Outpost of Freedom blog

Camp Lone Star – The King Can Do No Wrong, or Can He?

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
September 13, 2015

At the last hearing, Judge Hanen had told KC’s attorney, Sorola, that the Motion to Dismiss Indictment wasn’t written correctly. That motion had been denied in, which is discussed in Act II – A Kangaroo Court – Scene 1 – How Case Law Subverts the Constitution. Judge Hanen allowed that Sorola might submit a supplemental motion, and said that he was willing to hear a jurisdictional argument. AUSA Hagen was not pleased with the decision; however, dates were set for both the motion and opposition to be submitted to the Court.

Sorola filed his Second Motion to Dismiss Indictment, which “incorporates” the previous Notion to Dismiss. So we will look at what has been entered in support of the jurisdictional aspect of the case.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) Violates The Tenth Amendment

The Tenth Amendment provides: the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. As this Amendment makes clear, and as the Supreme Court has long-recognized, the federal government is one of enumerated, limited powers. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland. Accordingly, the federal government may act only where the Constitution so authorizes. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).

A corollary to this rule is that Congress may not act in areas prohibited to it. As Justice Thomas noted in his concurrence in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring), the Constitution “places whole areas outside the reach of Congress,” such as the First Amendment’s preventing “Congress from ‘prohibiting the free exercise’ of religion or ‘abridging the freedom of speech.'” Id. Justice Thomas went on to explain that the “Second Amendment similarly appears to contain an express limitation on the government’s authority,” and stated: This Court has not had recent occasion to consider the nature of the substantive right safeguarded by the Second Amendment. If, however, the Second Amendment is read to confer a personal right to “keep and bear arms,” a colorable argument exists that the federal government’s regulatory scheme, at least as it pertains to the purely intrastate sale or possession of firearms, runs afoul of that Amendment’s protections. Although Printz dealt with a successful challenge to the Brady Act’s requirement that state law enforcement officers conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers, the logic of Justice Thomas’s reasoning is compelling with respect to § 922(g)(1): the Tenth Amendment limits federal power; the Second Amendment specifically prohibits the federal government from infringing the individual right to bear arms; thus, it surely cannot be constitutional for the federal government to prohibit a person’s purely intrastate possession of firearms.

For the reasons stated above, Mr. Massey respectfully requests that the Court find 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied to him and dismiss the pending indictment.

Of course, AUSA Hagen has to answer this Motion, who knows, maybe even his future as a United States Attorney is in jeopardy, since this is a high profile case and Hagen has stated that he has been pressured from above to win this case. However, it appears that Mr. Hagen was not up to answering Sorola’s Motion, so we have a new player, AUSA Jason Corley (the new King), who filed the “Government’s Response” to Massey’s Motion.

Massey’s motion was simply three pages, the above being the substantial portions thereof. However, the Government’s Response was 24 pages. And, as I began reading the Government’s Response, a quote from W. C. Fields popped into my mind:

“If you can’t dazzle them with brilliance, baffle them with bullshit.”

As I continued reading, I realized that the position Corley was taking, he was asserting as if he were King. He has his interpretation of what something means, and there is absolutely no attempt to balance justice with what he believes. This brought to mind another historical quote, most often expressed shortly before the ousting, or abdication, of a King, who refused to abide by the constitution or exercise any semblance of justice. – The King can do no Wrong!

Now, to restrain you from falling asleep or rolling on the floor laughing, I will only address some of the aspects of the government’s argument.

First, we will talk about legal theory, since that seems to be an important consideration on the government’s part. The following, though interspersed through the Motion, are consolidated simply to demonstrate their concern:

1. Defendant’s motion is not ripe for consideration as a factual matter. Defendant has presented merely a legal theory, namely that “purely” intrastate possession of a firearm cannot be infringed by the federal government of the United States. Defendant has not, however, presented any facts whatsoever let alone “sufficient facts which, if proven, would justify relief.” (page 4)
2. Defendant now files a motion to dismiss the indictment based solely on a proposed legal theory that “purely” intrastate possession of a firearm by a felon (or presumably any other individual) cannot be regulated or criminalized by the federal government. (page 6)
3. But this factual issue does not tangentially create a legal dispute on a matter not in controversy, namely an unrelated constitutional theory cloaked as a suppression issue. (page 7)
4. Article III of the United States Constitution grants the Court authority to adjudicate ‘cases’ or ‘controversies’, not irrelevant and tangential legal theory… Defendant does not have standing to challenge any supposed government regulation or criminalization of “purely” intrastate possession of a firearm. (page 8)
5. Because Defendant’s second motion to dismiss proposes an irrelevant and tangentially reached legal theory, and because Defendant does not have standing to challenge that issue, the government respectfully requests that the Court deny the motion to dismiss the indictment. (page 8)
6. Because both legal theory and binding case law are contrary to Defendant’s proposition, the Government respectfully requests that Defendant’s second motion to dismiss be denied. (page 11)
7. The legal theory postulated by Defendant is just that, a legal theory. Other legal theory supports the proposition that the federal government through an act of Congress may indeed have the authority to criminalize “purely” intrastate possession of a firearm by a felon should Congress make the requisite findings that it is necessary and proper to criminalize possession of a firearm by a felon to promote the general welfare of the American people, insure domestic tranquility, and establish justice. (page 15)

So, let’s look at what he has said. In #1 and #2, he suggests that it is a “legal theory” the “‘purely’ intrastate possession of a firearm cannot be infringed by the federal government”. Well, the Second Amendment notwithstanding, the Commerce Clause is based ” foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”. And, the government has yet to directly control intrastate commerce under the provision.

There is little doubt that the government has tried, by twisted abuse of our language (See Motion to Dismiss Indictment), tried to extent their authority to any firearm that had been in interstate commerce, though, as we will discuss, they change the language when it suits their purpose.

In #3 and #4, he suggests that it is an “unrelated constitutional theory”. In this same document, he cites the Constitution as the authority, as he sees it, as absolute, as if spoken by the King, himself. So, there is no theory allowed on the public side, since only the government side can cite their interpretation of the Constitution as legitimate. This kinda makes you wonder why they even use a pretext of justice when they simply want to imprison someone.

In both #4 and #5, he suggest that it is “irrelevant” that Massey challenge the Indictment because he has no standing, presumably, to defend himself. Once again, the King has spoken.

In 1936, in the Supreme Court decision of Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (297 US 288), Justice Brandeis, in a separate but concurring decision, provided insight into the evolving role of the United States Supreme Court, wherein he said:

The Court developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision. They are:

[Rule] 5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation…”

It was clear that the matter of standing had to do with matters brought to that Court, on certiorari, or error. It did not provide a means whereby a trial on criminal charges, in the lowest court of the federal system, could deny standing to challenge the law or the jurisdiction of the matter upon which one was charged.

In #6 and #7, he tends to give credence to the legal theory by stating that theory and case law are “contrary to [Massey’s] proposition”. However, we must understand that the government proposed another “legal theory”. That “theory” is suggested in the following excerpt:

Were Congress to make the proper findings and act in the interest of the “general Welfare” of the people of the United States, it is theoretically possible Congress could, and theoretically possible Congress does, have the constitutional power to regulate and criminalize all possession of firearms by felons. Congress, however, has not chosen to act pursuant to alternative powers and has instead relied on the Commerce Clause. Because of this, an interstate nexus relating to possession of the firearms is an element of the crime and any challenge the Defendant is raising in regard to “purely” intrastate possession is a factual challenge, not a constitutional one.

Now, this brings us into a whole new world of conjecture. He theorizes that Congress could, do, and does have the power to, criminalize any possession by any felon, anywhere within this (mythical) Kingdom. It has bee clearly established, when Equal Protection was discussed, that if a firearm or ammunition were manufactured in a state, those possessing such firearms and ammunition are not subject to criminal charges, since the firearm and/or ammunition had not entered interstate commerce. So, is Corley suggesting that Congress is too damned stupid to see the loophole that have left for those who live in certain states, or that they are wise enough to know that those living in those states are not the type that the felon in possession law was intended for, regardless of the fact that those with felony convictions are still felons. Or, his the King (government), perhaps, capable of doing wrong?

If his theory were correct, under the “general Welfare” provision of the Constitution, they (Congress) could dictate any, and every, aspect of our lives. Now, there is little doubt that they are slowly creeping in that direction, but AUSA Corley seems to think that we have already arrived.

Moving right along, we find, on page 6 of the Government’s Response:

“Article III of the Constitution grants the Judicial Branch authority to adjudicate ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’ In our system of government, courts have ‘no business’ deciding legal disputes or expounding on law in the absence of such a case or controversy.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc. and DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno. “A controversy is mooted when there are no longer adverse parties with sufficient legal interests to maintain the litigation.” “Accordingly, an actual, live controversy must remain at all stages of federal court proceedings, both at trial and appellate levels.”

Talking about stretching the hell out of an argument, the controversy here is a criminal charge brought by the US government against Massey. It is not a dispute between parties, it is an accusation based upon the misapplication of a statute. Is it even conceivable that someone, especially a highly paid public servant attorney, could deny an accused person of challenging the misrepresentation? Or, can the King (Corley) do no wrong?

Now, I expect that you are getting as bored at reading this as I am at having to wade through it (I do have my boots on), to find the little gems that (if I were a psychiatrist) demonstrate the insanity, or at least the mental instability, of the person who prepared the Government’s Response. Surely, not even the King would allow him to pass the background check, on mental grounds, to own a firearm.

But, there are two more rather interesting point that warrant our attention. Sorola cited McCulloch v. Maryland with reference to “limited powers” of government, according to the Constitution. In what appears to be a DOJ (Department of Justice) boilerplate insert (page 10), he suggests that the limited powers of government have a broad interpretation. From the Government’s Response:

In citing from McCulloch:

“This government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers.

“But, there is no phrase in the instrument which, like the articles of confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers; and which requires that everything granted shall be expressly and minutely described. Even the Tenth Amendment, which was framed for the purpose of quieting excessive jealousies which had been excited, omits the word ‘expressly,’ and declares only, that the powers ‘not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states or the people;’ thus leaving the question, whether the particular power which may become subject of contest, has been delegated to the one government, or prohibited to the other, to depend upon a fair construction of the whole instrument.”

“So with respect to the whole penal code of the United States; whence arises the power to punish, in cases not prescribed by the constitution? All admit, that the government may, legitimately punish any violation of its laws; and yet, this is not among the enumerated powers of congress.”

Then, in Corley’s own words (the King has spoken):

It should come as no surprise then that the Supreme Court ruled in McCulloch v. Maryland that Congress had the power to incorporate a bank despite having no specifically enumerated power to do so. The precedent set nearly two hundred years ago in McCulloch v. Maryland works against Defendant, not for him.

Now, he talks about if not prohibited, and in the case of the matter of McCulloch, dealing with the creation of a bank, there is no prohibition against the government so doing.

But, the “legal theory” presented makes clear that there is a prohibition against the government’s intervention into the right to keep and bear arms, known as the Second Amendment, and the prohibition therein is called “infringement”.

Nowhere does the constitution address the government’s inability to infringe upon the creation of banks. In fact, there is much said about coin and currency, all implying such powers as necessary with regard to banks. So, just how does that work “against the Defendant”?

The second is an effort to conjoin “Militia” and “people”, as expressed in the Second Amendment, as only the “body of the people” (pages 11-13). He cites a “Second Amendment constitutional scholar”, which, apparently, he places the opinion of above the written laws.

If we consider that the framers of the Constitution were far more particular in the choice of words that the AUSA, we can easily dispute the effort to co-join, since they used both “Militia” and “people”. And Congress, surely, is more meticulous than the AUSA, when they enacted the following:

10 U.S.C. § 311: Militia: composition and classes

(a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section 313 of title 32, under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and of female citizens of the United States who are members of the National Guard.

(b) The classes of the militia are –

(1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and the Naval Militia; and

(2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia.

So, here we have “members of the militia”, who are, clearly, individuals, like people. However, that doesn’t stand as the only element that suggests individuality.

10 U.S.C. § 312: Militia duty: exemptions

(a) The following persons are exempt from militia duty:

(1) The Vice President.

(2) The judicial and executive officers of the United States, the several States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.

(3) Members of the armed forces, except members who are not on active duty.

(4) Customhouse clerks.

(5) Persons employed by the United States in the transmission of mail.

(6) Workmen employed in armories, arsenals, and naval shipyards of the United States.

(7) Pilots on navigable waters.

(8) Mariners in the sea service of a citizen of, or a merchant in, the United States.

