufactured in another state, then you are guilty because of the ammunition. If you live in a state that manufactures both weapons and ammunition, you can possess those “firearms” and ammunition. However, if you live in a state that manufactures one, the other, or neither, then you may have but one, or none. That seems to give preference to one state over another.

Further, this absolutely defies the concept of equal justice; it would defy the concept of Article IV, § 2, which states, “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all of the Privileges and Immunities of the Citizens of the several States.” It would mean that if one moved to another state, with what was legal, from the federal standpoint, in the state from which he began, he would be a criminal in the other state.

Before we look back to put some perspective on our argument, let’s visit another provision of the Constitution, not included in the argument, but relevant to our consideration, is Article IV, § 4:

“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government…”

Under the authority so guaranteed, Texas enacted their own “felon in possession” statute, many decades ago. It provides that:

Sec. 46.04. UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF FIREARM.

(a) A person who has been convicted of a felony commits an offense if he possesses a firearm:

(1) after conviction and before the fifth anniversary of the person’s release from confinement following conviction of the felony or the person’s release from supervision under community supervision, parole, or mandatory supervision, whichever date is later;

So, one “commits an offense”, unless his sentence for a felony, and any other supervision, etc., is five years, or more, behind him. Texas recognizes that the right to bear arms is restored when one has rehabilitated himself, and “stayed clean” for five years.

So, the Texas statute is in conflict with 922 (g) if we accept that “has” means “had”, and the impediment, the prohibition of possession, was not limited to the act of commerce, but was applicable to the rest of one’s life.

And, the “equal justice” provision, Article IV, § 2, is in conflict with 922 (g) if we accept that “has” means “had”, in that the application would be solely dependent upon the state that one lived in, rather than any sense of justice..

However, if we consider that “has”, as written, means “has”, as written and intended, and improperly applied in the “administration” of that law by the government, then there is no conflict between 922 (g) and either Article IV, § 2, or the right of Texas to enact laws under “a Republican Form of Government”.

* * *

Since April 20, when the court first received the “First Supplement…”, Massey and Sorola have been waiting, anxiously, for Judge Hanen’s ruling on the motions before it. Now Judge Hanen is busy dealing with the Department of Justice and their deceitful practice of defying his order in the Amnesty case, but after 4 weeks, there was still no ruling.

It seems that if Judge Hanen were going to rule against Sorola’s motions, it would be a no-brainer to simply rule, and get on with the trial. However, there was nothing except a very loud SILENCE from the Court, until May 20, when Judge Hanen delivered a rather interesting “Order“. The order indicates that Hanen still has to rule on two motions before the Court, and opens the door for another round of paperwork, (amendments to the previous positions), giving until May 29 to answer. He does cite the recent Henderson v. United States decision out of the Supreme Court, and though he finds that there is no “impact on the pending motions”, he leaves the door open, to allow the Prosecution every latitude.

Massey’s apprehension in quite understandable. He has been wearing an “ankle bracelet” since November 12, 2014, and has been under “Home Detention”, since that time (See “Camp Lone Star – Cruel and Unusual Punishments – Before Conviction“. His last motion was submitted on April 20, and so a month later, he finds that there will be nine more days of agonizing waiting for the ruling that will determine whether the Constitution and the laws of the State of Texas are supreme, or if Administrative Rules and Regulations override them.

So, why is Judge Hanen waiting so long to rule? Denying the motions would be such a simple task, though ruling that “Felon in Possession” is, well, unconstitutional, is not so easily accomplished. There is a likelihood that the government, facing such a loss, would appeal. Most judges prefer to not have a decision overturned by a higher court, so if he is going to grant the Motion to Dismiss, he apparently afforded every opportunity for the Prosecutor to attempt a challenge to the position presented in the “First Supplement…”, thereby minimizing the possibility of a successful appeal. And, of course, knowing that the government does not like to have its authority challenged, it might well be a career ending decision for Hanen to make. However, if others are willing to give their lives for the Constitution, then to end one’s career for such purpose is an act worthy of a true patriot.

Further, Judge Hanen has not rescheduled the planned June 4 Jury Selection, nor the Pre-Trial Conference, set for June 2, leaving just one working day from the final motions to trial start. This would lend one to believe that his intention is to rule in favor of the Motion to Dismiss Indictment, unless the government can scrape together a non-existent argument in opposition to “has-had” and “equal justice”. In which case, the trial would have to be scheduled even further down the road to allow for preparation.

It does appear that when Judge Hanen does pick up his gavel, it will come down declaring freedom for KC Massey, and a quandary for the government, as all those who have been convicted, or even pled guilty to “Felon in Possession” may have pled, or been convicted, of a non-crime.

Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus
Scene 2 – Who is in Charge Now?

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 23, 2015

Setting the Stage: Ten years after the Ashwander Decision, an Act of Congress established a far more authoritative agency structure, creating a Fourth Branch of Government. Though intended to affect less than 1% of the population, or so they said, it now affects nearly every one of us.

bu·reauc·ra·cy. noun

A system of government in which most of the important decisions are made by state officials rather than by elected representatives.

Administrative Agencies Rule Our Lives

The “Administrative Procedures Act of 1946” was submitted by Representative Pat McCarran, Democrat, Nevada, who gave us some insight into its purpose, when, in the Congressional Record, he said:

“We have set up a fourth order in the tripartite plan of government which was initiated by the founding fathers of our democracy. They set up the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches; but since that time we have set up fourth dimension, if I may so term it, which is now popularly known as administrative in nature. So we have the legislative, the executive, the judicial, and the administrative.”

What? A fourth branch of government? My Constitution only has three. Wouldn’t an Amendment be required to create a fourth branch?

He then goes on to say:

“[This bill], the purpose of which is to improve the administration of justice by prescribing fair administrative procedure, is a bill of rights for the hundreds of thousands of Americans whose affairs are controlled or regulated in one way or another by agencies of the Federal government. It is designed to provide guarantees of due process in administrative procedure.

So, he says that there are hundreds of thousands of people “whose affairs are controlled or regulated in one way or another by agencies of the Federal government.” The population of the United States, in 1946, was 150 million people. So, the “hundreds of thousands”, he didn’t say anything about a million, would constitute well less than one percent of the population.

There is an old saying that if you give an inch, they will take a mile. This appears to be an understatement when you consider that the less than 1% has expanded, in these past 69 years, to incorporate probably 99.9% of the people in this country.

This is, most certainly, NOT the limited government that was given to us by the Founding Fathers. Though we find that their foresight provided a means by which we could challenge that expansion (let’s be honest, usurpation) of authority in the limitations imposed upon that government. However, before we do, we need to look at what those men of integrity also told us of the consequences of such usurpations.

The Founders on Constitutional Limitations

Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No 78, made clear the judiciary, especially the Supreme Court (which is the only court proposed at the date of his writing) was “the citadel of the public justice and the public security“, and, that “No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid“.

Further, Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137), says that “an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void“.

Prior to the ratification of the federal Constitution, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in 1787, first nullified an enacted statutes that was contrary to the North Carolina Constitution, in Bayard v Singleton (1 N.C. 42). They said that “if they could [enact legislation contrary to the constitution], they would at the same instant of time destroy their own existence as a legislature and dissolve the government thereby established“.

The next Scene will explain what the Founders did to protect us from such encroachments by the government that we created.

Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus
Scene 1 – Limited Federal Jurisdiction

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 22, 2015

Setting the Scene: This Act is a series of scenes that will lead up to the events, the paper chase, that are going on in Montana, in an effort to persuade the Court to recognize that rights of William wolf and the limitations of federal authority, as conceived by the Founders. It will provide an understanding of what was, why it was, and what happened to deceive us into believing that it no longer existed. It will conclude with the ongoing effort to restore the proper relationship between the federal government and us.

* * *

From my early school years, I heard explanations pertaining to Habeas Corpus, the “Sacred Writ”. It could be used to remove you from unlawful detention; it could be written on a scrap of paper to be served; it could be served, on your behalf, by anyone who wanted to assist you in being removed from unlawful detention, and, perhaps even more. It was championed as fundamental to our liberty. However, little more was said of it, and it remained only as a mental symbol of something that, though not well explained, was one of the most important inclusions in the Constitution. So important that it was not included in the Bill of Rights, rather, it was part of that first venture into the creation of the new government that we have, today, the Constitution.

Understanding that circumstances might warrant the suspension of that “Sacred Writ”, the power to do so was left solely to the Legislative Branch of the government, and only “in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”

Interestingly, this fits nicely within that portion of the Fourth Amendment that states that you have a right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation” against you. But, what do “nature” and “cause” mean? So, we will visit the language of the Founders; from Webster’s 1828 Dictionary, we find that “nature” is a noun, and that the appropriate definition is, ” The essence, essential qualities or attributes of a thing, which constitute it; what it is”. So, nature is the element (essence) from which the charges are brought. The “cause” is, quite simply, that which brings it about — the act.

So, the “cause” is the act that brings about the charges, and the nature is the source from which the law acquires its authority. And, in any act, for which a “cause” is brought by the federal government, it must also have a source of authority, that being only, and limited to, the Constitution. The Constitution provides for both authority of enactment of laws and limitations upon the jurisdiction within which it can apply those laws and impose penalties, if convicted of the act.

