Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus
Scene 4 – Government Fears Habeas Corpus

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 27, 2015

Setting the Stage: Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum (the sacred writ) has not been addressed at the Supreme Court since 1890. A recent effort resulted in the Supreme Court simply refusing to rule on a Petition for Habeas Corpus, even after all of the lower courts refused to even acknowledge that right. Now, in the current story, the Court has paid “token” acknowledgment of the right, while endeavoring to quash it — rather than pursuing Justice, as is its constitutional responsibility. Instead, as you will see, the Federal District Court in Montana is there to make sure that the government has no chance of losing a case.

The Government is Afraid of Habeas Corpus

William Krisstofer Wolf (that’s is how the government refers to a friend that we know simply as “Wolf”) and I have known each other for over a year. We have never met, but we have shared many hours of phone conversation, email correspondence, and I can’t count the number of times I was a guest on his radio show on “The Montana Republic”.

Among the subjects discussed in those appearances were “The Plan for Restoration of Constitutional Government“, “Declaration of Dissolution of Government”, “Targeting“, “Committees of Safety“, and “Habeas Corpus – The Guardian of Liberty“. The last, regarding the “Sacred Writ”, Habeas Corpus, was also the subject of some of our private conversations. Wolf fully understands what I had learned, over the past three years, though we had never anticipated having to call upon the sacred writ on his behalf — until he was arrested on March 25, 2015.

Based upon our previous conversations on the subject, I prepared a simple demand for Habeas Corpus (3 pages) and a Power of Attorney authorizing me to speak o his behalf regarding Habeas Corpus. These were Priority mailed to him on March 27, and he executed and attempted to have them delivered to the Court. After numerous attempts to have the guards take and deliver the documents to the Court, and the Court refusing to recognize the prepared Habeas Corpus, Wolf resorted to a one page, handwritten, Habeas Corpus (Court Doc. 1), dated April 1, to wit:

United States of America
v.                                             15-                  -BIL-CSO
William Krisstofer Wolf

In the Honorable Court of:
UNITED STATES Magistrate Judge Carol S. Ostby
On April 1, 2015, I, William Krisstofer Wolf, by the only means available. in Yellowstone Corrections Facility interoffice mail, SERVE on the court a DEMAND FOR HABEAS CORPUS.
In as such, I, William Krisstofer Wolf hereby request to be put on the Docket to Schedule a hearing date on the DEMAND FOR HABEAS CORPUS. This docket request for a scheduling here is needed to allow my Attorney in Fact, who has a Power of Attorney – Specific, time to travel to this Honorable Court to speak on my behalf, by authority of the case of Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 US 146.

Done on this Day, April 1, 2015
/s/William Krisstofer Wolf
Defendant

This was sufficient for the Court to finally take notice of Wolf’s right to challenge both unconstitutional laws and absence of jurisdiction. On April 15, the Court “Received” the document. The Court stated that they would not let the Habeas Corpus hold the Court hostage, so they opened a civil case, on April 16, and filed the handwritten Habeas Corpus and then filed an ORDER (Court Doc. 2), immediately thereafter.

The Court’s Efforts to Quash Habeas Corpus

Here are some of the “claims” made in the ORDER (Court Doc. 2):

1. [T]he document does not specify the number of the criminal case or indicate in any other way that it is meant to be filed in the criminal case.
2. [T]he document states that Wolf is acting “by the only means available”; yet counsel was appointed for Wolf in the criminal case on March 26, 2015.
3. Wolf did not pay the filing fee of $5.00 or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
4. “In all courts of the United States, the parties may plead and conduct their own causes personally or by counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (emphasis added); see also Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). [She concludes this claim with the statement] “Wolf may litigate this matter pro se, or he may appear through duly qualified and admitted counsel without an attorney-in-fact.
5. [T]he “‘demand for habeas corpus’ does not set forth any allegations of fact”. “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Wolf cannot mount such an attack until he alleges facts he believes demonstrate that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2242. If Wolf intends to proceed, he must submit an amended petition alleging such facts and explaining why his custody violates the law.
6. If Wolf intended to seek a detention hearing in the criminal case that is pending against him, he should discuss this with his attorney, who can file a motion for a detention hearing under the criminal case number, CR 15-20-MJ-BLG-CSO. If Wolf wishes to file the motion on his own, the Court will then need to consider the motion and decide whether to entertain the motion from Wolf personally, notwithstanding his representation by counsel. But the rule that an attorney-in-fact may not act for Wolf in court applies in all federal cases, civil or criminal. Kelley, 539 F.2d at 1201-03. Moreover, in the criminal case, Wolf’s attorney-in-fact can play no role at all. Wolf is the person charged.

Response to The Court’s Efforts to Quash Habeas Corpus

So, let’s look at what the correct response is to the above claims:

As far as Claim #1, Wolf had no access to documents, and by this time, he was “blocked” from calling some of his friends on the phone. At the time that he wrote the handwritten, which was long after the typed 3 page version (Court Doc. 3), he had only the “Criminal Complaint“, and from that, was only able to extract “15-     -BIL-CSO”, which he properly quoted in the handwritten document, and it was styled as all subsequent filings, “United States of America v. William Krisstofer Wolf”, just as the Court did. So, that doesn’t take rocket science, heck, even the Post Office could have figured that out.

To Claim #2, that he is acting “by the only means available”, raises an interesting question. Wolf stated to the Judge, at his next appearance, that he does not recognize the jurisdiction of the Court and he had no intention of entering a plea. So, if he were to go through the court appointed attorney, an officer of that court, would he not be submitting to the jurisdiction that that Court? There is little doubt, as you will see, that the Court will resort to obfuscation and chicanery in an effort to undermine his right to challenge that persecution that is currently being conducted against him.

Claim #3 says that he “did not pay the filing fee of $5.00”. I can find no reference to the filing fee in the “UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA – Local Rules of Procedure“. However, with regard to:

Rule 3.1 Filing a New Case.

(a) Required Items. The following items are required to file a new case:

(1) a complaint, petition, or other originating document;

(2) unless the originating document is a petition for writ of habeas corpus, payment of the full amount of the filing fee or a motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); and

(3) a civil cover sheet, unless the plaintiff or petitioner is proceeding pro se.

So, the originating document (1)was provided, though they refused the first and opened the case based upon the handwritten document. As to the fee, there is an exception for Habeas Corpus (2), and otherwise, only the full amount can be accepted. It does not address any partial, or alternate fee, such as $5.00, it simply exempts Habeas Corpus from fees. As it exempts the requirement for a cover sheet (3), if he is proceeding pro se (presumably, that would also apply to someone proceeding “pro per”. So, why the effort to extort (yes, that is the legal term) $5.00 from Wolf? Or, is it an effort to simply place obstructions in the way, to discourage his attempt to seek his right to challenge the Court?

Now, with Claim #4, we enter into a rather interesting aspect, which deals directly with our rights and efforts to force us into submission to the dictates of the government. This will be similar to those in #5 and #6, though we will consider them separately. The claim cites both 28 U.S.C. § 1654 and the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). Consequently, “[a]ny individual acting without an attorney must appear personally and may not delegate that duty to any other person who is not a member of the bar of this Court.” D. Mont. L.R. 83.8(a) [Local Rules of Procedure]; see also United States v. Kelley, 539 F.2d 1199, 1201-03 (9th Cir. 1976).

28 U.S. Code § 1654 – Appearance personally or by counsel
In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.

As stated earlier, a writ “is a form of written command in the name of a court or other legal authority to act, or abstain from acting, in some way.” It requires no plea, nor is it a case; it is a request for the court to command an action, which, in the matter of Habeas Corpus, is to issue the writ to raise the questions posed by the person requesting the writ. From that point, it’s not a matter of innocence or guilt, it is to assure that there is proper legal authority regarding the action upon which it is based.

The next citation is the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35:

And be it further enacted, That in all courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by assistance of such counsel or attorneys at law as by the rules of the said courts respectively shall be permitted to manage and conduct causes therein… for crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United States, and all civil actions in which the United States shall be concerned… in the respective courts before which the suits or prosecutions shall be.

In the broadest construction, that “assistance of counsel”, which clearly is not an “attorney at law”, hence the “or”, nor the party, himself, hence the other “or”, which leaves the possibility that a party, a person, may, since he is also capable of taking all responsibility upon himself, assign another to speak on his behalf, as an “attorney in fact”.

The Court references D. Mont. L.R. 83.8(a):

83.8 Self-Represented Litigants.

(a) Any individual acting without an attorney must appear personally and may not delegate that duty to any other person who is not a member of the bar of this Court. A selfrepresented person is bound by the Federal Rules and all applicable local rules. Sanctions, including but not limited to entry of default judgment or dismissal with prejudice, may be imposed for failure to comply with local rules.

This Rule applies to “litigants. This will be addressed along with the cited Kelley case.

Regarding United States v. Kelley, as we look at that case, we might wonder just what the Court was thinking, or was it stabbing blindly, in the dark, to endeavor to equate Kelley with the current matter, the writ. Kelley was being prosecuted. He was not seeking to question the constitutionality of the law, nor the jurisdiction. First, “he argues that he had a right to be represented by a non-lawyer.” Then, “Kelley sought to have his trusted friend Hurd, who was well-versed on Kelley’s monetary theory, serve as trial counsel. Hurd is a roofer and not a licensed attorney. The district court denied the request and prohibited Hurd from sitting at the counsel table or consulting with Kelley during the course of the trial.”

