Burns Chronicles N^o 8
Active Patriots v. Passive Patriots

image © 2016 Militia News

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
February 16, 2016

“…As to the history of the revolution, my ideas may be peculiar, perhaps singular. What do we mean by revolution? The war? That was no part of the revolution’ it was only an effect and consequence of it. The revolution was in the minds of the people, and this was effected from 1760 to 1775, in the course of fifteen years, before a drop of blood was drawn at Lexington. The records of the thirteen legislatures, the pamphlets, newspapers in all the colonies ought to be consulted during that period, to ascertain the steps by which the public opinion was enlightened and informed concerning the authority of parliament over the colonies”.

John Adams to Thomas Jefferson      August 24, 1815.

I believe that Adams’s description of the Revolution, being the period in which the populace transitioned from faith in government to distrust of government, is probably appropriate for the 18th century as well as today.

Since Ruby Ridge, Idaho and Waco, Texas, we have seen a very substantial change in the attitude of large portions of our people, with regard to the government. The recent murder of LaVoy Finicum, with the full knowledge that those who murdered him will have absolute and complete protection from the government, is indicative of that distrust. The question, however, is not about that distrust, rather, which of us are truly Patriots, and which are only pretend patriots?

There was a transition, 241 years ago, where those who were loyal to the Crown and presumed that they would never fight against their government, found a moment in time had come to decide as to whether to maintain that obedience to the government, or take up arms against it.

On April 19, 1775, that time had come. Those within a reasonable distance of Lexington and Concord, thousands of them, picked up their arms and ventured out into the beginning of a struggle that would last for another six years. They left home and family, not knowing if they would ever return. They crossed the line, not because of what had happened to them, but rather what had happened to their neighbors, many of them from other colonies.

As word spread through the other colonies, many thought the problem was only between Massachusetts and the Crown. In time, they realized that the violation of the British Constitution and the loss of their “Rights of Englishmen” were in jeopardy, just as in Massachusetts. They, then, chose their course. They became Active Patriots.

The passive patriots that had not bought or drunk tea were split. Some became Active Patriots, while others remained passive patriots, throughout the Revolutionary War.

We are at that point in our history where we are facing quite similar circumstances. Some have already become Active Patriots, while others, though appearing to be active patriots, are, in fact, passive patriots, or worse.

The passive patriot simply needs to sit back and watch the world go by. Perhaps he might express support for the Active Patriots, or for their cause, or even make contributions to that cause, financially, or otherwise. But at best, he is a sideline supporter. Some might be more active by participating in interim forms of government, such as Committees of Safety.

Some of those passive patriots went to Burns, Oregon, recently. They were willing to demonstrate, carry signs, sound off in public meetings, and show support for those Active Patriots who had taken a step in Civil Defiance by opening the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge administration area to the public.

Of course, the Active Patriots went armed; the Second Amendment does provide for the “security of a free State”, which they had declared the Refuge to be. However, they made clear that the arms were solely for self-defense, and those who had the opportunity to visit the Refuge during these events found that the people inside were peaceful, unoffending, and courteous to all who visited them. They were not the haughty bureaucrats who normally occupied those buildings. And, those who visited them, without nefarious thoughts on their minds, were clearly passive patriots.

Now, there is a third side to this equation. We don’t find them in the historical context. But, we find them in proliferation in our current era of “revolution”. These are the ones that would have traveled to Concord to discourage colonists from firing on the Redcoats, diverted them to another activity (perhaps carrying signs or pitchforks), or perhaps even have told the British what the Active Patriots were up to.

Today, however, they are comprised of people who want to take charge; they want to control the situation; they may even want to help save the lives of Active Patriots by convincing them to submit to arrest. And, they will tell others that they were simply trying to avoid any bloodshed — even after blood had been shed. Let’s refer to them as false patriots. (See The Burns Community)

Those who went to Concord knew that blood was to be shed. The idea is to shed the blood of the enemy, and endeavor to keep your own from being shed, however, that consequence was a part of the effort.

During the course of events in Burns, there were many who contacted me, and others, asking whether the time had come. These were Active Patriots, simply waiting for that day we all know was coming, but not wanting to simply go to an event (Sugar Pine Mine; Montana Big Sky Mine) and camp out, away from family and digging into their own purses to act out a role. They really wanted to know if the British had fired on colonists, and if the colonists were going to fire back.

Some went to Burns. Some remain, and some have since left. They were insufficient in number to have any effect, because the false patriots had done everything that they could to divert as many as possible in the wrong direction.

If others are ready to go to a barricade and protest, or possibly for other purposes, they might divert them to over fifty miles away in a gesture of sympathy for a life lost. So, let’s look at the three, and put them in rather simple terms.

Active Patriot — One who is ready and willing to take up arms, regardless of costs, affect on family, or fortune, and is committed to the cause to that extent. These would properly be considered the real III% that are willing to take up arms.

Passive patriots — These are those who will go to varying extent to support the Active Patriot, by any number of means. They are the support every army needs, and they do so, willingly. Often, their activities might put their lives at risk, but that is inconsequential to the completion the efforts that they have begun. Time and money are their primary contributions. These are the Supporters of the III%.

Finally, we come to the false patriot. His actions tend to support the enemy, whether through disruption, diversion, intelligence gathering (frequent communication with the enemy), and often the attempt to discredit or ridicule those who are of the other classes. These people are not patriots; rather, they are, in fact, simply false. In years past, they would be referred to as “culture vultures” or “patriots for profit”, if their concern was primarily their monetary gain. However, others might be more accurately defined as “snitches”, “informants”, “spies”, or worse.

Since we have progressed from Civil Disobedience, where one might get arrested and spend a few hours or days in jail, to Civil Defiance, where we stand, firmly, against the enemy, and endeavor to turn the continued encroachment of our rights, then we can fully expect that the time will come, soon, in which the line is drawn and the point of no return has been reached. It behooves us to identify which role our neighbors will take. If they are to be Active Patriots, or passive patriots, then we are in need of both. However, if they are false patriots, then they need to be excluded from any aspect, no matter how mundane, of our work. They need to be expelled from our community, for they serve no useful purpose, except that purpose which serves the enemy.

Burns Chronicles N^o 2
Ambush

LaVoy Finicum’s last ride
“I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give me liberty or give me death!”
                                                                                    Patrick Henry, March 23, 1775

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
February 2, 2016

The Death of LaVoy Finicum

Note: Times given are referenced to the aerial time stamps, minus eight hours. Quotations are based upon the best recollection of the witnesses.

I had lunch with Ammon Bundy while the Sharp family sang. It was the first time I had met Ammon, and we went over the articles I intended to write about the events that led up to the actions of January 2, 2016, with the investiture of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge administration complex, since renamed the Harney County Resource Center. The subjects for the articles were the misunderstanding of the people of Burns as to what source resulted in the fear and anxiety then extant in the town of Burns, and the information available in the “public” records contained in the filing cabinets at the refuge that might show the use of subterfuge in the obtaining of land to extend the federal “ownership”, not only in the Refuge, but throughout Harney County.

Ammon also indicated his pleasure for the upcoming meeting in the Grant County town of John Day, expecting to get additional support from Grant County Sheriff Glenn Palmer. As we discussed, it was to the backdrop of the Sharp family’s vary harmonious singing.

I then visited Ryan Payne, an old friend and fellow board member of the Operation Mutual Defense (OMD) Advisory Board. Ryan, too, was looking forward to a productive meeting with the Grant County community, hoping to establish a Committee of Safety to become a voice from the disenfranchised people of that County, as they had in Harney County.

The meeting was to begin at 6:00 PM on January 26, 2016. The drive, which in that part of the country, is a rather fixed route. From the Refuge, you go west on Sodhouse Lane to State Road 208, then North into Burns where you pick up US 395 North, through Malheur National Forest, through Seneca, and finally to John Day. The trip is just over 130 miles and is, unquestionably, the only practical way between the two locations.

Vehicle #1, the lead vehicle, LaVoy’s white 4-door pickup truck, contained Robert “LaVoy” Finicum driving, Ryan Payne at shotgun, and, from driver’s side to passenger side in the back seat, Ryan Bundy, Victoria Sharp, and Shawna Cox. Vehicle #2 contained Mark McConnell, driving his brown 4-door Jeep, with Brian “Budda” Cavalier at shotgun and Ammon Bundy in the rear. This was the position of all of the people as they left the HCRC, and the position of each until they left their respective vehicles. Thus, they began their 33-mile drive to Burns, which resulted in an unexpected and tragic termination.

After leaving Burns, they traveled up US 395 about 15 miles north of the intersection with US 20. As they passed National Forest Road 2820 (NF 2820) on their right, they noticed a line of trucks and other vehicles stacked up to enter US 395. There were at least eight vehicles, rather odd for the middle of a forest. This was about 4:25 PM, and about an hour out from their destination.

Once those vehicles turned north, the same direction they were traveling, it dawned on them that this might just not be a coincidence. However, optimistically, they continued on their way.

Less than a minute later, Vehicle #2 pulled over in response to flashing lights and sirens. Those who pulled over Vehicle #2 identified themselves as FBI HRT (Hostage Rescue Team) with a loudspeaker. They then instructed the driver to exit the vehicle and walk toward them, hands on his head. He approached them, he was instructed to lie on the ground, head away from them, and “low-crawl” back to them, where they disarmed him, cuffed him and patted him down. The same procedure was then addressed to the man in the back seat (Ammon), and finally to the man in the front seat (Budda), until all three were “secured”. All three acted without resisting, and fully compliant with the instructions given. They were then placed on the ground with their backs against one of the FBI vehicles, where they remained until after those from Vehicle #1 were finally returned to that area. Ammon’s hat and briefcase were still in the Jeep when it was recovered from impound, two days later

Vehicle #1, realizing that Vehicle #2 was no longer behind them, and not wanting to separate from and abandon their friends, slowed to a stop just beyond NF 31, about 3/4 mile from where the ambush began. They were followed by two FBI vehicles that stopped about 40 feet behind them. Ryan Payne then stuck his hands and head out of the passenger side window and a single shot was fired, striking the truck near the outside rear-view mirror.