After all, we know that the Constitution was written to set limits upon the government that was created by that document. They granted to that government so created, both powers and authorities, and they imposed limitations upon it.

Most cases that go to the United States Supreme Court are based upon certiorari; that is to see if there were irregularities, or errors, at trial in the inferior court. These writs deal solely with whether the applicable laws, or standards of justice (due process), were properly applied. The decisions in such cases often have the appearance of creating not only detailed instruction as to interpretation of a law, rule, or regulation, but also often they go beyond that written law, serving to extend the authority of such law beyond that was intended by the Congress, when it was enacted. This, however, is based upon the presumption that it if a law is enacted by, or under the authority (rules and regulations), of Congress, it must be constitutional in its enactment.

What is does not do, at least in recent years, is question whether the law, even if constitutionally enacted, is imposed where the constitutional limitations preclude its applicability, i.e. jurisdiction.

Before we proceed further, perhaps understanding what a “writ” is, and what it is not, is necessary for perspective. It is not a court case, nor a lawsuit, nor a criminal prosecution against a person. Quite simply, it is “a form of written command in the name of a court or other legal authority to act, or abstain from acting, in some way.”

Limited federal Jurisdiction

Under Article I, § 8, clause 17, Congress has “exclusive legislative jurisdiction”. Under Article IV, § 3, clause 2, Congress may “make all needed Rules and Regulations”, with the caveat, “respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” So, under these authorities, many ‘laws” are enacted that apply only to the extent that jurisdiction also applies. A good example of this is a law enacted in 1825 that gave the government the authority to punish “certain crimes against the United States”. We’ll let the act speak for itself:

“That if any person or persons, within any fort, dock-yard, navy-yard, arsenal, armory, or magazine, the site whereof is ceded to, and under the jurisdiction of the United States, or on a site of any lighthouse, or other needful building belonging to the United States, the sight whereof is ceded to them [United States], and under their jurisdiction, as aforesaid, shall, willfully…”

Take note that this does not apply to government property outside of that limited jurisdiction. The property must be to be on lands that are ceded and jurisdiction also ceded, within the authority granted by the Constitution.

For those interested, there are a number of Supreme Court decisions that support the requirement for a Constitutional nexus for an enactment of Congress to be valid and applicable, outside of that limited jurisdiction. These can be found in the article, “Habeas Corpus – The Guardian of Liberty“.

Now, what we have been taught and have been inclined to believe for our entire lives, is eviscerated, if we heed a decision of the Supreme Court, In Re Lane (135 U.S. 443), ruled on in 1890, in which a man was charged with rape, under federal law. The rape took place in the Oklahoma (Indian) Territory (unorganized), though the case was tried in Kansas (statehood in 1861). Lane was convicted and imprisoned in Kansas. Kansas punishment being less harsh, Lane attempted to challenge federal jurisdiction, opting to be punished under Kansas law.

The law under which he was charged and convicted of, had the jurisdictional, “in the District of Columbia or other place, except the territories, over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction,” in its wording. Now, that wording, “other place, except the territories, over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction” can appear to be misleading. However, the Court clarified that rather confusing statement by explaining that “except territories”, was not in the context of Article IV, § 3, clause 2 (needful rules and regulations), but rather, as those organized territories, seeking statehood — those which had been granted, by Congress, the authority to propose a constitution and to create Legislative, Executive and Judicial Branches, and were authorized to enact laws, administer them, and the judicial branch to provide a forum for justice. These same grants of authority were endowed upon the states, within the limits of the state constitution, by adoption of the state constitution and the granting of statehood. The extent of federal jurisdiction, the laws, rules, and regulations, was limited solely to the unorganized territories.

Supreme Court (and Inferior Courts) Don’t Want to Rule on Constitutionality

In 1936, the Supreme Court ruled on a case known as Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (297 U.S. 288). The details of the case are not something that we need concern ourselves with, though we must heed the words of Justice Brandeis, as he explained the seven rules that the Court had adopted in applying their judicial authority. The applicable rules are:

1.  The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, nonadversary, proceeding, declining because to decide such questions ‘is legitimate only in the last resort…

4.  The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of… Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter…

5.  The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.

6.  The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.

7.  ‘When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.

As we can see, Rules 1, 4 and 7, are means by which the Court can avoid ruling on the constitutionality of a matter before them.

Rule 5 provides for a condition upon which one must have been injured to even challenge a statute, even as to constitutionality and jurisdiction. And, Rule 6 provides a bar against challenge, if a person “has availed himself of its benefits”.