It is well known that if you don’t assert a right, the Court will not grant you that right. Kelley wanted Hurd to sit with him and counsel him. Kelley did not provide a “power of attorney”, according to the decision, he just wanted Hurd to sit and advise him. It doesn’t begin to approach the question at hand. This case is not on point, since it is silent on the point that the Court is trying to make about power of attorney and attorney in fact, and whether this is applicable to a writ, instead of litigation.

Finally, she says that he “may litigate this matter pro se, or he may appear through duly qualified and admitted counsel without an attorney-in-fact.” “Litigate means, “To dispute or contend in form of law; to settle a dispute or seek relief in a court of law; to carry on a suit… a judicial contest.” This is not a dispute, it is simply seeking an answer to a challenge to jurisdiction and constitutionality. As stated before, it is “a form of written command in the name of a court… to act, or abstain from acting, in some way.” It is not an adversarial proceeding.

Wolf had provided a “Power of Attorney”, making Gary Hunt his “Attorney in Fact”, and that was submitted to the Court and filed in the case. Therefore, it is before the Court. The Court, however, challenges Wolf’s right to have someone other than the court appointed attorney, or another “attorney at law”, speak for him on this matter that is not a suit, and, is not a prosecution, it is a “writ of right”, asking the Court to rule on the question presented — that being whether the laws upon which the charges are based, are, in fact, constitutional as applied to Wolf, and whether he falls under the jurisdiction of the authority behind those laws, and the Court, itself (or should I say, “herself”?).

So, let’s see what both “power of attorney” and “attorney in fact” mean (Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition):

Power of attorney: An instrument authorizing another to act as one’s agent or attorney. The agent is attorney in fact and his power is revoked on the death of the principal by operation of law. Such power may be either general or special. [no citations given]

Attorney in fact: An attorney authorized to act in his place and stead, either for some particular purpose, as to do a particular act, or for the transaction of business in general, not of legal character. This authority is conferred by an instrument in writing, called a “letter of attorney,” or more commonly a “power of attorney”. [no citations given]

Now, so as not to be misunderstood, that phrase, “not of a legal character” applies only to the “general business”, which is separated from the “particular act” by the “or”.

So, what the Court has said is, well, not on point to the entire matter before it.

So, let’s move on to Claim #5:

Though she does cite, correctly, from the case, when she says, “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody”, she has the subject of custody out of context to what is applicable in Wolf’s case. Wolf has not been convicted. He is challenging his detention based upon absence of jurisdiction as well as absence of constitutional authority of the charges against him. In Preiser, Rodriguez had been convicted and had already served some time in prison. He had sought relief from the length of his sentence, well, in the words of the decision:

Respondents were state prisoners who had elected to participate in New York’s conditional-release program, by which a prisoner serving an indeterminate sentence may earn up to 10 days per month good-behavior-time credits toward reduction of his maximum sentence… Held: When a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his physical imprisonment and by way of relief seeks a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.

This decision, Preiser, as stated in the decision, is an action under 28 U.S, Code §2254:

(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 US Code § 2251: Stay of State court proceedings, begins the subject of dealing with state prisoners challenging through the federal court system. Wolf’ case is purely federal, so we need not concern ourselves, though the court has, with this,. Even if we did, we are really discussing what it says in §2241 (b), below, so I have no idea what her majesty was thinking; she should no that this is a federal matter — I think.

Though the ORDER does not cite §2254, as the case does, it does, properly, cite §§2241-2242, below. However, this citation is really apples and oranges, as the Preiser decision has no bearing on the subject of this current matter. §2254 has no relevance, at all, to the Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum Wolf is seeking, and that the Court is required to respond (answer) to.

So, let’s look at the pertinent parts of 28 U. S. Code §§2241-2242:

28 U.S.C. § 2241 : US Code – Section 2241: Power to grant writ

(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had.

(b) The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit judge may decline to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer the application for hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it.

(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless –

(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or

(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United States; or

(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States; or

28 U.S.C. § 2242 : US Code – Section 2242: Application

Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf. It shall allege the facts concerning the applicant’s commitment or detention, the name of the person who has custody over him and by virtue of what claim or authority, if known. It may be amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions. If addressed to the Supreme Court, a justice thereof or a circuit judge it shall state the reasons for not making application to the district court of the district in which the applicant is held.

So, the District Court is the proper place in which to initiate a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad subjiciendum. Now, under subparagraph (c), we find two applicable qualifiers for who may Petition for such writ. The ORDER cites subparagraph (3), though seems to skip right over subparagraph (1). However, until the person detaining Wolf has answered the writ, that determination cannot be made. Though that last sentence may seem confusing, we will shed some light on it as we venture into the next relevant section, that the Court seemed to have completely, or conveniently, overlooked.

28 U.S.C. § 2243 : US Code – Section 2243: Issuance of writ; return; hearing; decision

A court, justice or judge entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.

The respondent is, of course, the person who has detained Wolf, or that Wolf is detained under the authority thereof. So, unless the Court can show that the applicant (“attorney in fact”, or, “next friend”) is not entitled thereto, which it has, perhaps, insufficiently, attempted to do, must either grant or require the respondent to “show cause”. By the way, “forthwith” is without delay, immediately, etc., It does not provide for excuses, only action.

The writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained. It shall be returned within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed.

Now, the civil case was opened on April 15, fully two weeks after the Habeas Corpus was submitted, “by the only means available”, and the Court has still not, over a month later, even begun the process that §2243 requires. So, from the “forthwith”, being the starting of the clock required for what Madison, the father of the Constitution, described as “in the most expeditious and ample manner“, the respondent then has three days to return, which is “to show cause”. Remember, the Fourth Amendment states that you have the right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation”.

Further, the Court states, “Wolf cannot mount such an attack until he alleges facts he believes demonstrate that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”. But, wait just a minute. The Amendment says that the government has to show “nature” and “cause”, not the accused. This is supported by the wording in §2243, that the “order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained.” It sort of makes you wonder if law school has any courses on English comprehension.

Continuing with §2243:

The person to whom the writ or order is directed shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention. When the writ or order is returned a day shall be set for hearing, not more than five days after the return unless for good cause additional time is allowed.

There it is, again. The person making the return, that would be the person detaining, not the person detained, “shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention.” How could that have possible been overlooked by a District Judge, in whose hands lie the lives and futures of those who are required to stand before her for judgment? And, when is that damned hearing going to be held? Wolf sits in detention, denied his liberty, while the judge fritters away that very object that brought the colonies to rebel against England, and part ways with a corrupted judicial system.

The remainder of §2243:

Unless the application for the writ and the return present only issues of law the person to whom the writ is directed shall be required to produce at the hearing the body of the person detained. The applicant or the person detained may, under oath, deny any of the facts set forth in the return or allege any other material facts.

The return and all suggestions made against it may be amended, by leave of court, before or after being filed.

The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.

Now, that last line says it all, that “The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.”

As to Claim #6, Wolf does not seek a detention hearing, as to do so would admit to jurisdiction. The other points in this Claim have already been addressed.

Stay tuned for Act I, Scene 5.

Camp Lone Star — A Favorable Ruling?

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 26, 2015

On March 30, Massey attended a hearing with testimony that was discussed in Camp “Lone Star — The Setup – Get Massey“. At the end of that hearing, since the government had not responded directly to the existing “Motion to Dismiss”, Judge Hanen allowed the Prosecutor until April 10, and the Defense until April 17, to file supplemental motions.

Massey’s attorney, Louis Sorola, submitted a First Supplement to Opposed Motion to Dismiss Indictment. However, rather than just arguing “case law”, though some was included, he ventured into the realm of “substantive law”, arguing two points with regard to the Constitution, and not just previous decisions.

Massey wanted to challenge jurisdiction, though he was too late to do so, having pled “not guilty”. He also wanted to question the constitutionality of the charges against him, for a number of reasons — most significantly, those discussed in “Camp Lone Star – Massey & The Clash of Laws“. However, his former attorney, Ed Cyganiewicz, refused to take the battle to the courtroom, preferring to go along with the game of “let’s make a deal”. Fortunately, Massey’s insistence in fighting, rather than just giving in, caused Cyganiewicz to withdraw from the case.

Providence, then, provided his next attorney, Mr. Louis Sorola. Sorola listened to Massey, and Massey provided him a copy of an article, Liberty or Laws? “Felon in Possession of a Firearm” is Not Legal or Lawful“, which addressed, among other questions, what Massey refers to as the “has-had” argument and the “equal justice” argument.

Sorola, faithful to his client (unusual, nowadays), did research, found that the “has-had” argument had not been argued, and then prepared the “First Supplement…” (linked above), and served it on the Court and Judge Hagen within the time allowed.

Word came back that after receiving the “First Supplement…”, the courthouse was “abuzz”. Apparently, Hagen was taken aback, and had no idea just how to deal with this new stick in the federal spokes.

The Argument

Let’s first look at the wording of the “felon in possession” statute, 18 USC § 922 (g), that is pertinent to the argument.

“to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”

That is it. The question is what does “has” mean, as written in the statute.

Now, we will look at the “has-had” argument (paragraph #4), from the “First Supplement…”:

The word “has”, as opposed to the word “had” was used in the statute. “Has” is the third person singular, present indicative, verb meaning active in the action just completed, where “had” is past tense and participle of the verb have, meaning in a previous situation. So, if one were the direct recipient, then the word “has” would be appropriate. However, if it were expansive, intended to include any firearm shipped in interstate commerce, then “had” would be the proper verb. The use of “had” would have meant to include any and all that “had” been so transported any time prior

Keep that in mind as we visit the “equal justice” argument “(paragraphs #14, 15), again from the “First Supplement…”:

[I]f you live in a state that manufactures a firearm, then you can possess it, as it has not been involved in interstate commerce. However, if you have ammunition that was manufactured in another state, then you are guilty because of the ammunition. If you live in a state that manufactures both weapons and ammunition, you can possess those “firearms” and ammunition. However, if you live in a state that manufactures one, the other, or neither, then you may have but one, or none. That seems to give preference to one state over another.