The first shot having been fired, Ryan’s concern was for the women who were well within that line of fire. He exited the truck, hands held about shoulder level, and yelled, “There are women in here”. Seeing the number of guns pointed at him, when the command was given, “hands on your head. Walk toward us”, he complied. He was then searched, handcuffed, and taken back to where the three from Vehicle #2 were detained, a few hundred yards behind Vehicle #1.

After Ryan left the vehicle, LaVoy, seeing laser dots around him, and the observers in the back seat seeing a laser dot directly on LaVoy’s hat, he sticks his head and one hand out the window and yells, “Go ahead and shoot me.” He follows that with, “We are going to meet with the Sheriff [Palmer of Grant County]. We have a meeting with the Sheriff. You are going to have to shoot me. We are going to see the Sheriff. We are going to see the Sheriff.”

LaVoy then turned to the remaining occupants and said, “We are going to see the Sheriff. If you girls want to get out, then you can.” Victoria then replied, “I am not getting out.” She was terrified because Ryan had been shot at.

Shawna, a grandmother herself, was not going to leave a little girl by herself, opted to go with the flow. So, the three in the back seat slid down, knees against the back of the front seat, getting their heads as low as possible. In the forest, there was no cell phone service, so efforts to call out were futile. Shawna, however, had her phone video camera on and was filming these events, as they happened.

At 4:33:47 PM, LaVoy accelerates and the chase was on. Shawna then asked how far they would make it before the tires would be shot out. Receiving no answer, she asked, “How far is it to John Day?” LaVoy replied, “Fifty miles.”

Just over a mile up the road, at the end of a left sweeping curve, three vehicles block the roadway. The roadside has a snow bank about 2-3 feet high. After just about 1 minute of flight, hoping to get to Sheriff Palmer at John Day, their hopes decelerate as rapidly as LaVoy’s truck before it turns slightly to the left and plows through the snow. As an agent runs into the path of the truck, LaVoy swerves further to the left, probably to avoid injuring the agent. The truck comes to its final rest. Although past the vehicles blocking the road to John Day, the failed momentum of LaVoy’s efforts to reach sanctuary with Sheriff Palmer.

Unknown to those in the truck, and those back down the road, an effort was made to warn them of what was to come.

Victoria and Shawna were last minute passengers in Vehicle #1 because Victoria was late in preparing for the trip to John Day. Her family had left more than ten minutes ahead of LaVoy, in that they were scheduled to sing at the Community Meeting, the destination of all.

When the Sharp family passed the checkpoint at Seneca, they tried to contact those behind them, but cell reception was non-existent where these events were unfolding. Any chance to forewarn them of what they might expect was not able to be conveyed.

Within seconds, LaVoy is out of the truck, hands raised, and observing where the agents are, walks widely away from the truck and towards its rear to assure that if gunfire begins, that the truck and those inside of it are not in the line of fire.

[Note: A Witness has provided a correction — that the gunfire started even before LaVoy got out of the truck, that being the shots fired at LaVoy’s truck while he was still on the road driving toward the roadblock. opf ]

The rear seat occupants slowly rise, after LaVoy exits. They are still trying to stay low, but also to observe, as best they can, what is occurring outside of the vehicle. They see LaVoy, hands in the air, trying to negotiate deep snow and probably uneven ground, stumbling, occasionally, probably because he was wearing his narrow cowboy boots.

[Note: Ryan Bundy is recording, verbally, on his cell phone, what is transpiring. Shawna Cox is taking video of the events, as they go down. Neither phone nor camera have been returned to their owners. opf ]

LaVoy then, probably still attempting to remove the threat from those still in the vehicle, yells, “Shoot me, just go ahead and shoot me.” As he is being shot, he turns back towards his friends, still in the truck, as if in a final good-bye. Just 13 seconds after LaVoy left the truck, he falls to the ground, dead. However, his arm does move, slightly, after he lay on the ground, perhaps as a last gesture to those still inside, perhaps a reflexive reaction.

Note: Second person information from one of the witnesses, indicates that LaVoy was shot

[Note: The witness has provided a correction to the article – that the witness observed at least three shots that hit LaVoy, though there may have been ore. opf ]

There is no reason to believe that he was shot in the face, only in the body-mass.

Those inside are terrified; they see that LaVoy is shot, while unarmed. In reflection, if soldiers (or Marines) in Afghanistan, had acted as the agents and shot an unarmed man, without provocation, would have violated the Rules of Engagement (ROE) of war, and would have stood Court Martial, then probably imprisoned or discharged from service. Unfortunately, the ROE do not apply here, in our own “free” country.

At the same time that the gunfire was directed at LaVoy, by two agents clearly aiming at him, those inside of the truck begin seeing laser dots, perhaps thirty or forty at any given time, and Ryan Bundy is shot in the shoulder. Bullets begin to pierce the truck; windows break, impacted by bullets. All hell breaks loose as perhaps hundreds of bullets penetrate the vehicle or hit the snow, outside, sending clouds of snow into the air. All of the windows had been broken by gunfire, which was described as “coming from every direction”.

Ryan and Victoria had gotten on their knees, ducking as low as they could while Shawna remained in the previously described position. They began to wonder if the gunfire would ever stop, and that eventually they, too, would be killed by the agents.

Laser dots were appearing on knees, seats, all over, inside of the truck and they realized that other agents had come out from behind trees on the left side, and perhaps the right side of the road, firing randomly into the truck and surrounding area. Whether through the grace of God, or simply poor marksmanship, after nearly six minutes, those inside began yelling, “Stop, stop”. Then, gunfire, flash-bang grenades, and tear gas projectiles, ceased.

During this ordeal, Victoria, who had, just finished EMT school, said, “They shot him. I want to help him”, though she was restrained from doing so by Ryan and Shawna. At eighteen years of age, gentle Victoria had seen war come to her own country.

The right side of the truck had plowed snow, so the occupants were told to exit the left door, Ryan Bundy, being first, walks, with hands up, onto the paved roadway and is secured. Next comes Victoria, and finally, Shawna. With no female agents present, Shawna watched very closely as an agent simply ran his fingers around Victoria’s waistband of her pants.

The three were then detained, but allowed to lean against a van, in an effort to stay warm, as opposed to those from Vehicle #2, where they were forced to sit on the cold ground.

After a while, Shawna and Victoria were loaded in a van (not sure of the vehicle type) and driven back to pick up Payne, McConnell, Ammon and Budda. Ryan Bundy was transported by ambulance back to Burns.

They were detained at that location for what seemed like hours. Ryan Payne, after learning of LaVoy’s death, berated the forty, or so, agents, calling them murderers and that they had blood on their hands — something that those who took over the refuge had attempted to avoid, since January 2. However, those who had constantly expressed a desire for a “peaceful resolution” had, finally, drawn first blood in a contemptible act against American citizens, thereby proving the assertions made by Ammon Bundy throughout the course of the occupation of the refuge.

Victoria was extremely upset and constantly expressing her outrage over what the government had done. Mark McConnell, surely upset himself, took it out on Victoria, for her vocal expressions, until quieted by the others.

Somehow Ammon, when searched, managed to sneak his cell phone past the pat down, and as they drove towards Burns, the interior lights of the vehicle being left on, was able to call his wife, Lisa, and began telling her what had happened, including the first outside knowledge of LaVoy’s death. As they approached Burns, the interior lights were turned off, probably so that those on the street could not see who the occupants were. The glow from the phone face now showing brightly on Ammon’s face. They then stopped, pulled them out of the vehicle and found the cell phone.

Next stop was the hospital to check on Ryan Bundy, who still had a bullet in his shoulder, then on to a rest area west of Burns, where everybody was removed. About the same time, Ryan Bundy was also delivered to the rest area.

All were given their Miranda Rights, and it is unknown whether anybody answered any subsequent questions. They were then advised that they were being charged with “conspiracy to impede officers”. The document, the Criminal Complaint, must have been prepared after the arrests were made. A nefarious practice, and probably illegal even by the standards of justice that were intended by the “due process” concept of law. This is abundantly clear by the fact that “Robert ‘LaVoy’ Finicum” is not listed on the Complaint, for if it were prepared before the arrests were made, his name most surely would have been included, unless they had already intended to kill him. More logically, the Criminal Complaint, a requisite for this type of arrest, was prepared after the FBI Special Agent, Katherine Armstrong, signed the Complaint, and Stacie F. Beckerman, U. S. Magistrate, signed the document, purportedly in Portland, some 300 miles away by road. Certainly, not what we should expect from our government.

Finally, all were together, though, then, each was placed in a separate vehicle for transport to their final destinations. Two vehicles transported Mark McConnell and Victoria Sharp back to Burns, where they were released. The remainder went in the opposite direction, presumably directly to Multnomah County Jail.

As far as firearms, one witness said that LaVoy had a 9-mm in his shoulder holster, well under his armpit, and there is no indication that he reached high enough or deep enough under his jacket to even get his hand close to it. With the exception of Shawna and Victoria, all were probably armed, as was the practice. Ryan Bundy appears to have dropped his firearm into the snow as he exited the vehicle. Mark McConnell had his taken when he was “apprehended” at the first stop. LaVoy’s well recognized revolver was left beside the seat when he exited Vehicle #1 to draw fire away from the remaining occupants of that vehicle.