(b) A person who claims exemption because of religious belief is exempt from militia duty in a combatant capacity, if the conscientious holding of that belief is established under such regulations as the President may prescribe. However, such a person is not exempt from militia duty that the President determines to be noncombatant.

Though some are general in nature, others are, without a doubt, applied to individuals of certain character. So, if the “theory” of the AUSA is correct, and whether the Congress wanted to us the “general Welfare” provision, or the Commerce Clause, they would have, if what Corley wants to suggest, surely have included a class of people known as “felons”.

So, I wonder what the King will have to say about the obvious, and rather discomforting, exclusion of “felons” from the most logical source of limitation of the right to bear arms. Is it possible that the King (Congress) can do no wrong, and accordingly, will not “infringe”, except via the “Commerce Clause”?

Rule of Law, or, Rule of Man
An Analysis of the Kim Davis Fiasco

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
September 8, 2015

The Supreme Court and States’ Tenth Amendment Rights

The Constitution created a Union. That Union was of the several States, and the Constitution was written to join those States into a confederation, with a federal government that dealt only within the powers and authorities defined in the document. The autonomy of states was assured within the Constitution, though doubts arose as to whether the federal government might attempt to secure more power than was intended and granted to it.

The most significant clarification of that intent was laid out in the Preamble to the Bill of Rights. A preamble sets forth the purpose of a document, and that which was ascribed to the first ten Amendments reads, as follows:

The Preamble To The Bill Of Rights

Congress of the United States
begun and held at the City of New-York, on
Wednesday the fourth of March, one thousand seven hundred and eighty nine.

The Conventions of a number of the States, having at the time of their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added: And as extending the ground of public confidence in the Government, will best ensure the beneficent ends of its institution.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, two thirds of both Houses concurring, that the following Articles be proposed to the Legislatures of the several States as amendments to the Constitution of the United States, all, or any of which articles, when ratified by three fourths of the said Legislatures, to be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of the said Constitution; viz.

Articles in addition to, and Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America, proposed by Congress and ratified by the Legislatures of the several States, pursuant to the fifth Article of the original Constitution.

The last two amendments made even more obvious the limited role of the federal government:

Amendment IX

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Amendment X

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

After the Civil War, a Fourteenth Amendment was ratified (the lawfulness of that ratification may be questioned, though that is not the topic of this article). It stated that no State could “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” However, it was not intended to, nor did early application of that provision even suggest that there was one set of laws that applied to all, and if the states were in agreement over an issue, or each State had addressed an issue, that the issue in question was not one that was subject to federal approval.

The rights protected by the Constitution would have to extend to all citizens, not all people, as was clear by the wording in the Amendment. Those rights, however, were deemed natural rights pertaining to “life, liberty, and property”. They were not rights which would take from one to give to another.

In 1973, a Supreme Court decision demonstrated that the rights of the States, so solidly secured by the Constitution, would no longer be exercised by the States, if the federal government decided that it wanted to bring any aspect of our lives under its wing. This is clearly demonstrated in the decision that expanded the government’s role in abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The decision defied previously held limitation of authority, was widely accepted by the public, perhaps not fully understood were the ramifications of the expansion of federal powers.

Justice Rehnquist explained the problem and the ramifications in his dissenting opinion, when he wrote:

“To reach its result [the majority opinion], the Court necessarily has had to find within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment a right that was apparently completely unknown to the drafters of the Amendment. As early as 1821, the first state law dealing directly with abortion was enacted by the Connecticut Legislature. By the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, there were at least 36 laws enacted by state or territorial legislatures limiting abortion. While many States have amended or updated their laws, 21 of the laws on the books in 1868 remain in effect today. Indeed, the Texas statute struck down today was, as the majority notes, first enacted in 1857 and has remained substantially unchanged to the present time.”

“There apparently was no question concerning the validity of this provision or of any of the other state statutes when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. The only conclusion possible from this history is that the drafters did not intend to have the Fourteenth Amendment withdraw from the States the power to legislate with respect to this matter.”

So, we have seven out of nine justices expanding the power of the federal government; usurping from the States those rights that were retained by them. And, unfortunately, we had a naive public that applauded, or damned, the decision of the Court, not even considering the affect on our Constitution and the rights of the States.

Now, to get to where we are going, we must address another Supreme Court decision, this being made in June 2015, and bears heavily on the current situation regarding Rowan County, Kentucky, County Clerk Kim Davis, who, as of this writing, sits in Rowan County Detention Center (121 Lee Avenue, Morehead, Kentucky), under a Contempt of Court charge.

This charge stems from another Supreme Court decision, decided in June 2015. That case is Obergefell, et al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health, et al., 576 US ___. It was filed “claiming that respondent state officials violate the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the right to marry or to have marriages lawfully performed in another State given full recognition.” So, by the simple wording in the complaint, “the right to marry”, we have something that was never considered a right, it was always, at best, a religious or civil choice, converted and accepted by the Court to be deemed a right, having nothing to do with “equal protection of the laws.” There is no “protection” in marriage simply the notification that two people, of opposite sexes, are bound together in matrimony. Or, as Noah Webster described it the first American Dictionary (Webster’s 1828), marriage is “the legal union of a man and woman for life,” which served the purposes of “preventing the promiscuous intercourse of the sexes . . . promoting domestic felicity, and . . . securing the maintenance and education of children.” So, is a legalized union to be considered, now, to be a “right”?

The conclusion to the decision reads:

“Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned. The First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations to continue the family structure they have long revered. The same is true of those who oppose same-sex marriage for other reasons. In turn, those who believe allowing same-sex marriage is proper or indeed essential, whether as a matter of religious conviction or secular belief, may engage those who disagree with their view in an open and searching debate. The Constitution, however, does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex.”

So, Kim Davis is free “to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned.” However, “[t]he Constitution… does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex.” What kind of double-speak is that? The “right” is a part of the First Amendment. The abomination is the contradiction that the Constitution does not permit. Try as I might, I cannot find that, anywhere.

In an age where the enumerated rights are under fire, we have courts granting rights that were never considered rights, nor were they enumerated, and, if they were rights, the came strictly under the purview of the state.

By definition, this process of expansion of federal power and usurpation of state power is known as the “incorporation doctrine- a constitutional doctrine through which selected provisions of the Bill of Rights are made applicable to the states through the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” So, we must ask which provision of the Bill of Rights is made applicable to the states, or, if the description needs to be updated to “Incorporation Usurpation Doctrine”

To exemplify this overarching expansion of federal authority, we can look to Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion in Obergefell, where he wrote:

“Petitioners make strong arguments rooted in social policy and considerations of fairness. They contend that same-sex couples should be allowed to affirm their love and commitment through marriage, just like opposite-sex couples. That position has undeniable appeal; over the past six years, voters and legislators in eleven States and the District of Columbia have revised their laws to allow marriage between two people of the same sex.

“But this Court is not a legislature. Whether same-sex marriage is a good idea should be of no concern to us. Under the Constitution, judges have power to say what the law is, not what it should be. The people who ratified the Constitution authorized courts to exercise “neither force nor will but merely judgment.”

“Although the policy arguments for extending marriage to same-sex couples may be compelling, the legal arguments for requiring such an extension are not. The fundamental right to marry does not include a right to make a State change its definition of marriage. And a State’s decision to maintain the meaning of marriage that has persisted in every culture throughout human history can hardly be called irrational. In short, our Constitution does not enact any one theory of marriage. The people of a State are free to expand marriage to include same-sex couples, or to retain the historic definition.

“This universal definition of marriage as the union of a man and a woman is no historical coincidence. Marriage did not come about as a result of a political movement, discovery, disease, war, religious doctrine, or any other moving force of world history–and certainly not as a result of a prehistoric decision to exclude gays and lesbians. It arose in the nature of things to meet a vital need: ensuring that children are conceived by a mother and father committed to raising them in the stable conditions of a lifelong relationship.

Though our very mobile and fast-paced society has had an effect on the “lifelong relationship”, it has done nothing to warrant an extension of that purpose to achieve marriage, for marriage sake, as a right, rather than the original indentation of providing security for the children (posterity).

Whether we are a Democracy, a Republic, or both, we are, without question, to be a self-governing people. At this time, there are over 300 million people in this country. Of that number, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) reported, in 2013, that only 1.6% of the population was queer (homosexual, both sexes). That is not a minority, it is an insignificant number. And, there is nothing that prohibits them from living as they choose. Those laws have slowly fallen to our modern world, where they are not prosecuted; rather, they are allowed to practice their life-style, without legal penalty. Isn’t it enough that the biblical punishment is no longer inflicted, or are we to allow this insignificant group hold sway over our lives, our morality, and our culture?

Of those 300 million plus, they are represented in their respective state legislatures by hundreds of senators and representatives, chosen by the citizens of those states to enact laws. In no state is the court given the right to enact laws, simply, the “power to say what the law is, not what it should be.” ONLY the representatives of the people, and in accordance with the respective State Constitution make the laws.

Likewise, in the federal government, there are 435 representatives and 100 senators, those, also, elected to represent the will of the people, and enact laws accordingly.

So, we have thousands of the representatives of the people who have enacted laws in accordance with the will of the people, and those laws no longer act unfavorably on the insignificant number. That is what was intended, and that is what should continue to be.

However, we find that a simple majority of nine Justices, yes, just five appointed individuals, not chosen by the people, themselves, have established an apparent right to enact laws contrary to the will of the people and their representatives. That is an oligarchy (rule by a small, select group), and, as you will not find “marriage” in the federal Constitution, you will neither find “oligarchy” as our form of government.

Unless, of course, the people will stand idly by as those robed “oligarchs” continue to expand their authority, destroying our whole concept of self-government.

The Road to Contempt of the People

Based upon the Supreme Court’s contradictory decision in Obergefell, et al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health, et al, James Yates, April Miller, and others, filed complaints with the United States District Court, Eastern District of Kentucky, Northern Division at Ashland, against Kim Davis, individually and as County Clerk of Rowan County.

The Complaint by Yates was brought under 42 USC §1983:

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.”

Now, “secured by the Constitution and laws” will be addressed, later on. However, we see that the “exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States [Article I, § 8, clause 17].” comes in to play here, notwithstanding the fact that the Constitution and the laws are both supportive of the right of a State to make its own laws, and by the broadest stretch of imagination, does not include marriage, a civil bond.

The Complaint also incorporates a letter from the Governor, Steven L. Beshear, to the “Kentucky County Clerks, dated June 26, 2015. The letter reads, in part:

“As elected officials, each of us has taken an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Kentucky. The Obergefell decision makes plain that the Constitution requires that Kentucky – and all states – must license and recognize the marriages of same-sex couples. Neither your oath nor the Supreme Court dictates what you must believe. But as elected officials, they do prescribe how we must act.”

“Effective today, Kentucky will recognize as valid all same sex marriages performed in other states and in Kentucky. In accordance with my instruction, all executive branch agencies are already working to make any operational changes that will be necessary to implement the Supreme Court decision. Now that same-sex couples are entitled to the issuance of a marriage license, the Department of Libraries and Archives will be sending a gender-neutral form to you today, along with instructions for its use.”

“You should consult with your county attorney on any particular aspects related to the implementation of the Supreme Court’s decision.”

So, the Governor first informs the recipients that they had “taken an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Kentucky.” Then, he provides his solution, whereby “same-sex couples are entitled to the issuance of a marriage license, the Department of Libraries and Archives will be sending a gender-neutral form to you today, along with instructions for its use.”

So, the oath is to the constitutions, and, presumably, the laws made in accordance thereof. And then, he talks about entitlements. What? I suppose he didn’t feel any more comfortable than I do in suggesting that they are “rights”, rather, that queers are “entitled” to a legal bond intended to assure that children are conceived and brought up in a healthy environment.

Finally, he wants to “implement” the Supreme Court decision. So, which constitution provides a directive, or even implies, that a decision must be implemented, if not an enacted law passed in accordance with those constitutions? Does the oath bind them to a Court decision?

The US Constitution provides the authority to enact laws in Article I, § 1, to wit:

“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”

“All legislative Powers” means what it says, “All”. Nobody else in the federal government is empowered to make laws. The Court can only rule on the constitutionality of a law. Even without referring to the “Case Law Method”, which has moved the courts away from the Constitution, simply building upon previous decision, without regard to the Constitution, we can see that something is amiss — in violation of the Constitution.

Now, let’s look at the Kentucky Constitution, beginning with the Kentucky Bill of Rights:

Section 2. Absolute and arbitrary power denied. Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority.

Section 4. Power inherent in the people – Right to alter, reform, or abolish government. All power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority and instituted for their peace, safety, happiness and the protection of property. For the advancement of these ends, they have at all times an inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such manner as they may deem proper.