Further, this absolutely defies the concept of equal justice; it would defy the concept of Article IV, § 2, which states, “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all of the Privileges and Immunities of the Citizens of the several States.” It would mean that if one moved to another state, with what was legal, from the federal standpoint, in the state from which he began, he would be a criminal in the other state.

Before we look back to put some perspective on our argument, let’s visit another provision of the Constitution, not included in the argument, but relevant to our consideration, is Article IV, § 4:

“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government…”

Under the authority so guaranteed, Texas enacted their own “felon in possession” statute, many decades ago. It provides that:

Sec. 46.04. UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF FIREARM.

(a) A person who has been convicted of a felony commits an offense if he possesses a firearm:

(1) after conviction and before the fifth anniversary of the person’s release from confinement following conviction of the felony or the person’s release from supervision under community supervision, parole, or mandatory supervision, whichever date is later;

So, one “commits an offense”, unless his sentence for a felony, and any other supervision, etc., is five years, or more, behind him. Texas recognizes that the right to bear arms is restored when one has rehabilitated himself, and “stayed clean” for five years.

So, the Texas statute is in conflict with 922 (g) if we accept that “has” means “had”, and the impediment, the prohibition of possession, was not limited to the act of commerce, but was applicable to the rest of one’s life.

And, the “equal justice” provision, Article IV, § 2, is in conflict with 922 (g) if we accept that “has” means “had”, in that the application would be solely dependent upon the state that one lived in, rather than any sense of justice..

However, if we consider that “has”, as written, means “has”, as written and intended, and improperly applied in the “administration” of that law by the government, then there is no conflict between 922 (g) and either Article IV, § 2, or the right of Texas to enact laws under “a Republican Form of Government”.

* * *

Since April 20, when the court first received the “First Supplement…”, Massey and Sorola have been waiting, anxiously, for Judge Hanen’s ruling on the motions before it. Now Judge Hanen is busy dealing with the Department of Justice and their deceitful practice of defying his order in the Amnesty case, but after 4 weeks, there was still no ruling.

It seems that if Judge Hanen were going to rule against Sorola’s motions, it would be a no-brainer to simply rule, and get on with the trial. However, there was nothing except a very loud SILENCE from the Court, until May 20, when Judge Hanen delivered a rather interesting “Order“. The order indicates that Hanen still has to rule on two motions before the Court, and opens the door for another round of paperwork, (amendments to the previous positions), giving until May 29 to answer. He does cite the recent Henderson v. United States decision out of the Supreme Court, and though he finds that there is no “impact on the pending motions”, he leaves the door open, to allow the Prosecution every latitude.

Massey’s apprehension in quite understandable. He has been wearing an “ankle bracelet” since November 12, 2014, and has been under “Home Detention”, since that time (See “Camp Lone Star – Cruel and Unusual Punishments – Before Conviction“. His last motion was submitted on April 20, and so a month later, he finds that there will be nine more days of agonizing waiting for the ruling that will determine whether the Constitution and the laws of the State of Texas are supreme, or if Administrative Rules and Regulations override them.

So, why is Judge Hanen waiting so long to rule? Denying the motions would be such a simple task, though ruling that “Felon in Possession” is, well, unconstitutional, is not so easily accomplished. There is a likelihood that the government, facing such a loss, would appeal. Most judges prefer to not have a decision overturned by a higher court, so if he is going to grant the Motion to Dismiss, he apparently afforded every opportunity for the Prosecutor to attempt a challenge to the position presented in the “First Supplement…”, thereby minimizing the possibility of a successful appeal. And, of course, knowing that the government does not like to have its authority challenged, it might well be a career ending decision for Hanen to make. However, if others are willing to give their lives for the Constitution, then to end one’s career for such purpose is an act worthy of a true patriot.

Further, Judge Hanen has not rescheduled the planned June 4 Jury Selection, nor the Pre-Trial Conference, set for June 2, leaving just one working day from the final motions to trial start. This would lend one to believe that his intention is to rule in favor of the Motion to Dismiss Indictment, unless the government can scrape together a non-existent argument in opposition to “has-had” and “equal justice”. In which case, the trial would have to be scheduled even further down the road to allow for preparation.

It does appear that when Judge Hanen does pick up his gavel, it will come down declaring freedom for KC Massey, and a quandary for the government, as all those who have been convicted, or even pled guilty to “Felon in Possession” may have pled, or been convicted, of a non-crime.

Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus
Scene 3 – Guardian of Personal Liberty

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 26, 2015

Setting the Stage: Joseph Story called Habeas Corpus “the great bulwark of personal liberty.” He did so as he, as well as did other legal scholars and various Supreme Court decision, because the founders knew that overarching government might attempt to suppress the rights of the people that had been so recently won, at great cost to the people. The inclusion of the “sacred writ” in the Constitution was to assure that their posterity would always have a means of challenging the federal government, when it went beyond those limits set by the Constitution.

The Truth About Habeas Corpus, the “Sacred Writ”

Now, let’s visit the remedy the Founders provided us, in the Constitution. It is fair to say that the Constitution was written with an understanding of both human nature and the incessant obsession in some to seek power solely for the sake of wielding that power.

In Article I, which is the Legislative Branch, § 9, clause 2, it provides that:

The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.

A privilege is a right that can be suspended.

So, exactly what does it mean? Let’s see what some early judicial scholars had to say.

In 1768, William Blackstone, in his Commentaries, provides insight into the necessity and requirements associated with this Writ of Right.

But the great and efficacious writ in all manner of illegal confinement, is that of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum; directed to the person detaining another, and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner with the day and cause of his caption and detention…

[I]f a probable ground be shewn, that the party is imprisoned without just cause, and therefore hath a right to be delivered, the writ of habeas corpus is then a writ of right, which “may not be denied, but ought to be granted to every man that is committed, or detained in prison, or otherwise restrained, though it be by the command of the king, the privy council, or any other.”

In a former part of these commentaries we expatiated at large on the personal liberty of the subject. It was shewn to be a natural inherent right, which could not be surrendered or forfeited unless by the commission of some great and atrocious crime, nor ought to be abridged in any case without the special permission of law.

A remedy the more necessary, because the oppression does not always arise from the ill-nature, but sometimes from the mere inattention of government.

From the Constitutional Convention, we have Madison’s Records of the Federal Convention.

“The privileges and benefits of the writ of habeas corpus shall be enjoyed in this government in the most expeditious and ample manner: and shall not be suspended by the Legislature, except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a limited time, not exceeding [blank] months.”

“Expeditious and ample” are easily understood, and, clearly, the intention of the inclusion of the “Sacred Writ” within the protection of the Constitution. Being the only “right” defined as a “privilege”, we need simply understand that it is the only enumerated right that is subject to legislative suspension, though only legislative.

William Rawle, in “A View of the Constitution of the United States” (1829), provides us insight into the perception of the Writ just forty years after the Ratification of the Constitution, and, clearly, as it was envisioned at the time.

Reasons will be given hereafter for considering many of the restrictions, contained in the amendments to the Constitution, as extending to the states as well as to the United States, but the nature of the writ of habeas corpus seems peculiarly to call for this construction. It is the great remedy of the citizen or subject against arbitrary or illegal imprisonment; it is the mode by which the judicial power speedily and effectually protects the personal liberty of every individual, and repels the injustice of unconstitutional laws or despotic governors. After erecting the distinct government which we are considering, and after declaring what should constitute the supreme law in every state in the Union, fearful minds might entertain jealousies of this great and all-controlling power, if some protection against its energies when misdirected, was not provided by itself.

If this provision had been omitted, the existing powers under the state governments, none of whom are without it, might be questioned, and a person imprisoned on a mandate of the president or other officer, under colour of lawful authority derived from the United States, might be denied relief.

The Honorable Justice Joseph Story, in “Commentaries on the Constitution“, will provide even more insight.

1333. In order to understand the meaning of the terms here used, it will be necessary to have recourse to the common law; for in no other way can we arrive at the true definition of the writ of habeas corpus. At the common law there are various writs, called writs of habeas corpus. But the particular one here spoken of is that great and celebrated writ, used in all cases of illegal confinement, known by the name of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, directed to the person detaining another, and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner, with the day and cause of his caption and detention… It is, therefore, justly esteemed the great bulwark of personal liberty; since it is the appropriate remedy to ascertain, whether any person is rightfully in confinement or not, and the cause of his confinement; and if no sufficient ground of detention appears, the party is entitled to his immediate discharge. This writ is most beneficially construed; and is applied to every case of illegal restraint, whatever it may be; for every restraint upon a man’s liberty is, in the eye of the law, an imprisonment, wherever may be the place, or whatever may be the manner, in which the restraint is effected.

Finally, we will visit Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856):

HABEAS CORPUS, remedies A writ of habeas corpus is an order in writing, signed by the judge who grants the same, and sealed with the seal of the court of which he is a judge, issued in the name of the sovereign power where it is granted, by such a court or a judge thereof, having lawful authority to issue the same, directed to any one having a person in his custody or under his restraint, commanding him to produce, such person at a certain time and place, and to state the reasons why he is held in custody, or under restraint.

7.  The Constitution of the United State Article 1, s. 9, n. 2, provides, that ” the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it and the same principle is contained in many of the state constitutions. In order still more to secure the citizen the benefit of this great writ, a heavy penalty is inflicted upon the judges who are bound to grant it, in case of refusal.