Terrorism? or, An Act of War?

The Oklahoma City Bombing

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 11, 1995 (republished August 4, 2015)

[Note: This article was written over twenty years ago. It is republished with minor revisions. You can probably, with your knowledge of recent events, supplement what has been presented.]

Dresden, Germany, February 1945 — A series of allied bombing raids resulted in virtual firestorms, nearly destroying this city, which dated from the early 13th century, along with many of its centuries old architectural landmarks. Over 135,000 people, the vast majority being women and children, died during these raids.

Japan, August 1945 — Hiroshima, Japan, three-fifths of the city destroyed, along with 75,000 people, mostly women and children. Just a few days later, another atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, destroying half the city and killing another 75,000 people, again, mostly women and children. These three events killed 285,000 people, yet they were acts of war, and were intended to end World War II.

During the “Vietnam War,” Haiphong, the major North Vietnamese city, was bombed over and over, and in 1972 the harbor was mined. Much of the city was destroyed and tens of thousands lost their lives. There was, however, no “declaration of war” to justify these acts, yet we perceive them to be Acts of War.

April 15, 1986, in a strategic operation, naval air forces attacked military targets in Tripoli, Libya. One of those targets was the home of Muammar Qaddafi. Hundreds were killed, yet no “declaration of war” had existed between the United States and Libya.

December 20, 1989, United States forces, under the operational name “Just Cause”, invaded Panama with the purported purpose of arresting Manuel Noriega on drug trafficking and money laundering charges. Hundreds died, and significant damage to the capital of Panama resulted. After trial, in December 1992, the federal judge from Miami ruled that Noriega was a “prisoner of war.”

On January 15, 1991, unified forces from 31 nations began a new form of warfare (without declaration) against Iraq. For five weeks smart missiles and smart bombs were directed against, the capital, Baghdad. Smart bombs were able to enter ventilation stacks of bomb shelters, killing women and children without destroying the shelter. Cruise missiles traveled hundreds of miles to explode close to their targets, killing tens of thousands of civilians in this new game of attrition. Never, however, a treaty of peace, for there was never a “declaration of war.”

These acts are not considered to be acts of “terrorism”, for they occurred during the course of a war. It is quite clear that during a war, acts, which might otherwise be considered below the dignity of man, can occur and be accepted as a consequence of war. If there is a war and thousands die, those deaths are written off as a consequence of war. Even without the accepted, and constitutionally required, declaration of war, war can be waged against innocent civilians with no effort made for discrimination of targets.

Since the “Declaration of War” has, apparently, become an unnecessary act; perhaps we can find a way of determining when a war exists by other means. In the Academic American Encyclopedia, under “court”, we find that, “Courts fulfill three important functions: (1) they resolve disputes that, while often routine, are crucial to those involved; (2) they provide protection from illegal actions by government and individuals; and (3) occasionally, they resolve disputes of great political and social significance.” Clearly, then under a normal circumstance, “protection from illegal acts by government” should leave the government open to be punished by the court. One can reasonably conclude that a state of war exists when government commits illegal acts against a people, with impunity.

No judicial process will hold the victors to task. Justice must be set aside during time of war, which is clearly affirmed in the Constitution (Article I, Section 9, clause 2, dealing with Habeas Corpus, and, Article V, Bill of Rights, dealing with exemption from Grand Jury process). So, perhaps, a state of war (since declarations have become a thing of the past) can best be determined by the fact that no trials are held to determine justice, or injustice, for the deaths that are a consequence of hostile action. How else, in this modern age, can the determination be made that a war even existed?

This being the case, perhaps we should look around and see if there are other wars going on, perhaps at this very moment. Maybe we should start back in August 1992. Hostilities broke out and, in the first incident, two “men” were killed. Hostilities ceased for a few days, but, then, another act of senseless murder occurred when Vicki Weaver stood in her doorway and was killed by a single sniper’s bullet. Well, this was clearly not a war since a trial was held. Unfortunately, even though three people were killed, no one was found guilty. This, then, must be a war, because war crimes trials were held, but the heinous offender could not be identified.

Just a few months later, another war began. This war lasted 51 days and the subsequent war crimes trials were held almost a year later. We know that this was a war because nine people were found guilty of killing (or other related acts of complicity) four men who were dressed and equipped as soldiers.

We can determine which side each side was on in these last two incidents by looking at a couple of factors. First was the uniform. One side chose black military uniforms, complete with web gear, automatic rifles, tanks, helicopters, grenades and other modern implements of war. The other side wore normal clothes — jeans, dresses, sneakers, etc., and used simple, legal weapons. They also sought refuge in their home and place of worship. The final indicator is that they fired only in self-defense. And, it must be war, since even the commanding general at the Justice Department in Washington, D.C. never described the acts of the enemy as terrorism.

On April 22, 1993, I left Waco, after 47 days, to return to Florida. I remember that I was somewhat dumbfounded by the events of April 19, and until I returned to Waco, in mid May, had not been able to sort out certain thoughts. When I returned to Waco, and finally stood on the concrete that was once the floor of the Mt. Carmel church, I looked around and saw partially burned remnants of utensils, clothes, books, letters, and toys, indicative of the lives once lived, and since lost, here. I recalled similar situations in Vietnam, and realized that a state of war existed here, in the United States of America. I realized that I was at war with the United States Government, but, that the war that I was in was still a “cold war”. Not so for those who died in those ashes, but for many, a state of war had begun.

After the Oklahoma City Bombing, we heard the battle cry come up from the side wearing black uniforms, “Terrorism,” they yell, over and over again. “Terrorism, it’s unfair, and they killed women and children. Terrorism, there is no other word for it.”

Many leaders who were on the side of the patriots also take up the battle cry. Many, who just a few years before, cried out that the surprise attacks by the Black uniformed soldiers were acts of war, now cry terrorism along with their enemies of the recent past. “Condemn them,” they yell. “Hang them after a quick and speedy trial. They are not warriors; they are cowards. Hang them, be done with them”. The cry came out from all those leaders who, so recently professed, to be on the side of the patriots.

Meanwhile, many who, just a few years before, had taken the battle cry of “Do whatever is necessary to end this mess,” are now questioning the fairness of the actions of the black uniforms, and beginning to understand why the poorly equipped soldiers of the other side have resorted to an act that cost 167 lives.

Perhaps it might be best to dispel the association of “baby killer” with the act that occurred in Oklahoma City. Since the sixties, the construction of federal buildings has been an “anti-terrorist” design. Since the bombing of Flight 103 (December 1988), we have been advised that federal buildings are potential targets of such bombings. As we learned from Waco, keeping your children in a location that has danger associated with it leaves the responsibility on the parent, not the aggressor. In fact, I never knew that there were day care centers in federal buildings. I supposed, prior to April 19, that the government had enough concern for children to move day care centers to a locations away from what it knew to be potential targets.

The determination of what constitutes an act of terrorism has to be defined by each of us, individually. It cannot be left to a government which controls the weapons of war, the streets, the language, and the press, to make that determination for us. If we allow this to happen, the stigma that will be placed on any act, whether it be the self-defensive actions against four BATF agents killed while assaulting a church in Texas, or a U. S. Marshall who has just killed a dog and a fourteen year old boy (Sammy Weaver), or bombing a federal building where people who chose to be employees of a government run amuck. We must resist succumbing to the need for approval by such controlling entities.

This leaves us, then, with the question:

Was this an Act of Terrorism? or, an Act of War?

Timothy McVeigh v. Lon Horiuchi

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
July 30, 2015

From time to time, on Internet radio shows or various discussions, I am accused of supporting Timothy McVeigh. This accusation has been leveled more frequently, of late, including from an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA), in opposition to a series of articles I have been writing.

This recent case, consistent with some of the previous accusations, are responses born of the inability of the other side to offer any viable refutation to arguments I have set forth. This is most commonly known as argumentum ad hominem. It is more accurately and understandably described as, ‘if you can’t counter the argument attack the messenger’.

First, understand what I have said –that has been converted to a simple and blanket “support for Timothy McVeigh”. I have always said that I am supportive of McVeigh’s motivation for bombing the Murrah Building. After all, for the two years since Waco, as I traveled the country, I heard many patriots say that we should bomb a government building. I still stand behind that, though I always qualify that support, explaining that if it were my job to do, I would have done it differently. I would have bombed the building at night. However, McVeigh had to make the call, as it was his mission. And, though little known, he did explain why he bombed it in the daytime. He offers his explanation in an article he wrote, “An Essay on Hypocrisy, by Tim McVeigh“, and goes into more detail in “Why I bombed the Murrah Federal Building“.

I have also written my assessment of McVeigh and the bombing in “The Passing of the Torch“.

This most recent accusation, from an AUSA, someone who is “supporting” the FBI in the case he is prosecuting, brings to mind a consideration of who he “supports”.

There was an FBI sniper present at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, in support of the government’s effort to put down a man, Randy Weaver, who had refused to turn informant for the government. This sniper, Lon Horiuchi, from just a few hundred feet away, managed to miss his claimed target and hit a mother, Vicki Weaver, holding her infant child in her arms, and killing her instantly. The Rules of Engagement, later determined to be unlawful, provided that snipers could shoot any male holding a firearm. Vicki was, without any doubt, not of the male sex — a fact easily determined through the sniper rifle scope.

RUBY RIDGE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, August 22, 1992
1) If any adult male is observed with a weapon prior to the announcement [of surrender], deadly force can and should be employed, if the shot can be taken without endangering any children.

Now, after the first murder by Horiuchi, the FBI continued to keep him on staff, an obvious act of support, and brought him to a scene where his skills could, again, be put to effective but illegal use. It was just a few months later that Sniper Horiuchi went to Waco, Texas, and participated in the killing of over 80 men, woman, and children, including one “coffin birth” and one unborn child.