So, the Kentucky Constitution disallows “[a]bsolute and arbitrary power over the lives [and] liberty” of the people. So, just what about the decision regarding the current case (Yates, Miller, et al) and the charge of Contempt of Court (which will soon be discussed) is not “absolute and arbitrary”?

And, if “[a]ll power is inherent in the people” and “founded on their [people] authority”, how can a judge, at the lowest level of federal courts, make a decision, based upon a decision, though not enacted into law, be used to deprive Kim Davis of her liberty?

The Bill of Rights concludes with:

Section 26. General powers subordinate to Bill of Rights – Laws contrary thereto are void. To guard against transgression of the high powers which we have delegated, We Declare that every thing in this Bill of Rights is excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain inviolate; and all laws contrary thereto, or contrary to this Constitution, shall be void.

Just consider what “inviolate” means.

Now, from the Kentucky Constitution, the Legislative Branch:

Section 29. Legislative power vested in General Assembly. The legislative power shall be vested in a House of Representatives and a Senate, which, together, shall be styled the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

Section 55. When laws to take effect – Emergency legislation. No act, except general appropriation bills, shall become a law until ninety days after the adjournment of the session at which it was passed, except in cases of emergency, when, by the concurrence of a majority of the members elected to each House of the General Assembly, by a yea and nay vote entered upon their journals, an act may become a law when approved by the Governor; but the reasons for the emergency that justifies this action must be set out at length in the journal of each House.

Section 68. Civil officers liable to impeachment – Judgment – Criminal liability. The Governor and all civil officers shall be liable to impeachment for any misdemeanors in office; but judgment in such cases shall not extend further than removal from office, and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under this Commonwealth; but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be subject and liable to indictment, trial and punishment by law.

So, as in the federal government, “legislative power [enacting laws]” is vested in the General Assembly. Nobody else can make laws.

The Kentucky Constitution makes provision for “emergency legislation”, which, under the circumstances, would have to be done to “implement” the decision, and to protect the County Clerk, who is bound to uphold the laws enacted in accordance with both constitutions. It would appear that Kim Davis suffered in jail because the legislative branch was remiss in their responsibility to the people and the officials of the state.

Finally, absent an impeachment, it would appear that no legal action could be taken against an official of the state. The qualifier, “but the convicted party” would require such impeachment prior to legal action.

However, what we are finding, in this current situation, is that the lowest level judge in the federal system, can, single-handedly, deny an elected official, under the authority of the state Constitution, her liberty.

On September 1, 2015, April Miller filed a Motion to Hold Defendant Kim Davis in Contempt of Court, stating:

“Plaintiffs do not seek to compel Davis’ compliance through incarceration. Since Defendant Davis continues to collect compensation from the Commonwealth for duties she fails to perform, Plaintiffs urge the the [sic] Court to impose financial penalties sufficiently serious and increasingly onerous to compel Davis’ immediate compliance without further delay.

However during a hearing on September 3, Judge David L. Bunning arbitrarily opted to incarcerate Kim Davis, in Contempt of Court. In that hearing, the minute notes show:

“Defendant Davis shall be remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal pending compliance of the Courts Order of August 12, 2015, or until such time as the Court vacates the contempt Order.”

It appears that the Judge opted for jail time in lieu if the requested monetary damages.

Kim Davis was released, on September 8, during the course of preparing this article. An understanding was made that the marriage licenses issued by the County will not bear her name or title, though the will simply say, “Rowan County, Kentucky” at the line for the Clerk/ Deputy Clerk signature.

Laws on the books

Many people are claiming that Kim Davis violated the law by not issuing marriage licenses to queers that wanted to be married to each other.

We have all been taught that we are a nation of laws, not a nation of men. So, let’s look at what the responsibility of an elected official is, if their job requires that they obey the law.

First source is the Kentucky Constitution, which, in Section 223A states:

“Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in Kentucky. A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized.”

Next, we have Kentucky Statutes:

“402.005 Definition of marriage. As used and recognized in the law of the Commonwealth, “marriage” refers only to the civil status, condition, or relation of one (1) man and one (1) woman united in law for life, for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally incumbent upon those whose association is founded on the distinction of sex.”

Well, Kim Davis has taken a position that requires that she uphold the laws. That pretty much settles it from the State side of the matter. But, since it was a federal judge, maybe we need to look at what the federal government has to say.

I find no reference to (marriage” in the Constitution, though I do find the specific reservation in the Tenth Amendment:

“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

So, we find that since there is no delegation to the federal government, or courts, regarding marriage, in the Constitution, then that authority must be one of those “reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

So, does the federal government have anything to say about marriage? Yes, they do; however, it pertains ONLY to “administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States”, and has nothing, at all, to do with licensing (legal permission) for marriage. Clearly, that “right” is reserved to the state.

1 U.S.C. § 7 : Definition of “marriage” and “spouse”

“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”

So, let’s review the Kim Davis incident. Kim is an elected official, the County Clerk of Rowan County, Kentucky. When she took the position, she also took an oath to uphold the federal and state constitutions and the law of the land.

Both constitutions provide for the legislative bodies (Senate and House of Representatives) to have the sole authority to enact laws. If a judge rules an act unconstitutional, then the legislative body must enact a law consistent with the ruling. That is the only way that it can work. It is not up to the individual to determine what she can, or cannot, do. It is those who have taken the role in government to enact laws, well, to enact laws.

Kim Davis should not be held in contempt of court. If anyone is to be held in contempt of court, it should be those in the legislative bodies that leave on the LAW books laws that are unconstitutional. They are paid far better than Kim Davis is, and their job is to write the laws that she is to enforce. Every member of the state legislature should be willing to sit in jail, in lieu of Kim Davis, for she is the only one that is upholding the law. The same might be said of the Congress, as they, too, recognizing their limited role in the matter of marriage.

As a final thought, Kim Davis has stated that she refused to issue the licenses because of her religious beliefs. Had a law been lawfully enacted that allowed queers to marry, then Kim Davis would have to decide whether she wanted to continue in her job, or not, based upon a law that was properly enacted. To put that in more interesting terms, if any legislative body (not judicial) thinks that they have a right to change a definition this is thousands of year old, based upon the Bible, which defines marriage, then those in that legislative body have placed themselves above God.

Camp Lone Star – Federal Gun Laws and the Commerce clause

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
August 20, 2015

The entire “Felon in Possession” federal law is hinged on Commerce. From its inception, it has been enforced by taxation, since the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms is an agency of the U. S. Treasury department.

We are dealing specifically with 18 U.S. Code 922 (g):

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person – [conditions omitted]

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

We are going to delve into the purpose of commerce, as defined by the Constitution. We can also wonder why someone charged with “felon in possession” is not taxed; instead, he is determined to be a criminal. We will start with some historical background.

Role of the Federalist Papers

James Madison, fourth president (1809-1817), and recognized as the “Father of the Constitution”, for his role in drafting as well as arguing for ratification, is the best single source for an understanding of the intent and purpose of the Constitution and the government created by that Constitution.

The Federalist Papers, being the arguments that led to ratification of the Constitution, have been used in legal justification to support, and to overturn, laws enacted by Congress. After all, the intent of the Constitution, as laid out in the Federalist Papers is what the American people, through their respective state conventions, relied upon as the original intent of the Framers, and therefore, must be what the Constitution truly means, wherever any ambiguity exists.

There are many hundreds of U.S. Supreme Court decisions where the Federalist Papers were cited in arguing and/or deciding decisions before that court. If the Federalist Papers, those words by Hamilton, Jay, and especially Madison, supported a decision, it was so supported. If they were inconsistent with an enactment, then the enactment was overturned.

An example of the strength of original intent might be demonstrated with an example. In United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), Lopez argued that the federal law regarding “gun free school zones” was outside of the scope of authority granted to Congress by the commerce clause, “The Congress shall have Power…[t]o regulate Commerce… among the several States…” (Art. I, §8, cl. 3). Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, and in so doing, said [at 457-458]:

The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers. As James Madison wrote, “[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.” The Federalist No. 45. This constitutionally mandated division of authority was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties. Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serves to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.

The decision removed from enforcement the federal gun free school zone law, as a determination of that nature resided solely with the state, by those powers not granted to the federal government, rather, retained by the state government.

In another instance, Alden et al. v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), this case dealt with the sovereignty of a American state government, Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court:

… Any doubt regarding the constitutional role of the States as sovereign entities is removed by the Tenth Amendment, which, like the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was enacted to allay lingering concerns about the extent of the national power. The Amendment confirms the promise implicit in the original document: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 10.

The federal system established by our Constitution preserves the sovereign status of the States in two ways. First, it reserves to them a substantial portion of the Nation’s primary sovereignty, together with the dignity and essential attributes inhering in that status. The States “form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere.” The Federalist No. 39.

Second, even as to matters within the competence of the National Government, the constitutional design secures the founding generation’s rejection of “the concept of a central government that would act upon and through the States” in favor of “a system in which the State and Federal Governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people–who were, in Hamilton’s words, `the only proper objects of government.'” (quoting The Federalist No. 15). In this the founders achieved a deliberate departure from the Articles of Confederation: Experience under the Articles had “exploded on all hands” the “practicality of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for the States as political bodies.” The Federalist No. 20.

Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association (2015), with Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, said:

When a party properly brings a case or controversy to an Article III court, that court is called upon to exercise the “judicial Power of the United States.” Art. III, §1. For the reasons I explain in this section, the judicial power, as originally understood, requires a court to exercise its independent judgment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws.

Those who ratified the Constitution knew that legal texts would often contain ambiguities. As James Madison explained, “All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal . . . .” The Federalist No. 37.

One of the key elements of the Federalists’ arguments in support of the allocation of power to make binding interpretations of the law was that Article III judges would exercise independent judgment. Although “judicial independence” is often discussed in terms of independence from external threats, the Framers understood the concept to also require independence from the “internal threat” of “human will.” The Federalist No. 78, “The judiciary . . . may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment . . . “. Independent judgment required judges to decide cases in accordance with the law of the land, not in accordance with pressures placed upon them through either internal or external sources. Internal sources might include personal biases, while external sources might include pressure from the political branches, the public, or other interested parties.

Necessary and Proper

Article I, §8, clause 18:

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

This clause is worthy of additional consideration. What may be necessary and proper for the function, and the fulfillment of the duties, of the federal government is, without question, within the realm of the intent. That comes under the portion which states, “the foregoing Powers”, meaning those enumeration within Article I, §8.

Next, we have to consider, “all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government”. Here, we can consider whether a “Power” exists, and whether, without express authority, the government can properly assert that “Power”. For example, Article II, §2 provides that the President is “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States”. clearly, laws enacted to facilitate that function are within the scope of the intent of clause 18. So, too, would be laws that set forth the operation of other functions within the various “Departments or Officers”, though the existence of those Departments and Officers must, by their creation, be consistent with the Constitution.

Now, here comes a stickler. The Preamble to the Constitution provides a description of the purpose of the Constitution and the government it created:

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

Let’s look at some adjectives (Definitions from Webster’s 1828 Dictionary, the words as understood by the Founders):

establish: To set and fix firmly or unalterably; to settle permanently. To found permanently; to erect and fix or settle; as, to establish a colony or an empire.

insure: To make sure or secure.

provide: To procure beforehand; to get, collect or make ready for future use; to prepare.

promote: To forward; to advance; to contribute to the growth, enlargement or excellence of any thing valuable, as, to promote learning, knowledge, virtue or religion.

secure: Free from fear or apprehension of danger.

(1) To set or fix firmly or unalterably a form of Justice; (2) To make sure that there is domestic Tranquility; (3) To procure beforehand, ready for future use, the common defence; (4) To forward (encourage) the general Welfare; and, (5) To make free from fear or apprehension, the Blessings of Liberty.

Of these, two are somewhat ambiguous, unless the on text is understood. How can enactments, for example, make sure that there is domestic Tranquility? Well, that Tranquility might best be described as the absence of government intrusion into our lives, so, it is absence of action rather than action that can produce the intended result. The other is to promote the general Welfare. It doesn’t say provide, therefore, providing the general welfare is not what was intended. Further, it says “general”, meaning creating a wholesome setting for the people to provide for their own welfare. These two, then, would, perhaps, require laws limiting activities of government that would be detrimental to the purposes.

The other three are rather straightforward. Establishing a judicial system that is focused on justice, rather than unconstitutional law. Providing for military protect for the country, should the need arise — it does say “defence”. And, to enact any law that assures that our posterity will enjoy the same “Blessings of Liberty that we intended to enjoy.