It is pro8.  per to consider, 1. When it is to be granted. 2. How it is to be served. 3. What return is to be made to it. 4. The bearing. 5. The effect of the judgment upon it.

9. – 1. The writ is to be granted whenever a person is in actual confinement, committed or detained as aforesaid, either for a criminal charge, or, …under any color or pretence whatsoever…

10. – 2. The writ may be served by any free person, by leaving it with the person to whom it is directed, or left at the gaol or prison with any of the under officers, under keepers, or deputy of the said officers or keepers...

16.  The habeas corpus can be suspended only by authority of the legislature. The constitution of the United States provides, that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of invasion and rebellion, the public safety may require it. Whether this writ ought to be suspended depends on political considerations, of which the legislature, is to decide…

It is apparent that the inclusion of Article I, Section 3, clause 3, was included in the Constitution as a bar against overarching government, unconstitutional laws, and jurisdiction beyond that authorized by the Constitution.

Wolf Trap – Act I – Habeas Corpus
Scene 1 – Limited Federal Jurisdiction

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 22, 2015

Setting the Scene: This Act is a series of scenes that will lead up to the events, the paper chase, that are going on in Montana, in an effort to persuade the Court to recognize that rights of William wolf and the limitations of federal authority, as conceived by the Founders. It will provide an understanding of what was, why it was, and what happened to deceive us into believing that it no longer existed. It will conclude with the ongoing effort to restore the proper relationship between the federal government and us.

* * *

From my early school years, I heard explanations pertaining to Habeas Corpus, the “Sacred Writ”. It could be used to remove you from unlawful detention; it could be written on a scrap of paper to be served; it could be served, on your behalf, by anyone who wanted to assist you in being removed from unlawful detention, and, perhaps even more. It was championed as fundamental to our liberty. However, little more was said of it, and it remained only as a mental symbol of something that, though not well explained, was one of the most important inclusions in the Constitution. So important that it was not included in the Bill of Rights, rather, it was part of that first venture into the creation of the new government that we have, today, the Constitution.

Understanding that circumstances might warrant the suspension of that “Sacred Writ”, the power to do so was left solely to the Legislative Branch of the government, and only “in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”

Interestingly, this fits nicely within that portion of the Fourth Amendment that states that you have a right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation” against you. But, what do “nature” and “cause” mean? So, we will visit the language of the Founders; from Webster’s 1828 Dictionary, we find that “nature” is a noun, and that the appropriate definition is, ” The essence, essential qualities or attributes of a thing, which constitute it; what it is”. So, nature is the element (essence) from which the charges are brought. The “cause” is, quite simply, that which brings it about — the act.

So, the “cause” is the act that brings about the charges, and the nature is the source from which the law acquires its authority. And, in any act, for which a “cause” is brought by the federal government, it must also have a source of authority, that being only, and limited to, the Constitution. The Constitution provides for both authority of enactment of laws and limitations upon the jurisdiction within which it can apply those laws and impose penalties, if convicted of the act.

After all, we know that the Constitution was written to set limits upon the government that was created by that document. They granted to that government so created, both powers and authorities, and they imposed limitations upon it.

Most cases that go to the United States Supreme Court are based upon certiorari; that is to see if there were irregularities, or errors, at trial in the inferior court. These writs deal solely with whether the applicable laws, or standards of justice (due process), were properly applied. The decisions in such cases often have the appearance of creating not only detailed instruction as to interpretation of a law, rule, or regulation, but also often they go beyond that written law, serving to extend the authority of such law beyond that was intended by the Congress, when it was enacted. This, however, is based upon the presumption that it if a law is enacted by, or under the authority (rules and regulations), of Congress, it must be constitutional in its enactment.

What is does not do, at least in recent years, is question whether the law, even if constitutionally enacted, is imposed where the constitutional limitations preclude its applicability, i.e. jurisdiction.

Before we proceed further, perhaps understanding what a “writ” is, and what it is not, is necessary for perspective. It is not a court case, nor a lawsuit, nor a criminal prosecution against a person. Quite simply, it is “a form of written command in the name of a court or other legal authority to act, or abstain from acting, in some way.”

Limited federal Jurisdiction

Under Article I, § 8, clause 17, Congress has “exclusive legislative jurisdiction”. Under Article IV, § 3, clause 2, Congress may “make all needed Rules and Regulations”, with the caveat, “respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” So, under these authorities, many ‘laws” are enacted that apply only to the extent that jurisdiction also applies. A good example of this is a law enacted in 1825 that gave the government the authority to punish “certain crimes against the United States”. We’ll let the act speak for itself:

“That if any person or persons, within any fort, dock-yard, navy-yard, arsenal, armory, or magazine, the site whereof is ceded to, and under the jurisdiction of the United States, or on a site of any lighthouse, or other needful building belonging to the United States, the sight whereof is ceded to them [United States], and under their jurisdiction, as aforesaid, shall, willfully…”

Take note that this does not apply to government property outside of that limited jurisdiction. The property must be to be on lands that are ceded and jurisdiction also ceded, within the authority granted by the Constitution.

For those interested, there are a number of Supreme Court decisions that support the requirement for a Constitutional nexus for an enactment of Congress to be valid and applicable, outside of that limited jurisdiction. These can be found in the article, “Habeas Corpus – The Guardian of Liberty“.

Now, what we have been taught and have been inclined to believe for our entire lives, is eviscerated, if we heed a decision of the Supreme Court, In Re Lane (135 U.S. 443), ruled on in 1890, in which a man was charged with rape, under federal law. The rape took place in the Oklahoma (Indian) Territory (unorganized), though the case was tried in Kansas (statehood in 1861). Lane was convicted and imprisoned in Kansas. Kansas punishment being less harsh, Lane attempted to challenge federal jurisdiction, opting to be punished under Kansas law.

The law under which he was charged and convicted of, had the jurisdictional, “in the District of Columbia or other place, except the territories, over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction,” in its wording. Now, that wording, “other place, except the territories, over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction” can appear to be misleading. However, the Court clarified that rather confusing statement by explaining that “except territories”, was not in the context of Article IV, § 3, clause 2 (needful rules and regulations), but rather, as those organized territories, seeking statehood — those which had been granted, by Congress, the authority to propose a constitution and to create Legislative, Executive and Judicial Branches, and were authorized to enact laws, administer them, and the judicial branch to provide a forum for justice. These same grants of authority were endowed upon the states, within the limits of the state constitution, by adoption of the state constitution and the granting of statehood. The extent of federal jurisdiction, the laws, rules, and regulations, was limited solely to the unorganized territories.

Supreme Court (and Inferior Courts) Don’t Want to Rule on Constitutionality

In 1936, the Supreme Court ruled on a case known as Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (297 U.S. 288). The details of the case are not something that we need concern ourselves with, though we must heed the words of Justice Brandeis, as he explained the seven rules that the Court had adopted in applying their judicial authority. The applicable rules are:

1.  The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, nonadversary, proceeding, declining because to decide such questions ‘is legitimate only in the last resort…

4.  The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of… Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter…

5.  The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.

6.  The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.

7.  ‘When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.

As we can see, Rules 1, 4 and 7, are means by which the Court can avoid ruling on the constitutionality of a matter before them.

Rule 5 provides for a condition upon which one must have been injured to even challenge a statute, even as to constitutionality and jurisdiction. And, Rule 6 provides a bar against challenge, if a person “has availed himself of its benefits”.

So, we can see how extremely difficult it is to question constitutionality, jurisdiction, or to even find that you are in a position to challenge the lawfulness, of any act of Congress. But, we also have to understand the “nature” of those “statutes” referred to in the Rules.

In the Ashwander decision, it was pointed out that the Rules had been adopted over the past few decades, so this was really nothing new. Administrative agencies, though few at the time (Tennessee Valley Authority was one such agency), were relatively new. However, in an effort to expand constitutional authority beyond the limits imposed by the Constitution, and based upon the adoption of those Rules, Congress took another step, in 1946, to expand their authority beyond those limits. That will be the subject of Scene 2.

Wolf Trap – Wolf Speaks from Jail

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
May 14, 2015

I received the following from William Wolf, through a circuitous route, since the government has decided that he should not be allowed to communicate with me. In fact, his communicating with me has so disturbed them that they will be moving him from the Yellowstone County Detention Facility, in Billings (where the Courthouse is) to the Crossroads Correctional Center (pictured above), in Shelby, Montana, about 300 miles, and a five hour drive to the Courthouse. Also, over 200 miles from his friends in Bozeman. Rather odd, since he will have to make the 600 mile round trip for very court appearance, but, heck, it is not their money, it is ours. It is, however, the first story that I have covered where the driving time to court, at least prior to conviction, has always kept down to very reasonable –which this is not.

We had identified Ed Grey (CHS in the Criminal Complaint) as the informant for the government. The Criminal Complaint even states that he “has provided reliable information to the FBI in the past and has not been known to provide false or misleading information and some of the information has been able to be corroborated by independent investigative means.”

We can add another player, Jeff Howard, who may have known that Ed Grey was bad, or was just duped by Grey into an introduction with Wolf.

For whatever reason, wolf has yet to provide a name for the UCE (FBI Undercover Employee), though he has referred to him as “Dirty” in the following presentation of Wolf’s side of the story.

Remember, there are always at least two sides to every story. The government will always get theirs out, first, making it the Prima Facie Story, which results in premature condemnation, as explained in Thought Crimes. So, clear your head, if you have read the Criminal Complaint, and try to be objective in learning the other side of that story.