Some were shot to death by sniper fire and others burned to death by fire started by the FBI or other government agents. (Note: Ron Cole and I found three sandbagged sniper positions, in May 1993.) However, he is assured a pension from his employment for the government, both military and FBI.

I am sure that the AUSA would support Lon Horiuchi, either tacitly, or openly, if asked to do so.

So, if I am to take sides in what is surely inevitable in this country, then I will be required to support either Lon Horiuchi, or, Timothy McVeigh. In weighing the intent behind the actions of both Horiuchi and McVeigh, I find that McVeigh did not specifically target children, while Horiuchi acted with depraved indifference to the presence of children, in both instances.

It is possible that the AUSA would never openly support Lon Horiuchi, though he will surely never damn him. The fact that Horiuchi is now comfortably retired lends credence to the supposition that both government agencies and personnel continue to overtly support Horiuchi.

I would like to extend my thanks to the AUSA for bring this subject to my attention. Absent his criticism, I might never have broached the subject.

Independence Day – July 4

In the Year of Our Lord, Two Thousand and Fifteen
and of Our Independence, Two hundred and Thirty-Nine

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
July 4, 2015

Two hundred and thirty-nine year ago, a handful of men, expressing the sentiments that had already been expressed in over ninety similar declarations, committed to paper a consolidation of those documents that had preceded it, and the will of the people of the 13 British colonies of North America.

After over five years of combat, rag-tag farmers, fighting against the greatest military force in the world at that time, prevailed in a war they believed, with honor, to be “the right thing to do.”

Just about one hundred and fifty-four years ago, again, a test between those who believed that they were right was pitched against others who believed that they were right. The contest, this time, was between those who wanted to preserve a Union and those who believed that States had rights that could not be subordinated to a simple majority in opposition.

This war lasted less than five years, and the side that lost, though they had fought, with honor, because it was “the right thing to do.” And, the side that won also, fought with honor, because it was “the right thing to do.” However, the losing side forgiven by the winning, first at the surrender next by a general amnesty by President Lincoln, and finally, by amnesty granted by President Johnson, because that, too, was “the right thing to do.”

They were also recognized as an honorable foe by those who fought on the winning side, and most of the general population of the northern states, because it was “the right thing to do.” Among all, there was no animosity, except by a handful of those in Congress who chose to punish those who had done what they believed to be “the right thing to do.”

Eventually, Congress relinquished and allowed the punishment known as “Reconstruction” to expire, and we were, finally, whole, again. History recognized that both sides had done what they believed to be “the right thing to do.” And, the country continued to progress, in relative harmony, for another century. During that century, twice the United States was called upon to aid European nations, and to defend herself, because they believe it to be “the right thing to do.”

Since that time, we have started many wars, and we have lost all of them. Perhaps it is because we have left to the government the determination as to what “the right thing to do” is. It is not the will of the people, for they are simply encouraged to wave the flag.

It is the people that have allowed the representatives to become leaders, rather than our “representatives” to follow our will. And, we have allowed then to make the decisions that have lead our country to the despair, the distress that we now find ourselves living with.

For the first time since the end of World War II we find ourselves faced with the question as to just what we need to determine as “the right thing to do”, just as the Americans were called upon to do, in the past.

If we are seeking an answer, perhaps a single sentence from the Declaration of Independence, that first instance of having to determine what “the right thing to do” was, will provide the guidance that had since been lost:

But when long trains of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide for new guards for their future security.

Camp Lone Star – Act III – A Kangaroo Court
Scene 1 – How Case Law Subverts the Constitution

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
June 8, 2015

Kangaroo Court
1: a mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded or perverted
2: a court characterized by irresponsible, unauthorized, or irregular status or procedures
3: judgment or punishment given outside of legal procedure
(Merriam Webster)

In a recent article, “Government Enforces Their Laws – Who Shall Enforce the Constitution?“, I raise a question that is now worthy of our consideration. If we want our birthright of Constitutional Government, as envisioned by the Founders, we cannot rely upon government for interpretation those laws passed which are applied contrary to the Constitution.

To quote Teddy Roosevelt, with regard to the “case law method”, “some of the teaching of the law books and of the classroom seemed to me to be against justice… we are concerned with [the] question of what law is, not what it ought to be.”

In my Constitution, government was granted powers and authorities, and had limitations imposed upon it. Here, we will deal with some authorities granted and some limitations imposed. And, we, as Americans concerned about our country and our posterity find that we are in a situation similar to that which the Founders recognized, 240 years ago. And, we, like they, must weigh, very carefully, the extent of encroachments into our rights and our lives, as they did, then.

On April 17, 2015, the final pre-trial motions were submitted to the Court. The Court has taken 7 weeks to prepare a Memorandum Opinion and Order, to address the argument presented to the Court by Massey’s attorney.

Rather than outright denying the motions, the extended interval tended to support the probability of a well-crafted reply, granting the motions and dismissing charges against Massey. I don’t doubt that, somewhere, that well crafted order still exists, though it has been replaced by a rather poorly crafted order, which will be the subject of this article, and was substituted solely because Massey created a situation in which the Judge, for reasons that many will not understand, chose not to pursue justice in that it would reflect on him as supporting someone who could not keep his promise — his agreement with the Court.

Honor, one’s word being good, is an important part of life. Massey, regardless of why, gave his word that he would not partake of any illegal substances — as a condition of his “home detention” (See Cruel and Unusual Punishments – Before Conviction) — rather than remaining in jail awaiting trial.

The dilemma this created for Judge Hanen is that he would be challenging the status quo by granting the motion, undermining the very strength of the federal “Felon in Possession” law, and putting it back in proper perspective with those limitations imposed by the Constitution. This would leave those in government who support the improper interpretation in a position to accuse Hanen of siding with a man lacking honor and unable to abide by an agreement that he willingly made as a condition of his pre-trial release.

We must put ourselves in a position to understand that this apparently minor infraction would probably have similar consequences, or at least should have them, within our own community. Suppose you supported someone whom you had faith in to a position of chairman, or some other leadership role, within your organization. Suppose, then, he gave his word to abide by a promise that he had made, and then broke that promise. Would you continue to support him in the office that he held? This is what the politicians do, and this is an intolerable situation — it cannot be supported, if we stand behind our belief that honor and trust are necessary elements of leadership.

This is similar to the situation in which Judge Hanen finds himself. If he was willing to challenge the system and return to a proper interpretation of the law, it could be career ending decision, and could subject him to ridicule by others in government, including some of his peers on the federal benches. For him to take upon himself that responsibility, he would have to know that the person he was supporting by his actions was one as honorable as the Judge would be, in standing for justice. This is typical “office politics” and is true in business and the patriot community, as well. Violate the trust and you lose support.

So, let’s look at the “Memorandum Opinion and Order” that denied the Motions to Dismiss the Indictment (there were two of them: Motion to Dismiss Indictment, and First Supplement to Opposed Motion to Dismiss Indictment).

The Order begins with a misrepresentation that sets an erroneous foundation for what follows in the three “arguments” that the court offers, when it says:

As detailed below, Massey’s Motion to Dismiss focuses on the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 922(g), which makes it a crime for a person who has previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year “to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment.

First, he implies that the entire question rests on “the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 922(g)“. Though challenges to constitutionality were made, there was an even stronger argument made with regard to the grammatical context of the statute, which, if correct, would allow other aspects of the law to fit, neatly, into earlier Congressional interpretations of the extent of the “commerce clause”. This will be addressed in the third point.

1. Second Amendment Argument:

Massey’s argument relies heavily on District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), which upheld the right of people to have firearms for their personal protection. He argues that, among others, you do not lose your right to freedom of speech for being a convicted felon, so you cannot lose, forever, your right to keep and bear arms. Perhaps, unfortunately, the argument did not bring up the fact that 10 U.S.C. § 311 does exclude some from being members of the militia, though “felons” are not among those exclusions, which is a direct contradiction of the felon in possession statute, as applied.

The Court then argues that Heller did not address the felon aspect, He does point out that the court has set up the “scrutiny” to be applied in weighing whether a statute unfairly limits the “not infringe” (my words) provision of the Second Amendment, but rather than compare it to real world, he simply builds upon case law, redefining the Constitution, one case at a time.

In the dismissing nature of the current judicial system, he says:

The Second Amendment, at its core, protects “law-abiding” citizens. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. It is clear that convicted felons are not such citizens and thus fall outside of the Second Amendment’s protection. Accordingly, the Court need not consider the second inquiry because Section 922(g)(1) does not burden conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment.

So, unlike Texas, that being the location of the private property in which the alleged crime (possession) was committed, he determines that the rehabilitation program, under the various penal systems, cannot achieve its stated goal of rehabilitation, during the course of one’s life. In direct contravention of that “philosophy”, we have the opportunity to look at Massey’s life, since that rehabilitation, in “Who is K. C. Massey?“. What he does not address is the question of jurisdiction. If the “crime” was committed on private property (affirmed, in the next argument), is it constitutional to supersede Texas law absent an act that was committed on public lands? This doesn’t address an even more serious breach of jurisdictional limitations, which is quiet apparent in Massey’s case, as Massey was absolutely sure that they were on private land, with permission of the owner, to protect the owner’s property.

2. Equal Protection Clause Argument:

This argument, in the Order, addresses only that challenge brought up in the first of Massey’s Motions. It is, perhaps, inserted here to avoid addressing the ramifications of the subsequent challenge to “equal protection” brought up in the second Motion — a legal sleight of hand.