So, of these, “necessary and proper” must adhere to the achievement of the objectives. Anything contrary thereto would be unnecessary and improper.

Returning to “Departments and Officers”, the creation of Departments and the Officers within those departments would have to be within the confines of the defining powers of government. For example, if the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, is created under the authority of excise taxes, then it is a tax collection agency, and its sole purpose is the collection of those taxes. Would a law be necessary and proper if it made a criminal of someone who chose to not pay the tax, or would it be limited to collection, not by force, rather, by judicial process, of any taxes owed?

This is the fine line of what the Constitution means. It is left to proper judicial interpretation, and that interpretation was made in the Supreme Court decisions cited above.

The Lopez case determined that the commerce clause was limited in its reach, and that it was encroaching on the rights and jurisdiction of the states to determine whether someone could possess a firearm within a specified distance from a school.

Alden reinforces the authority of the states to retain their sovereignty, if there is not a specific “necessary and proper” aspect to a federal law enacted by the Congress, or a Rule administered by an Administrative Agency.

The Perez case demonstrates the necessity of the judges and justices to interpret the original intent of a legislative act, as intended by the wording in the law, as well as to weigh the constitutionality, the “necessary and proper” aspect of an enactment of Congress, or a Rule promulgated by an agency..

The Commerce Clause

In Federalist Papers 41-46, he provides a thorough explanation of the three branches, their separation, and their powers and limitations. He also points out that there is a distinction between “necessary and proper” (Art. I, §8, cl. 18) and what is “unnecessary or improper”.

As he continues through these six Papers, he raises two questions:

1.  Whether any part of the powers transferred to the general government be unnecessary or improper?
2.  Whether the entire mass of them be dangerous to the portion of jurisdiction left in the several States?

And, into doing, he provides insight into:

[T]he several powers conferred on the government of the Union; and that this may be the more conveniently done they may be reduced into different classes as they relate to the following different objects:
1. Security against foreign danger;
2. Regulation of the intercourse with foreign nations;
3. Maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the States;
4. Certain miscellaneous objects of general utility;
5. Restraint of the States from certain injurious acts;
6. Provisions for giving due efficacy to all these powers.

Now, the one that we are concerned with is that dealing with is number 3:

[The Power] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;

In particular, the second, “among the several States”, which he defined, above, as “3. Maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the States“.

One of the defects of the Articles of Confederation was that it had no means whereby it could control what one state did with regard to another state, as far as duties or taxes. If a ship came from a foreign port with goods to be delivered to a couple of different ports, in different states, it had an unfair impact on other than the first state visited. For example, if a ship came into New York, and had goods for New Jersey, New York would impose a duty on all of the goods aboard. Then the ship would cross the river to New Jersey, having already paid duties in New York, increasing the price of the goods offloaded in New Jersey.

Vermont and the already created Northwest Territories, being land bound, might be charged anything for any goods transported across any of the coastal states, to get to a shipping port — adding additional costs to those goods. Whereas the coastal states would have not additional charges on their goods.

It was with this problem, already existing, that lead to the inclusion of the commerce clause. Or, to put it in the words of James Madison (FP 42):

The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the commerce between its several members, is in the number of those which have been clearly pointed out by experience. To the proofs and remarks which former papers have brought into view on this subject, it may be added that without this supplemental provision, the great and essential power of regulating foreign commerce would have been incomplete and ineffectual. A very material object of this power was the relief of the States which import and export through other States, from the improper contributions levied on them by the latter. Were these at liberty to regulate the trade between State and State, it must be foreseen that ways would be found out to load the articles of import and export, during the passage through their jurisdiction, with duties which would fall on the makers of the latter and the consumers of the former. We may be assured by past experience, that such a practice would be introduced by future contrivances; and both by that and a common knowledge of human affairs, that it would nourish unceasing animosities, and not improbably terminate in serious interruptions of the public tranquility.

Now, to extend the ambiguous wording of the clause into means of enacting laws the step upon the toes, or the rights, of the States to determine what is acceptable within their sovereign lands, as, without a doubt, and abuse of the intent of that clause. It violates the very concept of a Union, making the federal government master of all, and the states, masters of naught, at least to the extent that the federal government intends to extend its influence.

So, when that provision for commerce becomes a uniform tax imposed by the federal government (Gun Control Act of 1934), rather than the intended purpose on not letting one state take advantage of another. Then the tax is removed and the act becomes a crime, (as discussed in Massey & The Clash of Laws) which is in opposition to the Texas Constitution and Statutes, we must, if the judiciary will not question what the intent is, and whether the federal “felon in possession” law is within that intent.

As was seen in the court decisions cited above, the Supreme Court does recognize the intent based upon the writings of Hamilton, Jay, and Madison. So, in the name of justice, should the lower court rule, with the wisdom intended, in favor of the Constitution? That is what Madison told us was intended. Thus leaving any challenge to seek an interpretation contrary to the Constitution as a burden on the government, rather than imprison someone, leaving the obligation on this victim of government oppression, the loss of his job, his family, and facing starting over, with the stigma of “convict” attached to his name, if the Supreme Court eventually rules that the law, as interpreted by the government agents, is in error, with regard to any authority granted by the Constitution? Is that not his proper role?

Camp Lone Star – The World Turned Upside Down

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
July 28, 2015

I believe that the prosecutor, Ass. US Attorney William Hagan, in the K. C. Massey felon in possession matter, is worried. Why would I think that to be the case? Well, Massey recently sat with Mr. Hagan to discuss the upcoming trail. Hagen has some interesting, and rather desperate, thoughts.

We’ll start with the fact that the “has-had” argument (See Camp Lone Star — A Favorable Ruling?) seems to have put him on the defensive. He explained to KC that what he was doing by stopping or detaining illegals at the border was “in or affecting commerce” (from the felon in possession law, 18 U. S. Code § 922 (g)(1). Interesting the illegally entering the country, and/or smuggling people, firearms, and drugs, is considered, by the Ass. US Attorney to be “commerce”.

So, what is commerce? Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, defines it as:

The exchange of goods, productions, or property of any kind; buying, selling, and exchanging of articles. The transportation of persons and property by land, water, and air [for payment].

So, let’s put some perspective on this — from our own history. John Hancock, and many others, would buy goods at one port, outside of the colonies, and bring them into the colonies. Often, much of the cargo would be off-loaded prior to entry into the port and then the taxes would be paid only on that portion of the cargo that was declared. That portion was “in or affecting commerce”. But, what of the cargo that had been offloaded? Was it “commerce”, which is legal, or was it smuggling, which is illegal? Since they only had tariffs and other fees for the cargo that was off-loaded in port, it was “commerce” and had no criminal penalties associated with it.

However, those goods that were off-loaded elsewhere, well, were consider “smuggled contraband”, and were in no wise considered to be commerce. If the transporter were caught, he would lose the goods, his ship, and, perhaps, serve time in jail.

Commerce, then, is legal transporting. Smuggling is criminal, and is not, in the least, any aspect of commerce. If caught, the property is not transferred to the owner, or the purchaser. It is confiscated by the government, and then sold or destroyed.

So, does 18 U. S. Code § 922 (g)(1) apply to legal transportation only, or does it apply to illegal transportation (smuggling), as well? If it also applies to smuggling, then we need to ask Mr. Hagen, and the government, why when they catch people entering illegal, with firearms or without, if they are in commerce, or not.

But, if we consider that the government doesn’t stop them, rather, they escort them to a bus or train station, sends them around the country to where they are not wanted, gives them our hard earned money so they don’t have to work, thereby rewarding them far better than those who wait, and abiding by the existing immigration laws, which are otherwise not enforced. Perhaps I am wrong, since government, apparently, considers smuggling to be “commerce”.

So, it could be rather confusing to those who think they know the law, as opposed to those who can read and comprehend the English language, and can differentiate between the meanings of words.

However, if we are a nation of laws, as we are led to believe, then should the precise wording of a law be the applicable interpretation? Or, have we become a nation subject to the rule of illiterate, or otherwise politically driven, prosecutors.

Let’s enter another interesting realm based upon the discussion between Massey and Hagen. Mr. Hagen states that Massey was not on the premises where he lived. Now, the discussion centered on whether the premises were the house – the building, or the property that the house was on. Black’s tells us that the estate, the premise, is “the land and buildings thereon”. So, here we have another discrepancy between the law (Texas Penal Code, Section 46.04) applicable in Texas, whereby Massey can posses a firearm, and the federal interpretation. Mr. Hagen says the house, the state law says the “premise”. This was discussed, absent the recent reinterpretation, in Camp Lone Star – Massey & The Clash of Laws.

But, that is not quite the point that we want to make. By Mr. Hagen even suggesting that Massey might have not been charged with a crime if he had been in his house, he also recognizes the validity of the state law. However, since Massey wasn’t in his house, then the feds can charge him with felon in possession (regardless of the wording of that law), because he is not in his house. Is the implication that Texas law would have applied, had Massey been in his house? If so, why would Texas law not apply if Massey were not in his house? And, if it did apply if Massey was not in his house, or on the premises, then it would still be Texas jurisdiction, since the Massey house is in Texas — and, if the feds can assume jurisdiction over any land in Texas, then can’t they also assume jurisdiction in Massey’s house?

Now, let’s visit one more part of the discussion that has to do with “erroneous” statements made during the hearing. This was discussed in a previous article, Camp Lone Star – Act Two: The Contradictions Scene 2: To Detain, or Not to Detain? That is the Question.

Mr. Hagen told Massey that it didn’t matter if the “government agents lied, misspoke, or misrepresented the facts in their testimony, as long as the meat of the story is true”. Let’s see if we can put a perspective on this, and then digest it.

Government agents are trained to observe and report. Some of those agents referred to their notes during their testimony at the March 30, 2015 hearing (referenced in the above link). That hearing was, among other purposes, to justify the procedure used to detain Massey — to make sure that it satisfied the ruling on stops, detentions, searches, etc, based upon Supreme Court rulings. So, what they “misspoke, or misrepresented, in court, at that hearing, were simple “errors” that made what the did appear to be lawful, in accord with the Supreme court rulings, what might have been deemed unlawful, if the truth were told.

Now, if you or I were to lie, misspeak, or misrepresent, under oath, we would be criminal under the federal perjury laws:

18 U.S.C. § 1621: Perjury generally

Whoever – (1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true; or (2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true; is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. This section is applicable whether the statement or subscription is made within or without the United States.

18 U.S.C. § 1622: Subornation of perjury

Whoever procures another to commit any perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury, and shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

So, the three important questions are:

1. Was there any testimony on “any material matter” that might have lead to a different determination as to whether the stop, or detention, satisfied the Supreme Court rulings? (§1621)
2. Did Mr. Hagen know that the information provided by the witnesses was misspoken, misrepresented, or a downright lie? (§1622)
3. What would happen to you, or me, if we lied, misspoke, or misrepresented, any material matter, as they did at the hearing?

So, being a nation of laws, or so we are told, we can revisit the words of James Madison, in Federalist #62, when he said, “Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?”

If it is to be known, is it to be known in the language we all understand, or a cryptic language, lacking logic, where the government can change “in or affecting commerce” to the “commerce” of illegal entry and smuggling.

If the federal government recognizes Texas law, if someone is in his house, does not Texas law apply equally throughout Texas, unless the person is on federal land, having jurisdiction ceded by the state?

And, can the (public) servants lie to the master (people), with impunity, and the master be held to the rigid interpretation and application of the law, if he “lies, misspeaks, or misrepresents”?

The British, after the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown, played an old tune, “The World Turned Upside Down”. It appears that the people need to begin playing that same tune.

Montana Malfeasance
Jesse Newsom and Writs of Assistance

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
July 22, 2015

There is little doubt that the government knew that Jesse Newsom was on the road when they chose to serve a search warrant, not on him but on the premise and a vehicle. This will be explained in a subsequent article dealing with his arrest.

Shawn Hill, Special (I always get a kick out of the adjective, as applied to FBI) Agent, out of the Kalispell FBI office, served the warrant on July 10, 2015. The Warrant, signed by Magistrate Judge John T. Johnston, United States District Court, District of Montana, is, as is common with federal warrants, incomplete. There are four check boxes on the form, none of which are checked. Rather, it leaves the discretion to the server of the warrant, much like the Writs of Assistance that James Otis spoke against, about 250 years ago, when the Writs were blanket authority to search wherever they wanted to, for whatever they wanted, and carried no requirement of specificity with regard to what they were looking for. The only difference between then and now is that, now, a judge has to sign the warrant, but that appears to be a “done deal” when the FBI requests a warrant.