You will note that this was an FBI operation directed at enforcing firearms violations. Normally, that would be the purview of the BATF, not the FBI. Therefore, there is good reason to believe that this factor is proof of what Wolf is claiming that it was entrapment because of his political views.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

Summer 2014. Met Ed Grey on a jobsite. Jeff Howard said he was a friend, so possibly Jeff is involved, also. Ed said he listens to my shows and radio broadcasts. We met a few times over lunch, and talked about world issues. Always in public, never in private.

Late September. The Bozeman, Montana, City Commission met concerning an outcry over the Bearcat Armored Vehicle. I spoke openly against it. Ed contacted me and wanted to talk, since he missed the meeting. We met at Old Chicago pizza joint and had lunch. We talked about that vehicle and how it was illegally obtained. He told me he had a friend who was a patriot that wanted to build a bunker up here. So I said I would ask around. I contacted a friend, Kate R. of a local realtor company. See she said she knew of a place. I relayed the info to Ed Grey.

October. Ed Grey’s friend (UCE) “Dirty” was introduced at the Yellowstone Truck Stop, out in the open. We discussed what he wanted in property. We discussed the Bearcat and world issues. He said he was a private security contractor and had worldwide contacts. He said he could get things that could deal with the Bearcat like RPG’s. I never inquired about those. He told me he was selling his business and moving to Montana.

November. Ed Grey came to my home to help with a well pump. We talked on a variety of issues, and then he wanted to see the property. We talked about Dirty wanting to move to Montana again, and that he could get all kinds of military hardware. I told him I was interested in a military grade shotgun, either the Atchisson AA-12 or SAIGA 12 gauge military version. He told me that Dirty did, in fact, have a Class III dealer license for his company’s weapons and repairs. I had asked because of wanting it legally purchased and converted. Both Saiga and Atchisson full auto shotguns, the military version had an identical civilian version, except for manufacturing standards, but compatible and interchangeable parts.

December. Ed told me Dirty is passing through and wanted to meet. We met at the Corner Cafe in Four Corners, Montana (formerly known as the Cinnamon Bear). We sat out in the open. We talked about the property, world issues, and the Committee of Safety meeting. Ed mentioned about the shotgun after Dirty talked about how he wanted property he could have a gun range on for his automatic weapons. I told him I wanted the Saiga 12 fully automatic for its super durability over its civilian counterpart and how one could easily be converted to the other. He confirmed that his Class III licensee could convert it and had access to military surplus. I was very clear on wanting his Class III dealer to purchase and convert it and wanted that then to be a private sale (that is legal).

January 2015. Met with Ed and Dirty at the Flying J Truck Stop and we went to view the property. We talked of many things, including the shotgun and how he had seen the Yahoo video and how impressive it was. I agreed it would be great to own one and that it was an impressively designed firearm. He said his guy could get me six at $600 each. Again, I confirmed it was the Saiga 12 fully automatic version and his Class III could buy and convert it. He said yes.

We met with the realtor and viewed the property. We talked about modifying the property. We also talked about the Committee of Safety meeting Dirty wanted to attend.

Held the Committee of Safety meeting. Dirty and Ed attended and stayed after the meeting. He told me he could get me the exact model I wanted. I again asked about his Class III, converting it and he said yes.

February. Ed Grey texted me asking what length barrel. I said shortest possible (I believe I did and need the text messages from AT&T to prove it). He then asked the strange question of if I wanted it to be Mil Spec. So I said yes, knowing that Mil Spec meant higher quality metals.

March. Met with Ed Grey in his truck, as we had conflicting schedules. He showed a video of a Saiga 12 full automatic in action. He fired two clips. He then said, “yours will look just like this except converted and it will cost $125 more for the internal parts.” I asked Ed Grey if the $125 was for the fully auto converted. He said yes.

March 25. Met with Dirty at Yellowstone Truck Stop and ate. I did not see his vehicle. He talked about the Saiga 12 fully automatic he had bought for himself. He even said he had purchased five of them. He said how it emptied the clip and 1.9 seconds. I said I wanted a pistol grip on the front of mind. He said his Class III dealer had done that, as a favor for finding him the property. I asked again if mine had been converted and he said yes. His vehicle was parked in the back because the lot was full. I moved mine into the back. He showed me a Saiga 12 shotgun that I never touched. Again, I asked if it was converted. He said yes. I made the purchase and was arrested by a multitude of armed agents. Dirty was cuffed and taken away.

Points Of Fact

The Saiga 12 automatic shotgun line has two identical versions. The Saiga 12 fully automatic is made for the Russian military and is a superior manufactured firearm meeting military design/durability specs. It comes with a 14-inch barrel only.

The Saiga 12 semi automatic shotgun is identical to its fully automatic sibling, except it is semi automatic and inferior in construction. It is licensed here, in America, and sold off the shelf. The parts are fully interchangeable, with no modification needed. That is why I wanted a shotgun designed to withstand military rigors that could be legally converted.

Multiple times, I was told I was getting a Saiga 12 fully automatic shotgun from his factory (military surplus) and his Class III dealer could convert it. Dirty even charged me for the internal parts.

There is no way to make a fully automatic weapon more fully automatic with any factory conversion kit; ergo the only conversion is to semi automatic. Also, the barrel statement shows entrapment as the fully military version comes standard with it.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

April 19, 2015

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
April 19, 2015

Twenty years ago, today, the Murrah Federal Courthouse, in Oklahoma City, was bombed by a patriot who intended to light the fuse of violent resistance to the government’s overarching, and deadly, imposition upon the rights of the people. Some of the motivation behind this act was a response to the efforts of government, just two years earlier, to divest some people of their right to bear arms, and other infringements of the Constitution.

Twenty-two years ago, today, agencies of the federal government murdered over 80 people; in Waco, Texas; men, women, and children, in their own home/Church. Again, divesting the right to bear arms, and other constitutional infringements were the underlying elements in this event.

Two-hundred and forty years ago, today, more than 80 men stood on Lexington Green to demonstrate dissatisfaction with the government’s effort to divest them of their constitutional and sacred right to keep arms.

Today, K. C. Massey’s attorney, Louis Sorola, filed (electronically) a Motion to Dismiss the Indictment upon which the government’s case against Massey rests. That motion is an objection to the government’s attempt to divest Massey of his right to bear arms, by overreaching constitutional authority.

There are two elements in each of these events. First, arms; Second, the Constitution

Now, the government and Mainstream Media downplay the latter and demonize the former. And, that has become the underlying creed of law enforcement, as demonstrated by the short (45 second) video clip, “Sheriff’s Deputy Admits MRAPs Are For Constitutionalists“. Though the jurisdiction and the date of the video are not known (unless someone comes forward with that information), it is apparent that the two deputies are serious in what they say:

Deputy #1: “We’ve got a lot of constitutionalists and a lot of people that stockpile weapons, a lot of ammunition, and they have [intelligible] weapons here locally.”

So, the first Deputy sees danger in “constitutionalists” stockpiling weapons and ammo. He sounds a lot like General Gage, military governor of Massachusetts.

Deputy #2: “It’s worldwide. The world is unstable now; you look anywhere, you watch the news.”

As to the second, what is “worldwide”? The fear of constitutionalists is an international problem? “Hey, buddy! Yeah, you, the deputy, don’t you work for this county? What are you doing dealing in international matters?”

As George Santayana said, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.“

Have we learned? Can we remember? What, possibly, can the government do to return to the Constitution, and avoid the violence that they have already begun?

Let us not slide further into that abyss of abject slavery and obedience to a government that was supposed to belong to us.

Government’s purpose is to govern the Government,
Not to govern the People.

Camp Lone Star — The Setup
Get Massey

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
April 18, 2015

There were always bits and pieces that pointed toward a rather unpleasant picture; however, they amounted to nothing more than circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence has always been an insufficient foundation for my articles.

Now, we are going to look at some of that circumstantial evidence. It will include statements from players, though that information has not yet been made public, nor is the government even aware that this information has come to light. One of these two sources was present the night before the arrest (October 19, 2014). The other was present at the shooting incident (August 29, 2014).

We will begin with the team of Massey, Varner, and Foerster, and the relevant events leading up to, and after the shooting incident.

In the early afternoon of August 29, Massey decided to run a patrol, and asked if anyone wanted to go. Both Varner and Foerster agreed to go. Whether Foerster made any phone calls, once he knew that Massey was participating in the patrol, is not known. It is possible that another person in the camp provided that information to an unknown investigator awaiting the opportunity and circumstance under which Massey could be charged with “Felon in Possession”. We will refer to that other person as “S”.

To establish a timeline for the subsequent events, we look at when Massey spoke with Mr. Aguilar, the Curator of the Sabal Palms Preserve, the private property where the shooting occurred. Varner had looked at his phone at about 3:00 PM, just a couple of minutes before Massey finished his conversation with Mr. Aguilar — to provide protection on the Sabal Palms property.

Approximately 20 minutes later, after visiting a couple of other locations, they arrived near the scene of the subsequent shooting. A BP agent appeared to be interested in something, so Massey asked him if they could help. The agent responded, “Yes, we could use some help.” At this point, they parked the Mule (an ATV) and spread out. Varner says that Massey was about sixty feet away and Foerster, another 120 feet away. Shortly after they began, Varner saw an unidentified BP agent jogging along with Foerster, perhaps ten feet from him. This event is estimated to be 5 to 7 minutes before the shooting. Minutes later, because of the vegetation, visibility between Varner, Massey, and Foerster was obscured. So, we have a BP agent with Foerster before the shooting.