So, we can see how extremely difficult it is to question constitutionality, jurisdiction, or to even find that you are in a position to challenge the lawfulness, of any act of Congress. But, we also have to understand the “nature” of those “statutes” referred to in the Rules.

In the Ashwander decision, it was pointed out that the Rules had been adopted over the past few decades, so this was really nothing new. Administrative agencies, though few at the time (Tennessee Valley Authority was one such agency), were relatively new. However, in an effort to expand constitutional authority beyond the limits imposed by the Constitution, and based upon the adoption of those Rules, Congress took another step, in 1946, to expand their authority beyond those limits. That will be the subject of Scene 2.

Camp Lone Star – Nor Shall Private Property be Taken…

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 22, 2015

Massey received at “Notice of Seizure and Administrative Forfeiture Proceeding” from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, dated November 19, 2014. In it, the government had listed weapons and ammunition, which, according to their assessment, total $1134.90. This included three .45 caliber and two 7.62 mm weapons, and over 2500 rounds of ammunition — do the math — the weapons, alone, would exceed the BATF total.

It contained both forms and inventories, listing the above items. And, there were explicit instructions on what to do to contest the forfeiture of the property. No compensation offered, just try as you might, ‘we are going to keep this stuff’.

It also cited various statutes, however, when Massey read the statutes, he did not see any applicability. If he goes to trial, the property would be evidence, and, if he doesn’t go to trial, the property should be returned. After all, it is theft to keep property if there was no crime committed with the property. But, after scrutinizing the documents, he realized that this was “civil forfeiture”, the taking of property just because they want to take it.

Now, Massey, not sure if they were trying to trick him into some sort of confession — professing to own weapons that he might not own, and realizing that there might be other traps in the forms that they wanted him to fill out, declined to complete the forms, and simply question their right to take property, under the circumstances.

So, within the time constraints in the document, he chose to respond, via correspondence, rather than government forms. After citing the many statutes that were referred to in the BATF letter, he writes, “I have read those cited sections, and I am at a loss as to what authority is being used to deny the owners said property. I see nothing that begins to suggest such authority within the context of those codes.”

He asks them to be more specific in their cited statute, and he reminded them that, according to the CAFRA Act of 2002, the Burden of Proof lies upon the Government, to wit:

18 USC 983 (c) Burden of Proof. – In a suit or action brought under any civil forfeiture statute for the civil forfeiture of any property –

(1) the burden of proof is on the Government to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture;

Don’t you suppose that the government should have some idea of their authority, instead of trying to trick somebody into doing something that the person has no obligation to do?

So, just like in a ping pong game, another mailing from the BATF, in which they state:

As stated in your Notice of Forfeiture Proceedings letter, dated November 19, 2014, the Claim must identify the specific property being claimed; state the claimant’s interest in such property; and be made under oath, subject to penalty of perjury.

Are my eyes deceiving me? The government already listed the property, now they want Massey to list the property. They also want him to “claim an interest in [the] property“. But, they started the game. First, they took the property from Massey. Then, they told him what property they wanted him to forfeit. Now, they act as if they don’t know what property they are talking about, and they question his interest in the property.

Let’s get real. When they took the property from Massey, whether it was his, or belonged to someone else, he had taken responsibility for the property, unless, of course, it was stolen. So, he would also have the obligation to return the property to its rightful owner, one the government finishes with the circle-jerk. It makes me begin to wonder (well, I have wondered since back in 1993, Waco, Texas) whether the BATF (back then, we referred to them as Bat F#$ks) only hired retards, since they can’t seem to do anything right, and are more prone to screw it up worse than it was, one they set their minds (perhaps overly gracious) to work on it.

Anyway, that last BATF notice was dated December 18, 2014, and it also had attached lists of the mysterious property that they wanted Massey to identify.

So, on December 29, Massey responded. Now, though his response is linked, here, it is simply too wonderful to not insert portions of the response, here in this article. In response to BATF alleging that he had submitted a claim:

I am in receipt of your letter of December 18. It misrepresents that I submitted a claim for the return of property. What I sent you was an explanation as to the circumstances surrounding the property that you are endeavoring to seize.

So, now that they may have gotten that right, let’s move on to why Massey cannot respond to deal with the property and ownership, as the BATF would like him to:

First, the Court has barred me from any communication with members of Rusty’s Rangers. The property that you are seizing is owned by members of what the government refers to as “Rusty’s Rangers”. You have not noticed them regarding their property, though you have put upon me a requirement that I violate a court order, or make me responsible for the loss of property owned by members of “Rusty’s Rangers”. If I don’t violate the court order, then you will deny the rightful owners their property.