Hanen, in citing a previous decision, says, “a law is subject to strict scrutiny review in the face of an equal protection challenge only if (1) there is a fundamental right affected or (2) the law targets a suspect class. He continues, “does not impermissibly impinge upon a right protected by the Second Amendment because it regulates conduct that falls outside the scope of the Amendment’s guarantee.”

So, let’s look, first, at (1), where the law in question, “felon in possession, affects the Second Amendment. As mentioned above, 10 U.S.C. § 311 is the codification of the Second Amendment. That statute has a solidly placed foundation in the Constitution, as it clearly defines what at least the one provision of the Second is the militia. It makes exception for some, as far as being, without question, in the militia, though “felons”, or any descriptor that would imply such, is not exclude from the mandatory inclusion in the militia.

Now, let’s look at (2), whether it targets a “suspect class”. Here, we enter more into the First Supplement (the second motion to dismiss the indictment), though Hanen refused to address that part of that motion. If it refused people in one state, merely because they lived in that state, and approved those in another state, simply because they lived in that state, would they not be creating a “suspect class” of those who lived in one of the “refused” states? Quite simply, living in one state makes you a “suspect”, while living in another allows you all of the privileges of firearms possession and ownership. So, if we consider the asserted Second Amendment right, including the codification, and compare that to the “commerce clause”, what do we come up with?

Back in 1934, the Congress enacted the first firearms control act. The concern was expressed in the record (Congressional Record, reference: keep and bear arms, pg 42 “}, which says:

Mr. FREDERICK. That takes me into the purposes of this bill. This bill, as I see it, is intended to be a bill for the suppression of crime and is proposed to the United States Congress which ordinarily has no power in such matters, under the guise of a revenue raising bill.

So, we have, “which ordinarily has no power in such matters, under the guise of a revenue bill”. Now, they were using the commerce clause, as that original acts required that interstate commerce be involved. However, since they had no power to “suppress crime”, they used their power to tax (“revenue raising bill”), to both fund and track firearms. That was the only way that they could mount a challenge to the Second Amendment — by taxing, not by criminal charges, unless the tax was ignored. That was what the Constitution, even loosely construed in the act, allowed. There are no amendments that would extend that authority beyond what existed in 1934 — except the machinations of “case law”, which disregards the Constitution if one can manipulate the words of a previous decision to extend government authority where it had no constitutional authority to go. This is precisely why I suggest that we, the People, need to interpret Our Constitution, as the government is intent upon subverting it.

3. Commerce Clause Challenge:

Now, let’s look at the statute, in detail:

18 USC 922

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person –

(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

There are two key elements that we need to consider. First, “possess in or affecting commerce“. “In” is easily understood. That would clearly be in the act of shipping or transporting. “Affecting”, while that would mean that the possession affected, had an effect on, the transporting.

Here, the Judge cites United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1996), which says that the “in or affecting commerce’ element can be satisfied if the firearm possessed by a convicted felon had previously traveled in interstate commerce.” Damn, I need to return to school and take English Grammar all over, again. I cannot draw the same conclusion that the Court did in Rawls, though apparently, Judge Hanen apparently, can make that broad leap — away from the Constitution and into the lap of a government that wants to have absolute control over every aspect of our lives (Hint: That was once known as slavery). So, in a sense, the wording from Rawls rewrites the wording of the statute (922 (g)(1)) into something that is not written as law, rather, is interpreted into something that is not written in law, thereby making it law because the judges of the Fifth Circuit wanted it to be; not what it was intended to be when passed into law (or regulation). It is bad enough when the Congress can go from taxing to criminalization, however, when they allow the Courts to go even further and make something that does not exist, and then they can be described as nothing less than a Kangaroo Court.

But, wait, we’re not done, yet. That second part of the statute states, “to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate… commerce“, was discussed in A Favorable Ruling?. This, too, stretches our comprehension of the English Language. Here is how it is presented in Massey’s motion:

The word “has”, as opposed to the word “had” was used in the statute. “Has” is the third person singular, present indicative, verb meaning active in the action just completed, where “had” is past tense and participle of the verb have, meaning in a previous situation. So, if one were the direct recipient, then the word “has” would be appropriate. However, if it were expansive, intended to include any firearm shipped in interstate commerce, then “had” would be the proper verb. The use of “had” would have meant to include any and all that “had” been so transported any time prior.

That cannot be too difficult to understand, unless they teach a different grammar in law school, or have judicial indoctrination classes that they have not told us about. It has to do with tense. So, who is to interpret the laws? Will it be the government? Or, will it be we, the People, who have a vested interest in the laws of this nation, and, more importantly, in the Constitution that created that government that is now ignoring that document to increase their power over our very lives?

The Order says, “The Indictment, in all four counts, charges that Massey “did knowingly possess in and affecting interstate commerce a firearm . . . said firearm having been shipped in interstate commerce.” Now, the wording of the statute has been conveniently rearranged as it was presented to the Grand Jury that issued the Indictment. If that Grand Jury accepts that the wording of a law (statute) is what they are told, and probably in writing, how are they to know that it differs from the law that they are asked to weigh against Massey’s actions? If they did choose to question the wording, I’m sure that the US Attorney would explain to them that he, being a lawyer, has said that “this is what the law is, and, if Massey is in violation of this law, as I present it to you, you must come back with an Indictment”.

Let’s compare the wording from the Indictment

… did knowingly possess in and affecting interstate commerce a firearm . . . said firearm having been shipped in interstate commerce.

And the statute:

… to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

Darn look at that. They have introduced another verb, “having”.

“Had” and “having” are both past tense, as described in the First Supplement. However, “has”, is present tense (present indicative). So, the statute says “has”, while the proper verb should have been “had”, if what the government claims was intended was really intended when the statute was written. However, the Grand Jury was led to believe the even more broadly expressed “having”, which is very inclusive.

Has – present 3d singular of have
Had – past and past participle of have
Having – To be in possession of already

So, do we allow the government to redefine words so that they can imprison those that they want to punish? Or, do we decide that you don’t have to be a lawyer, or a judge, to understand the Constitution and the statutes alleged to be written in “Pursuance” to the Constitution?

Here is what James Madison said regarding laws:

It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is today, can guess what it will be tomorrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?

They will be “incoherent” if the Courts use a different language than the People. We cannot know what the law is, today, if that law is not based upon the language that we understand. The law is little known and less fixed when previous decisions of the courts have redefined the words, moving slowly but steadily away from the Constitution, for it is unfixed with subsequent decisions, and little known unless we make a daily habit of reading what the courts have done to both our language and the Constitution.

There is even more that troubles the patriot’s heart, and you will find those points highlighted in the linked Order. Suffice to say that if we fit the analogy of frogs in the water approaching its boiling point, we have, so far complained of the rising temperature, have failed to get out of the water.

Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus
Scene 4 – Government Fears Habeas Corpus

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 27, 2015

Setting the Stage: Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum (the sacred writ) has not been addressed at the Supreme Court since 1890. A recent effort resulted in the Supreme Court simply refusing to rule on a Petition for Habeas Corpus, even after all of the lower courts refused to even acknowledge that right. Now, in the current story, the Court has paid “token” acknowledgment of the right, while endeavoring to quash it — rather than pursuing Justice, as is its constitutional responsibility. Instead, as you will see, the Federal District Court in Montana is there to make sure that the government has no chance of losing a case.

The Government is Afraid of Habeas Corpus

William Krisstofer Wolf (that’s is how the government refers to a friend that we know simply as “Wolf”) and I have known each other for over a year. We have never met, but we have shared many hours of phone conversation, email correspondence, and I can’t count the number of times I was a guest on his radio show on “The Montana Republic”.

Among the subjects discussed in those appearances were “The Plan for Restoration of Constitutional Government“, “Declaration of Dissolution of Government”, “Targeting“, “Committees of Safety“, and “Habeas Corpus – The Guardian of Liberty“. The last, regarding the “Sacred Writ”, Habeas Corpus, was also the subject of some of our private conversations. Wolf fully understands what I had learned, over the past three years, though we had never anticipated having to call upon the sacred writ on his behalf — until he was arrested on March 25, 2015.

Based upon our previous conversations on the subject, I prepared a simple demand for Habeas Corpus (3 pages) and a Power of Attorney authorizing me to speak o his behalf regarding Habeas Corpus. These were Priority mailed to him on March 27, and he executed and attempted to have them delivered to the Court. After numerous attempts to have the guards take and deliver the documents to the Court, and the Court refusing to recognize the prepared Habeas Corpus, Wolf resorted to a one page, handwritten, Habeas Corpus (Court Doc. 1), dated April 1, to wit:

United States of America
v.                                             15-                  -BIL-CSO
William Krisstofer Wolf

In the Honorable Court of:
UNITED STATES Magistrate Judge Carol S. Ostby
On April 1, 2015, I, William Krisstofer Wolf, by the only means available. in Yellowstone Corrections Facility interoffice mail, SERVE on the court a DEMAND FOR HABEAS CORPUS.
In as such, I, William Krisstofer Wolf hereby request to be put on the Docket to Schedule a hearing date on the DEMAND FOR HABEAS CORPUS. This docket request for a scheduling here is needed to allow my Attorney in Fact, who has a Power of Attorney – Specific, time to travel to this Honorable Court to speak on my behalf, by authority of the case of Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 US 146.

Done on this Day, April 1, 2015
/s/William Krisstofer Wolf
Defendant

This was sufficient for the Court to finally take notice of Wolf’s right to challenge both unconstitutional laws and absence of jurisdiction. On April 15, the Court “Received” the document. The Court stated that they would not let the Habeas Corpus hold the Court hostage, so they opened a civil case, on April 16, and filed the handwritten Habeas Corpus and then filed an ORDER (Court Doc. 2), immediately thereafter.