About 2 to 4 minutes before the shooting, BP agent Cantu moves to within a few feet behind Varner, though he says nothing. As shots are heard, Varner said, “Shots fired”, and repeated this at least three times. Cantu doesn’t react to these calls, or the shots — at least at this time.

The first words out of Cantu’s mouth were, “Where is Massey?” That raises the question, since Massey was not visible from where Varner and Cantu were; how did Cantu knew that Massey was on the patrol?

Varner responds by yelling to Massey, “Cantu is looking for you!”

Cantu then walked in the direction of the shots, without meeting Massey. Within a few minutes, he returns with the BP agent who fired the shots, and Foerster. Now, this gets interesting; Varner is absolutely sure that the agent’s nametag read “Hernandez”, while the government’s testimony, to date, says it was “Gonzales”. Foerster and the agent were both still in possession of their firearms.

Cantu and the agent walked toward the “assembly area”, where the investigation was to be conducted. Cantu told Massey to follow them with the Mule. Massey said something to the effect that nobody was hurt and they would like to leave. Cantu told him that they would have to go to the assembly area for the investigation. They were all still in possession of their weapons, which were left in the Mule when they arrived at the assembly area.

An agent from BPS removed the weapons from the Mule and placed them in the back of a BP vehicle. One could suppose that “Officer Safety” advised them that there was a risk in leaving the weapons with the innocent Camp Lone Star members.

About this time, the shooter, Hernandez/Gonzales, walked up to Cantu and traded firearms with him. The evidence in the shooting was not bagged, but rather simply changed holsters. This happened before any outside investigators arrived on the scene. Ponder, if you will, whether the subsequent investigation, conducted by the Sheriff’s Deputy and the FBI, included the weapon used in the shooting; if ballistics tests were conducted, and which weapon was tested, if they even bothered to ask for it. But, let’s not confuse ourselves with such details. However Varner, once again, confirms that the shooter’s nametag read “Hernandez”.

Varner, upon asking Cantu what had happened, was told that the shooting occurred when the agent was about 30 feet from Foerster, which was confirmed in subsequent testimony. Varner remains incredulous; “How could anyone miss with five shots from 30 feet?” Varner also states that he never heard the shooter utter a word, to anyone, throughout the entire ordeal.

When Varner’s weapons were returned to him by the Sheriff’s Deputy, the Deputy asked what had happened. Varner told him about the BP requesting help, though that, conveniently, does not show up in the testimony.

When the trio returned to Camp Lone Star, “S” was, uncharacteristically, standing, waiting, for them. He had never done so, before.

Next, we fast-forward to the evening of October 19, 2014. Archie Seals, James Lewis, and Massey were in the long-term motel room that was used for an occasional good night’s rest, a good hot shower, and for meetings, as the need arose.

This particular night a conference call was scheduled with a number of militia people from around the country. The topic of the call was a plan for a massive gathering in Washington, D.C., though the objective, strategy, and tactics were, at the least, undeveloped. They did decide to name it “Operation American Freedom”.

The call had been going on for quite a while, when Foerster buzzed the room and Lewis went down to let him in, brought him up by the elevator, and into the room. This is significant in that Foerster had been removed from Camp Lone Star due to his erratic behavior, at least three weeks prior, and had not been heard from, since. He did not say anything; he simply went over to the bed and sat down. He remained there for the rest of his stay.

After the conference call ended, Lewis and Seal returned to Camp Lone Star. Foerster remained, absent any meaningful conversation or reason. Then he left, probably after he was certain that Massey was going to spend the night in the motel room.

The next morning, Massey left and found 15 to 20 agents waiting in the parking lot to arrest him. Well, someone must have told them that he had spent the night in the room. The presence of 15 to 20 agents indicates that they knew that Massey had spent the night in the room.

When I began this story, I explained that there was a lot of circumstantial evidence. Well, some is explained, above, while other such evidence can be surmised by the events. Taken together, it only raises a suspicion, at best.

Now, when we look at the sworn testimony by either document, or from the transcript, we have established a critical timeline of events.

The government claims that the shooting occurred at about 3:45 PM. The government’s sworn testimony states that that the first records check was run by Deputy Sheriff Valerio, after he arrived at 4:18 PM.

Massey’s attorney, Mr. Louis Sorola, though he has yet to receive copies, made notes while reviewing some records. The two important records, and the absence of one, show that Massey was run through the NCIC system at 15:12:53 (That’s 3:12 PM), fully one half hour before the shooting, and over an hour before the sworn statement as to the first records check to determine if Massey (not even a witness to the shooting) had a felony record. The NCIC records check was not run by the Sheriff, and there is no record in the Persecutor’s file that shows that the Sheriff ran them (as testified), or not. The check was run by FBI SA Schneider. But, the FBI didn’t arrive on the scene until after the Sheriff, and, purportedly, only to conduct interviews.

There is no record that Varner was ever run that day. Though, if they didn’t know better, they would have run everyone who had weapons, including Varner.

Finally, Foerster, who is a convicted felon, was not run through the system until after 8:00 PM, though I do not have the exact time. So, since Foerster was the alleged target of the shooting, why was he not run until much later? For appearance sake? If Massey was the target, they may have wanted to appear diligent in all respects, and, at least, run Foerster, one of only two witnesses to the “crime”.

A final thought with regard to what appears to be a major screw up; the government first attempted to make it appear that Massey had no right, under Texas law, to be on the Sabal Palms property with a weapon. Obviously, they were unaware that he had just come from reaching an agreement with Mr. Aguilar that did allow that land to be included in the “premises”, according to Texas law. Via sworn testimony, they attempted to convert “public” land to be construed as any land the public can go on, and apply that construction to a private nature preserve, Sabal Palms.

I’m certain there are many more facts that have been withheld from the defense, and I am equally certain that as those facts are eventually produced, the likelihood of Prosecutor Hagen receiving an Award from Department of Justice for successful prosecution is about as remote as his chances of going to Heaven.

Wolf Trap – Keep Your Trap Shut

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
April 15, 2015

In this day and age, no one knows any one’s phone number. They either click the name, or speak the name into the phone. So, what happens when your phone is taken away, and then you get to make a phone call from a detention center?

Wolf was arrested in March 26. We found out about the arrest that day, and that he was detained at the Yellowstone County Detention Facility. It appears to be a county run, rather than a contracted facility; however, their phone system is quite profitable for the contractor. A collect call from an inmate costs $3.75 for the first minute and then a $1.00 each additional minute, with calls limited to 20 minutes. However, if they have money in their Commissary Account, they only pay 35¢ per minute, same limit.

Wolf received my Priority Mail envelope on Monday, March 30, and, since my letterhead had a phone number, he called me, beginning our communication. He understood what I had asked, answered some of the questions I posed, promised to provide a written account of the incident that led up to and culminated in his arrest on federal charges. We also discussed a legal maneuver, the Demand for Habeas Corpus (See Habeas Corpus – The Guardian of Liberty) and exactly how to proceed with it. He affirmed that he had executed the Power of Attorney, and he knew exactly how to proceed the next time he was in front of a judge. Undoubtedly, the call was recorded or monitored, so I’m sure that they were privy to our objective. It appears, however, that it took a couple of days for the jailers to get instructions, find somebody to make a decision, or otherwise decide that he should no longer be able to communicate with those outside. Our last phone call was Thursday, April 2.

He had asked that I pass messages on to R, T, C, and N, which I did, immediately after our first conversation. R was in communication with him and made sure that there was money in his commissary, so he was able to call out until April 2. In addition, he assured me, on the 2nd, that the written account would be sent as soon as he could get an envelope and stamps.

After contacting R and others, I found was not the only one who had received no mail or phone calls from Wolf. I decided that I wanted to shake some things up. I wrote a letter and for tracking purposes, sent it Priority Mail. For the purpose of this article, the pertinent portion of the communication is as follows:

April 10, 2015

I called the detention center and all they could tell me was that you had money in the commissary fund, which means that unless something untoward has occurred, I should have heard from you, as should T & R have heard.

This is rather concerning, and I think that you can understand why. So, here is what we/I will do.

I will expect a phone call from you the day that you receive this letter. If I do not hear, in a reasonable amount of time, there are two assumptions that I can make.

First, that you are holding out communicating, perhaps hoping that we, outside, will react, and act. This is not going to happen. We have a remedy, or two, and I fully expect that there will be a resolution. However, that would lead me to take the third step, which, if nothing else, would be rather embarrassing to you when the truth came out.

Second, it is possible that they have put you in a hole and incommunicado. I would not be surprised at this, as I have heard from a couple of attorneys working on federal matters (you know who they represent) that have decided that, to be kind, I am no friend to them. It seems in the second matter, they have gotten blowback that they never expected. We should find out, soon, what the consequences are. If, however, they have treated you in the manner suggested, that also moves me to step three. This would result in extreme embarrassment on the part of both the Detention Facility and the federal yahoos. And, because of the recent Texas story, MSM may be beginning to listen to us.

So, what is step three? Quite simply, I contact Billings Gazette, other local newspapers, and some local radio and television stations, and explain that they have put you in a black hole and incommunicado. Absent charges, bail, or any information on you. It will fare poorly for the responsible party. I would not want to be in their shoes.

I’m sure that my articles on the subject will elicit additional participation by my hundreds of followers (I will give them all of the appropriate contact information).

So, you (those reading this communication) are advised.

Priority Mail tracking indicated that it was delivered to the mailbox on Monday, April 13. This time, I heard nothing and have no idea whether they had violated federal postal laws (remember, he has yet to be officially charged with a crime) and refused to give him my letter. I still do not have an answer to that question.