Then, he returns to the very laws that BATF is attempting to enforce or misinterpret,

I also brought to your attention that you have not stated why the property was seized and subject to forfeiture. You throw a number of codes out, though each of them is so broad in its construction, that I have yet to find any presumed authority for the forfeiture.

Notwithstanding that what you are attempting to do is clearly in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, I find that you also fail to meet your statutory obligation under 18 U.S.C. § 983

(c) Burden of Proof. – In a suit or action brought under any civil forfeiture statute for the civil forfeiture of any property –

(1) the burden of proof is on the Government to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture;

So, how can the government demonstrate a burden of proof, when there is no charge associated with which the burden can be demonstrated? A specific criminal, or other act, under the laws of the United States would have to be submitted as a cause of action, and then the burden of proof, by a preponderance of evidence. I see no evidence with which you might, in the most ludicrous manner, attach a “burden of proof”. It is that which I am seeking, and, it would appear that this would have to be provided prior to any requirement for me to file a claim for the property of others.

Well, that was sent to the BATF via Fed Ex, so they have had over 5 months in which to see if they can do more than sling words, without meaning or context. And, since no Order has been filed on the case, or provided to Massy, we must presume that the whole matter of forfeiture is on hold, and that Massey will be able to return all of the property to the rightful owners, once the case is dismissed (see next article).

In the meantime, maybe those BATF officials have returned to school to learn something other than intimidation is behind the laws of this country.

Camp Lone Star – Act Two: The Contradictions
Scene 3: To Be, or Not to Be – Forthright

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
April 14, 2015

In Act One: The Government Charade, Judge Hanen graciously gave Prosecuting Attorney Hagen, the opportunity to respond to the Motions to Suppress and Dismiss, in greater detail, since he had failed to address some of the points presented in Mr. Sorola’s motions. The deadline for the response was April 10. So, we anxiously awaited that filing to see if Hagen could dig out of the hole he had created for himself, with his prosecution (persecution?) of K. C. Massey.

Well, I received a copy of Government’s Supplementary Response To Motion Suppress And Motion To Dismiss Indictment, on Friday, April 10. Now, it is typical of the “case law” method, which, well, let’s use the description of Teddy Roosevelt’s thoughts on this method, from the book “Bully Pulpit”, by Doris Kearns Goodwin. Case law method was developed at Harvard in 1872. “Though the pleasure he took in his studies is amply expressed in his journal, he was troubled that ‘some of the teaching of the law books and of the classroom seemed to me to be against justice.’ He noted critically that ‘we are concerned with [the] question of what law is, not what it ought to be.'” So, like Teddy, we are stuck with “what law is, not what it ought to be.”

Hagen’s Response addresses a number of higher court opinions, both Supreme and appellate, though we will only be looking at those opinions of the Supreme Court. So, let’s look at just how Mr. Hagen attempts to extricate himself from that hole. At this time, we will only address the Response to the Motion to Suppress.

First, he addresses the Motion to Suppress Evidence. In so doing, he lists the following:

(i) Defendant was observed carrying a rifle and that observation was made prior to any alleged search or stop;
(ii) Defendant was asked for his identification by law enforcement in the course of investigating a shooting involving a federal agent;
(iii) Defendant was detained after the shooting occurred as potential witnesses;
(iv) Defendant’s firearms were seized to protect both law enforcement and civilian witnesses; and,
(v) Defendant’s possession of two firearms was in violation of both state and federal law.

Regarding (i), this was discussed in the previous article. If the act was criminal, why did the government not arrest Massey when the observation was made? The answers rests on identification of Massey and determination of his status, none of which would have occurred had the “stop” or “detention” not occurred. Should we “cooperate” with law enforcement if going about our daily lives might result in subjecting ourselves to directed persecution? In this case, the shooter, in violation of both law and policy, and, the subject of the “investigation”, goes free, while the non-witness is subsequently arrested. One has to wonder if this whole thing was a set up to “get Massey”.

Regarding (ii) & (iii), that, too, was addressed in the previous post. Someone who, like the “investigator”, Cantu, had no more information than Cantu had, until Cantu received a radio message and passed that same information on to Massey, does not really qualify as a witness to anything. This leaves the question of “stop” or “detention” open, and that will be discussed shortly.

Regarding (iv), Foerster, Massey, and Varner, all retained their weapons, posing no threat, as testified to by Cantu. Subsequently, the decision was made, by persons unknown, that the weapons should be “secured”. “Seized”, as described in the Response, has no relationship to the testimony.