The Warrant did have an “Attachment B”, but “Attachment A” was conspicuously missing. Presumably, Attachment A would have been the constitutionally required “Oath or affirmation” providing the “probable cause” deemed necessary to justify the issuance of the Warrant. The Amendment also states, “particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” This Amendment, in response to what the Writs of Assistance were, includes this provision to insure that the warrant is issued to seize only what is known to exist, hence the inclusion of “particularly describing” both place and objects to be seized.

The definition of “particularly” that the Framers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights would recognize can be found in Webster’s 1828 Dictionary. Here is what we find, “particularly – adv. Distinctly; singly.” So, now we can compare what was intended, at least as should be interpreted by both the People and the government, as to the wording in the warrant’s “Attachment B”. We’ll deal with just a couple of the items described to be seized, though you can review the wording of the Attachment and see that there are others that so general as to fall well outside the obvious intent of the Fourth Amendment. (image of Attachment B; text of Attachment B)

The first listed item is:

1. Any and all firearms, destructive device, or ammunition as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a), or any photographs of firearms or ammunition or of persons in possession of firearms or ammunition.

Now, the Constitution recognizes our right “to be confronted with the witnesses against[us]” (Sixth Amendment). What if that “witness” is our own camera, or pictures from friends? Is that a violation of the Fifth Amendment prohibition, “nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law“. And, what of the property that is not criminal in its nature; proof of a crime; or the proceeds of criminal activity? It is taken, as we will see, with a preposterous disregard for personal property rights — that which is supposed to be protected by the Constitution, and not to be taken just because they want to, well, fish.

Fish. Well, why would we use that word? Simply, the other item on the property to be seized raises no possible doubt that the government is “fishing”, an absolute contradiction to the intent of the Framers. From “Attachment B”:

9. Evidence of occupancy, control, or ownership of the property to be searched, including but not limited to, received mail, outgoing mail with a return address, concealed mail, deeds, leases, rental agreements, photographs, personal ledgers, utility and telephone bills, and statements, and identification documents.

I have emphasized some of the items, but to all of them, what possible motive could there be to seize any of the listed items? Are they checking to see if he has permission to live where he lives? Are the concerned that he might not be paying his bills? Why would they want to know who he corresponds with? Federal law prohibits the government from opening mail. Is there a loophole that states that mail is sacred while in the hands of government, but is no longer sacred after it is received, or before it is sent? I can’t find one.

So, now, we can look at what was actually seized and inventoried, during the search.

• item 5 – No trespassing sign
• item 6 – Belt buckle
• item 8 – Black binder [presumably with un-“described papers “contained in the binder]
• item 10 – Camo shirt
• item 11 – Camo hat
• item 13 – Northwestern Energy Bill [concerned about his power usage?]
• item 14 – Camo hat
• item 15 – Camo pants, shirt and belt
• item 16 – Camo Backpack
• item 22 – Rental agreement [are they making sure that he pays his rent?]
• item 23 – Conviction from Washington State
• item 24 – Camo patch
• item 25 – Boots
• item 29 – Camo Clothing
• item 30 – Camo Coat
• item 39 – Catalogs
• item 41 – Camo clothing w/ Newsome [sic] name
• item 49 – Misc. targets
• item 52 – Identification cards and Militia Emblem
• item 56 – 2 empty shotgun shells

Though the other items are related to firearms, ammunition, etc., we have to wonder what those listed, above, have to do with anything that would be evidence of a crime. Power bill and rental agreement, are, perhaps, the most far-fetched. Clothing, boots, binder of paperwork — what role can these play?

According to federal statutes, specifically, 10 U.S. Code §311, Jesse is a member of the United States Militia, by law. And, the statute, though it excludes certain people, does not exclude those convicted of a felony (yes, Jesse has been convicted of a felony, but that will be covered in a subsequent article). So, why would they take clothing and other objects associated with militia? It is their law that binds him to that obligation as United States Militia.

We can only hope that Jesse has some civilian clothes, so that he doesn’t have to run around naked. And, we can contemplate, since many of these items cannot be associated with criminal activity, in any way, that he has been denied his property, “without due process of law“.

Now, I used the term “fishing”, earlier. So, let’s continue the journey into the fishing elements of this story. First, we will consider Mr. “A”. Mr. “A” was contacted by cell phone, while the agents were still at Jesse’s house. Mr. “A” was in town, Great Falls, when he received the call. He agreed to meet them at Jesse’s home. They waited until he arrived and then Special (there we go, again) Agent Mark D. Seyler, out of Helena FBI office, asked him questions, as Mr. “A” told me, they already had answers to. Did you know that Jesse was in a militia, and such. It appears that his “interview” was intended more as a threat, intimidation, or a warning.

From Jesse’s home, they went to the home of Mr. “B”. Here, it was a bit different, as they acknowledged that Mr. “B”‘s “name showed up on paperwork” that was taken during the search. Mr. B. did a good job of playing a government official with many, “I don’t recall”, or “I didn’t know that”. This, I suppose, is the first confirmed catch from the government’s “fishing expedition”. We can little doubt that there are many more names that will come under their scrutiny — to see how many more they can catch.

However, at one point, the agent stated that “about 10% of militia participants might be prone to violence”. They led Mr. “B” to the understanding that they didn’t consider him in that 10% (ha, ha, ha), and it appears that they were, again, attempting to intimidate or discourage Mr. “B”.

From what I have seen in the past, taking paperwork to expand their understanding of the militia networking is a new tactic, and though their pursuit has nothing to do with criminal activity. It is intelligence gathering, by unlawful use of search warrants and intimidation.

Camp Lone Star – Act III – A Kangaroo Court
Scene 2 – Presumption of Guilt

Massey’s own little Dungeon

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
June 25, 2015

We will begin with three definitions. The first is an amendment to the Constitution, that being limitations imposed upon the federal government and for the securing of our rights, as understood by the Framers of the Constitution, and, which are our birthright.

The second, the legal definition of one of the terms of that amendment, included to clarify that term.

The third, the description of what is known as a Kangaroo Court. As you read the following, you will see that all three of the definitions provided for such a Court are applicable in the case against K.C. Massey.

8th Amendment
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Bail [Black’s Law Dictionary – 5th Edition]
The Surety or sureties who procure the release of a person under arrest, by becoming responsible for his appearance at the time and place designated.

Kangaroo Court
1: a mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded or perverted
2: a court characterized by irresponsible, unauthorized, or irregular status or procedures
3: judgment or punishment given outside of legal procedure
(Merriam Webster)

In a previous article, Cruel and Unusual Punishments – Before Conviction, the conditions of release according to the Appearance Bond, were discussed. There were a number of conditions set, though the first three predicate the whole of the “Bond” that he was subject to. Those three were:

To appear for court proceedings

If convicted, to surrender to serve a sentence that the court may impose

To comply with all conditions set forth in the Order Setting Conditions of Release.

Now, based upon the definition of “bail” and the prohibition against “excessive bail”, when we look at the conditions, is it possible that the third condition, “to comply…”, might be deemed “excessive”, in that it goes beyond a requirement to appear, as per the definition, and the intent of the Bill of Rights?

Now, heed what we are discussing, for every patriot knows that he stands for the Constitution, and in so doing may be placing himself in a situation where he might find that he is charged and arrested for some made up crime.

However, since the government holds the guns, if Massey wanted to stay out of jail, pending trial, which he was more than willing to stand for, he would have to agree to the conditions.

The day that Massey was arrested, they did a UA (Urine Analysis) and find THC (from marijuana) in his test. So, they filled out the conditions as they would for someone charged with selling drugs, requiring random UA testing. Well, THC stays in your system for weeks, or longer. So, a scheduled test would have been sufficient to determine if he had not broken the law by using marijuana, since there is no federal law against use of marijuana. The random aspect of testing was detrimental to another condition, that he be gainfully employed, since he could be called from work to report for the UA, at any time, disrupting his reliability at work.

Massey agreed to the terms on November 3, 2014. He first refused the UA test in May 2015. He had gone over six months with absolute compliance with the conditions, even though he knew that they were unconstitutional. However, since half a year does not cut it for a speedy trial, and the confinement to home, not even allowed to maintain his property away from the immediate vicinity of the house, without prior permission from the Probation Officer (he is not on probation, he only, constitutionally, has to appear in court), and finding that when he was supposed to drive the ninety miles to Dallas for the UA, broke down, and refused the UA. Since he had taken that step, he continued to refuse subsequent calls for a UA.

That is until his next court appearance. Knowing that he would probably not pass the UA that he knew they would require when he arrived for the June 2 hearing, but he went to court, as required by the Constitution and the Conditions.

Now, the punishment that he received, prior to that June 10 hearing was bad enough. He was not a free, innocent man, until proven guilty. He was subject to conditions that were slightly less than if he had been in jail. He had such a limited amount of freedom that it could, nowise, be considered such.

Since he failed the UA on the 10th, he was sent to jail in the custody of the Brownsville Sheriff, though the contract with the federal government put him under the authority of the U. S. Marshall Service. The Marshall Service decided the Massey should be in Maximum Security. They have also imposed other conditions and restrictions that, along with general jail procedures, have imposed the following on Massey:

• His cell (sketch, above) is about 7′ by 10 feet, and includes bed, toilet, shower and table.
• He has only had only two 1-hour recreation periods since he has been in jail (three weeks).
• When he leaves the cell, for any reason, he first puts his hands through the food port and they are handcuffed. Then he is allowed out and told to face the wall while shackles are placed on his ankles and a chain around his waist. Then, he is handcuffed to the waist chain — yes, two bracelets on each hand.
• When he is out of his cell, he is always escorted by three guards, and the hallways are cleared before he can enter a hallway. One of the guards is constantly videotaping the procession.
• There is one window, in the cell door. That is where food is fed to the “animals”. It has a magnetic cover and is only open, with few exceptions, when they want to talk with him, pass food, or deliver the telephone to him so that he can make phone calls.
• Some guards will leave the door window cover off, at night, when the lights are dimmed, so they can do bed checks, about hourly. Other guards prefer to open the window, bang on the door, and make a lot of noise, then shine a flashlight in to see if he is there, and probably to make sure he is awake, every hour, during their shift.
• His cell walls are painted white, and the only constant sound is the whistling of the air-conditioning blowing into the call, keeping the temperature in the sixties. He only has one blanket.

As far as personal attention to his needs, he has gotten the many food gifts that were sent to him. He has had health problems. At one doctor call, he was found to have blood and high protein levels in his urine. For this, the doctor prescribed antibiotics. He tried them for three days and his stomach reacted, giving him pain, so he stopped taking the antibiotics. They have reported him for refusing to take his medicine, though they have not reported why he has refused it.

• He has a preexisting water on the knee problem that he has always treated with exercise, which provides relief.
• He has a pre-existing case of shingles, for which they have given him Triamcinolone, and he has had some relief.
• They had given him one Ibuprofen per day, taken in the presence of the guards, though he has had to quit taking them as it exacerbated the kidney problem.
• He has pain in his kidney, and, hopefully, will receive some treatment for that when he sees the doctor, again. He had been dealing with the kidney problem with exercise, to the point of perspiration to remove toxins, and cranberry juice. However, it is difficult to perspire in such a confined space with temperatures in to sixties.

If Massey is convicted, he will no longer be under the authority of the U. S. Marshall Service, but will be under Bureau of Prisons. At that point, being convicted, his living conditions will be far better than what he is currently enduring, and he will have regular exercise and will be able to seek necessary medical attention, without the constraints that are currently imposed upon him.

It appears that, perhaps, the government has taken the 8th Amendment literally, as it implies that once you are convicted, you can not be subjected to “cruel and unusual punishment”. It fails to prohibit cruel and unusual punishment prior to conviction, and, clearly, that is what Massey has been subjected to since his first arrest.

As far as “excessive bail”, the Conditions of Release were for an unsecured bond of $30,000. Whether that might be considered excessive, or not, is subjective, but let’s assume that it is not for the sake of discussion. If we assume that to be the point that anything over it would be excessive, then the conditions would, without a doubt, qualify as EXCESSIVE, and they go well beyond the simple historical concept of assuring that one be present in court, when required to.

As far as the Kangaroo Court, there is no doubt that “the principles of law and justice are disregarded or perverted“, and that this is “characterized by irresponsible, unauthorized, or irregular status or procedures“, and, finally, that “punishment [is] given outside of legal procedure“.

Quite simply put, some of the conditions that have been imposed upon Massey are outside of the constitutional framework created by the Founders, and some equate more toward medieval dungeon techniques resorted to by kings, tyrants, dictators, and other despots.

If we consider that if he is convicted of a crime, his conditions will improve, considerably, then we must also conclude that the justice system is based more upon punishment for Presumption of Guilt than upon any sense of justice.