The Court’s Efforts to Quash Habeas Corpus

Here are some of the “claims” made in the ORDER (Court Doc. 2):

1. [T]he document does not specify the number of the criminal case or indicate in any other way that it is meant to be filed in the criminal case.
2. [T]he document states that Wolf is acting “by the only means available”; yet counsel was appointed for Wolf in the criminal case on March 26, 2015.
3. Wolf did not pay the filing fee of $5.00 or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
4. “In all courts of the United States, the parties may plead and conduct their own causes personally or by counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (emphasis added); see also Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). [She concludes this claim with the statement] “Wolf may litigate this matter pro se, or he may appear through duly qualified and admitted counsel without an attorney-in-fact.
5. [T]he “‘demand for habeas corpus’ does not set forth any allegations of fact”. “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Wolf cannot mount such an attack until he alleges facts he believes demonstrate that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2242. If Wolf intends to proceed, he must submit an amended petition alleging such facts and explaining why his custody violates the law.
6. If Wolf intended to seek a detention hearing in the criminal case that is pending against him, he should discuss this with his attorney, who can file a motion for a detention hearing under the criminal case number, CR 15-20-MJ-BLG-CSO. If Wolf wishes to file the motion on his own, the Court will then need to consider the motion and decide whether to entertain the motion from Wolf personally, notwithstanding his representation by counsel. But the rule that an attorney-in-fact may not act for Wolf in court applies in all federal cases, civil or criminal. Kelley, 539 F.2d at 1201-03. Moreover, in the criminal case, Wolf’s attorney-in-fact can play no role at all. Wolf is the person charged.

Response to The Court’s Efforts to Quash Habeas Corpus

So, let’s look at what the correct response is to the above claims:

As far as Claim #1, Wolf had no access to documents, and by this time, he was “blocked” from calling some of his friends on the phone. At the time that he wrote the handwritten, which was long after the typed 3 page version (Court Doc. 3), he had only the “Criminal Complaint“, and from that, was only able to extract “15-     -BIL-CSO”, which he properly quoted in the handwritten document, and it was styled as all subsequent filings, “United States of America v. William Krisstofer Wolf”, just as the Court did. So, that doesn’t take rocket science, heck, even the Post Office could have figured that out.

To Claim #2, that he is acting “by the only means available”, raises an interesting question. Wolf stated to the Judge, at his next appearance, that he does not recognize the jurisdiction of the Court and he had no intention of entering a plea. So, if he were to go through the court appointed attorney, an officer of that court, would he not be submitting to the jurisdiction that that Court? There is little doubt, as you will see, that the Court will resort to obfuscation and chicanery in an effort to undermine his right to challenge that persecution that is currently being conducted against him.

Claim #3 says that he “did not pay the filing fee of $5.00”. I can find no reference to the filing fee in the “UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA – Local Rules of Procedure“. However, with regard to:

Rule 3.1 Filing a New Case.

(a) Required Items. The following items are required to file a new case:

(1) a complaint, petition, or other originating document;

(2) unless the originating document is a petition for writ of habeas corpus, payment of the full amount of the filing fee or a motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); and

(3) a civil cover sheet, unless the plaintiff or petitioner is proceeding pro se.

So, the originating document (1)was provided, though they refused the first and opened the case based upon the handwritten document. As to the fee, there is an exception for Habeas Corpus (2), and otherwise, only the full amount can be accepted. It does not address any partial, or alternate fee, such as $5.00, it simply exempts Habeas Corpus from fees. As it exempts the requirement for a cover sheet (3), if he is proceeding pro se (presumably, that would also apply to someone proceeding “pro per”. So, why the effort to extort (yes, that is the legal term) $5.00 from Wolf? Or, is it an effort to simply place obstructions in the way, to discourage his attempt to seek his right to challenge the Court?

Now, with Claim #4, we enter into a rather interesting aspect, which deals directly with our rights and efforts to force us into submission to the dictates of the government. This will be similar to those in #5 and #6, though we will consider them separately. The claim cites both 28 U.S.C. § 1654 and the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). Consequently, “[a]ny individual acting without an attorney must appear personally and may not delegate that duty to any other person who is not a member of the bar of this Court.” D. Mont. L.R. 83.8(a) [Local Rules of Procedure]; see also United States v. Kelley, 539 F.2d 1199, 1201-03 (9th Cir. 1976).

28 U.S. Code § 1654 – Appearance personally or by counsel
In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.

As stated earlier, a writ “is a form of written command in the name of a court or other legal authority to act, or abstain from acting, in some way.” It requires no plea, nor is it a case; it is a request for the court to command an action, which, in the matter of Habeas Corpus, is to issue the writ to raise the questions posed by the person requesting the writ. From that point, it’s not a matter of innocence or guilt, it is to assure that there is proper legal authority regarding the action upon which it is based.

The next citation is the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35:

And be it further enacted, That in all courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by assistance of such counsel or attorneys at law as by the rules of the said courts respectively shall be permitted to manage and conduct causes therein… for crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United States, and all civil actions in which the United States shall be concerned… in the respective courts before which the suits or prosecutions shall be.

In the broadest construction, that “assistance of counsel”, which clearly is not an “attorney at law”, hence the “or”, nor the party, himself, hence the other “or”, which leaves the possibility that a party, a person, may, since he is also capable of taking all responsibility upon himself, assign another to speak on his behalf, as an “attorney in fact”.

The Court references D. Mont. L.R. 83.8(a):

83.8 Self-Represented Litigants.

(a) Any individual acting without an attorney must appear personally and may not delegate that duty to any other person who is not a member of the bar of this Court. A selfrepresented person is bound by the Federal Rules and all applicable local rules. Sanctions, including but not limited to entry of default judgment or dismissal with prejudice, may be imposed for failure to comply with local rules.

This Rule applies to “litigants. This will be addressed along with the cited Kelley case.

Regarding United States v. Kelley, as we look at that case, we might wonder just what the Court was thinking, or was it stabbing blindly, in the dark, to endeavor to equate Kelley with the current matter, the writ. Kelley was being prosecuted. He was not seeking to question the constitutionality of the law, nor the jurisdiction. First, “he argues that he had a right to be represented by a non-lawyer.” Then, “Kelley sought to have his trusted friend Hurd, who was well-versed on Kelley’s monetary theory, serve as trial counsel. Hurd is a roofer and not a licensed attorney. The district court denied the request and prohibited Hurd from sitting at the counsel table or consulting with Kelley during the course of the trial.”

It is well known that if you don’t assert a right, the Court will not grant you that right. Kelley wanted Hurd to sit with him and counsel him. Kelley did not provide a “power of attorney”, according to the decision, he just wanted Hurd to sit and advise him. It doesn’t begin to approach the question at hand. This case is not on point, since it is silent on the point that the Court is trying to make about power of attorney and attorney in fact, and whether this is applicable to a writ, instead of litigation.

Finally, she says that he “may litigate this matter pro se, or he may appear through duly qualified and admitted counsel without an attorney-in-fact.” “Litigate means, “To dispute or contend in form of law; to settle a dispute or seek relief in a court of law; to carry on a suit… a judicial contest.” This is not a dispute, it is simply seeking an answer to a challenge to jurisdiction and constitutionality. As stated before, it is “a form of written command in the name of a court… to act, or abstain from acting, in some way.” It is not an adversarial proceeding.

Wolf had provided a “Power of Attorney”, making Gary Hunt his “Attorney in Fact”, and that was submitted to the Court and filed in the case. Therefore, it is before the Court. The Court, however, challenges Wolf’s right to have someone other than the court appointed attorney, or another “attorney at law”, speak for him on this matter that is not a suit, and, is not a prosecution, it is a “writ of right”, asking the Court to rule on the question presented — that being whether the laws upon which the charges are based, are, in fact, constitutional as applied to Wolf, and whether he falls under the jurisdiction of the authority behind those laws, and the Court, itself (or should I say, “herself”?).

So, let’s see what both “power of attorney” and “attorney in fact” mean (Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition):

Power of attorney: An instrument authorizing another to act as one’s agent or attorney. The agent is attorney in fact and his power is revoked on the death of the principal by operation of law. Such power may be either general or special. [no citations given]

Attorney in fact: An attorney authorized to act in his place and stead, either for some particular purpose, as to do a particular act, or for the transaction of business in general, not of legal character. This authority is conferred by an instrument in writing, called a “letter of attorney,” or more commonly a “power of attorney”. [no citations given]

Now, so as not to be misunderstood, that phrase, “not of a legal character” applies only to the “general business”, which is separated from the “particular act” by the “or”.

So, what the Court has said is, well, not on point to the entire matter before it.

So, let’s move on to Claim #5:

Though she does cite, correctly, from the case, when she says, “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody”, she has the subject of custody out of context to what is applicable in Wolf’s case. Wolf has not been convicted. He is challenging his detention based upon absence of jurisdiction as well as absence of constitutional authority of the charges against him. In Preiser, Rodriguez had been convicted and had already served some time in prison. He had sought relief from the length of his sentence, well, in the words of the decision:

Respondents were state prisoners who had elected to participate in New York’s conditional-release program, by which a prisoner serving an indeterminate sentence may earn up to 10 days per month good-behavior-time credits toward reduction of his maximum sentence… Held: When a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his physical imprisonment and by way of relief seeks a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

This decision, Preiser, as stated in the decision, is an action under 28 U.S, Code §2254:

(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 US Code § 2251: Stay of State court proceedings, begins the subject of dealing with state prisoners challenging through the federal court system. Wolf’ case is purely federal, so we need not concern ourselves, though the court has, with this,. Even if we did, we are really discussing what it says in §2241 (b), below, so I have no idea what her majesty was thinking; she should no that this is a federal matter — I think.