Regarding (v), here comes a problem, with Hagen’s comprehension skills. He quotes Texas Penal Code, as follows:

Texas Penal Code § 46.04 Unlawful Possession of Firearm

(a) A person who has been convicted of a felony commits an offense if he possess a firearm:

(1) After conviction and before the fifth anniversary of the persons release from confinement following conviction of the felony or the person’s release from supervision under community supervision, parole, or mandatory supervision, whichever date is later; or

(2) After the period described by Subdivision (1), at any location other than the premises at which the person lives.

So, it says, in the singular, that he is in violation “if he possess a firearm”, before the fifth anniversary. Are we to assume that if he possesses more than one firearm, he is exempt from violation? It says nothing about any limitation after the fifth anniversary. Except, perhaps, in some secret version of Texas law that Hagen has hidden in his drawers.

Now, if Hagen is suggesting that Massey was not at “the premises at which the person lives”, the government also already stated that Massey had been at Camp Lone Star for four months. So, can there be any doubt as to where he lived at the time of this incident? The purpose of this provision is, without doubt, to provide the means for protecting the “premise”. Does that preclude someone from going on to his neighbor’s property, with that neighbor’s permission, to provide for that protection?

However, we can put that all aside, as Massey is not charged with violation of state law, Hagen has charged him with violation of federal law. The Sheriff’s Office has not chosen to file charges against Massey in their jurisdiction, so that makes Hagen’s argument somewhere on the other side of moot.

So, let’s look at the Supreme Court decisions that Hagen has cited to defend his position. First is Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court Nevada 542 US 177. He argues that “A police officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment“.

So, let’s see what Hiibel says:

At 177, setting the background of the case, it says, “Petitioner Hiibel was arrested and convicted in a Nevada court for refusing to identify himself to a police officer during an investigative stop involving a reported assault. Nevada’s “stop and identify” statute requires a person detained by an officer under suspicious circumstances to identify himself.”

At 184, we find “Here there is no question that the initial stop was based on reasonable suspicion, satisfying the Fourth Amendment requirements noted in Brown.“

Then finally, at 185, the pages cited by Hagen, we find, “Asking questions is an essential part of police investigations. In the ordinary course a police officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment. “‘[I]nterrogation relating to one’s identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.”… the Court has recognized that a law enforcement officer’s reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate further.“

So, just what were the “suspicious circumstances”, or “reasonable suspicion”, that existed on August 29, 2014, on the Sabal Palms property? Perhaps Hagen should be instructing BPS, FBI, and others, as to what is required to “investigate” and require that one identify himself, absent the criteria established by the Supreme Court. I suppose that we could also ask Mr. Hagen what the difference is between and “interview”, as described in testimony, and, “interrogation”, as cited in this case.

Then, he cites INS v. Delgado 466 US 210. He does not, however, provide any quotation from that case, so I suppose that quantity rather than quality might be his motivation, here. So, to put a context on the current situation, I will provide the quotations. This case refers to whether INS could profile by asking questions of employees being suspected of being illegal aliens. So, here is what the cited page, 216, tells us:

In contrast, a much different situation prevailed in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), when two policemen physically detained the defendant to determine his identity, after the defendant refused the officers’ request to identify himself. The Court held that absent some reasonable suspicion of misconduct, the detention of the defendant to determine his identity violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure.

Unless the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded, one cannot say that the questioning resulted in a detention under the Fourth Amendment.

So, the Court has given us a situation, and then concludes, “Unless… a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded”, then the questioning was not a detention. However, Hagen as argued that this was a “stop” (Terry Stop), not a detention, and there is no doubt that when Massey “cooperated” in providing his identification, he had already been told that there was an investigation and that he could not leave.

Next, he cites United States v. Sharpe 470 US 675. At least he provides a context, and page (685), though, again, no quotation. So, we will begin at 684:

In that case, law enforcement agents stopped the defendant after his arrival in an airport and seized his luggage for 90 minutes to take it to a narcotics detection dog for a “sniff test.” We decided that an investigative seizure of personal property could be justified under the Terry doctrine, but that “[t]he length of the detention of respondent’s luggage alone precludes the conclusion that the seizure was reasonable in the absence of probable cause.”

And, at the cited page 685:

While it is clear that “the brevity of the invasion of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion,” we have emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes.

So, in the first instance, a stop of 90 minutes was unreasonable, absent “probable cause”. And, in the second, there was an “invasion of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests”, rests upon “reasonable suspicion”. They speak of “seizure”. That is what the Prosecution has claimed, and maintained by continue to retain, all of the firearms, except Varner’s. But, they were not “seized”, according to testimony. They were “secured” for Officer Safety.