“No bended knee for me”
Who Does the Patriot Fight For?

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
June 15, 2015

Almost every patriot I have met, when asked, “What are you willing to fight for?”, will answer, my family – my children and grandchildren. The Founders chose the word “Posterity” to explain their objective in both fighting and establishing a new government comprised of member States. What they did, they did for us, their posterity.

So, what happened when that government established upon those principles, as well as others, becomes the enemy of that very protection that they were, and we are, willing to fight for?

In 1997, Jennifer McVeigh was threatened with a charge of treason and the possibility of the death penalty (McVeigh’s Sister Tells Why She Aided U.S. Case Against Him) if she refused to testify against her brother. As tough at is it was, she opted to testify against her sibling.

Robert Beecher recently faced a similar situation. His daughter, Jessica, had owned two .22 caliber rifles that were found on the property that Beecher lived on, and one of which was included in the Indictment. She had also bought her father a .30-30 rifle for his birthday. This, too, was included in the Indictment and a picture of Robert holding the 30-30, pasted in Facebook, was instrumental in the government filing a Criminal Complaint, and securing search and arrest warrants for the property and Beecher.

During the initial interrogation of Beecher, FBI Special Agent Slater, having already ascertained that Jessica had purchased the firearms, suggested, “Maybe we should arrest her, instead”. Though the applicability of federal law is, and ought to be, questioned, 18 U. S. Code §922 (d)(1) does make it criminal to transfer a weapon to a know felon, regardless of state law (See “Felon in Possession of a Firearm” is Not Legal or Lawful).

With the possibility of Jessica serving ten years in prison for giving a birthday present, Robert had the unfortunate necessity of making one of the most difficult decisions of his life. It was whether he, or Jessica, or both, would spend ten years in prison.

The only decision that could be more severe than what Robert faced would be whether he would give his life for her. Now the latter decision, I think we all would agree, has only one proper answer. So, we must consider that the former also has only one answer.

Some questions arise as to whether the threat to go after Jessica would be carried out. Would it have gotten Robert off on his charges? Would the government even stoop so low as to make such a threat — to coerce someone into pleading guilty to what should not even be a crime, unless there was criminal intent in the activity?

We have been taught that we are a nation of laws, not a nation of men. So, just what laws are we a nation of?

In 1982, the Justice Department tried to determine how many federal criminal laws there were. Their answer was that there were over 3,000 criminal laws (however, many of those laws have multiple conditions that may be met, increasing the actual crimes to considerably more) contained within the 23,000 (currently 27,000) pages of U. S. Code.

When there are that many laws, we are not a nation of law; rather, we are a nation subject to the will of the men that administer those laws.

This brings to mind a quote from James Madison in Federalist #63:

It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is today, can guess what it will be tomorrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?

In Robert’s first letter to me, he said, “No bended knee for me”. Against what Robert was faced with, he stood firm to the principles that guide true patriots. He refused to bend a knee, though the force was overwhelming, and he had no choice but to succumb to that force. He was willing to sacrifice a portion of his life — for his Posterity.

His plea agreement, which he entered into to protect his family, especially his daughter, Jessica, committed him to 10 years in prison and 5 years supervised release. The government has promised (if any weight can be attributed to a government promise) to file for a sentence reduction within 360 days. Only time will tell if, and what, that will be.

In the meantime, we must all understand that those who speak out will find that the government will pull out all of the stops to put us in prison, if they can find just one violation of those 3,000 laws. This will continue to be true UNTIL such time as we find the need to replace the government that has deviated so far from what the Founders intended.

Camp Lone Star – Act III – A Kangaroo Court
Scene 1 – How Case Law Subverts the Constitution

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
June 8, 2015

Kangaroo Court
1: a mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded or perverted
2: a court characterized by irresponsible, unauthorized, or irregular status or procedures
3: judgment or punishment given outside of legal procedure
(Merriam Webster)

In a recent article, “Government Enforces Their Laws – Who Shall Enforce the Constitution?“, I raise a question that is now worthy of our consideration. If we want our birthright of Constitutional Government, as envisioned by the Founders, we cannot rely upon government for interpretation those laws passed which are applied contrary to the Constitution.

To quote Teddy Roosevelt, with regard to the “case law method”, “some of the teaching of the law books and of the classroom seemed to me to be against justice… we are concerned with [the] question of what law is, not what it ought to be.”

In my Constitution, government was granted powers and authorities, and had limitations imposed upon it. Here, we will deal with some authorities granted and some limitations imposed. And, we, as Americans concerned about our country and our posterity find that we are in a situation similar to that which the Founders recognized, 240 years ago. And, we, like they, must weigh, very carefully, the extent of encroachments into our rights and our lives, as they did, then.

On April 17, 2015, the final pre-trial motions were submitted to the Court. The Court has taken 7 weeks to prepare a Memorandum Opinion and Order, to address the argument presented to the Court by Massey’s attorney.

Rather than outright denying the motions, the extended interval tended to support the probability of a well-crafted reply, granting the motions and dismissing charges against Massey. I don’t doubt that, somewhere, that well crafted order still exists, though it has been replaced by a rather poorly crafted order, which will be the subject of this article, and was substituted solely because Massey created a situation in which the Judge, for reasons that many will not understand, chose not to pursue justice in that it would reflect on him as supporting someone who could not keep his promise — his agreement with the Court.

Honor, one’s word being good, is an important part of life. Massey, regardless of why, gave his word that he would not partake of any illegal substances — as a condition of his “home detention” (See Cruel and Unusual Punishments – Before Conviction) — rather than remaining in jail awaiting trial.

The dilemma this created for Judge Hanen is that he would be challenging the status quo by granting the motion, undermining the very strength of the federal “Felon in Possession” law, and putting it back in proper perspective with those limitations imposed by the Constitution. This would leave those in government who support the improper interpretation in a position to accuse Hanen of siding with a man lacking honor and unable to abide by an agreement that he willingly made as a condition of his pre-trial release.

We must put ourselves in a position to understand that this apparently minor infraction would probably have similar consequences, or at least should have them, within our own community. Suppose you supported someone whom you had faith in to a position of chairman, or some other leadership role, within your organization. Suppose, then, he gave his word to abide by a promise that he had made, and then broke that promise. Would you continue to support him in the office that he held? This is what the politicians do, and this is an intolerable situation — it cannot be supported, if we stand behind our belief that honor and trust are necessary elements of leadership.

This is similar to the situation in which Judge Hanen finds himself. If he was willing to challenge the system and return to a proper interpretation of the law, it could be career ending decision, and could subject him to ridicule by others in government, including some of his peers on the federal benches. For him to take upon himself that responsibility, he would have to know that the person he was supporting by his actions was one as honorable as the Judge would be, in standing for justice. This is typical “office politics” and is true in business and the patriot community, as well. Violate the trust and you lose support.

So, let’s look at the “Memorandum Opinion and Order” that denied the Motions to Dismiss the Indictment (there were two of them: Motion to Dismiss Indictment, and First Supplement to Opposed Motion to Dismiss Indictment).

The Order begins with a misrepresentation that sets an erroneous foundation for what follows in the three “arguments” that the court offers, when it says:

As detailed below, Massey’s Motion to Dismiss focuses on the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 922(g), which makes it a crime for a person who has previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year “to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment.

First, he implies that the entire question rests on “the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 922(g)“. Though challenges to constitutionality were made, there was an even stronger argument made with regard to the grammatical context of the statute, which, if correct, would allow other aspects of the law to fit, neatly, into earlier Congressional interpretations of the extent of the “commerce clause”. This will be addressed in the third point.

1. Second Amendment Argument:

Massey’s argument relies heavily on District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), which upheld the right of people to have firearms for their personal protection. He argues that, among others, you do not lose your right to freedom of speech for being a convicted felon, so you cannot lose, forever, your right to keep and bear arms. Perhaps, unfortunately, the argument did not bring up the fact that 10 U.S.C. § 311 does exclude some from being members of the militia, though “felons” are not among those exclusions, which is a direct contradiction of the felon in possession statute, as applied.

The Court then argues that Heller did not address the felon aspect, He does point out that the court has set up the “scrutiny” to be applied in weighing whether a statute unfairly limits the “not infringe” (my words) provision of the Second Amendment, but rather than compare it to real world, he simply builds upon case law, redefining the Constitution, one case at a time.

In the dismissing nature of the current judicial system, he says:

The Second Amendment, at its core, protects “law-abiding” citizens. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. It is clear that convicted felons are not such citizens and thus fall outside of the Second Amendment’s protection. Accordingly, the Court need not consider the second inquiry because Section 922(g)(1) does not burden conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment.

So, unlike Texas, that being the location of the private property in which the alleged crime (possession) was committed, he determines that the rehabilitation program, under the various penal systems, cannot achieve its stated goal of rehabilitation, during the course of one’s life. In direct contravention of that “philosophy”, we have the opportunity to look at Massey’s life, since that rehabilitation, in “Who is K. C. Massey?“. What he does not address is the question of jurisdiction. If the “crime” was committed on private property (affirmed, in the next argument), is it constitutional to supersede Texas law absent an act that was committed on public lands? This doesn’t address an even more serious breach of jurisdictional limitations, which is quiet apparent in Massey’s case, as Massey was absolutely sure that they were on private land, with permission of the owner, to protect the owner’s property.

2. Equal Protection Clause Argument:

This argument, in the Order, addresses only that challenge brought up in the first of Massey’s Motions. It is, perhaps, inserted here to avoid addressing the ramifications of the subsequent challenge to “equal protection” brought up in the second Motion — a legal sleight of hand.

Hanen, in citing a previous decision, says, “a law is subject to strict scrutiny review in the face of an equal protection challenge only if (1) there is a fundamental right affected or (2) the law targets a suspect class. He continues, “does not impermissibly impinge upon a right protected by the Second Amendment because it regulates conduct that falls outside the scope of the Amendment’s guarantee.”

So, let’s look, first, at (1), where the law in question, “felon in possession, affects the Second Amendment. As mentioned above, 10 U.S.C. § 311 is the codification of the Second Amendment. That statute has a solidly placed foundation in the Constitution, as it clearly defines what at least the one provision of the Second is the militia. It makes exception for some, as far as being, without question, in the militia, though “felons”, or any descriptor that would imply such, is not exclude from the mandatory inclusion in the militia.

Now, let’s look at (2), whether it targets a “suspect class”. Here, we enter more into the First Supplement (the second motion to dismiss the indictment), though Hanen refused to address that part of that motion. If it refused people in one state, merely because they lived in that state, and approved those in another state, simply because they lived in that state, would they not be creating a “suspect class” of those who lived in one of the “refused” states? Quite simply, living in one state makes you a “suspect”, while living in another allows you all of the privileges of firearms possession and ownership. So, if we consider the asserted Second Amendment right, including the codification, and compare that to the “commerce clause”, what do we come up with?

Back in 1934, the Congress enacted the first firearms control act. The concern was expressed in the record (Congressional Record, reference: keep and bear arms, pg 42 “}, which says:

Mr. FREDERICK. That takes me into the purposes of this bill. This bill, as I see it, is intended to be a bill for the suppression of crime and is proposed to the United States Congress which ordinarily has no power in such matters, under the guise of a revenue raising bill.

So, we have, “which ordinarily has no power in such matters, under the guise of a revenue bill”. Now, they were using the commerce clause, as that original acts required that interstate commerce be involved. However, since they had no power to “suppress crime”, they used their power to tax (“revenue raising bill”), to both fund and track firearms. That was the only way that they could mount a challenge to the Second Amendment — by taxing, not by criminal charges, unless the tax was ignored. That was what the Constitution, even loosely construed in the act, allowed. There are no amendments that would extend that authority beyond what existed in 1934 — except the machinations of “case law”, which disregards the Constitution if one can manipulate the words of a previous decision to extend government authority where it had no constitutional authority to go. This is precisely why I suggest that we, the People, need to interpret Our Constitution, as the government is intent upon subverting it.

3. Commerce Clause Challenge:

Now, let’s look at the statute, in detail:

18 USC 922

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person –

(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

There are two key elements that we need to consider. First, “possess in or affecting commerce“. “In” is easily understood. That would clearly be in the act of shipping or transporting. “Affecting”, while that would mean that the possession affected, had an effect on, the transporting.