However, he managed to get a call out to V, Tuesday, April 14, morning. V then advised us, via email, of the rather cryptic communication received from Wolf, which reads as follows:

Wolf called me this morning from YCDF.
He said he is under a communication block – his mail is being read, mail comes without envelopes, and they won’t let him have any mailing out material,
He said that “thing from his regular guest” will probably be blocked. I don’t know anymore and he didn’t explain any more.
He said he isn’t charged yet, and no bond. He’s being blocked from access to his Attorney in Fact.
Sorry his was so cryptic, but I’ve tried to relay it the way he said it.

The “thing from the regular guest” is, of course, the Habeas Corpus. The Attorney in Fact is the same as the preparer of the Habeas Corpus.

I spoke with V and he informed me that Wolf said that since he had called V, V would now be put on the “blocked” list — no longer able to be called. Why he was allowed to call anyone is surely a question to be answered. Is it possible they can block calls without cause? Is it possible that calls are monitored for content? Has Wolf been given a list of prohibited content? Or, do they just make the shit up as they go?

On a more positive note, early this afternoon, R received mail with the executed “Memorandum in support of Habeas Corpus”, the Power of Attorney, and the long awaited account of Wolf’s side of the story. This was accomplished only because Wolf managed to find someone to mail out for him what the Detention Facility would not allow him to mail out.

What is abundantly clear is that though he was arrested on March 26, he has told me that he insisted on a Grand Jury Indictment, in accordance with the Constitution. “They” said that the case would go before a Grand Jury, though we do not know when. He is being held, without bond and without charges, as shown on the YCDF inmate search page. With his last name, “Wolf”, in the search box, you get this:

Then clicking either his name or the “Charges” link, you get this:

So, Wolf has been held in jail for 20 days, without charges and no bail set. Though he initially had some communication privileges (incoming mail and phone, but no outgoing mail), those have been curtailed to no privileges, at all, unless he can continue to devise means to communicate. If the pattern holds, and he is only able to make one call to a person, who is then blocked, then it cannot be even remotely considered communication. The only thing missing is a damp, dark dungeon.

Update – April 14, 2015: Wolf has directed the documents that he was supposed to send me, and a letter, through the Defense Attorney that has been assigned to him. He has managed to circumvent the restrictions, at least to some degree. That would suggest that he still has his spirit up and is not yielding to their attempts at intimidation. However, and I agree with him, he did say, “They will not win!” More on this, later.

Government’s job is to govern the Government,
Not to govern the People.

Wolf Trap – The Setup

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
April 14, 2015

On March 26, 2015, a Montana radio host, William Wolf, was arrested by the FBI (not the BATF) in violation of 18 US Code §922 (o)

(o)           (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun.

(2) This subsection does not apply with respect to—

(A) a transfer to or by, or possession by or under the authority of, the United States or any department or agency thereof or a State, or a department, agency, or political subdivision thereof; or
(B) any lawful transfer or lawful possession of a machinegun that was lawfully possessed before the date this subsection takes effect.

The “machine gun” in question may have been legal, until modified by the FBI, as explained in the Criminal Complaint. So, let’s look at some of the information gleaned from the Complaint (underlining, mine):

During [a] meeting [September 30, 2014], Wolf expressed interest in CHS [Ed Gray] introducing Wolf to a former colleague who could possibly provide technical or monetary assistance in building the gun [this would be a flame throwing gun that had previously been mentioned].

Yes, the informant was Ed Gray. I got this information directly from Wolf, before communications were cut off — but that is another story.

On October 10, 2014, a CHS [Confidential Human Source – Ed Gray] introduced Wolf to the colleague, who in actuality was a FBI undercover employee (“UCE”).

Gray brought his agent (handler) in to meet Wolf.

At one point during [a] meeting [December 18, 2014], the UCE stated to Wolf that he would ask his contacts about acquiring a flamethrower for Wolf. Wolf immediately replied, “Try to get me a Russian automatic shotgun too.”

[In a footnote] The possession of the type of flamethrower described by Wolf to the UCE is not regulated under the laws of the United States and thus would not violate federal law to possess such a device.

According to Wolf, the offer was made and then he made the request.

The FBI acquired a firearm with the specifications desired by Wolf—i.e., a Saiga-12 fully-automatic shotgun with a shortened military grade barrel. FBI Headquarters modified a semi-automatic Saiga-12 gauge shotgun to a fully- automatic with a shortened barrel.

So, the FBI manufactured an Automatic shotgun from a Semi-automatic shotgun.

The CHS stated that in addition to the $600.00 previously arranged for by the UCE [Ed Gray], an additional $125.00 was necessary due to the conversion of the shotgun to fully automatic. Wolf agreed to the pay the extra $125.00 for the conversion.

So, now the cost, since they couldn’t come up with what the said they could, goes from $600 to $725. not really significant, except with regard to detail.

The UCE informed Wolf that his “supplier” was a Class III dealer and had converted the firearm from semi-automatic to full- automatic, to which Wolf acknowledged.

On March 26, Wolf took possession of the shotgun and,

Wolf then paid the UCE $720.00 for the firearm and took possession of it from the UCE. Wolf placed the encased firearm into his vehicle. Wolf was then taken into custody by the FBI without incident.

There is that picky detail. The bill was for $725, according to the previous agreement. The UCE only got $720. I suppose that they were so excited that they were wetting their pants because the managed to entrap Wolf, or, they just aren’t concerned with details in their reports.

The Complaint then ends with the:

CONCLUSION

Based on the information contained in this Affidavit, there is probable cause to believe that William Krisstofer Wolf knowingly possessed a machine gun, in violation 18 U.S.C. § 922(o).

First, let’s look at what they did and question the legality, and then at why they did it, and question the legality.

What They Did

As I understand it, if I wanted to purchase a machine gun and went to a gun store operated by a Class III licensee, he would hand me some paperwork for a background check and some paperwork for the Class III license. I would complete the forms and return them to him. He would then submit the forms to BATF and if the background came back clean, then the Class III license would probably also be issued.

However, if I went to the same gun store and said that I wanted to purchase a machine gun, and they said that will be $725 dollars, and if he didn’t require me to complete any paperwork, background check or Class III license application, I must assume that I am in compliance, as it is his legal responsibility to take the aforementioned steps to comply with his license. If I accepted that offer, he then took my money and handed me the machine gun, I would have satisfied every obligation placed upon me by a federal licensee.

The UCE was presented as, and did not deny, that he was a Class III licensee. So, who is the criminal party?

But, let’s assume that there is exception to 18 US Code §922 (o) (posted above). Well, there are two exceptions. The second exempts anybody who had acquired the machine gun prior to effective date of the rule.

The interesting one, however, and reading it with full regard to the punctuation (we are still a nation of laws, not of man, I presume), we can see that it says, as the first exemption (ellipsis … connotes words omitted for clarification):

(A) a transfer… by… the authority of the United States or any agency thereof…

So, if it was transferred by an agency of the United States, it is exempt, as per §922 (o) (2) (B). However, if as was represented by Ed Gray, that UCE was a Class III licensee, then it is not exempt, however, the guilty party (criminal) is not the one that relied upon the licensee, rather it is the licensee who violated the conditions of his license and the federal rules. This doesn’t even venture into who modified a semi-automatic rifle into an automatic, and whether he was properly (legally) authorized to do so.

That aside, though very significant, we can still rely upon the Complaint to determine what the focus of their efforts was — the motive for the set up and entrapment. After all, we all know that every crime has a motive. It is the government’s motive we are pursuing, for if there was a subsequent crime resulting from the government’s crime, which one is more important for us to concern ourselves with?

Why They Did It

Wolf made clear in his various meetings and radio shows what he thought of the government, which most of us already see as a bit out of hand. So, in one radio show, beginning back in November 2013, he presented his purpose,

to educate the public on how to counter action at the local, state and federal levels that were viewed as overstepping on constitutional rights… Over the next twelve months, Wolf repeatedly espoused his contempt for local judges, law enforcement, the county attorney, city and county commissioners, and the agents and agencies of the federal government.

Perhaps a bit overbroad in its inclusiveness, but not beyond the sympathies of many. He also called for:

Wolf called for a “restoration of the constitutional government.”

and

Wolf stated on multiple occasions that he considered agents of the government (local, state, or federal) to be the true enemy to the American people.

In a July 2014 radio show,

Wolf asked his program listeners “Are you willing to attempt a restoration of our constitutional government? Because that is what we are going to do.

And, in a December 18, 2014

Wolf described his plan to conduct a meeting in late January 2015 for the purpose of educating the public about “committees of safety.” Wolf viewed these committees of safety as the last peaceful method to address his grievances with the government.

So, though he referred to the historical Committees of Safety, and is seeking a peaceful solution, they seem to be offended by the function of Committees of Safety being the means of peaceful redress of grievances and the right of self-defense, and the defense of others.

Obviously, they don’t like the way the Wolf talks about dealing with the problem, and they can’t charge him with sedition, nor can the charge him with unlawful speech, so they have committed criminal acts against him in order to entrap him into committing acts which may appear criminal, though, as explained above, are not.

Camp Lone Star – Act Two: The Contradictions
Scene 3: To Be, or Not to Be – Forthright

Gary Hunt
Outpost of Freedom
April 14, 2015

In Act One: The Government Charade, Judge Hanen graciously gave Prosecuting Attorney Hagen, the opportunity to respond to the Motions to Suppress and Dismiss, in greater detail, since he had failed to address some of the points presented in Mr. Sorola’s motions. The deadline for the response was April 10. So, we anxiously awaited that filing to see if Hagen could dig out of the hole he had created for himself, with his prosecution (persecution?) of K. C. Massey.