Okay, just one more. This is United States v. Leon 468 US 897. Though no quotations are given, he points out that Rotunno, the agent who swore to the accuracy of the information used to secure the various Warrants and Criminal Complaint, was present neither at the shooting incident investigation on August 29, nor at the arrest on October 20, 2014. Quite simply, Rotunno “fabricated” (that is a polite form of lying) an important element of what happened on August 29, which implied that Foerster, and Foerster, alone, might have committed a criminal act by “pointing: his firearm at Gonzales. Massey and Varner were innocent parties to the entire episode. So, Hagen’s assertion might apply to Foerster, but the great leap to envelope Massey in his web is without any lawful or legal merit.

That doesn’t however, remove us from consideration of what the court said in U. S, v Leon.

In this case, a warrant was issued based upon observations during a drug trafficking investigation, by law enforcement officers. There was nothing illegal about the observations, nor were there misrepresentations, or outright lies, in the affidavit that resulted in the warrant.

The court held that “Application of the exclusionary rule should continue where a Fourth Amendment violation has been substantial and deliberate, but the balancing approach that has evolved in determining whether the rule should be applied in a variety of contexts – including criminal trials – suggests that the rule should be modified to permit the introduction of evidence obtained by officers reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate.”

Further, that “the courts must also insist that the magistrate purport to perform his neutral and detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police… However the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.”

And, that “A police officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable. Suppression remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth, or if the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his detached and neutral judicial role.”

So, though even Foerster may find relief by this decision, Massey was nothing more than a bystander in the events of August 29, and nothing conjured by Hagen can change that relationship. There was never the requisite probable cause, suspicion, or any other factor, that would ensnare Massey in this web. It is only Hagen’s desire to please those “up the river” that forces him to persist in the persecution of K. C. Massey.

Now, I realize that what was just stated might be considered by some to be overstepping the bounds of propriety. However, we must not detach ourselves from the reality that we are constantly presented with the excuse that, “there are only a few bad cops”. We have learned, over time that “few” is a gross misrepresentation of reality.

Let us simply refresh our minds with a recent event wherein an innocent man spent thirty years on Death Row. He was released when his innocence was final acknowledged. His innocence was known by the Prosecutor, from the very beginning. That Prosecutor, Marty Stroud, has repented. Marty Stroud is demonstrative of the subject of the book, “Three Felonies a Day”, by Harvey A. Silverglate, in which the objective is to obtain a conviction, regardless of guilt, and to distort the wording of the law to achieve that end.

Camp Lone Star – Act Two: The Contradictions
Scene 1: Pointing Weapons, or Not Pointing Weapons?

 Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
April 11, 2015

In previous articles, we have discussed the Criminal Complaint, Arrest Warrant, and Search Warrant. In each of those documents, we have a set paragraph, to wit:

On August 29, 2014, United States Border Patrol Agents from the Fort Brown Border Patrol Station, while in performance of their official duties, encountered an armed individual, identified as John Frederick FOERSTER, in the brush. During this encounter, FOERSTER turned and pointed a firearm at a USBP Agent, who intern [sic] fired several shots at FOERSTER. FOERSTER is a member of “Rusty’s Rangers,” an armed citizen militia group patrolling the border of the United States and Mexico.

In each document bears the signature of “Anthony M. Rotunno, Special Agent ATF”. Below that, it states that it was “Sworn to before me and signed in my presence”, that being signed by “United States Magistrate Judge Ronald G. Morgan”. So, we have Rotunno swearing before Morgan that everything he has said is true. So, let’s see what the story is, now.

Hagen, the Prosecuting Attorney, in giving his response to Sorola’s motion, says:

[T]he way this all came about is there was one agent that was in heavy brush, and he was in hot pursuit of aliens. When he came through a clearing, he encountered John Foerster… Mr. Foerster had a weapon. It was an AK47 type pistol. And when the Border Patrol — and this is probably disputed. I don’t think that Mr. Foerster ever aimed or was planning on shooting the Border Patrol agent. But when the Border Patrol agent came through the brush, Foerster turned in his direction, and he was perceived as a threat by the Border Patrol agent who fired several shots at Mr. Foerster, thankfully missing.

The first witness was Danny Cantu, U. S. Border Patrol. Hagen is questioning him.

Q Okay. Now, at this point in time, did you know whether or not Border Patrol Agent [Marco] Gonzalez had been threatened or whether or not perhaps Border Patrol Agent Gonzalez had irresponsibly fired upon Foerster? Did you know?

A From what I had gathered, he had fired in — from what Mr. Gonzalez told me. Again, this was preliminary. I was trying to — I had to speak with everyone to figure out kind of what was actually happening, so I wasn’t sure at that point.