Though the ORDER does not cite §2254, as the case does, it does, properly, cite §§2241-2242, below. However, this citation is really apples and oranges, as the Preiser decision has no bearing on the subject of this current matter. §2254 has no relevance, at all, to the Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum Wolf is seeking, and that the Court is required to respond (answer) to.

So, let’s look at the pertinent parts of 28 U. S. Code §§2241-2242:

28 U.S.C. § 2241 : US Code – Section 2241: Power to grant writ

(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had.

(b) The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit judge may decline to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer the application for hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it.

(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless –

(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or

(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United States; or

(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States; or

28 U.S.C. § 2242 : US Code – Section 2242: Application

Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf. It shall allege the facts concerning the applicant’s commitment or detention, the name of the person who has custody over him and by virtue of what claim or authority, if known. It may be amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions. If addressed to the Supreme Court, a justice thereof or a circuit judge it shall state the reasons for not making application to the district court of the district in which the applicant is held.

So, the District Court is the proper place in which to initiate a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum. Now, under subparagraph (c), we find two applicable qualifiers for who may Petition for such writ. The ORDER cites subparagraph (3), though seems to skip right over subparagraph (1). However, until the person detaining Wolf has answered the writ, that determination cannot be made. Though that last sentence may seem confusing, we will shed some light on it as we venture into the next relevant section, that the Court seemed to have completely, or conveniently, overlooked.

28 U.S.C. § 2243 : US Code – Section 2243: Issuance of writ; return; hearing; decision

A court, justice or judge entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.

The respondent is, of course, the person who has detained Wolf, or that Wolf is detained under the authority thereof. So, unless the Court can show that the applicant (“attorney in fact”, or, “next friend”) is not entitled thereto, which it has, perhaps, insufficiently, attempted to do, must either grant or require the respondent to “show cause”. By the way, “forthwith” is without delay, immediately, etc., It does not provide for excuses, only action.

The writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained. It shall be returned within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.

Now, the civil case was opened on April 15, fully two weeks after the Habeas Corpus was submitted, “by the only means available”, and the Court has still not, over a month later, even begun the process that §2243 requires. So, from the “forthwith”, being the starting of the clock required for what Madison, the father of the Constitution, described as “in the most expeditious and ample manner“, the respondent then has three days to return, which is “to show cause”. Remember, the Fourth Amendment states that you have the right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation”.

Further, the Court states, “Wolf cannot mount such an attack until he alleges facts he believes demonstrate that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”. But, wait just a minute. The Amendment says that the government has to show “nature” and “cause”, not the accused. This is supported by the wording in §2243, that the “order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained.” It sort of makes you wonder if law school has any courses on English comprehension.

Continuing with §2243:

The person to whom the writ or order is directed shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention. When the writ or order is returned a day shall be set for hearing, not more than five days after the return unless for good cause additional time is allowed.

There it is, again. The person making the return, that would be the person detaining, not the person detained, “shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention.” How could that have possible been overlooked by a District Judge, in whose hands lie the lives and futures of those who are required to stand before her for judgment? And, when is that damned hearing going to be held? Wolf sits in detention, denied his liberty, while the judge fritters away that very object that brought the colonies to rebel against England, and part ways with a corrupted judicial system.

The remainder of §2243:

Unless the application for the writ and the return present only issues of law the person to whom the writ is directed shall be required to produce at the hearing the body of the person detained. The applicant or the person detained may, under oath, deny any of the facts set forth in the return or allege any other material facts.

The return and all suggestions made against it may be amended, by leave of court, before or after being filed.

The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.

Now, that last line says it all, that “The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.”

As to Claim #6, Wolf does not seek a detention hearing, as to do so would admit to jurisdiction. The other points in this Claim have already been addressed.

Stay tuned for Act I, Scene 5.

Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus
Scene 3 – Guardian of Personal Liberty

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 26, 2015

Setting the Stage: Joseph Story called Habeas Corpus “the great bulwark of personal liberty.” He did so as he, as well as did other legal scholars and various Supreme Court decision, because the founders knew that overarching government might attempt to suppress the rights of the people that had been so recently won, at great cost to the people. The inclusion of the “sacred writ” in the Constitution was to assure that their posterity would always have a means of challenging the federal government, when it went beyond those limits set by the Constitution.

The Truth About Habeas Corpus, the “Sacred Writ”

Now, let’s visit the remedy the Founders provided us, in the Constitution. It is fair to say that the Constitution was written with an understanding of both human nature and the incessant obsession in some to seek power solely for the sake of wielding that power.

In Article I, which is the Legislative Branch, § 9, clause 2, it provides that:

The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.

A privilege is a right that can be suspended.

So, exactly what does it mean? Let’s see what some early judicial scholars had to say.

In 1768, William Blackstone, in his Commentaries, provides insight into the necessity and requirements associated with this Writ of Right.

But the great and efficacious writ in all manner of illegal confinement, is that of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum; directed to the person detaining another, and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner with the day and cause of his caption and detention…

[I]f a probable ground be shewn, that the party is imprisoned without just cause, and therefore hath a right to be delivered, the writ of habeas corpus is then a writ of right, which “may not be denied, but ought to be granted to every man that is committed, or detained in prison, or otherwise restrained, though it be by the command of the king, the privy council, or any other.”

In a former part of these commentaries we expatiated at large on the personal liberty of the subject. It was shewn to be a natural inherent right, which could not be surrendered or forfeited unless by the commission of some great and atrocious crime, nor ought to be abridged in any case without the special permission of law.

A remedy the more necessary, because the oppression does not always arise from the ill-nature, but sometimes from the mere inattention of government.

From the Constitutional Convention, we have Madison’s Records of the Federal Convention.

“The privileges and benefits of the writ of habeas corpus shall be enjoyed in this government in the most expeditious and ample manner: and shall not be suspended by the Legislature, except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a limited time, not exceeding [blank] months.”

“Expeditious and ample” are easily understood, and, clearly, the intention of the inclusion of the “Sacred Writ” within the protection of the Constitution. Being the only “right” defined as a “privilege”, we need simply understand that it is the only enumerated right that is subject to legislative suspension, though only legislative.

William Rawle, in “A View of the Constitution of the United States” (1829), provides us insight into the perception of the Writ just forty years after the Ratification of the Constitution, and, clearly, as it was envisioned at the time.

Reasons will be given hereafter for considering many of the restrictions, contained in the amendments to the Constitution, as extending to the states as well as to the United States, but the nature of the writ of habeas corpus seems peculiarly to call for this construction. It is the great remedy of the citizen or subject against arbitrary or illegal imprisonment; it is the mode by which the judicial power speedily and effectually protects the personal liberty of every individual, and repels the injustice of unconstitutional laws or despotic governors. After erecting the distinct government which we are considering, and after declaring what should constitute the supreme law in every state in the Union, fearful minds might entertain jealousies of this great and all-controlling power, if some protection against its energies when misdirected, was not provided by itself.

If this provision had been omitted, the existing powers under the state governments, none of whom are without it, might be questioned, and a person imprisoned on a mandate of the president or other officer, under colour of lawful authority derived from the United States, might be denied relief.

The Honorable Justice Joseph Story, in “Commentaries on the Constitution“, will provide even more insight.

1333. In order to understand the meaning of the terms here used, it will be necessary to have recourse to the common law; for in no other way can we arrive at the true definition of the writ of habeas corpus. At the common law there are various writs, called writs of habeas corpus. But the particular one here spoken of is that great and celebrated writ, used in all cases of illegal confinement, known by the name of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, directed to the person detaining another, and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner, with the day and cause of his caption and detention… It is, therefore, justly esteemed the great bulwark of personal liberty; since it is the appropriate remedy to ascertain, whether any person is rightfully in confinement or not, and the cause of his confinement; and if no sufficient ground of detention appears, the party is entitled to his immediate discharge. This writ is most beneficially construed; and is applied to every case of illegal restraint, whatever it may be; for every restraint upon a man’s liberty is, in the eye of the law, an imprisonment, wherever may be the place, or whatever may be the manner, in which the restraint is effected.

Finally, we will visit Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856):

HABEAS CORPUS, remedies A writ of habeas corpus is an order in writing, signed by the judge who grants the same, and sealed with the seal of the court of which he is a judge, issued in the name of the sovereign power where it is granted, by such a court or a judge thereof, having lawful authority to issue the same, directed to any one having a person in his custody or under his restraint, commanding him to produce, such person at a certain time and place, and to state the reasons why he is held in custody, or under restraint.

7.  The Constitution of the United State Article 1, s. 9, n. 2, provides, that ” the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it and the same principle is contained in many of the state constitutions. In order still more to secure the citizen the benefit of this great writ, a heavy penalty is inflicted upon the judges who are bound to grant it, in case of refusal.

It is pro8.  per to consider, 1. When it is to be granted. 2. How it is to be served. 3. What return is to be made to it. 4. The bearing. 5. The effect of the judgment upon it.

9. – 1. The writ is to be granted whenever a person is in actual confinement, committed or detained as aforesaid, either for a criminal charge, or, …under any color or pretence whatsoever…

10. – 2. The writ may be served by any free person, by leaving it with the person to whom it is directed, or left at the gaol or prison with any of the under officers, under keepers, or deputy of the said officers or keepers...

16.  The habeas corpus can be suspended only by authority of the legislature. The constitution of the United States provides, that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of invasion and rebellion, the public safety may require it. Whether this writ ought to be suspended depends on political considerations, of which the legislature, is to decide…

It is apparent that the inclusion of Article I, Section 3, clause 3, was included in the Constitution as a bar against overarching government, unconstitutional laws, and jurisdiction beyond that authorized by the Constitution.

Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus
Scene 2 – Who is in Charge Now?

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 23, 2015

Setting the Stage: Ten years after the Ashwander Decision, an Act of Congress established a far more authoritative agency structure, creating a Fourth Branch of Government. Though intended to affect less than 1% of the population, or so they said, it now affects nearly every one of us.

bu·reauc·ra·cy. noun

A system of government in which most of the important decisions are made by state officials rather than by elected representatives.

Administrative Agencies Rule Our Lives

The “Administrative Procedures Act of 1946” was submitted by Representative Pat McCarran, Democrat, Nevada, who gave us some insight into its purpose, when, in the Congressional Record, he said:

“We have set up a fourth order in the tripartite plan of government which was initiated by the founding fathers of our democracy. They set up the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches; but since that time we have set up fourth dimension, if I may so term it, which is now popularly known as administrative in nature. So we have the legislative, the executive, the judicial, and the administrative.”

What? A fourth branch of government? My Constitution only has three. Wouldn’t an Amendment be required to create a fourth branch?

He then goes on to say:

“[This bill], the purpose of which is to improve the administration of justice by prescribing fair administrative procedure, is a bill of rights for the hundreds of thousands of Americans whose affairs are controlled or regulated in one way or another by agencies of the Federal government. It is designed to provide guarantees of due process in administrative procedure.

So, he says that there are hundreds of thousands of people “whose affairs are controlled or regulated in one way or another by agencies of the Federal government.” The population of the United States, in 1946, was 150 million people. So, the “hundreds of thousands”, he didn’t say anything about a million, would constitute well less than one percent of the population.

There is an old saying that if you give an inch, they will take a mile. This appears to be an understatement when you consider that the less than 1% has expanded, in these past 69 years, to incorporate probably 99.9% of the people in this country.

This is, most certainly, NOT the limited government that was given to us by the Founding Fathers. Though we find that their foresight provided a means by which we could challenge that expansion (let’s be honest, usurpation) of authority in the limitations imposed upon that government. However, before we do, we need to look at what those men of integrity also told us of the consequences of such usurpations.

The Founders on Constitutional Limitations

Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No 78, made clear the judiciary, especially the Supreme Court (which is the only court proposed at the date of his writing) was “the citadel of the public justice and the public security“, and, that “No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid“.

Further, Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137), says that “an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void“.

Prior to the ratification of the federal Constitution, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in 1787, first nullified an enacted statutes that was contrary to the North Carolina Constitution, in Bayard v Singleton (1 N.C. 42). They said that “if they could [enact legislation contrary to the constitution], they would at the same instant of time destroy their own existence as a legislature and dissolve the government thereby established“.

The next Scene will explain what the Founders did to protect us from such encroachments by the government that we created.

Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus
Scene 1 – Limited Federal Jurisdiction

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 22, 2015

Setting the Scene: This Act is a series of scenes that will lead up to the events, the paper chase, that are going on in Montana, in an effort to persuade the Court to recognize that rights of William wolf and the limitations of federal authority, as conceived by the Founders. It will provide an understanding of what was, why it was, and what happened to deceive us into believing that it no longer existed. It will conclude with the ongoing effort to restore the proper relationship between the federal government and us.

* * *

From my early school years, I heard explanations pertaining to Habeas Corpus, the “Sacred Writ”. It could be used to remove you from unlawful detention; it could be written on a scrap of paper to be served; it could be served, on your behalf, by anyone who wanted to assist you in being removed from unlawful detention, and, perhaps even more. It was championed as fundamental to our liberty. However, little more was said of it, and it remained only as a mental symbol of something that, though not well explained, was one of the most important inclusions in the Constitution. So important that it was not included in the Bill of Rights, rather, it was part of that first venture into the creation of the new government that we have, today, the Constitution.

Understanding that circumstances might warrant the suspension of that “Sacred Writ”, the power to do so was left solely to the Legislative Branch of the government, and only “in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”

Interestingly, this fits nicely within that portion of the Fourth Amendment that states that you have a right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation” against you. But, what do “nature” and “cause” mean? So, we will visit the language of the Founders; from Webster’s 1828 Dictionary, we find that “nature” is a noun, and that the appropriate definition is, ” The essence, essential qualities or attributes of a thing, which constitute it; what it is”. So, nature is the element (essence) from which the charges are brought. The “cause” is, quite simply, that which brings it about — the act.

So, the “cause” is the act that brings about the charges, and the nature is the source from which the law acquires its authority. And, in any act, for which a “cause” is brought by the federal government, it must also have a source of authority, that being only, and limited to, the Constitution. The Constitution provides for both authority of enactment of laws and limitations upon the jurisdiction within which it can apply those laws and impose penalties, if convicted of the act.

After all, we know that the Constitution was written to set limits upon the government that was created by that document. They granted to that government so created, both powers and authorities, and they imposed limitations upon it.

Most cases that go to the United States Supreme Court are based upon certiorari; that is to see if there were irregularities, or errors, at trial in the inferior court. These writs deal solely with whether the applicable laws, or standards of justice (due process), were properly applied. The decisions in such cases often have the appearance of creating not only detailed instruction as to interpretation of a law, rule, or regulation, but also often they go beyond that written law, serving to extend the authority of such law beyond that was intended by the Congress, when it was enacted. This, however, is based upon the presumption that it if a law is enacted by, or under the authority (rules and regulations), of Congress, it must be constitutional in its enactment.

What is does not do, at least in recent years, is question whether the law, even if constitutionally enacted, is imposed where the constitutional limitations preclude its applicability, i.e. jurisdiction.

Before we proceed further, perhaps understanding what a “writ” is, and what it is not, is necessary for perspective. It is not a court case, nor a lawsuit, nor a criminal prosecution against a person. Quite simply, it is “a form of written command in the name of a court or other legal authority to act, or abstain from acting, in some way.”

Limited federal Jurisdiction

Under Article I, § 8, clause 17, Congress has “exclusive legislative jurisdiction”. Under Article IV, § 3, clause 2, Congress may “make all needed Rules and Regulations”, with the caveat, “respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” So, under these authorities, many ‘laws” are enacted that apply only to the extent that jurisdiction also applies. A good example of this is a law enacted in 1825 that gave the government the authority to punish “certain crimes against the United States”. We’ll let the act speak for itself:

“That if any person or persons, within any fort, dock-yard, navy-yard, arsenal, armory, or magazine, the site whereof is ceded to, and under the jurisdiction of the United States, or on a site of any lighthouse, or other needful building belonging to the United States, the sight whereof is ceded to them [United States], and under their jurisdiction, as aforesaid, shall, willfully…”

Take note that this does not apply to government property outside of that limited jurisdiction. The property must be to be on lands that are ceded and jurisdiction also ceded, within the authority granted by the Constitution.

For those interested, there are a number of Supreme Court decisions that support the requirement for a Constitutional nexus for an enactment of Congress to be valid and applicable, outside of that limited jurisdiction. These can be found in the article, “Habeas Corpus – The Guardian of Liberty“.

Now, what we have been taught and have been inclined to believe for our entire lives, is eviscerated, if we heed a decision of the Supreme Court, In Re Lane (135 U.S. 443), ruled on in 1890, in which a man was charged with rape, under federal law. The rape took place in the Oklahoma (Indian) Territory (unorganized), though the case was tried in Kansas (statehood in 1861). Lane was convicted and imprisoned in Kansas. Kansas punishment being less harsh, Lane attempted to challenge federal jurisdiction, opting to be punished under Kansas law.

The law under which he was charged and convicted of, had the jurisdictional, “in the District of Columbia or other place, except the territories, over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction,” in its wording. Now, that wording, “other place, except the territories, over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction” can appear to be misleading. However, the Court clarified that rather confusing statement by explaining that “except territories”, was not in the context of Article IV, § 3, clause 2 (needful rules and regulations), but rather, as those organized territories, seeking statehood — those which had been granted, by Congress, the authority to propose a constitution and to create Legislative, Executive and Judicial Branches, and were authorized to enact laws, administer them, and the judicial branch to provide a forum for justice. These same grants of authority were endowed upon the states, within the limits of the state constitution, by adoption of the state constitution and the granting of statehood. The extent of federal jurisdiction, the laws, rules, and regulations, was limited solely to the unorganized territories.

Supreme Court (and Inferior Courts) Don’t Want to Rule on Constitutionality

In 1936, the Supreme Court ruled on a case known as Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (297 U.S. 288). The details of the case are not something that we need concern ourselves with, though we must heed the words of Justice Brandeis, as he explained the seven rules that the Court had adopted in applying their judicial authority. The applicable rules are:

1.  The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, nonadversary, proceeding, declining because to decide such questions ‘is legitimate only in the last resort…

4.  The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of… Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter…

5.  The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.

6.  The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.

7.  ‘When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.

As we can see, Rules 1, 4 and 7, are means by which the Court can avoid ruling on the constitutionality of a matter before them.

Rule 5 provides for a condition upon which one must have been injured to even challenge a statute, even as to constitutionality and jurisdiction. And, Rule 6 provides a bar against challenge, if a person “has availed himself of its benefits”.

So, we can see how extremely difficult it is to question constitutionality, jurisdiction, or to even find that you are in a position to challenge the lawfulness, of any act of Congress. But, we also have to understand the “nature” of those “statutes” referred to in the Rules.

In the Ashwander decision, it was pointed out that the Rules had been adopted over the past few decades, so this was really nothing new. Administrative agencies, though few at the time (Tennessee Valley Authority was one such agency), were relatively new. However, in an effort to expand constitutional authority beyond the limits imposed by the Constitution, and based upon the adoption of those Rules, Congress took another step, in 1946, to expand their authority beyond those limits. That will be the subject of Scene 2.