Well, I received a copy of Government’s Supplementary Response To Motion Suppress And Motion To Dismiss Indictment, on Friday, April 10. Now, it is typical of the “case law” method, which, well, let’s use the description of Teddy Roosevelt’s thoughts on this method, from the book “Bully Pulpit”, by Doris Kearns Goodwin. Case law method was developed at Harvard in 1872. “Though the pleasure he took in his studies is amply expressed in his journal, he was troubled that ‘some of the teaching of the law books and of the classroom seemed to me to be against justice.’ He noted critically that ‘we are concerned with [the] question of what law is, not what it ought to be.'” So, like Teddy, we are stuck with “what law is, not what it ought to be.”

Hagen’s Response addresses a number of higher court opinions, both Supreme and appellate, though we will only be looking at those opinions of the Supreme Court. So, let’s look at just how Mr. Hagen attempts to extricate himself from that hole. At this time, we will only address the Response to the Motion to Suppress.

First, he addresses the Motion to Suppress Evidence. In so doing, he lists the following:

(i) Defendant was observed carrying a rifle and that observation was made prior to any alleged search or stop;
(ii) Defendant was asked for his identification by law enforcement in the course of investigating a shooting involving a federal agent;
(iii) Defendant was detained after the shooting occurred as potential witnesses;
(iv) Defendant’s firearms were seized to protect both law enforcement and civilian witnesses; and,
(v) Defendant’s possession of two firearms was in violation of both state and federal law.

Regarding (i), this was discussed in the previous article. If the act was criminal, why did the government not arrest Massey when the observation was made? The answers rests on identification of Massey and determination of his status, none of which would have occurred had the “stop” or “detention” not occurred. Should we “cooperate” with law enforcement if going about our daily lives might result in subjecting ourselves to directed persecution? In this case, the shooter, in violation of both law and policy, and, the subject of the “investigation”, goes free, while the non-witness is subsequently arrested. One has to wonder if this whole thing was a set up to “get Massey”.

Regarding (ii) & (iii), that, too, was addressed in the previous post. Someone who, like the “investigator”, Cantu, had no more information than Cantu had, until Cantu received a radio message and passed that same information on to Massey, does not really qualify as a witness to anything. This leaves the question of “stop” or “detention” open, and that will be discussed shortly.

Regarding (iv), Foerster, Massey, and Varner, all retained their weapons, posing no threat, as testified to by Cantu. Subsequently, the decision was made, by persons unknown, that the weapons should be “secured”. “Seized”, as described in the Response, has no relationship to the testimony.

Regarding (v), here comes a problem, with Hagen’s comprehension skills. He quotes Texas Penal Code, as follows:

Texas Penal Code § 46.04 Unlawful Possession of Firearm

(a) A person who has been convicted of a felony commits an offense if he possess a firearm:

(1) After conviction and before the fifth anniversary of the persons release from confinement following conviction of the felony or the person’s release from supervision under community supervision, parole, or mandatory supervision, whichever date is later; or

(2) After the period described by Subdivision (1), at any location other than the premises at which the person lives.

So, it says, in the singular, that he is in violation “if he possess a firearm”, before the fifth anniversary. Are we to assume that if he possesses more than one firearm, he is exempt from violation? It says nothing about any limitation after the fifth anniversary. Except, perhaps, in some secret version of Texas law that Hagen has hidden in his drawers.

Now, if Hagen is suggesting that Massey was not at “the premises at which the person lives”, the government also already stated that Massey had been at Camp Lone Star for four months. So, can there be any doubt as to where he lived at the time of this incident? The purpose of this provision is, without doubt, to provide the means for protecting the “premise”. Does that preclude someone from going on to his neighbor’s property, with that neighbor’s permission, to provide for that protection?

However, we can put that all aside, as Massey is not charged with violation of state law, Hagen has charged him with violation of federal law. The Sheriff’s Office has not chosen to file charges against Massey in their jurisdiction, so that makes Hagen’s argument somewhere on the other side of moot.

So, let’s look at the Supreme Court decisions that Hagen has cited to defend his position. First is Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court Nevada 542 US 177. He argues that “A police officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment“.

So, let’s see what Hiibel says:

At 177, setting the background of the case, it says, “Petitioner Hiibel was arrested and convicted in a Nevada court for refusing to identify himself to a police officer during an investigative stop involving a reported assault. Nevada’s “stop and identify” statute requires a person detained by an officer under suspicious circumstances to identify himself.”

At 184, we find “Here there is no question that the initial stop was based on reasonable suspicion, satisfying the Fourth Amendment requirements noted in Brown.“

Then finally, at 185, the pages cited by Hagen, we find, “Asking questions is an essential part of police investigations. In the ordinary course a police officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment. “‘[I]nterrogation relating to one’s identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.”… the Court has recognized that a law enforcement officer’s reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate further.“

So, just what were the “suspicious circumstances”, or “reasonable suspicion”, that existed on August 29, 2014, on the Sabal Palms property? Perhaps Hagen should be instructing BPS, FBI, and others, as to what is required to “investigate” and require that one identify himself, absent the criteria established by the Supreme Court. I suppose that we could also ask Mr. Hagen what the difference is between and “interview”, as described in testimony, and, “interrogation”, as cited in this case.

Then, he cites INS v. Delgado 466 US 210. He does not, however, provide any quotation from that case, so I suppose that quantity rather than quality might be his motivation, here. So, to put a context on the current situation, I will provide the quotations. This case refers to whether INS could profile by asking questions of employees being suspected of being illegal aliens. So, here is what the cited page, 216, tells us:

In contrast, a much different situation prevailed in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), when two policemen physically detained the defendant to determine his identity, after the defendant refused the officers’ request to identify himself. The Court held that absent some reasonable suspicion of misconduct, the detention of the defendant to determine his identity violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure.

Unless the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded, one cannot say that the questioning resulted in a detention under the Fourth Amendment.

So, the Court has given us a situation, and then concludes, “Unless… a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded”, then the questioning was not a detention. However, Hagen as argued that this was a “stop” (Terry Stop), not a detention, and there is no doubt that when Massey “cooperated” in providing his identification, he had already been told that there was an investigation and that he could not leave.

Next, he cites United States v. Sharpe 470 US 675. At least he provides a context, and page (685), though, again, no quotation. So, we will begin at 684:

In that case, law enforcement agents stopped the defendant after his arrival in an airport and seized his luggage for 90 minutes to take it to a narcotics detection dog for a “sniff test.” We decided that an investigative seizure of personal property could be justified under the Terry doctrine, but that “[t]he length of the detention of respondent’s luggage alone precludes the conclusion that the seizure was reasonable in the absence of probable cause.”

And, at the cited page 685:

While it is clear that “the brevity of the invasion of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion,” we have emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes.

So, in the first instance, a stop of 90 minutes was unreasonable, absent “probable cause”. And, in the second, there was an “invasion of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests”, rests upon “reasonable suspicion”. They speak of “seizure”. That is what the Prosecution has claimed, and maintained by continue to retain, all of the firearms, except Varner’s. But, they were not “seized”, according to testimony. They were “secured” for Officer Safety.

Okay, just one more. This is United States v. Leon 468 US 897. Though no quotations are given, he points out that Rotunno, the agent who swore to the accuracy of the information used to secure the various Warrants and Criminal Complaint, was present neither at the shooting incident investigation on August 29, nor at the arrest on October 20, 2014. Quite simply, Rotunno “fabricated” (that is a polite form of lying) an important element of what happened on August 29, which implied that Foerster, and Foerster, alone, might have committed a criminal act by “pointing: his firearm at Gonzales. Massey and Varner were innocent parties to the entire episode. So, Hagen’s assertion might apply to Foerster, but the great leap to envelope Massey in his web is without any lawful or legal merit.

That doesn’t however, remove us from consideration of what the court said in U. S, v Leon.

In this case, a warrant was issued based upon observations during a drug trafficking investigation, by law enforcement officers. There was nothing illegal about the observations, nor were there misrepresentations, or outright lies, in the affidavit that resulted in the warrant.

The court held that “Application of the exclusionary rule should continue where a Fourth Amendment violation has been substantial and deliberate, but the balancing approach that has evolved in determining whether the rule should be applied in a variety of contexts – including criminal trials – suggests that the rule should be modified to permit the introduction of evidence obtained by officers reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate.”

Further, that “the courts must also insist that the magistrate purport to perform his neutral and detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police… However the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.”

And, that “A police officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable. Suppression remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth, or if the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his detached and neutral judicial role.”

So, though even Foerster may find relief by this decision, Massey was nothing more than a bystander in the events of August 29, and nothing conjured by Hagen can change that relationship. There was never the requisite probable cause, suspicion, or any other factor, that would ensnare Massey in this web. It is only Hagen’s desire to please those “up the river” that forces him to persist in the persecution of K. C. Massey.

Now, I realize that what was just stated might be considered by some to be overstepping the bounds of propriety. However, we must not detach ourselves from the reality that we are constantly presented with the excuse that, “there are only a few bad cops”. We have learned, over time that “few” is a gross misrepresentation of reality.

Let us simply refresh our minds with a recent event wherein an innocent man spent thirty years on Death Row. He was released when his innocence was final acknowledged. His innocence was known by the Prosecutor, from the very beginning. That Prosecutor, Marty Stroud, has repented. Marty Stroud is demonstrative of the subject of the book, “Three Felonies a Day”, by Harvey A. Silverglate, in which the objective is to obtain a conviction, regardless of guilt, and to distort the wording of the law to achieve that end.