Here, the Judge cites United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 1996), which says that the “in or affecting commerce’ element can be satisfied if the firearm possessed by a convicted felon had previously traveled in interstate commerce.” Damn, I need to return to school and take English Grammar all over, again. I cannot draw the same conclusion that the Court did in Rawls, though apparently, Judge Hanen apparently, can make that broad leap — away from the Constitution and into the lap of a government that wants to have absolute control over every aspect of our lives (Hint: That was once known as slavery). So, in a sense, the wording from Rawls rewrites the wording of the statute (922 (g)(1)) into something that is not written as law, rather, is interpreted into something that is not written in law, thereby making it law because the judges of the Fifth Circuit wanted it to be; not what it was intended to be when passed into law (or regulation). It is bad enough when the Congress can go from taxing to criminalization, however, when they allow the Courts to go even further and make something that does not exist, and then they can be described as nothing less than a Kangaroo Court.

But, wait, we’re not done, yet. That second part of the statute states, “to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate… commerce“, was discussed in A Favorable Ruling?. This, too, stretches our comprehension of the English Language. Here is how it is presented in Massey’s motion:

The word “has”, as opposed to the word “had” was used in the statute. “Has” is the third person singular, present indicative, verb meaning active in the action just completed, where “had” is past tense and participle of the verb have, meaning in a previous situation. So, if one were the direct recipient, then the word “has” would be appropriate. However, if it were expansive, intended to include any firearm shipped in interstate commerce, then “had” would be the proper verb. The use of “had” would have meant to include any and all that “had” been so transported any time prior.

That cannot be too difficult to understand, unless they teach a different grammar in law school, or have judicial indoctrination classes that they have not told us about. It has to do with tense. So, who is to interpret the laws? Will it be the government? Or, will it be we, the People, who have a vested interest in the laws of this nation, and, more importantly, in the Constitution that created that government that is now ignoring that document to increase their power over our very lives?

The Order says, “The Indictment, in all four counts, charges that Massey “did knowingly possess in and affecting interstate commerce a firearm . . . said firearm having been shipped in interstate commerce.” Now, the wording of the statute has been conveniently rearranged as it was presented to the Grand Jury that issued the Indictment. If that Grand Jury accepts that the wording of a law (statute) is what they are told, and probably in writing, how are they to know that it differs from the law that they are asked to weigh against Massey’s actions? If they did choose to question the wording, I’m sure that the US Attorney would explain to them that he, being a lawyer, has said that “this is what the law is, and, if Massey is in violation of this law, as I present it to you, you must come back with an Indictment”.

Let’s compare the wording from the Indictment

… did knowingly possess in and affecting interstate commerce a firearm . . . said firearm having been shipped in interstate commerce.

And the statute:

… to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

Darn look at that. They have introduced another verb, “having”.

“Had” and “having” are both past tense, as described in the First Supplement. However, “has”, is present tense (present indicative). So, the statute says “has”, while the proper verb should have been “had”, if what the government claims was intended was really intended when the statute was written. However, the Grand Jury was led to believe the even more broadly expressed “having”, which is very inclusive.

Has – present 3d singular of have
Had – past and past participle of have
Having – To be in possession of already

So, do we allow the government to redefine words so that they can imprison those that they want to punish? Or, do we decide that you don’t have to be a lawyer, or a judge, to understand the Constitution and the statutes alleged to be written in “Pursuance” to the Constitution?

Here is what James Madison said regarding laws:

It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is today, can guess what it will be tomorrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?

They will be “incoherent” if the Courts use a different language than the People. We cannot know what the law is, today, if that law is not based upon the language that we understand. The law is little known and less fixed when previous decisions of the courts have redefined the words, moving slowly but steadily away from the Constitution, for it is unfixed with subsequent decisions, and little known unless we make a daily habit of reading what the courts have done to both our language and the Constitution.

There is even more that troubles the patriot’s heart, and you will find those points highlighted in the linked Order. Suffice to say that if we fit the analogy of frogs in the water approaching its boiling point, we have, so far complained of the rising temperature, have failed to get out of the water.

Jon Ritzheimer
When did Freedom of Speech Become Hate Speech?

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
June 3, 2015

Jon was born in San Diego County, California in 1983. He was raised in Lakeside and graduated from El Capitan High School. He worked briefly after high school in construction, though having no direction, decided to join the Marines in 2002.

Most of his military service was stateside, though he served a tour in Iraq in 2004-2005. He was a Motor Vehicle Operator (MOS 3531), stationed in Ramadi. He did convoy security and was subjected to gunfire and IED attacks. He returned to Iraq in 2008, this time operating an MRAP, which he lived in “outside the wire”, eating, drinking, sleeping, and living in the MRAP for five months. No showers and the toilet was a “wag bag”.

His time in service included adverse reports due to his criticism of Obama, and having tattoos that were outside of the policy limits. This caused him to not reenlist. He continued in the Marine Reserves until 2014. During his service he received the standard combat awards and a certificate of commendation for one of the actions in which he was involved. It might be worth noting that he was never fired upon by any Christians, throughout either tour.

Jon married in 2007, then, after leaving the Marines, began using his GI benefits to get an education. First, he worked for a Harley-Davidson dealer, then left to set up his own motorcycle repair business, which he ran until the threats that were being put out caused him to look to the safety of his family, which now included daughters 2 and 4 years old.

Jon is much like many thousands of Americans who pursued life, served their country, educated themselves, and began working to support a family, eventually having his own business.

Seeing, as many do, that Muslims are attempting to establish Shariah Courts, impose Shariah law requiring women to be covered, ankle to the top of their heads, Ritzheimer became concerned over the potential effect of Islam in this country. It wasn’t quite enough for any more than concern, but he did remember what he had seen in Iraq. How can freedom of speech be denied, not by government, rather, by the threat of the use of force?

The recent “Draw Mohamed” event in Texas, and the attempt by two Muslims from the Phoenix Muslim Center, to assassinate those who had gathered for the event, hit a nerve. Our right to freedom of speech is unquestionably one of the most important rights that we Americans have. To assert that right, and to show that Americans will not allow intimidation to force us to relinquish even the smallest bit of that right, led him to conceive of the Freedom of Speech Rally. The first Rally, on May 17, getting little attention, and had only a few participants. However, being a Marine (there is no such thing as an ex-Marine); he was determined to get the job done by organizing the second Rally, held this past Friday, May 29.

This Rally brought hundreds to the Mosque, both pro Free Speech and those who mistook the purpose of the Rally, on the other side of the road, to defend Islam.

This second Rally managed to get attention, not only in Phoenix, but nationally. Unfortunately, as the press often does, they “rewrote” the purpose of the rally in an effort to demonize Ritzheimer and try to turn a Freedom of Speech Rally into a “Hate Rally”. Ritzheimer began to fear for his safety, and the safety of his family. He began to question whether this event, at a mosque, would lead a situation similar to that which was attempted in Texas, and was successfully carried out in France. So much for Freedom of Speech and the Press. However, the theme was that we would not be intimidated into not speaking what we want, in our own country.

Ritzheimer admits that the shirt he wore at the Rally, amply stating “F**k Islam” was not in good taste, and he regrets it. He told me that he has a hard time believing that, since there are so many Muslims out there, they can all be bad (prone to accept radicalism). However, his reading of the Koran raises questions, though some Muslims may sincerely believe that we can live in harmony. He also apologizes to all Muslims of the latter sort.

As the attention to the Rally went national, and the press chose to redefine its purpose, Ritzheimer began to fear for his safety, the safety of his family and those attending the event. Questioning whether going to the mosque might subject them to the consequences that were attempted in Texas, and successful in France. Subsequently, he began to encourage the lawful carrying of firearms to the event, as a means of self-defense against any attempt by the Muslims to use force to suppress freedom of speech.

As the event drew near, friends, and even people unknown to Ritzheimer, informed him of the reaction from what appears to be the Muslim community, quite possibly from as far away as ISIS in Iraq is.

Note that the military advised prior service members to use caution, giving credibility on the part of the government, to the implied threat because of messages similar to these:

(Note: SAW (Sallah Allah Alayhi Wa Aaleh) = Peace be upon him and his household.)

As apprehensive as he was at the start of the Rally, he was relieved to see that the police department had done the unexpected. They “Police Line” taped both curb lines to keep the two sides apart, and then stationed their officers along the centerline of Orangewood Avenue, facing the officers in alternating directions, so that neither side was singled out by the neutral police department, who was there only to assure the safety of all concerned.

Though Jon realizes, now, that the Free Speech Rally could easily be misconstrued, regardless of what he intended, he still believes in, and stands for, the right of Americans to speak freely what they feel. Regardless of whether an inverted crucifix in a jar of urine expresses Freedom of Speech, or a carton drawing of Mohammed, Freedom of Speech is essential to the continuation of our great nation. Jon will continue to support that freedom, just as he supported it when he went, willingly, to Iraq to assure the Iraqis had a chance to establish that right.

Jon Ritzheimer is praised for supporting freedom of speech in the Muslim country of Iraq, and then condemned for supporting free speech in the country that sent him to Iraq. Those who have condemned Jon Ritzheimer, by so doing, have condemned the very fabric of our country.

Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus
Scene 4 – Government Fears Habeas Corpus

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 27, 2015

Setting the Stage: Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum (the sacred writ) has not been addressed at the Supreme Court since 1890. A recent effort resulted in the Supreme Court simply refusing to rule on a Petition for Habeas Corpus, even after all of the lower courts refused to even acknowledge that right. Now, in the current story, the Court has paid “token” acknowledgment of the right, while endeavoring to quash it — rather than pursuing Justice, as is its constitutional responsibility. Instead, as you will see, the Federal District Court in Montana is there to make sure that the government has no chance of losing a case.

The Government is Afraid of Habeas Corpus

William Krisstofer Wolf (that’s is how the government refers to a friend that we know simply as “Wolf”) and I have known each other for over a year. We have never met, but we have shared many hours of phone conversation, email correspondence, and I can’t count the number of times I was a guest on his radio show on “The Montana Republic”.

Among the subjects discussed in those appearances were “The Plan for Restoration of Constitutional Government“, “Declaration of Dissolution of Government”, “Targeting“, “Committees of Safety“, and “Habeas Corpus – The Guardian of Liberty“. The last, regarding the “Sacred Writ”, Habeas Corpus, was also the subject of some of our private conversations. Wolf fully understands what I had learned, over the past three years, though we had never anticipated having to call upon the sacred writ on his behalf — until he was arrested on March 25, 2015.

Based upon our previous conversations on the subject, I prepared a simple demand for Habeas Corpus (3 pages) and a Power of Attorney authorizing me to speak o his behalf regarding Habeas Corpus. These were Priority mailed to him on March 27, and he executed and attempted to have them delivered to the Court. After numerous attempts to have the guards take and deliver the documents to the Court, and the Court refusing to recognize the prepared Habeas Corpus, Wolf resorted to a one page, handwritten, Habeas Corpus (Court Doc. 1), dated April 1, to wit:

United States of America
v.                                             15-                  -BIL-CSO
William Krisstofer Wolf

In the Honorable Court of:
UNITED STATES Magistrate Judge Carol S. Ostby
On April 1, 2015, I, William Krisstofer Wolf, by the only means available. in Yellowstone Corrections Facility interoffice mail, SERVE on the court a DEMAND FOR HABEAS CORPUS.
In as such, I, William Krisstofer Wolf hereby request to be put on the Docket to Schedule a hearing date on the DEMAND FOR HABEAS CORPUS. This docket request for a scheduling here is needed to allow my Attorney in Fact, who has a Power of Attorney – Specific, time to travel to this Honorable Court to speak on my behalf, by authority of the case of Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 US 146.

Done on this Day, April 1, 2015
/s/William Krisstofer Wolf
Defendant

This was sufficient for the Court to finally take notice of Wolf’s right to challenge both unconstitutional laws and absence of jurisdiction. On April 15, the Court “Received” the document. The Court stated that they would not let the Habeas Corpus hold the Court hostage, so they opened a civil case, on April 16, and filed the handwritten Habeas Corpus and then filed an ORDER (Court Doc. 2), immediately thereafter.