Well, Gonzales, the only witness to the shooting besides Foerster, made no claim that begins to suggest that the weapon was pointed at Gonzales.

In Hagen’s initial statements, he said, “I believe [Massey] made one res gestae statement in connection with the arrest when he was told that they were going to do a search warrant, and that statement was, ‘There’s another gun in the hotel room, but it’s not mine.'” So, he ‘believes’, based upon something that he didn’t articulate, he makes a claim without foundation, setting the stage for the entire government performance. Perhaps it was Divine Inspiration.

Now, res gestae is a legal term which provides an exception to the prohibition of hearsay, and is met when somebody makes a spontaneous statement, closely connected to an event, before the mind has an opportunity to conjure a falsehood. Hagen perhaps, attempted to lay a foundation that Massey “volunteered” the information about a firearm in the motel room. Perhaps the same applies to the initial interview with Gonzales and the failure to report any instance where Foerster “turned and pointed a firearm at a USBP Agent.”

It also begs the question, why did Cantu state that he had to “speak with everyone”, when the sole shooter had already said that he was the sole shooter?

In cross-examination, Mr. Sorola is questioning Cantu:

Q To your knowledge, at any time were any of those weapons [that were taken from the Camp Lone Star volunteers] fired at this shooting?

A The Winchester (Varner’s] was not, as he was speaking with me when the shots were fired.

Q So at the time of this shooting, do you know who’s discharging what weapons?

A No.

Q Okay. Later on do you find out… who is firing a weapon, a firearm?

A Upon approaching… Foerster and Mr. Gonzalez area, yes.

Q And Agent Gonzalez is the only one that discharged a weapon; is that correct?

A At that point, that’s what I was told, yes.

Q And you were told that by Agent Gonzalez, right?

A Correct. And Mr. Foerster attested to that.

THE COURT: And you said at that time. I mean, nothing subsequent to that time has changed… ?

THE WITNESS: No, sir, no. It’s just that —

THE COURT: So as far as you know sitting here today, the only weapon that was shot was — the only weapon discharged was discharged by Agent Gonzalez.

THE WITNESS: Correct.

So, Cantu knew, the moment that he was able to speak with Gonzales, that no other weapon was fired, except Gonzales’. And, he makes no mention of any pointing or aiming by Foerster.

From that point on, there is no further discussion of pointing because the shooter, Marco Gonzales, after making initial statement, lawyered up, and Foerster has also refused to talk.

Q Okay. Was he [Agent Marco Gonzales, the shooter] going to visit with anybody? Was he going to talk about what happened?

A No. They — we were informed that he was not going to provide a statement out there.

Q All right. And who gave you that information?

A Let me see. Mr. Gerardo Reyes “Rey” Gonzalez.

Q Okay.

A He was the one who informed me that Agent Gonzalez was not going to provide a statement. He was the union leader.

So, though the agents are employees of the Border Patrol, and I’m sure that they are required, as a part of their duties, to file reports on any incidents, especially an officer involved shooting, and the union can “void” that obligation. It kinda makes you wonder who runs BPS — the government, or the union.

Now, since Gonzales has hidden behind the law and his union, it would appear that he has something to hide. Though we have not heard Foerster’s side of the story, he has not been charged with any criminal activity related to the shooting event, only that he was charged, like Massey, with felony possession of a firearm, and has plead guilty to that charge.

Massey is also charged with felony in possession of a firearm and has, rightfully, plead not guilty. He was not apprehended in the commission of a crime, nor did he have any knowledge of any crime, except what he heard during the course of the investigation. He was not even a witness to the crime of the discharge of a firearm by an agent of the government.

So, let’s try to be objective as we look at this “scene”. We have an affidavit, sworn to by Rotunno, in front of a judge. His claims of the weapon being pointed at the Agent flies in the face of what Gonzales and Foerster told the other investigators. Even the prosecuting attorney, Mr. Hagen, says that he doubts that a firearm was pointed at the agent. That was a bald-faced lie on the part of Rotunno, and he was never even at the scene of the shooting. That smells, very strongly, of Perjury.

However, if you lie to a government agent during the course of an investigation, you are subject to 18 US Code § 1001, and subject to 5 years in prison.

Then, we have the only one that committed a possible criminal act who only made some statements to others, before the union got him to lawyer-up.

However, who is the government going after? K. C. Massey, neither Gonzales for shooting at Foerster nor Rotunno for lying in a sworn statement.

It appears that we have returned to that era in history where “The King can do no wrong”. And, the King includes his, not our, public servants.

Government should not be theoretically defensible,

it should be the object of general acceptance.