The Court’s Efforts to Quash Habeas Corpus

Here are some of the “claims” made in the ORDER (Court Doc. 2):

1. [T]he document does not specify the number of the criminal case or indicate in any other way that it is meant to be filed in the criminal case.
2. [T]he document states that Wolf is acting “by the only means available”; yet counsel was appointed for Wolf in the criminal case on March 26, 2015.
3. Wolf did not pay the filing fee of $5.00 or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
4. “In all courts of the United States, the parties may plead and conduct their own causes personally or by counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (emphasis added); see also Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). [She concludes this claim with the statement] “Wolf may litigate this matter pro se, or he may appear through duly qualified and admitted counsel without an attorney-in-fact.
5. [T]he “‘demand for habeas corpus’ does not set forth any allegations of fact”. “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Wolf cannot mount such an attack until he alleges facts he believes demonstrate that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2242. If Wolf intends to proceed, he must submit an amended petition alleging such facts and explaining why his custody violates the law.
6. If Wolf intended to seek a detention hearing in the criminal case that is pending against him, he should discuss this with his attorney, who can file a motion for a detention hearing under the criminal case number, CR 15-20-MJ-BLG-CSO. If Wolf wishes to file the motion on his own, the Court will then need to consider the motion and decide whether to entertain the motion from Wolf personally, notwithstanding his representation by counsel. But the rule that an attorney-in-fact may not act for Wolf in court applies in all federal cases, civil or criminal. Kelley, 539 F.2d at 1201-03. Moreover, in the criminal case, Wolf’s attorney-in-fact can play no role at all. Wolf is the person charged.

Response to The Court’s Efforts to Quash Habeas Corpus

So, let’s look at what the correct response is to the above claims:

As far as Claim #1, Wolf had no access to documents, and by this time, he was “blocked” from calling some of his friends on the phone. At the time that he wrote the handwritten, which was long after the typed 3 page version (Court Doc. 3), he had only the “Criminal Complaint“, and from that, was only able to extract “15-     -BIL-CSO”, which he properly quoted in the handwritten document, and it was styled as all subsequent filings, “United States of America v. William Krisstofer Wolf”, just as the Court did. So, that doesn’t take rocket science, heck, even the Post Office could have figured that out.

To Claim #2, that he is acting “by the only means available”, raises an interesting question. Wolf stated to the Judge, at his next appearance, that he does not recognize the jurisdiction of the Court and he had no intention of entering a plea. So, if he were to go through the court appointed attorney, an officer of that court, would he not be submitting to the jurisdiction that that Court? There is little doubt, as you will see, that the Court will resort to obfuscation and chicanery in an effort to undermine his right to challenge that persecution that is currently being conducted against him.

Claim #3 says that he “did not pay the filing fee of $5.00”. I can find no reference to the filing fee in the “UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA – Local Rules of Procedure“. However, with regard to:

Rule 3.1 Filing a New Case.

(a) Required Items. The following items are required to file a new case:

(1) a complaint, petition, or other originating document;

(2) unless the originating document is a petition for writ of habeas corpus, payment of the full amount of the filing fee or a motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); and

(3) a civil cover sheet, unless the plaintiff or petitioner is proceeding pro se.

So, the originating document (1)was provided, though they refused the first and opened the case based upon the handwritten document. As to the fee, there is an exception for Habeas Corpus (2), and otherwise, only the full amount can be accepted. It does not address any partial, or alternate fee, such as $5.00, it simply exempts Habeas Corpus from fees. As it exempts the requirement for a cover sheet (3), if he is proceeding pro se (presumably, that would also apply to someone proceeding “pro per”. So, why the effort to extort (yes, that is the legal term) $5.00 from Wolf? Or, is it an effort to simply place obstructions in the way, to discourage his attempt to seek his right to challenge the Court?

Now, with Claim #4, we enter into a rather interesting aspect, which deals directly with our rights and efforts to force us into submission to the dictates of the government. This will be similar to those in #5 and #6, though we will consider them separately. The claim cites both 28 U.S.C. § 1654 and the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). Consequently, “[a]ny individual acting without an attorney must appear personally and may not delegate that duty to any other person who is not a member of the bar of this Court.” D. Mont. L.R. 83.8(a) [Local Rules of Procedure]; see also United States v. Kelley, 539 F.2d 1199, 1201-03 (9th Cir. 1976).

28 U.S. Code § 1654 – Appearance personally or by counsel
In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.

As stated earlier, a writ “is a form of written command in the name of a court or other legal authority to act, or abstain from acting, in some way.” It requires no plea, nor is it a case; it is a request for the court to command an action, which, in the matter of Habeas Corpus, is to issue the writ to raise the questions posed by the person requesting the writ. From that point, it’s not a matter of innocence or guilt, it is to assure that there is proper legal authority regarding the action upon which it is based.

The next citation is the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35:

And be it further enacted, That in all courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by assistance of such counsel or attorneys at law as by the rules of the said courts respectively shall be permitted to manage and conduct causes therein… for crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United States, and all civil actions in which the United States shall be concerned… in the respective courts before which the suits or prosecutions shall be.

In the broadest construction, that “assistance of counsel”, which clearly is not an “attorney at law”, hence the “or”, nor the party, himself, hence the other “or”, which leaves the possibility that a party, a person, may, since he is also capable of taking all responsibility upon himself, assign another to speak on his behalf, as an “attorney in fact”.

The Court references D. Mont. L.R. 83.8(a):

83.8 Self-Represented Litigants.

(a) Any individual acting without an attorney must appear personally and may not delegate that duty to any other person who is not a member of the bar of this Court. A selfrepresented person is bound by the Federal Rules and all applicable local rules. Sanctions, including but not limited to entry of default judgment or dismissal with prejudice, may be imposed for failure to comply with local rules.

This Rule applies to “litigants. This will be addressed along with the cited Kelley case.

Regarding United States v. Kelley, as we look at that case, we might wonder just what the Court was thinking, or was it stabbing blindly, in the dark, to endeavor to equate Kelley with the current matter, the writ. Kelley was being prosecuted. He was not seeking to question the constitutionality of the law, nor the jurisdiction. First, “he argues that he had a right to be represented by a non-lawyer.” Then, “Kelley sought to have his trusted friend Hurd, who was well-versed on Kelley’s monetary theory, serve as trial counsel. Hurd is a roofer and not a licensed attorney. The district court denied the request and prohibited Hurd from sitting at the counsel table or consulting with Kelley during the course of the trial.”

It is well known that if you don’t assert a right, the Court will not grant you that right. Kelley wanted Hurd to sit with him and counsel him. Kelley did not provide a “power of attorney”, according to the decision, he just wanted Hurd to sit and advise him. It doesn’t begin to approach the question at hand. This case is not on point, since it is silent on the point that the Court is trying to make about power of attorney and attorney in fact, and whether this is applicable to a writ, instead of litigation.

Finally, she says that he “may litigate this matter pro se, or he may appear through duly qualified and admitted counsel without an attorney-in-fact.” “Litigate means, “To dispute or contend in form of law; to settle a dispute or seek relief in a court of law; to carry on a suit… a judicial contest.” This is not a dispute, it is simply seeking an answer to a challenge to jurisdiction and constitutionality. As stated before, it is “a form of written command in the name of a court… to act, or abstain from acting, in some way.” It is not an adversarial proceeding.

Wolf had provided a “Power of Attorney”, making Gary Hunt his “Attorney in Fact”, and that was submitted to the Court and filed in the case. Therefore, it is before the Court. The Court, however, challenges Wolf’s right to have someone other than the court appointed attorney, or another “attorney at law”, speak for him on this matter that is not a suit, and, is not a prosecution, it is a “writ of right”, asking the Court to rule on the question presented — that being whether the laws upon which the charges are based, are, in fact, constitutional as applied to Wolf, and whether he falls under the jurisdiction of the authority behind those laws, and the Court, itself (or should I say, “herself”?).

So, let’s see what both “power of attorney” and “attorney in fact” mean (Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition):

Power of attorney: An instrument authorizing another to act as one’s agent or attorney. The agent is attorney in fact and his power is revoked on the death of the principal by operation of law. Such power may be either general or special. [no citations given]

Attorney in fact: An attorney authorized to act in his place and stead, either for some particular purpose, as to do a particular act, or for the transaction of business in general, not of legal character. This authority is conferred by an instrument in writing, called a “letter of attorney,” or more commonly a “power of attorney”. [no citations given]

Now, so as not to be misunderstood, that phrase, “not of a legal character” applies only to the “general business”, which is separated from the “particular act” by the “or”.

So, what the Court has said is, well, not on point to the entire matter before it.

So, let’s move on to Claim #5:

Though she does cite, correctly, from the case, when she says, “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody”, she has the subject of custody out of context to what is applicable in Wolf’s case. Wolf has not been convicted. He is challenging his detention based upon absence of jurisdiction as well as absence of constitutional authority of the charges against him. In Preiser, Rodriguez had been convicted and had already served some time in prison. He had sought relief from the length of his sentence, well, in the words of the decision:

Respondents were state prisoners who had elected to participate in New York’s conditional-release program, by which a prisoner serving an indeterminate sentence may earn up to 10 days per month good-behavior-time credits toward reduction of his maximum sentence… Held: When a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his physical imprisonment and by way of relief seeks a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

This decision, Preiser, as stated in the decision, is an action under 28 U.S, Code §2254:

(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 US Code § 2251: Stay of State court proceedings, begins the subject of dealing with state prisoners challenging through the federal court system. Wolf’ case is purely federal, so we need not concern ourselves, though the court has, with this,. Even if we did, we are really discussing what it says in §2241 (b), below, so I have no idea what her majesty was thinking; she should no that this is a federal matter — I think.

Though the ORDER does not cite §2254, as the case does, it does, properly, cite §§2241-2242, below. However, this citation is really apples and oranges, as the Preiser decision has no bearing on the subject of this current matter. §2254 has no relevance, at all, to the Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum Wolf is seeking, and that the Court is required to respond (answer) to.

So, let’s look at the pertinent parts of 28 U. S. Code §§2241-2242:

28 U.S.C. § 2241 : US Code – Section 2241: Power to grant writ

(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had.

(b) The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit judge may decline to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer the application for hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it.

(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless –

(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or

(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United States; or

(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States; or

28 U.S.C. § 2242 : US Code – Section 2242: Application

Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf. It shall allege the facts concerning the applicant’s commitment or detention, the name of the person who has custody over him and by virtue of what claim or authority, if known. It may be amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions. If addressed to the Supreme Court, a justice thereof or a circuit judge it shall state the reasons for not making application to the district court of the district in which the applicant is held.

So, the District Court is the proper place in which to initiate a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum. Now, under subparagraph (c), we find two applicable qualifiers for who may Petition for such writ. The ORDER cites subparagraph (3), though seems to skip right over subparagraph (1). However, until the person detaining Wolf has answered the writ, that determination cannot be made. Though that last sentence may seem confusing, we will shed some light on it as we venture into the next relevant section, that the Court seemed to have completely, or conveniently, overlooked.

28 U.S.C. § 2243 : US Code – Section 2243: Issuance of writ; return; hearing; decision

A court, justice or judge entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.

The respondent is, of course, the person who has detained Wolf, or that Wolf is detained under the authority thereof. So, unless the Court can show that the applicant (“attorney in fact”, or, “next friend”) is not entitled thereto, which it has, perhaps, insufficiently, attempted to do, must either grant or require the respondent to “show cause”. By the way, “forthwith” is without delay, immediately, etc., It does not provide for excuses, only action.

The writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained. It shall be returned within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.

Now, the civil case was opened on April 15, fully two weeks after the Habeas Corpus was submitted, “by the only means available”, and the Court has still not, over a month later, even begun the process that §2243 requires. So, from the “forthwith”, being the starting of the clock required for what Madison, the father of the Constitution, described as “in the most expeditious and ample manner“, the respondent then has three days to return, which is “to show cause”. Remember, the Fourth Amendment states that you have the right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation”.

Further, the Court states, “Wolf cannot mount such an attack until he alleges facts he believes demonstrate that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”. But, wait just a minute. The Amendment says that the government has to show “nature” and “cause”, not the accused. This is supported by the wording in §2243, that the “order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained.” It sort of makes you wonder if law school has any courses on English comprehension.

Continuing with §2243:

The person to whom the writ or order is directed shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention. When the writ or order is returned a day shall be set for hearing, not more than five days after the return unless for good cause additional time is allowed.

There it is, again. The person making the return, that would be the person detaining, not the person detained, “shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention.” How could that have possible been overlooked by a District Judge, in whose hands lie the lives and futures of those who are required to stand before her for judgment? And, when is that damned hearing going to be held? Wolf sits in detention, denied his liberty, while the judge fritters away that very object that brought the colonies to rebel against England, and part ways with a corrupted judicial system.

The remainder of §2243:

Unless the application for the writ and the return present only issues of law the person to whom the writ is directed shall be required to produce at the hearing the body of the person detained. The applicant or the person detained may, under oath, deny any of the facts set forth in the return or allege any other material facts.

The return and all suggestions made against it may be amended, by leave of court, before or after being filed.

The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.

Now, that last line says it all, that “The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.”

As to Claim #6, Wolf does not seek a detention hearing, as to do so would admit to jurisdiction. The other points in this Claim have already been addressed.

Stay tuned for Act I, Scene 5.